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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores the complex web of social relations created by the use of donor 
insemination (DI) in Aotearoa/New Zealand.  The experiences of pursuing parenthood 
and creating a family using this method of assisted conception are contextualised 
through attention to the practices of Donor Insemination Programmes and the 
discourses used by parents, their families and health professionals. Sociologists and 
other social scientists have drawn attention to the social and cultural consequences of 
the fragmentation of biological/genetic, gestational and social parenting that follows 
the use of third party gametes.  This thesis explores the implications of these 
procreative arrangements for the meanings attached to cultural concepts such as 
‘kinship’, ‘family’, and ‘parenthood’. Variation in the way these families respond to 
issues associated with the use of donor sperm in the conception of a child is also 
highlighted. The thesis also explores the dominant discourse in the New Zealand 
context of children’s ‘right’ to know their genetic origins, and how this is played out 
in the perceptions and actions of health professionals, parents of children conceived 
by DI and their kin. 
 
The research is exploratory and qualitative, drawing on semi-structured interviews 
with parents, grandparents, aunts and uncles of children conceived by DI, and with 
health professionals working in DI programmes. The inclusion of the perspectives of 
extended family members and health professionals constitutes a unique contribution 
to research on families with children conceived by DI. The secrecy, anonymity and 
confidentiality that have surrounded DI practices have long hindered the study of 
families with children conceived by DI. Despite a trend towards information-sharing 
in DI in New Zealand, the thesis shows that for these families, patterns of secrecy and 
disclosure are complex, variable and embedded in particular social and relational 
contexts. 
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PART ONE 
 
Setting the Scene 
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Chapter One 
Contextualising Conception 
 
Whereas “the birds and the bees” described a natural process, inaccessible to human intervention, 
occurring deep inside the woman’s body, and unfolding according to the laws of nature, the new 
narrative of assisted or achieved conception tells a different story.  This world becomes visible and 
knowable through technological means, creating new forms of accessibility to and improvement of 
reproduction (Franklin, 1995:333). 
 
Introduction 
This thesis explores the discourses, relationships and practices associated with the 
conception of a child or children through donor insemination. Donor insemination (DI) is 
the most commonly used form of third party conception1 in the field of assisted human 
reproduction (AHR).  Although usually considered one of the ‘new’ reproductive 
technologies, the use of DI as a medical ‘treatment’2 for male factor infertility has a 
relatively long history, dating back at least to the turn of the nineteenth century in Europe 
(Bateman Novaes, 1998:108-110). In New Zealand, anecdotal evidence suggests that DI 
has been practised by medical practitioners at least since the 1940s (Watkin, 1998; 
Daniels, 1999a). DI is a relatively simple procedure compared with other more ‘high 
tech’ methods of assisted conception. It involves the production of a semen sample from a 
male ‘donor’3 through masturbation. The donated semen is later inseminated into a 
recipient woman through either intracervical insemination (ICI), or intrauterine 
insemination (IUI).  Before the advent of cryopreservation (the ability to freeze living 
tissue, including semen) fresh semen samples were used in the insemination.  Today, 
                                                          
1 Third party reproduction refers to procreative arrangements that involve using the genetic material (sperm 
and/or oocytes or embryos) of persons outside a primary relationship.  For example, a couple who is 
intending to have a child, but who is unable to provide the viable sperm and/or eggs (gametes) themselves, 
may opt to use gametes provided by an anonymous donor or a person known to them. 
2 Whether DI can legitimately be considered a ‘treatment’ for infertility is debatable.  It does not cure 
infertility, and the person with the problem (the male) is not the one who is ‘treated’. While infertility is 
defined as a ‘couple’ problem by the medical profession (Dickens, 1990:23-24), the female body becomes 
the focus of fertility treatment which is carried out with the aim of assisting a couple to achieve the goal of 
conception and the birth of a child.  See Chapter Six for a discussion of DI as a ‘treatment’ for male factor 
infertility. 
3 Inverted commas are used here because it is not always clear whether gametes have literally been given 
without financial recompense, or whether financial incentives were involved in their procurement.  See 
discussion on the use of language in this thesis appearing later in this chapter.  See also Chapter Five for 
discussion on the construction of the provision of semen as a gift.   
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however, regulatory bodies such as the Reproductive Technologies Accreditation 
Committee (RTAC), the accrediting body for Australian and New Zealand fertility 
clinics, require that cryopreserved semen only be used in DI.4
 
The use of DI as a means of conception needs to be considered in the wider context of 
AHR generally.  Developments in the field of AHR, particularly since the birth in 1978 of 
the first baby conceived by in vitro fertilisation (IVF), have introduced unprecedented 
scientific/technological possibilities for conceiving and bearing children. Medical science 
has not only enabled the separation of biological reproduction from sexual relations; 
human conception now has been achieved outside the human body.  Moreover, the use of 
third party gametes in assisted conception introduces further complexities by enabling the 
splitting of male and female reproductive roles.  As a result, at the extreme, the possibility 
exists for a child to have five individual parents, instead of the ‘usual’ two.5 Use of these 
reproductive technologies has therefore added new social and cultural dimensions to the 
meaning both of human procreation and of family and parental roles.  As discussed in 
Chapter Three, ‘old’ assumptions about the ‘natural’ processes of procreation can no 
longer be taken for granted as the foundation of kin relations and the formation of 
families (Strathern, 1992b). 
 
Medically-assisted forms of conception using third party gametes include donor DI, egg 
donation, embryo donation and surrogacy.  Although these methods of reproduction 
constitute a very small part of all AHR, and a fraction of all human births, their existence 
is nonetheless highly problematic and controversial because they challenge foundational 
understandings about human reproduction, and the formation of families. Consequently, 
the possibilities afforded by these reproductive arrangements have far-reaching social 
implications, not only for the families created in this way, but for all people, including the 
state.  
 
                                                          
4 See RTAC Guidelines, Attachment J, 12.1, in Appendix D. 
5 Assisted conception using the gametes of third parties expands the possibilities of the number of ‘parents’ 
a child may have. For example, in the case of surrogacy, five ‘parents’ may be involved in the procreation 
and subsequent rearing of a child:  sperm donor, egg donor, gestational mother, social father and social 
mother.  In this case, the first three persons are constituted as having genetic or biological ties to the child, 
and the ‘social’ or adoptive parents as having social but not genetic/biological ties to the child. As 
discussed throughout this thesis, biological, social and legal parenthood can be separated or combined.  See 
Chapter Eleven for a discussion of parenthood in the context of DI. 
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The moral, ethical and legal issues that arise as a result of the social complexities that 
emerge from third party reproduction have been strongly debated in twentieth century 
western society.  The new social dimensions have long been recognised within ethics, law 
and theology, and governments have largely sought their enlightenment on the possible 
consequences of AHR from these sources (Stacey, 1992).  The Catholic Church takes the 
position that the use of third party gametes in AHR is morally wrong, on the basis that it 
intrudes a third party into the ‘sacred’ domain of marriage (Lauritzen, 1993).  Critics of 
DI have likened the practice to adultery and question the ethics of the production of 
semen used in DI through masturbation.  Speculation about the ethics of using DI arises 
in connection with the possible harm it might cause the parties who participate in these 
reproductive arrangements (Alpern, 1992).  Other ethical concerns revolve around the 
moral status of human gametes and zygotes (fertilised eggs), the ethics of embryo 
research, and issues concerning the potential commodification of human life through the 
commercialisation of reproductive services, most notably, commercial surrogacy, and the 
sale of human gametes (Wasserman and Wachbroit, 1992). 
 
The law plays an important role in regulating and controlling AHR in different societies.  
Legal debates about AHR concern major social issues such as the legal status of the 
parents and the children that are born as an outcome of third party reproduction.  High-
profile court cases contesting the custody of children born through surrogacy 
arrangements6 have highlighted the concerns about filiation, or parentage, that emerge 
(Shenfield, 1994), and whether such procreative arrangements are in the ‘best interests’ of 
the children so born (Heyl, 1988). Legislation in the United Kingdom and New Zealand 
has helped to clarify the status of the child born through third party reproduction.  The 
legal status of the child conceived through DI was clarified in English law by the Family 
Law Reform Act 1987, and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (Morgan 
and Lee, 1991).  The latter Act stipulates that the consenting husband/partner of the 
woman who is inseminated is to be treated as the father of the resulting child (Morgan 
and Lee, 1991:155).  Children born as a result of DI in circumstances where the 
husband/partner of the woman has not consented to the treatment are considered to be 
legally ‘fatherless’, which is a newly-created class of child (Morgan and Lee, 1991:156).  
                                                          
6 The so-called ‘Baby M’ case in the United States in the late 1980s is the most notable example (Oliver, 
1992). 
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In New Zealand, the Status of Children Amendment Act 1987, the only piece of 
legislation specifically addressing AHR7 (Caldwell and Daniels, 1992), was formulated 
to absolve sperm donors of parental rights and responsibilities, and recognise the 
husband/partner of the recipient woman as the legal father of the child conceived by DI.  
In the case of egg donation, the gestational mother is almost universally recognised as the 
legal mother (Shenfield, 1994).  As discussed where relevant throughout the thesis, many 
other countries have enacted similar legislative provision.  
 
In recent years, social science has been acknowledged as making a valuable contribution 
to shedding light on the social and cultural implications of new reproductive techniques 
(Stacey, 1992).  Contributions to the debates surrounding the use of DI have come from a 
number of social science disciplines including psychology, psychiatry, social work, 
sociology and social anthropology. Psychological studies on the use of DI have included 
studies on the psychological impact of infertility on couples and the types of loss 
associated with it (Adler and Boxley, 1985; Domar, Zuttermeister and Friedman, 1993; 
Mahlstedt, 1994), and the psychological distress associated with fertility treatment and 
treatment failure (Cook et al, 1989; Boivin et al, 1995).  Other studies have focused on 
the psychosocial wellbeing of parents after assisted conception resulting in a multiple 
birth (Colpin et al, 1999); the meaning of parenthood and couples’ reactions to male 
infertility (Edelmann, Humphrey and Owens, 1994); and the psychological issues 
associated with secrecy and disclosure for parents who have conceived by DI (Cook et al, 
1989; Bielawska-Batorowicz, 1994; Klock, Jacob and Maier, 1994; Klock, 1996). 
  
As well as studies of couples, some studies have been undertaken to understand the 
motivation of semen donors (see, for example, Daniels, 1989; Daniels, Lewis and Curson, 
1996; Emond and Scheib, 1998).  The effects on the children born as a result of DI have 
been a more recent focus of attention.  A number of studies were published during the 
1990s that evaluate the social and emotional development of children conceived by DI or 
other reproductive technologies (Golombok, et al, 1995; Chan, Raboy and Patterson, 
1998; Golombok et al, 1999).  Some of these studies also make comparisons between the 
                                                          
7 However, two bills currently before the New Zealand parliament, the Human Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Bill (New Zealand, 1996) and the Assisted Human Reproduction Bill (New Zealand, 1998), 
may enact further legislation in this area (Daniels, 1999a). 
 6
adjustment of children conceived by DI in lesbian-led and heterosexual families (Chan, 
Brooks, Raboy and Patterson, 1998; Chan, Raboy and Patterson, 1998). 
 
Social workers, psychologists and counsellors have increasingly become involved as part 
of the clinical team in DI programmes, and have contributed to the growing literature on 
the psychosocial aspects of DI (Daniels, 1986).  Much of the social workers’ contribution 
has focused on the implications for all the parties involved in third party conception 
including the couple, the donor, the child and the family (Snowden and Mitchell, 1981; 
Snowden, Mitchell and Snowden, 1983; Humphrey and Humphrey, 1988; Daniels, 1991). 
In the 1980s and 1990s, concerns about the long-term psychological effects of secrecy 
about DI on families, and those conceived by DI, led to a growing debate about its 
appropriateness (Snowden, Mitchell and Snowden, 1983; McWhinnie, 1986; Baran and 
Pannor, 1989; Daniels and Taylor, 1993a; Landau, 1998). An increase in pleas for 
openness, or what has become more commonly known in the literature as ‘information-
sharing’, has become evident in these debates (Brewaeys, 1996).8 Daniels and Haimes’ 
edited publication (1998) includes chapters on specific sets of actors in the DI network 
including the ‘users’ of DI, persons conceived by DI, the semen providers, medical and 
regulatory frameworks. This publication encompasses perspectives from a number of 
disciplines including sociology, history, anthropology and social psychology (Daniels and 
Haimes, 1998:3). 
 
Sociologists and other social scientists recognise that assisted reproductive techniques, 
such as DI, are enmeshed in a complex web of social relations.  Some sociologists have 
explored assisted reproduction in relation to biological and social notions of parenthood 
(Achilles, 1986; Haimes, 1992), the meaning of ‘family’ (Haimes, 1990; Achilles, 1993) 
and the ways in which people conceived with the use of donated gametes are represented 
by others (Haimes, 1998).  Sociologists have also examined the social context(s) within 
which gamete donation takes place, including issues of gender in gamete donation 
(Haimes, 1993a) and the construction of ‘infertility’ as both a medical phenomenon and a 
social problem (Bateman Novaes, 1998). These authors have explored the ways in which 
meanings are attached to relationships within families, the language used to describe 
                                                          
8 See Daniels and Taylor (1993a) for a discussion on the issues of secrecy and openness in DI, and other 
authors’ commentaries following in the same publication. 
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assisted reproduction, and the ways in which language usage actively constructs meaning 
and understandings about assisted conception and the different contexts within which this 
occurs.  This thesis extends these discussions, highlighting in particular the uniqueness of 
the New Zealand context and the embeddedness of the experience of infertility and third 
party conception in wider kin relations. 
 
This introductory chapter aims to establish the questions for and focus of this thesis.  The 
following section locates the thesis within the key debates in the literature, emphasising 
the contribution it makes to these debates.  The next section provides a background to the 
international and New Zealand contexts in which DI is practised.  A discussion on the use 
of language and terminology in the thesis follows.  The final section outlines the structure 
of the thesis. 
 
Locating the thesis in the field of AHR 
The primary focus of this thesis is the implications for New Zealand families of having a 
child conceived by DI.  It looks at the way that parents and their kin actively construct 
meaning around family and kin relationships in a situation where they have conceived a 
child with the use of sperm from an unknown donor.  The thesis thus explores the 
meanings attached to cultural concepts such as ‘family’ and related concepts such as 
‘fatherhood’, ‘motherhood’, ‘parenthood’, ‘kinship’ and ‘relatedness’.  The study makes a 
unique contribution to the field by including interviews not only with parents but also 
with extended family members, thereby making an argument that experiences of 
parenting and forming a family through DI are inextricably embedded in wider kin 
relations.   
 
Discussions about ‘family’ and ‘kinship’ raise questions about the merits of studying 
families with children conceived by DI.  This question informed the study from the 
beginning. Stacey (1992) has argued that because the family is a fundamentally important 
social unit in any society, the fact that new reproductive techniques introduce novel ways 
of human conception and family formation warrants their investigation by social 
scientists.  Although the number of people born through third party gamete donation is an 
extremely small percentage of total births (Robertson, 1994), the fact that these 
conceptions present a ‘deviant’ case, and the subsequent questions that this raises for the 
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families involved presents a topic of great social and sociological interest. A study of a 
subgroup of families tells us a great deal about the wider context of family and kinship 
patterns, which, in turn, informs understandings about how our society is organised and 
the extent to which diversity exists within family structures.   
 
This research is also timely because of recent media attention to issues such as the 
posthumous use of semen in assisted reproduction, and also links to other topical and 
controversial issues such as human cloning, genetic testing and stem cell research.  DI 
and other forms of assisted conception continually challenge cultural assumptions about 
what it means to be a ‘parent’ and the meaning of ‘family’.  Novaes (1989) rightly points 
out that as the new procreative techniques become more publicly established, in order to 
achieve social legitimacy, procreative and parental roles will have to be distinguished, 
defined and appropriately recognised.  In her view, a great deal of work remains to be 
done in this area before the practice of using third party gametes in human reproduction 
can become a legitimate, socially acceptable and well understood practice. 
 
By exploring the implications for families and their kin of having a child conceived with 
gametes of an unknown third party, the thesis raises questions about the meaning of 
biogenetic connection not only for parents, but for grandparents, aunts and uncles.  It also 
explores issues relating to the relative importance of biological and social ties, and of 
belonging to a particular family, the significance of biogenetic connection to the 
formation of identity, and how these families perceive themselves in relation to other 
‘types’ of family. 
  
In addition to locating the experience of DI in the wider family context, this thesis also 
provides a unique opportunity to view DI in the context of New Zealand clinical 
practices. The study includes interviews with health professionals working in donor 
programmes in New Zealand.  This group is considered important because, it is argued, 
the cultural context within which health professionals work to ‘make babies’9 has a 
bearing on how family-building through DI is conceptualised and experienced by those 
who conceive children in this way, and by their extended kin. The thesis highlights New 
                                                          
9 This idea comes from the title of a 1998 publication:  Making Babies:  A New Zealand guide to getting 
pregnant produced by members of Fertility Associates, a private fertility clinic in New Zealand. 
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Zealand’s uniqueness as a small country, with a small number of fertility clinics, which 
have adopted an innovative approach to information-sharing in DI.  For the past ten years 
or so, almost all fertility clinics have voluntarily adopted a policy of recruiting only 
semen donors who are prepared to be identified to their DI offspring at a later date.  
 
Health professionals working in New Zealand DI programmes also encourage parents of 
children conceived by DI to tell their children how they were conceived.  This unique 
approach to ‘openness’ was fostered by a socio-political climate that advocated that 
people had the ‘right’ to know their genetic origins.  This belief was written into law in 
the Adult Information Act, 1985, which, for the first time, enabled people who were 
adopted or who had placed their children for adoption, to have access to identifying 
information about their birth parents/children.  Advocacy of openness in adoption and 
assisted conception using third party gametes was also fostered to a large extent by New 
Zealand’s biculturalism, which means that New Zealand Maori cultural perspectives are 
taken into consideration in the formulation of policy and practice in New Zealand society.  
The fundamental importance to Maori of whakapapa, or knowing one’s genealogical 
origins, has therefore been instrumental in the development of the ‘right to know one’s 
genetic origins’ as a dominant discourse in New Zealand society more generally. 
 
Also unique to the New Zealand context is the inclusion of counsellors as central 
members of fertility treatment teams.  This highlights a move away from the biomedical 
model and the adoption of a biopsychosocial model in the context of fertility treatment.  
Clinical treatment teams thus focus not only on the medical problem of circumventing 
infertility, but also actively acknowledge and engage with the psychosocial implications 
of their practices.  Also unique to New Zealand, the adoption of this treatment model and 
a philosophy of openness in New Zealand fertility clinics have preceded legislation in this 
area.  Thus, the formulation of laws currently under consideration to govern AHR 
practices in New Zealand, will follow policies largely already adopted by clinics.  
 
The research and the practices being explored in this study are located in a particular 
socio-political context that impacts both lay and scientific understandings about AHR.  
The thesis therefore argues that because DI can be construed as the medicalisation of 
family building, the discursive and relational strategies employed by health professionals 
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in fertility clinics in the process of setting up relationships between donors and recipient 
families rework meanings attached to family and relatedness. In an environment 
relatively unregulated by legislation, clinicians have power in mediating relationships 
between  parents and donors, donors and DI offspring, and families who share the same 
donors. Clinics therefore set up relationships between families linked in the process of DI 
conceptions, and provide the context in which parents have their first introduction to 
forms of relatedness achieved by DI. Attitudes and beliefs about DI that permeate the 
medical/treatment culture constitute the basis for shared social action (Daniels, 1999b). 
As a result, it is argued that the particular policies and practices of clinics, such as 
advocacy of ‘openness’ and the child’s ‘right to know’ their genetic origins, and the 
construction of semen provision as an ‘altruistic gift’, therefore influence, if not entirely 
determine, the way parents and their wider families will act and relate to each other. 
 
This thesis is primarily located between the disciplines of sociology and anthropology.  
Social anthropological theorising about kinship and relatedness are central to the thesis.  
It draws on the work of anthropologists such as Schneider (1968 [1980]; 1984), and 
Strathern (1992a; 1992b) who have highlighted the centrality of biogenetic connection in 
Euro-American ideas about kinship. In the 1990s, several social anthropologists made a 
significant contribution to the literature on AHR by highlighting the cultural implications 
of the use of reproductive technologies including DI (see, for example, Strathern, 1992a, 
1992b; Edwards, Franklin, Hirsch, Price and Strathern, 1993, 1999; Ginsburg and Rapp, 
1995; Franklin, 1997; Franklin and Ragone, 1998).  As discussed in Chapter Three, these 
authors argue that understandings about the meaning of ‘natural’ procreation have been 
destabilised as a result of the use of reproductive technologies, and that this has 
implications for understandings of kinship and human relatedness. This thesis contributes 
to and extends the discussion of the complex implications of DI and AHR generally for 
the meanings people give to concepts such as ‘family’, ‘parenthood’, ‘fatherhood’ and 
‘kinship’, and challenges the notion that kinship ties emerge straightforwardly out of 
biological ties based on the ‘natural facts’ of life.  
 
In addition to focusing on social anthropological theoretical concerns about kinship, this 
exploratory, qualitative study also contributes to arguments about diversity, change and 
fluidity in contemporary Western families.  Discussion about relatedness in families using 
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DI is framed in this thesis by recent sociological theorising about families that recognises 
family diversity, fluidity and change.  These discussions reject the idea of ‘the family’ as 
a fixed, unitary concept and static societal institution (Morgan, 1996; Silva and Smart, 
1999; Smart and Neale, 1999). The thesis draws on the notion of ‘family practices’ 
(Morgan, 1996) which focuses on the interiority of family relationships, gendered 
practices and adult-child relationships, rather than ‘the family’ as a pre-given structure. 
Discussion and analysis therefore highlight the relational and dynamic aspects of 
families, rather than positing a model of ‘the family’ as a static societal institution.  The 
thesis also engages with an eclectic interdisciplinary literature in relation to particular 
themes. 
 
As outlined in Chapter Two, the thesis is primarily based on the analysis of interview 
material gained from semi-structured interviews with parents of children conceived by 
DI, their extended kin, and health professionals working in two DI programmes in 
fertility clinics in the South Island of New Zealand.  The study is national to the extent 
that research participants were drawn from areas as far south as Southland and as far 
north as the Bay of Plenty.  Analysis of information gained from interviewing people on 
one occasion necessarily provides a ‘snapshot’ view of people’s retrospective perceptions 
of their experience from a particular point in time.  Nevertheless, the richness of the 
interview material is testimony to the depth of insight that people have gained from the 
processes of interpreting their own lives and accounting for their own actions and the 
actions of others. 
 
This sociological study extends the discussion in a field that is under-theorised. The study 
does not attempt to test a theory or develop a theory; rather it draws upon literature both 
within and outside the field of AHR as interpretive and analytical tools. It emerges at a 
time when there is a great deal of interest in ‘family’ and an acknowledgement of the 
variety of family forms that exist in contemporary western societies. This research and 
the practices being explored in this study are located in a particular socio-political context 
which impacts on both lay and scientific understandings about AHR.  Current issues in 
AHR therefore need to be understood in relation to national and international practices 
that are medical, legal and political.  The following section provides background 
information about DI practices both internationally and within the New Zealand context. 
 12
 
Donor insemination:  the international and New Zealand contexts 
The use of DI as a means of circumventing male infertility has a relatively long history in 
the context of AHR. According to Daniels (1998b:78), the first reported use of donor 
sperm in artificial insemination10 occurred in the United States in 1884 though the 
incident was not reported in the medical literature until 1909. As previously mentioned, 
anecdotal reports in New Zealand suggest that some doctors, as early as the 1940s, 
assisted women with infertile husbands to conceive (Watkin, 1998; Daniels 1999a). The 
practice, however, has largely been shrouded in secrecy because of religious, moral and 
legal concerns about this method of conceiving children.  New Zealand’s first recognised 
donor programme was established in 1972 at Auckland’s National Women’s Hospital 
(Watkin, 1998:18; Daniels, 1999a) and similar programmes were also opened in 
Wellington and Christchurch in the 1970s.  Secrecy and anonymity, however, remained 
paramount concerns.  In the attempt to protect the identity of donors, many of whom were 
sourced within medical schools, these early donor programmes kept no records, and 
recipient couples received only minimum information about the donor (such as hair 
colour and eye colour only). 
 
In the 1980s many countries reported increasing use of AID by medical professionals 
(Daniels, 1985).  Ostensibly, this was prompted by social and technological factors 
including advances in gynaecological technology, the decline in numbers of children 
available for adoption, and increased public awareness of AID as a result of growing 
media attention to the issues and controversies surrounding the practice (Daniels, 
1985:235).  Despite growing use of this form of conception internationally, DI continued 
to be performed in an ad hoc manner within an unregulated environment.  To preserve 
anonymity between the parties to a DI conception, few practitioners kept records of 
inseminations which could link donors and recipient families, and recipient couples were 
advised to keep the nature of their child’s conception a secret, even from the child 
him/herself.   
 
                                                          
10 Until recently, DI was commonly known as artificial insemination by donor (AID). The reasons for the 
shift in terminology are explored in the next section of this chapter which examines language usage related 
to AHR. 
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Internationally, it is difficult to ascertain the extent of the use of DI and the numbers of 
children born, and how many families include a member born through DI, because few 
countries maintain statistics on DI.  According to Daniels and Haimes (1998:2), Britain 
and France are the only countries that maintain accurate DI statistics. In 1994, 1,805 
babies were reported to have been conceived through DI in the United Kingdom and, in 
1991, 1,777 babies were born in France after DI ‘treatment’ (Daniels and Haimes, 
1998:2).  Other countries, such as Australia, New Zealand and the United States, collect 
data on AHR, but separate statistics on DI are not included. Estimates are made: for 
example, Daniels (1985) estimated that one child a week born in New Zealand was 
conceived as a result of DI. 
 
Much of the language used in relation to AHR has stressed its technological aspects, 
highlighting the dominance of the scientific/technological/medical professions in the field 
(e.g. in vitro fertilisation (IVF), artificial insemination by donor (AID), and assisted 
reproductive technologies (ART)).  Human reproduction using assisted reproductive 
techniques was, and still is, seen as a way of reproducing ‘artificially’, as opposed to 
‘naturally’. According to Bateman Novaes (1998:108), the abbot and scientist Lazzaro 
Spallanzani (1729-1799) carried out initial experiments in the artificial insemination of 
frogs and dogs to determine the role of eggs and the ‘little animals’ (sperm) in semen in 
reproduction.  Early accounts in the literature refer to ‘Artificial Impregnation’, ‘Artificial 
Insemination’ or ‘Human Artificial Insemination’, the latter differentiating it from 
artificial insemination of other animals.  References were also made to the ‘Artificial 
Family’11.  The terms ‘artificial insemination by husband (AIH), and ‘artificial 
insemination by donor’ (AID) were widely used, and still are to some extent, to refer to 
the medicalised procedure of inseminating a woman with either her partner’s sperm, or 
the sperm of a donor. 
 
Some changes in terminology usage have occurred as a consequence of increasing debate 
about the social implications of assisted procreation, and with the increasing contribution 
                                                          
11 These terms were taken from articles and books as follows:   Hard, A.D. (1909) Artificial Impregnation. 
Medical World, 27:163; Lamson, H.D., Pinard, W. J., and Meaker, S.R. (1951) Sociological and 
Psychological Aspects of Artificial Insemination with Donor Semen. Journal of the American Medical 
Association, 1:14; Kraus, J and Quinn, PE (1977) Human Artificial Insemination:  Some Social and Legal 
Issues, Medical Journal of Australia, 1:19; Snowden, R & Mitchell, G.D. (1981). The Artificial Family.  
London:  George Allen & Unwin. 
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of the social sciences to the field.  More recently, for example, the term ‘artificial’ 
appears to have lost favour, particularly with social scientists, as the most useful or 
accurate way of assigning meaning to new medicalised ways of conceiving a child with 
the aim of creating a family.  The term ‘artificial reproduction’ has therefore been 
replaced with terminology such as ‘assisted human reproduction’ (AHR), ‘assisted 
conception’ or ‘assisted procreation’.  Similarly, artificial insemination by donor, or AID, 
has been replaced by the term ‘donor insemination’, or the acronym DI. A variety of 
factors appear to have contributed to this language, for example, the move towards using 
‘people first’ language in a bid to acknowledge the people involved in these procreative 
arrangements.  Moreover the shift from using the acronym AID was advocated to 
differentiate it from AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome). 
 
Growing developments in the broad field of AHR over the past two decades have raised 
concerns in many countries about the need to formulate policy and legislative frameworks 
to govern its use. The development of public policy and legislation concerning the use of 
DI therefore needs to be seen in the context of policy on AHR more generally.  Both 
internationally and in New Zealand, this process has been somewhat ad hoc and 
piecemeal.  Questions continually arise as to how much state control should be exercised 
in the area of AHR, and mechanisms used to address the ethical, legal, and political issues 
raised in this context vary between countries (Blank, 1998). Initiatives to regulate DI 
have primarily come out of reports of various commissions and committees established 
by governments to report on the complex issues associated with AHR.  These include the 
Warnock Committee in Britain (1984), the Waller Committee in Australia, and the Baird 
Commission in Canada (1993)  (Blank, 1998:139).   
 
In New Zealand, increasing concerns about the moral, legal and social implications 
afforded by new reproductive techniques, and the lack of a regulatory framework, fuelled 
developments in this area in the mid-1980s.  In 1984, a powerful professional group, 
representing the Royal Society of New Zealand, the New Zealand Law Society, the 
Medical Council of New Zealand and the New Zealand Medical Association, lobbied the 
government to appoint a standing committee to consider the legal, moral and social issues 
arising from IVF, artificial insemination and related ‘new birth technologies’ (Daniels 
and Hargreaves, 1997:2).  The group believed that a review of AHR and a monitoring 
 15
process was necessary (Coney and Else, 1999).  The birth of New Zealand’s first ‘test-
tube’ baby at National Women’s Hospital was announced in the same year.  Also in 1984, 
the first survey to determine the extent of the practice of AID was carried out in New 
Zealand (Daniels, 1985). This survey revealed a diversity of views and practices among 
practitioners. For example, of the 20 obstetricians and gynaecologists who responded to 
the survey, 9 (45%) thought it desirable that a child conceived through AID be told of 
his/her origins; 30% thought it undesirable; and a quarter (25%) were unsure whether or 
not it was better for the child to be told (Daniels, 1985:237).  The same study revealed 
that seven practitioners (35%) kept no records that could link a donor and a recipient 
couple, and six (30%) set no limit on the number of children to be conceived per donor 
(Daniels, 1985; Coney and Else, 1999:4). 
 
In 1985, the first action by the New Zealand government with regard to addressing the 
issues relating to AHR took place.  The Law Reform Division of the New Zealand Justice 
Department published an issues paper, New Birth Technologies, which aimed at 
encouraging New Zealanders to decide on acceptable options in this area, and to make 
submissions (Department of Justice, 1985).  A follow-up document, of the same name, 
summarising the 164 submissions received was published the following year (Department 
of Justice, 1986).  Almost a quarter of the submissions referred to the need for a 
‘watchdog committee’ to oversee assisted reproductive technologies (ART) in New 
Zealand (Daniels and Hargreaves, 1997; Coney and Else, 1999:4).  However, the author 
of the 1986 Justice Department report noted that there was no consensus on the status and 
purposes of such a committee (Department of Justice, 1986).  According to Daniels and 
Hargreaves (1997), this was perhaps understandable given the lack of consultation 
between the various groups and individuals involved. 
 
In response to the submissions received, however, the New Zealand Department of 
Justice established an Interdepartmental Monitoring Committee on Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies (IMCART) with representatives from several government departments.  
The committee was to act as a repository for information about ART, monitor 
developments, and advise ministers.  Its function was therefore reactive, rather than 
proactive (Daniels and Hargreaves, 1997).  In the same year, the Status of Children 
Amendment Act 1987 was passed.  This was a significant piece of legislation in the 
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evolution of the practice of DI in New Zealand because it clarified the legal parentage of 
children born as a result of DI.  The husband of the woman inseminated with donor sperm 
was to be recognised in law as the legal father, and the donor had no rights and 
responsibilities vis-a-vis the child.  This development drew comment at the time that the 
law was misnamed because it established parents’ rather than children’s status (Daniels, 
1999a).  This is the only piece of legislation in New Zealand that addresses any aspect of 
AHR. 
 
Although there have been calls from within both the medical and legal professions to 
introduce adequate regulatory frameworks for the practice of AHR, as in other countries, 
the New Zealand Justice Department has been reluctant to legislate in this highly 
complex and contested domain. Growing unease about the lack of a legislative or policy 
framework, prompted an AHR service provider, Fertility Associates, in 1990, to invite the 
Reproductive Technology Accreditation Council of Australia (RTAC) to review and 
accredit their clinic.  Later, RTAC became the accreditation body for all New Zealand 
fertility clinics (Daniels and Hargreaves, 1997).  This initiative may have been influenced 
by the establishment of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), a 
clinic licensing authority in the UK.12 Amidst growing concern at the time about issues 
related to surrogacy and the use of donor eggs in assisted reproduction, the Medical 
Council commissioned a review of AHR by the University of Otago Bioethics Centre.  
Biotechnology Revisited was published the next year (Medical Council of New Zealand, 
1991).  Fifty responses to the report were received, many expressing concern about the 
professional capture of ART, and professional self-regulation (Daniels and Hargreaves, 
1997:3).   
 
Concerns about the possible need for a regulatory framework for the practice of AHR in 
New Zealand were instrumental in the establishment of the Ministerial Committee on 
Assisted Reproductive Technologies (MCART) in 1993.  One of the Committee’s terms 
                                                          
12 The HFEA is the British licensing body established by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
1990 to regulate AHR.  This body “is the most comprehensive attempt to regulate ART anywhere in the 
world” (Coney and Else, 1999:5) Among other things, the Authority is required to operate a licensing 
system for all centres who use treatments involving the use of donated gametes.  The Authority is obliged 
to maintain a central registry containing information on all children born and all gamete providers.  One of 
its statutory duties is to publish a Code of Practice which is issued to all clinics to provide guidance on all 
aspects of licensed activities.  This Code is to be reviewed regularly to ensure that it remains relevant to 
contemporary society (Blank, 1998). 
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of reference was to find out what was happening in the field of AHR.  With this in mind, 
the report of the Canadian Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, 
Proceed with Care, published in 1993, was cited as an important source for informing 
debate.  With contributions from over 40,000 individuals, this 1,300 page report was 
considered by the Committee to be “the most exhaustive examination of the issues 
surrounding assisted reproduction anywhere in the world” (MCART, 1994:25).  In their 
1994 report to the Justice Department, the two-person New Zealand Committee 
recommended against legislating to establish a licensing scheme similar to that 
established in the United Kingdom.  Instead, the Committee recommended the 
establishment of a Council for Assisted Reproduction to act in an advisory and overseeing 
capacity (MCART, 1994).   The report set out a number of major recommendations with 
regard to the provision of DI services, including the rights of all parties involved and the 
establishment of registers.  An Officials Committee, established in 1995 by the New 
Zealand Justice Department to consider the MCART’s proposals, recommended against 
the establishment of a Council.  Instead, it suggested that the National Ethics Committee 
on Assisted Reproduction (NECAHR)13 take on some extra tasks.  The direction of policy 
on AHR in New Zealand is yet to be determined pending the outcome of discussion about 
the bills currently before parliament.  In the meantime, however, NECAHR has become 
the de facto policy-making body for AHR in New Zealand, particularly in the area of 
surrogacy (Daniels and Hargreaves, 1997:4). 
 
In the bid to introduce a legislative framework for AHR in New Zealand, in 1996, Labour 
MP, Dianne Yates introduced to parliament a Private Member’s bill designed to 
formulate a legal framework for restrictions and controls on assisted reproductive 
technology in New Zealand.  The Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Bill (New 
Zealand, 1996) was modelled on British, Canadian and Australian legislation.  The main 
points of the bill were to licence clinics, to keep centralised records, prevent cloning, and 
                                                          
13 NECAHR was initially established by the Ministry of Health as the Interim National Ethics Committee 
on Assisted Reproductive Technologies (INECART) in 1993.  At that time, the establishment of an ethics 
committee specifically for AHR was in response to the difficulties experienced by regional ethics 
committees in connection with assisted reproduction protocols (Daniels and Hargreaves, 1997).  INECART 
was responsible for declining ethical approval for applications from fertility clinics to perform IVF 
surrogacy on two occasions in 1993 and 1994.  Objections to this decision came from both the legal and 
medical professions.  INECART was reconstituted as NECAHR in 1995.  In 1997, the committee approved 
the practice of gestational surrogacy in principle.  The following year it approved the first case and 
provided draft criteria to clinics for future applications (Coney and Else, 1999:8). 
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outlaw the sale of babies and body parts/tissue/fluids. The bill had a second reading in 
1997, but it was not until late 1998 that the government finally introduced its proposed 
legislation.  The Assisted Human Reproduction Bill (New Zealand, 1998) prohibits 
‘unethical’14 techniques, provides rights of access to information to both gamete donors 
and children born through third-party reproduction, and “affirms and slightly expands the 
role of NECAHR” (Coney, 1999a:26).  Of particular relevance to the use of third party 
gametes in AHR, the bill prohibits payment for human gametes and embryos, and it 
stresses a policy of ‘openness’, setting up a central registry of information about donors 
of gametes and children born as a result of third party reproduction.  The bill, however, 
“falls short” of establishing a strong regulatory body to oversee AHR in New Zealand 
(Coney, 1999a:28). 
 
Specific issues relating to the practice of DI, addressed by official bodies assigned the 
task of evaluating AHR procedures in their respective countries, include access to DI 
services, screening and payment of gamete donors and issues of record-keeping and 
information-sharing.  An analysis of the social policy and legislative responses to AHR 
reveals that at least thirty-five countries have implemented either legislation, regulations, 
or guidelines relating to DI practices (Blank, 1998:139). Few countries have enacted 
legislation to ban DI, and most have laws that address the legal status of the DI child, so 
that he/she is considered a legal child of the ‘social’ father. 
 
Many countries limit access to DI to heterosexual couples.  In New Zealand, however, the 
Human Rights Act 1993 makes it illegal to discriminate on the basis of age, marital status 
or sexual orientation (MCART, 1994:14). In 1994, the Human Rights Commission ruled 
that Fertility Associates, Auckland, could not legally refuse DI for single women, nor 
could this clinic refuse DI for a Maori woman, with a Pakeha partner, using sperm from a 
Samoan friend (Coney and Else, 1999:7). These occurrences prompted both Fertility 
Associates and the Human Rights Commission to call for greater regulation of assisted 
reproduction.  Despite concerns expressed by health professionals15 and the public16 
                                                          
14 ‘Fundamentally unethical activities’ include the cloning of humans, fusing of animal and human gametes, 
implantation of animal or human embryos in the opposite species, and the use of human cells to develop 
procedures or techniques for undertaking any of these activities (Coney, 1999a:26) 
15 According to Daniels and Burn (1997), a number of health professionals are reported to be concerned 
about delivering AHR services to groups such as single, lesbian or post-menopausal women.  In 1995, a 
scientist resigned from Fertility Associates, citing her disagreement with the Human Rights legislation 
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about creating ‘fatherless families’, increasing numbers of single and lesbian women are 
accessing AHR services in New Zealand (Daniels and Burn, 1997).  
 
According to Blank (1998:144), about 50% of the countries that regulate DI practices, 
require donors be screened for sexually transmitted diseases and/or genetic disorders.  
This is the practice in Australian and New Zealand DI programmes which adhere to the 
guidelines for screening gamete donation established by the Fertility Society of Australia 
(MCART, 1994).  Payment of gamete donors is a particularly contentious issue because 
of arguments against the intrusion of the market economy in the ‘sacred’ area of human 
life, and concerns about the commodification of children17.  The problem of recruiting 
sufficient donors to meet recipient needs has often led clinics to offer financial incentives 
to attract potential donors.  Sperm donors are paid for their services in several countries 
including the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan (Blank, 1998:140-141).  
Other countries pay donor ‘expenses’ which circumvents the ethical dilemma of paying 
for human genetic material.  In New Zealand, donors have been offered some kind of 
financial incentive to donate semen, particularly when a student population is targeted.  
Currently, however, most clinics eschew paying donors, preferring an ‘altruistic’ to a 
‘commercial’ model.  Nonetheless, donor recruitment remains a perennial problem for 
donor programmes in New Zealand, and in almost all countries. 
 
The issues of record-keeping and information-sharing between the parties involved in DI 
conception remain highly controversial.  Most countries which have addressed the issue 
of DI in depth require some form of record-keeping but, for most, retaining donor 
anonymity is a paramount concern (Blank, 1998).  Some governments, however, have 
taken the view that it is in the donor offspring’s best interests to be able to access 
identifying information about the donor. Sweden was the first country to enact legislation 
stipulating that donor offspring had the right to learn their donor’s identity upon maturity 
(at no set age). This move, according to Daniels and Lewis (1996b), was fiercely opposed 
                                                                                                                                                                             
which resulted in these groups gaining access to ART (Daniels and Burn, 1997:81; Coney and Else, 
1999:8). 
16 A recent survey of public opinion conducted by Heylen Research Ltd. found that the majority of New 
Zealanders believed that lesbian couples, single women and women past the age of menopause should not 
have access to assisted reproductive services (Daniels and Burn, 1997). 
17 For arguments about the merits and pitfalls of applying a ‘commercial’ or an ‘altruistic’ model to the 
recruitment of gamete donors, see Daniels and Lewis (1996a), Daniels and Hall (1997) and Daniels (1998). 
See also, Chapter Five of this thesis. 
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by many Swedish health professionals who argued that forcing donors to be identifiable 
would lead to a shortage of sperm donors. In 1992, Austria instituted legislation similar to 
Sweden’s (Daniels and Lewis, 1996b:58).  According to Daniels (1997), the state of 
Victoria in Australia has introduced legislation to ensure that donor offspring have access 
to identifying information about their donor. Switzerland (1998) has also recently 
implemented similar legislation and Holland is in the process of following the same 
legislative path. No other jurisdictions have written this requirement into law, but some, 
like the State of Victoria, in Australia, require that a central register is maintained, 
containing non-identifying information accessible to the parties involved.  Identifying 
information is made available with the consent of the party inquired about (Blank, 
1998:146).   
 
In contrast to the Swedish situation, where legislation determined that information-
sharing was provided for by ensuring that records were kept, in the late 1980s New 
Zealand fertility clinics began voluntarily to move towards a policy of ‘openness’ with 
regard to exchange of information between the parties to a DI conception.  Currently, 
almost all clinics accept only those donors who are willing to be identified at a later date.  
Thus, the consensus is that, as in open adoption, it is in children’s best interests to be able 
to identify their biological/genetic parents.  As discussed in Chapter Nine, New Zealand 
is considered a world leader in information-sharing between the parties to a donor 
conception.  The trend towards information-sharing in DI can be related to the social 
climate of a particular era in New Zealand history. According to Daniels and Lewis 
(1996b:65), MCART attributed the move towards openness in AHR to a “new era of 
openness” after the opening up of adoption records, made possible by the passing of the 
Adult Information Act in 1985.  The committee evaluated the arguments for and against 
openness in AHR and determined that ‘openness’ was the best policy for the New 
Zealand context (MCART, 1994; Daniels and Lewis, 1996b).   
 
MCART’s (1994:27-34) guiding principles were formulated recognising the need to 
protect the rights and responsibilities of both partners, Maori and non-Maori, in the 
Treaty of Waitangi, 1840.18  Many of the submissions MCART received from individuals 
                                                          
18 The Treaty of Waitangi, 1840, represents an agreement between the colonising British Crown and the 
leaders of the indigenous Maori tribes of New Zealand.  The Treaty, which sets out the rights and 
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and organisations also advocated the need to respect both Maori and non-Maori beliefs 
and values.  The issues surrounding AHR are complex for Maori, and vary across 
whanau, hapu and iwi (Dyall, 1999).19  It is not known how many Maori currently seek 
infertility services in New Zealand, but one 1992 study revealed that a clinic reported that 
8.8% of its clients were Maori (Dyall, 1999:37).20 Many more Maori may wish to seek 
assistance to conceive but issues relating to knowledge about infertility services, and the 
costs involved, may limit access for some, particularly because Maori are 
disproportionately represented in the lower socio-economic groups.21  Where infertility is 
concerned, many advocate the traditional Maori form of adoption or the sharing of kin, 
known as whangai, as a preferred method of family formation (Dyall, 1999:36).22 
Furthermore, for Maori couples experiencing male infertility, accessing donor sperm 
from Maori donors is problematic.  In an unpublished paper, Daniels and Tau report that 
five New Zealand DI programmes reported considerable difficulties recruiting Maori 
donors.  Only one couple included in my study had used a Maori donor.  This couple had 
waited for six months for the clinic to obtain semen from a Maori donor from another part 
of the country. 
 
An important guiding principle for MCART was ‘the right to know one’s genetic origins’ 
(MCART, 1994:32; Daniels and Lewis, 1996b:60).  This principle is particularly relevant 
to Maori because of the cultural importance of knowing one’s whakapapa, or genealogy.  
The committee argued that, although not accepted by some countries, the right to know 
                                                                                                                                                                             
responsibilities of the Crown and the indigenous people, must be consulted in all public policy and 
legislative decision-making.  
19 The whanau is the basic unit of Maori society:  an extended family group consisting of up to three or four 
generations living together in a group of houses.  The hapu (sub-tribe) is the basic political unit in Maori 
society, consisting of a number of whanau.  A number of related hapu constitute an iwi (tribe)  (Ministry of 
Justice, 2001:30, 32, 34). 
20 This close to the percentage of Maori in New Zealand’s total population.  In the 1991 census, 9.7% of the 
New Zealand population identified as Maori (Statistics New Zealand, 1992:17). 
21 A report to the Minister of Maori Affairs on progress towards closing social and economic gaps between 
Maori and non-Maori in New Zealand claimed that “Maori continue to experience poorer health status, 
lower income levels, higher unemployment, higher rates of prosecution and conviction, lower educational 
status, and lower rates of living in owned homes than non-Maori” (Te Puni Kokiri, Ministry of Maori 
Development, 2000:10). 
22 The recent approval by NECAHR of a proposed surrogacy arrangement within a Maori family has 
sparked controversy in New Zealand because the surrogate would be carrying her brother’s genetic child. 
This has led to concerns that NECAHR was approving of a procreative arrangement bordering on incest. 
However, Maori advisors, who were consulted by the ethics committee, argued that, for Maori, it was 
acceptable for close relatives, including brothers and sisters to assist each other in such situations because 
the child “is seen as being part of the whole whanau”(Maling, 2001). 
 22
genetic origins was important in the New Zealand bi-cultural context.  In its report, the 
committee stipulated: 
 
[K]nowledge of whakapapa allows Maori to access constitutional rights and cultural strengths.  
Pakeha also recognise that biological origins are very important for some people as they discover 
their own identity (MCART, 1994:33). 
 
The philosophy of information-sharing practised in New Zealand clinics also extends to 
the recipient families.  As discussed in Chapter Seven, although anonymity between the 
parties is initially preserved, recipient couples are informed that their donor offspring 
have the right to seek identifying information about their donor at some time in the future.  
Donor profiles with non-identifying information about the donor are sent to recipient 
couples after their child is born; this includes information about the donor’s views on 
potentially being approached in the future. Donor insemination programmes advocating 
information-sharing have been in existence in New Zealand only since the late 1980s, so 
children conceived by DI who have the ability to receive identifying information about 
their donor are currently approximately 13 years old or younger.  As discussed in Chapter 
Ten, although some instances of donors and donor offspring meeting have been reported 
in New Zealand, it is not yet known how many DI offspring will seek identifying 
information about donors, or wish to meet them when they reach the age of 18 or more. 
 
Language and terminology 
 
Language, or discourse, is both substantive and active (Gubrium and Holstein, 1990).  In 
terms of substance, we can think of the language or terminology used to describe AHR as 
a resource for both naming a process or particular technique, and for identifying what is 
involved in the particular technique.   For example, ‘donor insemination’ names a 
particular procedure and also indicates that reproductive material from a third party is 
used in the attempt to achieve conception.  Discourse relating to AHR is active in the 
sense that it communicates particular political/professional interests, and knowledge 
claims.  A medical practitioner uses language that conveys his/her technical or 
biomedical expertise in the field.  In contrast, a counsellor or social worker uses language 
that emphasises the social outcomes of assisted reproduction, such as the formation of 
families, and the impact on human relationships that emerge as a result of assisted 
reproduction. The choice of language used has a political component, and therefore will 
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be shaped by how a ‘speaker’ positions him or herself or is positioned vis-a-vis other 
protagonists in the field.  Some feminists, for example, who position themselves as critics 
of medical intervention in reproductive processes, use language that highlights the 
clinical, technological, and controlling aspects of what they refer to as “new reproductive 
technologies” or NRT (see Wacjman, 1994). 
 
As well as conveying meaning about the technological processes involved in assisted 
reproduction, terminology used in AHR, to a limited extent, encompasses the social 
relationships that emerge through these processes.  Snowden, Mitchell and Snowden 
(1983) raise the important issue of the need to establish an appropriate vocabulary for 
‘artificial reproduction’. These authors argue that the language of adoption - birthmother, 
birthfather - is not suitable to describe situations where there is a separation between a 
genetic and a carrying mother (Snowden, Mitchell and Snowden, 1983).  Nor is it 
appropriate in the context of DI, where children are not born into one family and 
relinquished to another.  The English language does not yet contain the appropriate words 
to describe split biological/gestational/social parent-child relationships. Snowden, 
Mitchell and Snowden (1983) contend that it is not sufficient to use words that merely 
describe the techniques involved in artificial reproduction:  if we are to explore and 
define the social implications of AHR fully, these processes need to be understood in 
terms of the social relations in which they are embedded.  They argue that an appropriate 
vocabulary should therefore encompass and accurately describe the techniques used, the 
roles played by the parties involved in the procedures and the relationships between the 
people (Snowden, Mitchell and Snowden, 1983:27).   
 
Not surprisingly, this task is complicated not only by the complexity of the technical 
processes afforded by assisted conception, but by the number of parties that are 
potentially introduced into new reproductive arrangements.  The separation of 
reproduction and sexual intercourse in assisted conception means that the reproductive 
process can be broken down into several discrete parts, each of which may be performed 
by a different individual.  We can no longer assume that a ‘mother’ and a ‘father’ are the 
[biological/genetic and social] parents of a child.  For example, as a result of processes 
such as IVF, egg donation and surrogacy, the role of ‘mother’ can be broken down into 
three different processes: the production of an ovum, the gestation of a foetus and the 
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raising of the offspring.  Similarly, the role of ‘father’ can be split in two:  the provision 
of the sperm to achieve the conception of a child, and the raising or nurturing of the child.  
Snowden, Mitchell and Snowden (1983:32-35) therefore propose a “suggested 
nomenclature” that would describe the roles of the parties in the reproductive process.  
They identify seven different roles associated with ‘motherhood’ including the genetic 
mother, carrying mother, nurturing mother, genetic/carrying mother, genetic/nurturing 
mother, carrying/nurturing mother.  The ‘complete’ mother would combine all three 
roles/stages.  In relation to ‘fatherhood’, the terms genetic father, nurturing father and 
complete father are suggested. 
 
From this we can see that defining ‘motherhood’ is a more complex task than defining 
‘fatherhood’.  Nonetheless, where DI is concerned, the possibility for (at least) two 
‘fathers’ exists.23   The genetic father is the gamete donor, and the nurturing father is the 
husband or partner of the woman who is inseminated and bears the child.  In this 
situation, the ‘nurturing’ father is positioned next to the ‘complete’ mother. The authors 
contend that ‘complete’ is not meant to signify the quality of parenting, but merely the 
fulfilment of all possible reproductive roles. It nonetheless conveys a sense of  ‘more 
than’ or ‘better than’ a position which fulfils only part of all potential 
reproductive/parenting roles.  The extensive and complex set of terms suggested by 
Snowden, Mitchell and Snowden (1983) does not appear to have been used extensively in 
the literature.  Yet their attempt to come up with a set of terms to describe varying 
mothering and fathering roles with somewhat more precision is noteworthy because it 
raises the unanswerable questions of ‘Who is the mother?’ and ‘Who is the father?’  In 
one way or another, all can potentially be called ‘the mother’ or ‘the father’.  It should be 
noted, however, that these questions reflect a social, ‘taken-for-granted’ assumption that 
we all have only one mother or father.  All others are qualified (e.g. mother-in-law, 
adoptive mother, foster father, and so on) (Cameron, 1984:304, 320). 
 
Discussion of terminology associated with AHR, and the language used to define assisted 
reproductive procedures and persons involved in or created by these procreative 
arrangements, is discussed at relevant points in the thesis.  At this stage, however, I shall 
                                                          
23 See Chapter Eleven for a discussion about fatherhood in the context of DI.  See also Chapter Ten for the 
language used by parents of children conceived by DI when referring to their sperm donor. 
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indicate some of the main words or terms I use throughout this thesis, and why I have 
chosen them.  I generally prefer to use terms that give primacy to the human aspects 
rather than the technological.  For example, I refer to assisted conception or AHR rather 
than new reproductive technologies (NRT) or assisted reproductive technologies (ART).  
This appears particularly relevant in DI, which, unlike many other procedures, is not a 
‘high-tech’ method of assisting conception.  
 
While some authors refer to sperm donors as ‘semen providers’ to avoid implying 
whether or not semen providers were paid (see Daniels, 1998b), I prefer to use the term 
‘donor’.  This seems appropriate in the New Zealand context, where, as discussed in 
Chapter Five, semen provision is generally constructed as an altruistic gift.  I also refer to 
donors as ‘genetic parents’ or ‘genetic fathers’, not to imply a potential social relationship 
between donors and their DI offspring, but because donors are the progenitors of such 
offspring. Questions arise in connection with the appropriate terminology for referring to 
the children or people who have been born as a result of assisted reproduction generally, 
and DI in particular.  A person conceived by DI is often referred to in the literature as an 
‘AID child’ or, more recently, a ‘DI child’, or a ‘donor child’.24 Some researchers have 
argued, however, that the term ‘child’ tends to infantilise persons born as a result of DI, 
and neglects their later adult status (Haimes, 1992).  These researchers therefore prefer 
the term ‘offspring’ which has no age connotation.  Yet others prefer the phrase ‘DI 
adoptee’ (Cordray, 1995), placing DI in the realm of adoption. In this thesis, when 
referring to DI offspring, I prefer to use the phrase ‘children conceived by DI’.  This 
avoids reductionist labels such as ‘DI child’. I generally refer to people conceived by DI 
as ‘children’ or ‘individuals’ because the children of participants in this research were all 
12 years and under when the interviews took place, and were therefore children rather 
than adults.  
 
Finally, when distinguishing between  ‘biological’ and ‘social’ parents, I variously use 
the words ‘biological parent’ or ‘genetic parent’ because often these words are used 
interchangeably, or the term ‘biological/genetic parent’, which encapsulates the broader 
idea of the biogenetic connection between persons.  The lack of an adequate 
nomenclature for those who are conceived by DI and the parties to the DI conception, 
                                                          
24 See Haimes (1998) for the ways in which ‘the DI child’ has been represented and labelled. 
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particularly donors and social fathers, is discussed in more detail where relevant in the 
thesis.  
 
The structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into three parts.  The first part, entitled “Setting the Scene”, includes 
three chapters: this introductory chapter, a methodological chapter, and a chapter that 
reviews the main theoretical underpinnings of this research. This chapter has introduced 
the research project by framing the study and establishing the research context. The 
second chapter examines the processes of knowledge production that underlie this thesis. 
Highlighting the importance of reflexivity throughout the research process, I locate 
myself in the field of inquiry emphasising my positioning as both an ‘insider’ and an 
‘outsider’.  I examine my positioning as someone with a particular experience of ‘family’, 
a consumer of fertility services, and a student and researcher in the fields of infertility and 
AHR. I also outline the processes involved in choosing this research topic, gaining ethical 
approval, entering the field, accessing participants and carrying out interviews, attending 
to the ethical issues, and analysing the interview material. 
 
Chapter Three examines how discussion about changing families and family practices 
provides a context for the analysis of networks of DI relatedness.  Drawing on recent 
sociological theorising about family diversity and family practices, and social 
anthropological theorising about kinship in the context of assisted conception, the chapter 
explores the social construction of kin and family ties.  It looks at social anthropological 
concerns about ‘nature’ and ‘biology’, and the relationship between the ‘biological’ and 
the ‘social’, ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’.  In particular, the chapter explores the way in which 
analytical opposition between these sets of concepts has been destabilised.  Illustrations 
of the permeability of these dualisms are provided in analysis of the talk of parents of 
children conceived by DI and family members who both construct and deconstruct these 
oppositions as they talk about the meaning they give to DI in their families. 
 
Part Two examines the ways in which DI practices are negotiated.  The first chapter in 
this section, Chapter Four, attends to the pathways to donor conception.  It looks at the 
critical moments, the contingencies and the processes, involved in making the decision to 
conceive a child in this way.  The chapter draws on recent sociological theory on the 
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constitution of narrative identity and the production of selves to examine the impact of 
the discovery of male infertility, and the decision to conceive by DI, on couples and 
extended family members.  It examines couples’ reflections on the options for embarking 
on the ‘project’ of parenthood, including adoption, ICSI, considering a known, rather than 
an anonymous sperm donor, and ultimately the choice to use DI, which led to the 
conception and birth of a much-wanted child or children. 
 
The following three chapters examine the clinical context in which DI takes place.  
Chapter Five looks at DI practices in the context of two particular New Zealand DI 
programmes, and how the relationships are set up between fertility clinics, donors and 
recipients of donor sperm.  The chapter examines the discursive strategies used to 
construct semen donation as an altruistic ‘gift’, the recruitment and screening of donors, 
record-keeping and the complexity of donor anonymity in a context in which children 
may want to access information about genetic fathers.  The chapter also focuses on issues 
of choice and control and the rights of the various parties in the DI programme.  Chapter 
Six examines in more detail the politics of access to DI treatment.  It argues that fertility 
clinics are contexts for the construction of selves, which leads to the cultural examination 
of the clinical context.  In connection with issues of access, it examines the barriers 
encountered by prospective recipients resulting from the availability of donor sperm, and 
the implementation of clinical policies and procedures in relation to who are considered 
‘suitable’ for parenthood.   Chapter Seven presents an analysis of the processes of DI 
‘treatment’, outlining and examining the protocols and procedures involved in having DI 
treatment.  It looks at the types of information provided to recipients, contact between 
recipients and clinical staff and counsellors, the experience of inseminations, pregnancy 
and the birth of a child, and follow-up with DI programme staff. 
 
Part Three of the thesis includes four chapters that explore the negotiation of relationships 
within families (including extended family) and between families and outsiders after 
having a child conceived by DI. Chapter Eight discusses the issues of secrecy and 
disclosure, examining the complex and often contradictory processes involved in 
decisions to tell or not tell others about DI.  It examines the range of practices with 
respect to ‘information-sharing’ that were evident in families with children conceived by 
DI, and how these are embedded in sets of social relations.  Chapter Nine focuses on the 
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issue of telling the child about his or her DI origins, and the argument about the ‘right’ of 
the child to know this information.  It looks at clinical practices with regard to advocating 
that children be informed about how they were conceived, and parents’ attitudes and 
actions with respect to telling or not telling their children.  Chapter Ten explores the ways 
that parents and kin of children conceived by DI think about the sperm donor.  It explores 
the attitudes of recipients and their kin attitudes, their perceptions of donors and their 
levels of interest in those who have donated their sperm.  Chapter Eleven examines 
families with children conceived by DI in the context of family diversity and change.  It 
illustrates that parents who are using DI to conceive do so in a context of general 
‘troubling’ of what we understand by families in a world in which children are less likely 
to live with their genetic/biological fathers. 
 
Chapter Twelve, the concluding chapter, sums up the main arguments of the thesis.  It 
provides an overview of what this study contributes to knowledge about the implications 
for families of having a child conceived by DI, and how this, in turn, contributes to 
understandings about families and relatedness more generally at the turn of the twenty-
first century. 
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Chapter Two 
Exploring family connections: the research process 
 
[T]he most admirable thinkers within the scholarly community … do not split their work from 
their lives.  They seem to take both too seriously to allow such dissociation, and they want to 
use each for the enrichment of the other….  What this means is that you must learn to use your 
life experience in your intellectual work….  In this sense craftmanship is the center of yourself 
and you are personally involved in every intellectual product upon which you may work (C. 
Wright Mills, 1959:195,196). 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the social processes involved in carrying out this exploratory, 
qualitative study. In recent years, reflexivity has been given increasing attention by 
ethnographers and other social researchers, many of whom have produced ‘natural 
histories’ or ‘research biographies’ (Hammersley and Atkinson (1995:17, 22). A 
reflexive approach recognises that the researcher is part of the social world that she or 
he is studying, and that the research is shaped by her or his values and interests, thus 
highlighting that social research cannot be value-free (May, 1993; Smith, 1975). 
Advocating critical autobiography as social science, sociologists, such as Church 
(1995:3, 5) have emphasised the ‘private’, ‘personal’ and ‘emotional’ dimensions of 
their projects as a way of writing about and penetrating the world they are 
creating/inhabiting as a researcher.  By beginning from ‘I’, the researcher does not 
abdicate a commitment to what is ‘public’, ‘theoretical’ and ‘rational’; rather he/she 
acknowledges that what one presents of oneself as subjective and personal is 
simultaneously objective and public (Church, 1995:4). 
 
Bearing in mind the importance of reflexivity in the research process, the chapter 
encapsulates more than the rather standard account of the research methods chosen.  It 
begins with a discussion of my location in the field of study. I locate myself both as 
part of a particular ‘family’, which attached certain values and meanings to ideas 
about ‘family’, and as a person who has experienced ‘infertility’ and the use of 
conceptive technologies.  I also situate myself as a student and as a researcher who 
has pursued a particular academic path, which led me to carry out this particular 
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study. I consider the ways in which I was both an ‘insider’ and an ‘outsider’, and 
identify my shifting and changing positions during the process of carrying out this 
research, as both a researcher, and ‘consumer’ of fertility services.  I also pay 
attention to the contingent processes that led to my carrying out this sociological 
research. The research methods chosen, the processes of entering the field, negotiating 
access to participants, and the challenges and obstacles encountered in my research 
‘journey’ are also a focus of attention.  The chapter also discusses the ethical issues 
involved in doing qualitative research about ‘sensitive’ areas of social life: in this 
case, male infertility and issues connected with conceiving by ‘alternative’ means.  
The final section explores the on-going and time-consuming processes of organising 
and interpreting the data in order to write the thesis. 
 
Locating myself in the field 
My own experience of being part of a ‘family’ and my experience of infertility and 
the use of reproductive technologies have provided useful resources for undertaking 
this research and interpreting the interview material.  As Pahl (1995:196) has argued, 
when one is doing research one is often thinking about one’s own life as much as the 
life of others. The meanings I myself attach to concepts such as ‘family’, and related 
concepts such as ‘fatherhood’, ‘kinship’ and so on, are embedded in my personal 
experience of being part of a particular family and extended kin group. At times 
during the course of this research, I have had to question these, particularly when 
confronted by meanings or interpretations that contradict my own.   This has been a 
rewarding and enriching aspect of doing this research.  
 
I was born during the post-war baby boom and brought up in a family of six children. 
The family structure resembled the ‘traditional’ nuclear family in that my father was 
the breadwinner and my mother the full-time unpaid mother and homemaker.  But it 
did not conform to the ‘norm’ of the nuclear family, in that, for the first nine years of 
my life, we all lived in one half of my maternal grandmother’s large house.  She was 
the much-loved ‘matriarch’ in an extended family dominated by ‘strong’ women.  Our 
grandmother was a pivotal person in our lives, and through her we were aware of a 
connection to a vast kinship network.   My grandmother had been born into a wealthy 
rural family, with a wide network of kin relations.  Her father was the fifth of seven 
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sons, all of whom owned large sheep and cattle stations throughout the South Island 
of New Zealand towards the end of the nineteenth century.  Extended family was thus 
an important feature of our lives. 
 
We grew up surrounded by stories of my family history and kin connections: who had 
married whom, and who was related to whom.  My mother, who has a particular 
interest in her family geneaology, has written and published a book detailing the lives 
of her maternal grandfather and his six brothers.  A large circular family tree 
beginning in the centre with her great-grandfather and great-grandmother who had 
immigrated from Scotland with their seven sons in the mid-1800s hangs on her wall.  
Now in her late 70s, my mother continues to make connections with kin in various 
parts of world. 
   
Family history and genealogy were not only important to my mother; my father too 
was knowledgeable about, and proud of, his family origins.  He had immigrated to 
New Zealand from Denmark as a young man and, although he loved his adopted 
country, he strongly identified as a Dane and we, his children, grew up identifying as 
‘half-Danish’. Through my father, I developed a strong sense of my Danish ancestry, 
and as soon as I left high school I chose to learn more about it by living there for six 
months with my paternal uncle and his family.  This paternal uncle recently compiled 
a family tree including photographs and miniature portraits of extended family 
members going back five generations to the late 1700s.  This family tree is framed 
and now hangs on my wall, along with a number of artworks painted by members of 
my father’s family, serving as a reminder of this part of my heritage, or ‘roots’. 
 
Growing up in a family where people were constantly making explicit references to 
kinship ties, we were very aware that our eldest brother had a different biological 
father from the rest of us: my mother had been married before she married my father.  
Growing up with a brother who was ‘technically’ a half-brother has provided a 
resource for framing biological connections ‘outside’ the family, and a knowledge of 
the variety of interpretations that can be used to give meaning to biological 
relationships where there is no social relationship, and vice versa.  This gave me first-
hand experience of the way in which those who are born with biological connections 
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to persons ‘outside’ the nuclear family can be constructed as both ‘different’ and 
‘special’. I recall when my brother first met his biological father, at age 18, when he 
was embarking on the same professional career his father had chosen.  I was 12 at the 
time, and I remember asking him what it was like to meet his father.  He said that it 
was like meeting someone he had always known.  Yet no social relationship has 
developed between them.   
 
In addition to my experience of ‘family’ and ‘kinship’, my role as a researcher is 
inextricably entwined with my personal experience of infertility and assisted human 
reproduction.  I first became interested in infertility, and the variety of reproductive 
technologies used to circumvent it, when I failed to get pregnant myself, and 
embarked upon my own ‘infertility journey’ which ultimately led to my undertaking a 
series of ‘unsuccessful’ IVF treatments. Being positioned or positioning myself vis-à-
vis research participants variously as ‘researcher’, ‘infertility patient’, and ‘consumer 
of fertility services’ raised issues about being both an ‘insider’ and an ‘outsider’ in the 
field of inquiry.   Daly (1992:109) argues that researchers’ past-related experiences 
demand not only acknowledgement but also conscious inclusion in the research 
process. This not only involved informing participants of my experiences of infertility 
and fertility treatment, but also acknowledging how my experiences and values 
emerged within the socially-constructed setting of the interview, as well as in the 
interpretation of the interview material.   
 
With the aim of acknowledging my ‘insider’ status in the general fields of infertility 
and assisted human reproduction, I informed participants of my experience of 
infertility and IVF treatment.  This raised the spectre of how segmented this field is, 
depending on one’s infertility ‘diagnosis’ and method of assisted conception.  As a 
result of this fragmentation, in the context of researching families with children 
conceived by DI, I felt positioned only partially as an ‘insider’.  I could identify or 
empathise with some of the issues and experiences connected with infertility. At the 
same time, I felt that I was not entirely an ‘insider’ because my ‘problem’ was not 
male infertility.  Moreover, unlike my research participants, I had not experienced DI 
‘treatment’, which raises different issues from IVF ‘treatment’ that does not involve 
the use of third party gametes.  Also, unlike the parents I interviewed, I had not 
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become pregnant and given birth to a child as a result of clinical treatment.  Thus, in 
some ways I felt positioned as a person ‘without a family’, in the sense that I did not 
have children of my own.  Perhaps because of these ‘outsider’ elements, the general 
sensitivity of issues surrounding infertility, and my status as ‘researcher’ among the 
‘researched’, my experiences of infertility and IVF treatment were seldom taken up by 
interviewees, particularly in the context of interviews with couples. Some women 
participants, however, appeared to empathise with me as a woman ‘still trying’ to 
conceive through assisted means; and I was encouraged to do so by one woman who 
assured me that it was “worth it in the end”.  
 
I had a third IVF treatment just before beginning my PhD research, and thought at the 
time that that would be my last.  As is often the case in fertility treatment, and 
confirmed by participants in this research, it is difficult to concede ‘defeat’ when the 
possibility of the treatment ‘working’ next time looms large.  Partly encouraged by a 
friend’s successful IVF pregnancy, and because of my own continuing involvement in 
the field throughout the research process, I had one final attempt at IVF towards the 
end of the interview ‘phase’ of the study. Undoubtedly my experience of fertility 
treatment has been a resource for understanding the processes involved, and what is 
often referred to as the ‘emotional rollercoaster’ that generally accompanies it.   My 
experience of failed fertility treatment helped me to empathise with those who had 
repeated failed cycles before finally conceiving.  My particular experience of fertility 
treatment, however, differed from some of my participants.  For example, I remember 
starting the IVF drug regime at a time when I was carrying out one of my last 
interviews, which was with a lesbian couple who had conceived through self-
insemination.  When I told them about the injections I administered to myself, they 
were intrigued by the clinical regimes that I had to go through when they had had the 
good fortune of being able to conceive with relative ease, through self-insemination 
outside the clinical setting.  
 
My experience of unsuccessful IVF cycles, hospitalisation as a result of ovarian 
hyperstimulation syndrome (a potentially life-threatening situation associated with 
IVF treatment), and the disappointment of a series of failed attempts to conceive has, 
undoubtedly, made me somewhat ambivalent about fertility treatment.  At the same 
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time, I am aware that it works for some people and, because DI is low-tech, less 
physically invasive, and less costly than other forms of fertility treatment, it is, 
according to health professionals interviewed for this research, cumulatively the most 
successful treatment available. Nonetheless, with my treatment history, I was a little 
uneasy in the clinical setting, particularly when interviewing health professionals who 
had been involved in my treatment process. In relation to the latter, I experienced 
shifts and changes in my identity from ‘patient’/ ‘consumer of fertility services’ to 
‘researcher’.  Illustrating this shift, on one occasion I met with the Director of a 
fertility clinic for an IVF consultation just a week before I had scheduled an interview 
with him for this research. At the end of our private consultation he commented he 
would be wearing a “different hat” at our impending interview.  On that occasion, at 
the start of the interview he asked how it was for me to be interviewing couples who 
had had children through assisted conception.  I inferred from this that he was 
concerned that I might find it difficult to study ‘families’ when I myself had failed to 
conceive.  I assured him that I had no particular ‘problem’ with it, and certainly this 
was the case throughout the study.  At times, however, I have reflected on the 
chanciness of human conception, and that while it was elusive for me, it certainly was 
not for others. 
 
My infertility ‘journey’ ran parallel with my university studies.  In the year that 
investigations into my infertility began, I had returned to university to complete a 
degree in Sociology.  I enrolled for a course in Body Politics in the Sociology 
Department of the University of Canterbury, which introduced me to radical, liberal 
and Foucauldian feminist critiques of the ‘new reproductive technologies’.  I was 
fascinated to engage with this material from my position as a woman who was 
contemplating and exploring the possibilities of medically-assisted conception.  I later 
began researching other infertile couples’ experiences of infertility and fertility 
treatment for papers undertaken for my BA (Hons) degree.  Each of the four projects I 
undertook for this graduate degree encompassed an aspect of assisted human 
reproduction, further illustrating that my personal history is deeply implicated in my 
choice of a field of study.  One of the projects focussed specifically on donor 
insemination and introduced me to many of the issues for both recipient couples and 
donors. Information gleaned from participants in this small study raised a number of 
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questions that were later pursued in my thesis research.  After completing my BA 
(Hons) degree, I gained a summer scholarship from the New Zealand Health Research 
Council to study aspects of the ethics of assisted human reproduction, under the 
supervision of one of my PhD supervisors.  This also added to my location as a 
‘student’ and ‘researcher’ in this area of research. 
 
While my experience has informed my research, the research process has also 
influenced my personal life.  I began this particular academic ‘journey’ anticipating 
that it might be interrupted at any time with the conception and birth of a child.  This 
has not happened, and gradually it appears that the path towards parenthood has been 
closed off to me.  This undoubtedly has been emotionally painful for me at times, but 
in a way the research process has helped me ‘come to terms’ (inasmuch as anyone 
fully ‘comes to terms’ with infertility) with not having children.  I have come to see 
parenthood as one of many possibilities in life.  On a ‘good’ day, I am even glad that I 
do not have children and the many complications and sacrifices that this entails for 
parents.  At the same time, I still marvel at the ‘miraculousness’ of human conception 
and reproduction, the ‘specialness’ of the parent/child connection, and regret that this 
will not be part of my personal ‘journey’. 
 
Choosing a topic and research methods 
Preliminary discussions with one of my PhD supervisors pointed to the lack of 
research on families with children conceived using third party gametes.  At the time, 
my supervisor also indicated that no research on ‘DI families’ to date had included 
extended family members as participants, so this presented an opportunity to carry out 
ground-breaking research, and make an original contribution to the field.  Initial 
discussions with my supervisors focussed on the possibility of researching families 
with children conceived through any of a variety of procreative arrangements using 
third parties, such as surrogacy, egg donation, embryo donation, donor insemination, 
or IVF involving donated sperm and/or oocytes.  Given that few people had used 
some of these forms of procreation in New Zealand, and particularly in the South 
Island,1 where I was located, questions arose about the feasibility of conducting such 
a study.  Thus the project began as a ‘feasibility study’ before it was taken on as a 
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study for doctoral research. This conservative approach to ascertaining the suitability 
of the topic for PhD thesis research seemed appropriate considering that it was a 
‘sensitive’ area to research, and that similar sociological research had not been 
conducted before, in the field of AHR in New Zealand.  Later, after some initial 
attempts to recruit participants, it became clear that for practical reasons, such as 
access to participants, the study should be confined to families with children 
conceived by DI and health professionals working in DI programmes. 
 
Preliminary work involved reading widely on the topic of the use of third party 
gametes in assisted human reproduction, and developing a proposal to be submitted to 
the academic board and then to two committees for ethical approval to carry out the 
research.  First, I had to gain ethical approval from the National Ethics Committee on 
Assisted Human Reproduction (NECAHR).2  NECAHR was established in 1995 to 
provide ethical review of assisted human reproduction (AHR) in New Zealand. The 
committee, which operates under the Health and Disabilities Act 1993, was 
established by and is accountable to the Minister of Health.   Its terms of reference 
include reviewing new, untried or innovative methods of assisted human reproduction 
to ensure that all ethical aspects are considered.  This includes granting ethical 
approval for any research, including social science research, in the area of AHR 
(Daniels, 1998a).  After NECAHR reviewed and granted approval for my research to 
proceed, I was granted ethical approval by the University of Canterbury Human 
Ethics Committee, which was contingent on my gaining approval from NECAHR.   
 
A crucial task in the development of the research proposal is the ability to identify 
suitable research methods. Several researchers have identified qualitative methods as 
the most suitable for research on private and sensitive areas of people’s lives, 
particularly in an area where the dynamics are not yet fully understood (Voysey, 
1975; Gilgun, Daly and Handel, 1992; de Laine, 1997). Qualitative research methods 
are particularly useful in this type of research because they are more fluid and flexible 
than most quantitative research designs (Moon, Dillon and Sprenkle, 1990:359; 
Achilles, 1986:13). Because they are more open-ended and exploratory, they facilitate 
                                                                                                                                                                      
1 In 1997, when this research began, formalised egg donation programmes were only just being 
organised in South Island fertility clinics, and no children had yet been conceived through this method. 
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a more holistic, in-depth understanding of what is happening in a particular research 
setting (Moon, Dillon and Sprenkel, 1990; Gilgun, Daly and Handel, 1992).  
 
My vision for the research was humanist/interpretive, rather than scientific/positivist, 
which meant that I sought to develop an empathetic understanding of, or verstehen 
approach to, the meanings that people attach to their lives and their relationships 
(Good, 1996; Layder, 1993; de Laine, 1997). As Bryman and Burgess (1994) have 
pointed out, qualitative research is a dynamic process that cannot be reduced to 
particular techniques and set stages. According to Bechofer, it involves a “messy 
interaction between the conceptual and empirical world, deduction and induction 
occurring at the same time” (cited in Bryman and Burgess, 1994:2).  This is borne out 
by my own experience.  For example, when I entered the field, I had some knowledge 
of the literature on assisted human reproduction, and some of the theoretical and 
conceptual frameworks used by sociologists and social anthropologists that I could 
draw upon.  I was therefore aware that certain themes might emerge in the process of 
data collection, and these were used to frame the interview guide and influenced my 
selection of particular analytical frameworks for the interpretation of the data.  With 
these frameworks in mind, I nonetheless planned to be open to the possibility that the 
investigation would produce information that would disrupt the theoretical analysis 
that informed the research design. 
 
The primary method of data collection was face-to-face, semi-structured interviews 
with couples with children conceived by DI, their extended family members, and 
health professionals working in DI programmes. Other data sources included a form 
of ‘participant observation’ as a client at a fertility clinic, and as a member and 
committee member of the local Infertility Society. In 1999, I became an Individual 
Representative on the Executive of the New Zealand Infertility Society, which 
enabled me to keep abreast of developments in the fields of infertility and assisted 
reproduction.  I also attended three conferences and an information day hosted by the 
New Zealand Infertility Society and a symposium on medically-assisted surrogacy. 
Using information from a variety of sources facilitated triangulation, an important 
concept in qualitative research, which refers to seeking multiple sources of data to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
2 In 1995, the Interim National Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technologies (INECART) was 
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enhance the validity and reliability of the research ‘findings’ (Moon, Dillon and 
Sprenkle, 1990:361; Macdonald and Tipton, 1993). 
 
I chose face-to-face semi-structured interviews as the primary method of data 
collection because it appeared to be the best method of collecting information about 
complex, personal and sensitive areas of peoples’ lives (Fielding, 1993).  According 
to Fielding (1993:137), in-depth interviewing is frequently used by qualitative 
researchers aiming to explore people’s attitudes, beliefs and values.  This form of data 
collection worked well for exploring the meanings that people attach to taken-for-
granted concepts such as ‘family’, ‘parenthood’, ‘fatherhood’, and ‘motherhood’, 
because it elicited people’s talk around these concepts, and enabled an examination of 
the discourses they drew on to make sense of these in their day-to-day lives. Family 
researchers working in the area of infertility and fertility treatment have used 
qualitative methods successfully to explore a wide range of fertility and parenting 
experiences (see, for example, Sandelowski, Holditch-Davis and Harris, 1992; Daly, 
1992). My previous experience of carrying out semi-structured interviews with 
couples for projects carried out for my BA (Hons) degree had provided me with some 
relevant interviewing skills. 
 
Questions arose as to whether I should interview couples with children conceived by 
DI together or separately.  After considering the benefits and possible pitfalls of both 
formats, I decided to interview couples together.3  Daly (1992:107), who chose this 
method, argues that “parenthood is usually contingent on a shared construction of 
reality” and therefore interviewing couples together was the best way of trying to 
capture this.  Other advantages of conjoint interviews were that spouses/partners can 
jog each other’s memory and tend to keep each other honest, which were important 
for establishing reliability and validity of the data (Daly, 1992).  Although conjoint 
interviewing allowed for the possibility of disagreements or unanticipated disclosures, 
both of which occurred to a limited extent in my research process, the interaction 
between the couples provided insight into the couple’s relationship, and was a rich 
data source (Sandelowski, Holditch-Davis and Harris, 1992).  Interviewing couples 
                                                                                                                                                                      
reconstituted as NECAHR (Report of INECART, December 1995). 
3 See Daly (1992) and Sandelowski, Holditch-Davis and Harris (1992) for pertinent discussions about 
the advantages and challenges of conjoint interviewing. 
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was also useful in the recruitment process, because typically men are reluctant to 
participate in research involving discussions about the ‘sensitive’ topic of male 
infertility (Achilles, 1986; Lloyd, 1994, 1996). 
 
In all, I carried out 52 interviews for this study.  Nineteen of the interviews were with 
heterosexual couples with children conceived by DI, though one male partner 
declined to participate.  I interviewed one mother of children conceived by DI who 
was also a consumer representative for the fertility clinic accrediting body.  Three 
separated or divorced women, each with one or two children conceived by DI, are 
also included.  I also interviewed a lesbian couple who had used self-insemination 
methods of conception, and their gay male donor, and another lesbian couple who had 
conceived through a fertility clinic DI programme.  Fourteen interviews with extended 
family members, and 12 with health professionals were also completed.  Children 
conceived by DI were not interviewed specifically for this study,4 though some 
informal discussions with children took place in the context of interviews with their 
parents or after such interviews.  I did not set out to marginalise children; rather I did 
not feel that I possessed the necessary skills to interview young children, many of 
whom were too young to understand, let alone talk about abstract concepts such as 
genetic, biological or social ties.  Almost all of the parents included in this study had 
children who were younger than 12 years old, and many were pre-schoolers or babies.   
 
Negotiating access 
The secrecy, anonymity and confidentiality that surrounds DI has hindered 
sociological research on families with children conceived by DI (Achilles, 1986).  
Secrecy has led to difficulties identifying families with children conceived by DI as a 
specific ‘population’ in any society.  Consequently, I could not select a random 
sample from a population of DI families, and then generalise from my ‘findings’ to 
the particular population. Furthermore, for ethical reasons, participants were 
necessarily ‘self-selected’ because only those willing to speak about this ‘personal’ 
and ‘sensitive’ area of their lives are included in the study.  This raises questions 
about the ‘representativeness’ of my sample. I make no claims about its 
                                                          
4 Another New Zealand researcher, Dr Vivienne Adair, an educational psychologist and Director of the 
Centre for Child and Family Policy Research at the University of Auckland, New Zealand, has carried 
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representativeness in the statistical sense of the word.  Nevertheless, a degree of 
representativeness can be attributed to it given that the discourses that people draw on 
to help them make sense of their lives, and guide their actions are constituted by 
common and shared social understandings (Williams and Popay, 1994:122).  As a 
result, it can be expected that people who embark on similar experiences (e.g. having 
children by DI) at a particular time and in a particular place will draw on a set of 
discourses that are generally available to them to interpret and make decisions about 
their lives. 
 
Like other qualitative researchers who aim for ‘depth’ rather than ‘breadth’ (de Laine, 
1997:24-25), I aimed to discover the variety of experiences of a number of people 
located in different settings across the country, and to provide an in-depth analysis of 
these.  Like other qualitative researchers, I preferred to study a few cases intensively 
and use criterion-based selection techniques that are suitable in research that is 
directed at theory-building rather than to generalising about a population (Moon, 
Dillon, Sprenkle, 1990:360).  The general criteria for selection included being parents 
of a child or children conceived by DI, being an extended family member of a child 
conceived by DI, or working as a health professional in a Donor Insemination 
Programme at a fertility clinic.  More specific criteria were not applied because I was 
not sure how easy or difficult it would be to recruit participants for the research. 
 
Negotiating access was a key issue in the research process and raised a number of 
methodological and ethical issues.  At times it brought to the fore the politics of doing 
social research. As Law (1994:vii) has pointed out:  “Like life, research is the 
outcome of interaction.”  Gaining access is crucial to the research outcome and, like 
life, gaining access to research sites/participants is much to do with contingency, or as 
Law has argued, it is to do with “what you have, what you know, and whom you 
know” (1994:37).  Gaining access depended on being able to contact and get help 
from individuals, health professionals and social networks who had the information 
and power to be able to assist in the recruitment of participants. Gaining access was 
also to do with serendipity: chance encounters or ‘good’ timing.  For example, one 
participant said that if he had received the recruitment letter sent to him by the fertility 
                                                                                                                                                                      
out research focusing on the implications for children conceived by DI (see Adair and Purdie, 1996; 
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clinic, on my behalf, a few months earlier, he would have thrown the letter in the bin, 
but in the event, he felt ‘ready’ to discuss his experiences with a researcher.   
 
I began attempts to recruit couples who had conceived children by DI through the 
local Infertility Society.  I contacted the president of the Society who suggested that I 
attend the upcoming public meeting.  The meeting aimed to set up various ‘interest’ 
groups in relation to different ‘treatment’ options and routes to parenting (e.g. IVF, 
ICSI, DI, and adoption).  At this meeting I juggled my identities as ‘consumer of 
infertility services’, ‘would-be parent’ and ‘researcher’.  I initially joined the adoption 
group because I was personally interested in this option, and it also provided a means 
of preparing myself mentally for the task of asking people to participate in my 
research. I soon switched to the donor group where I introduced myself as someone 
with a particular history of ‘infertility’, an ‘IVF consumer’, and also as a ‘researcher’ 
with a focus on families with children conceived by DI.  I explained that I was 
attending the group session to recruit participants for my study, and was relieved 
when two women volunteered their contact details. Some days later I set up my first 
two interviews with them and their partners.  These and interviews with some of their 
family members constituted the ‘pilot’ interviews for the study, and provided a good 
basis for going further afield. 
 
One of my supervisors had connections with two South Island fertility clinics, and 
was instrumental in facilitating my access to these clinics.  Both agreed to assist in 
recruiting the majority of the couples who participated in this research. The Medical 
Director of the local fertility clinic responded in the affirmative to my letter asking for 
assistance in recruiting participants, with the proviso that the clinic also benefit from 
the research, possibly by future collaboration in the writing and publication of journal 
articles. A scientist and research facilitator at this fertility clinic was my point of 
contact.  She agreed to send out a letter from me about the research to couples who 
had conceived through their DI programme.  She wrote a covering letter that 
accompanied my recruitment letter and included a form so recipients could indicate 
whether or not they would be willing to participate in the research.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Rumball and Adair, 1999; Adair, 2000). 
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If recipients were willing to participate, they were to send their address and contact 
details back to the clinic in the provided stamped addressed envelope; at the clinic’s 
instigation, those who were not willing to participate were asked to provide a reason 
for their decision and also return the form. The research facilitator sent out letters in 
batches of 15-20, over several months, starting with couples with the oldest children. 
Because this particular DI programme was established in 1987, all of the children 
born after DI were less than 10 years old in 1998, the year I carried out most of the 
interviews.  The research facilitator only forwarded copies of consents to me and, 
from the approximately 70 letters sent out to couples who had conceived through their 
programme, only five refusals and 11 consents were received.  Over half did not 
respond to the letter (44), and 11 letters were returned unopened because the address 
was no longer current.   
 
The low response rate raised a number of issues and questions.  First, it informed the 
fertility clinic that they had lost contact with a number of couples who had had 
children through their programme, and who had not notified them of a change of 
address.  Second, it raised the question of whether the 44 who did not respond had 
received the letter or not; if they had, the question then arose as to why they chose not 
to respond.  According to the clinic’s research facilitator, those who returned refusals 
stated either that their relationship had broken up, or that having had a child/children 
through DI they had ‘moved on’ to live life as a ‘normal family’ and did not wish to 
discuss it.  In the absence of any information from those who did not wish to 
participate in the study, it cannot be established whether non-response can be 
attributed to similar or other reasons from these.  This level of non-response would 
tend to suggest, however, that secrecy, anonymity and confidentiality still pervade the 
practice of donor insemination, or that many wish to avoid constructing it as an 
‘issue’, as research on the topic might tend to suggest that it is. 
 
As well as recruiting participants locally, I aimed to interview couples who had 
conceived through other DI programmes to help establish whether experiences 
differed between regions and clinics.  To access people throughout New Zealand, I 
‘advertised’ in the New Zealand Infertility Society magazine, Pathways. Four couples 
who had conceived children through DI programmes in clinics in Wellington or 
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Auckland responded to my request for participants.  To interview these couples I 
travelled considerable distances by car in the North Island.  I also contacted a nurse at 
one of the North Island clinics, but she declined to help me recruit couples because 
she had assisted another researcher, whom she claimed was doing “similar” research 
to my own.   
 
With the aim of accessing participants through the other South Island fertility clinic, I 
had written a letter to the director to ask for his assistance.  Some months passed 
without a response from the director, who apparently was away on leave for part of 
the time, and had asked a clinical nurse to send out recruitment letters for me.  One of 
my supervisors then contacted the director, and spoke about the benefits of facilitating 
this research. Soon afterwards, the clinic sent out letters to ten couples, asking if they 
would be willing to participate in my research. Recipients were asked to contact me 
directly: three called me, agreeing to participate.  
 
The difficulties involved in gaining access to participants raised a number of 
important methodological issues.  The seemingly pivotal intervention by my 
supervisor highlighted Hornsby-Smith’s (1993) contention that “gaining access is a 
process of continual renegotiation, bargaining, and establishing trustful relations with 
gatekeepers and those to be studied”.  It also showed that gaining access can take 
several months, especially if access is required to hospitals or to an institutional 
setting (Arber, 1993:37).  It also suggested that sociological research in this area was 
not a priority for this and perhaps other fertility clinics, which seek to have control 
over research domains and outcomes that might directly affect their reputations and 
businesses. 
 
The issue of control over research parameters and processes also emerged in 
connection with trying to access lesbian and single women who had conceived though 
one of the clinics.  During an interview, a nurse raised concerns about the number of 
lesbian and single women who were going through the DI programme, which had 
originally been established to ‘treat’ heterosexual couples with male infertility.  After 
the interview I contacted the research facilitator to ask if she would be prepared to 
help me gain access to lesbian couples and single women who had conceived through 
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the programme.  She denied my request on the basis that “only two” lesbian couples 
had conceived through their DI programme, and that the children were very young, 
and that no single women had conceived, because most were ‘older’ and less likely to 
conceive.  This surprised me as it appeared to contradict what two nurses had told me 
about the numbers of lesbian couples and single women “going through” their 
programme. 
 
This response from the clinic was followed up by a call from one of my supervisors 
who said that the research consortium that had recently been set up through this clinic 
had plans for future research on lesbian couples and single women who had conceived 
through the programme.  Thus, the clinic wanted to reserve the right to gain access to 
these people at a future date.  This illustrated the ways in which dominant agents in a 
particular field attempt to protect their own interests by keeping out competition and 
maintaining a monopoly (Bourdieu, 1993). It also revealed the clinic’s desire to 
control the research process of a ‘newcomer’ to the field (Bourdieu, 1993:73). As a 
‘new player’ in the field, entry to the game came with certain conditions: that I play 
by their rules and “pay an entry fee which consists in recognition of the value of the 
game” (Bourdieu, 1993:74).  Perhaps because medical personnel are more familiar 
with quantitative methods, they expected that my study was to be confined to a 
particular ‘population’: heterosexual couples and their families.  
 
With a more flexible research design in mind I, on the other hand, had wished to 
follow up relevant areas of sociological interest that emerged during the research 
process.  The denial of access to lesbian parents through this fertility clinic had 
implications for the scope and direction of this study. I was frustrated that I was 
denied access to individuals who were somehow earmarked for ‘future research’ by 
others who were more powerfully positioned in the field.   I therefore felt caught in a 
contradictory position.  As a sociologist carrying out exploratory qualitative research 
on families who had children conceived by DI, I wanted to include the diversity of 
family forms that existed as a result of DI. Furthermore, according to the nurses on 
this programme, lesbian couples and single women were a significant group of clients.  
At the same time I did not want to alienate important gatekeepers who seemingly 
were not in favour of my including these other family forms in my study.   
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As an alternative approach, I pursued recruitment of lesbian couples through personal 
contacts. Through my supervisor, I gained access to a gay male donor, who had 
donated sperm to a lesbian couple who had conceived a child through self-
insemination methods.  Through him I was able to gain access to the two women. 
Another lesbian couple who had conceived through the local DI programme was 
accessed through a personal contact, who met the couple by chance at a mutual 
friend’s wedding. The inclusion of only two lesbian couples in this study may seem 
like a ‘token’ gesture to lesbian parenting. I believe, however, that their inclusion adds 
a valuable dimension to the study that highlights some of the similarities and 
differences between lesbian-led DI families and those headed by heterosexual 
couples, which could be gainfully explored in future research.  
 
Accessing family members 
A number of obstacles to accessing extended family members emerged throughout the 
research process, raising both methodological and ethical issues. To gain access to 
extended family members I asked couples during the interviews whether they would 
be willing to refer me to any family members who might be prepared to participate. 
The parents of children conceived by DI therefore became gatekeepers who had 
power to determine who else in their family I could talk to. Some were quite willing 
to help in the recruitment of other family members, but others were resistant.  
 
A number of ‘reasons’ emerged for non-referral to family members. Some couples 
said they had not informed family members of their child’s DI conception, so could 
not ask them to participate.  Others had informed family members, but said that the 
subject was never openly acknowledged within the family, so they were not willing to 
raise the matter with family members. Some couples said that they had asked, but 
their family member declined to participate because “there was really nothing to say”, 
and that the child was perceived as “just another member of the family”: in their view, 
there were no “issues” to discuss.5 Other couples said they would not ask their parents 
to participate because they believed they would not want to discuss their emotions or 
feelings with a researcher.  One mother of a child conceived by DI was willing to 
                                                          
5 The perspectives of family members who took these positions would have provided relevant 
information on the topic being studied; these positions, however, were constructed as reasons not to 
participate. 
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participate as a way of expressing her gratitude to the clinic for helping in the 
conception of her son, but she did not wish to involve any other family member in the 
research.  Some couples said they would ask family members and get back to me, but 
never did.  In some cases, I was reluctant to follow up in case I was perceived as 
being overly intrusive, when they had already participated in interviews themselves. 
In some cases, one member of the couple implied that other family members could be 
approached to participate, but the other seemed doubtful; in these cases, I did not 
receive any referrals. 
 
The blocks to accessing family members may be attributed to a number of factors that 
highlight some of the difficulties and complexities of doing family research. Many of 
the obstacles to gaining access relate to the ways in which having a child by DI is 
constructed as a ‘sensitive’ and ‘private’ issue, and to the secrecy surrounding it. 
Other researchers in this area have expressed concerns about the potentially negative 
effects of long-term surveillance or “undue vigilance” on relationships within these 
families (Humphrey and Humphrey, 1988:136).  Issues such as male infertility and 
using donated sperm to conceive a child are often regarded as private and taboo 
subjects, which are not a topic of general family conversation. Furthermore, 
reproductive decisions are generally construed as the couple’s private concern and 
“no-one else’s business”.  Resistance to referring me to extended family members is 
also understandable given that family life itself is a contested domain and a site of 
competing discourses (Collier, 1999), and that “family relationships are as marked by 
friction as they are by concord” (Edwards, 1998:162).  
 
Clearly, couples had to be comfortable with the idea of a researcher talking to other 
family members about their having conceived a child by DI, before they would refer 
me to them. As the interviewing process progressed, and after being refused access by 
some couples to family members, I became increasingly aware of this added 
‘intrusion’ into their family lives.  This was particularly true if the couple indicated 
that their relationships with other family members were somewhat strained. In some 
cases I did not ask to be referred to family members because I perceived a participant 
as particularly ‘vulnerable’, and I did not feel comfortable asking for a referral to a 
family member.  My values, and ‘gut feeling’ thus determined the extent to which I 
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was prepared to pursue access to family members in the context of any particular 
interview. As Pahl has stated, “I am my own research instrument” (1995:196). 
 
I also found there were barriers to gaining access to the ex-husbands or partners of 
women in cases of marital breakup.   In each of these cases I was referred directly to 
the woman, or the women themselves received the recruitment letters from the clinic 
because their husbands had moved to other addresses.  Thus, the women provided the 
key to access to their former partners.  In one of these cases I hesitated to intrude on a 
relationship which appeared to be marked by significant conflict. Another participant 
said that she would ask her ex-husband if he would be willing to participate in the 
research, but I did not hear back from her.  At one point during the interview, she had 
become tearful when recalling a time when they were still together. She called me 
much later about another family matter, and revealed that she and her ex-husband 
were no longer on speaking terms. In another case, during the interview the 
participant was enthusiastic about the possibility of my interviewing her ex-husband, 
and gave me his telephone number.  I rang the number on several occasions but got no 
reply.  Finally, a woman answered the phone and took a message, but he did not 
return my call.  Later, I heard through a third party, that his ex-wife had “forbidden” 
him to speak to me, which completely contradicted her stance during the interview. 
 
These situations illustrate the difficulty of obtaining information in an ethical manner.  
The failure to access these fathers has meant that only the separated/divorced 
women’s accounts are included in this study which necessarily gives “one side of the 
story”.  This is unfortunate in that much past research on families has been criticised 
for being mother-centred rather than father-centred (Lewis and O’Brien, 1987:4).  
Despite this ‘gap’, however, the ‘voices’ of other fathers are clearly evident 
throughout the thesis, which constrasts with Achilles’ (1986) experience of 
researching in this area.  She was able to access only three ‘husbands’ (two of whom 
were ‘voluntarily infertile’ through a vasectomy) for her thesis research, which she 
claimed reflected a general reticence in men to talk about their experience of having a 
child by donor insemination (Achilles, 1986:50). 
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Geographic distance also impeded access to some family members. To overcome this 
barrier I carried out three separate telephone interviews with one couple’s family 
members who lived in different cities in the North Island.  This proved to be a 
tactically complicated and quite expensive exercise, involving using recording 
equipment at the School of Journalism, which was available during the day only, and 
obtaining oral consent from the participants, rather than the usual written consent.  
One of my supervisors raised concerns about telephone interviews yielding 
qualitatively different data from face-to-face in-depth interviewing so, ultimately, I 
did not continue with telephone interviews. 
 
Accessing health professionals 
In the context of this study, health professionals are defined as personnel working in 
fertility clinics facilitating some aspect of the operation of DI programmes.  Health 
professionals working in two South Island fertility clinics participated in this research.  
These included two clinical directors, a scientist, three nurses, two laboratory 
technicians who also recruit donors, a counsellor, and a clinical psychologist. 
Additionally, I interviewed a nurse working in a North Island clinic in relation to the 
development of a donor family register.6  These participants were all identified and 
contacted through their clinics.  Through a personal contact, I was also able to 
interview a retired general practitioner who had used his own semen to inseminate one 
of his patients in the 1960s. 
 
Ethical issues 
Appreciation of the ethical considerations in research involving human subjects has 
evolved over time, and often in response to scandals which have caused concern about 
professional ethical conduct.7 As a result of such concerns, ethics committees have 
been established to help ensure that researchers adhere to basic ethical principles 
designed to protect human subjects from undue harm.  These include the need to 
obtain informed and voluntary consent from research participants, respect for the 
rights of privacy and confidentiality, the limitation of deception, and the minimisation 
                                                          
6 See Chapter Five for discussion on this register. 
7 In New Zealand, the Cartwright Inquiry into unethical practices in relation to the non-treatment of 
women with cervical cancer is a case in point (Coney and Bunkle, 1987; Bunkle, 1988; Cartwright, 
1988). 
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of risk to participants. Issues relating to these ethical principles pervaded all aspects of 
this research, and had to be attended to throughout the process.   
 
Carrying out research on families with children conceived by DI involved examining 
particularly sensitive and personal areas of people’s lives, highlighting the need to pay 
attention to the ethical issues at stake.  Qualitative family researchers, Larossa, 
Bennett and Gelles (1981) point out that certain aspects of the family as an institution 
in our society make it important to seek and maintain informed consent.  These 
include the pervasiveness of family life; the inaccessiblity of family life; the physical 
setting in which qualitative research is undertaken (usually the family home); and the 
resemblance of qualitative family research to therapy (Larossa, Bennett, and Gelles, 
1981).  Added to these considerations is the fact that many activities of families are 
considered private (i.e. no-one else’s business), as well as being inaccessible. 
 
Interviews took the form of guided conversations that aimed to elicit frank, and well 
considered, rather than “glib or easy answers” (Fielding, 1993:138). I chose to carry 
out semi-structured interviews which would allow participants the flexibility to 
discuss areas of particular relevance to them, but would also ensure that major topic 
areas were covered (Fielding, 1993).  I developed an interview guide that set out these 
main areas of questioning and identified probes to solicit more information, if and 
when necessary. Three main versions of the interview guide were developed: one for 
parents with children conceived by DI, one for family members and another for health 
professionals.  The health professional interview guide was modified according to the 
particular role in the DI programme.8
 
Interviews with couples and family members generally took place at their homes, and 
most interviews with health professionals took place in  fertility clinics. All interviews 
were taped and later transcribed.  In line with the requirements of ethical committees, 
including the National Ethics Committee on Assisted Human Reproduction 
(NECAHR), I prepared an information sheet9 that was presented to research 
participants before the interview began. The information sheet emphasised that the 
researcher was aware of the private and sensitive nature of the topic, and that 
                                                          
8 For copies of the interview guides, see Appendix A. 
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participants were free to withdraw from the project at any time.  Confidentiality and 
anonymity for all participants was assured, and contact details for all those involved, 
including my supervisors, were supplied.  Participants read the information sheet 
before signing the consent form, and all were given the information sheet to retain for 
future reference.  None of those who participated later revoked their consent. 
 
Before interviews began, I informed participants of the areas of questioning and then 
followed my interview guide.  Semi-structured interviewing allowed for some 
flexibility in the direction the discussion took, but digressions were often initiated by 
participants who chose to focus on a particular aspect of their experience.  They were 
also urged to talk only about issues/topics that they felt comfortable divulging to a 
researcher.  I informed participants that they were entitled to receive a copy of the 
interview transcript, and return it to me with any desired changes.  Few participants 
requested a copy of the interview transcript, and only one returned the transcript to me 
with any additions or modifications.  This occurred on an occasion when the 
microphone battery on my tape-recorder had run low, and I had found it difficult to 
hear some of the taped interview.  
 
Given the sensitive and private nature of the topic, it was important to be alert to 
possible harm caused to participants in the research.  It was difficult to anticipate what 
ethical issues might arise during the course of an interview.  To some extent I 
assumed that the element of self-selection in the recruiting process would eliminate 
those who would find the interview unduly stressful or an unwelcome intrusion into 
their lives.  Nonetheless, I was aware that some male participants were ambivalent 
about participating, raising the spectre of possible coercion by their partners.  On 
other occasions children conceived by DI were themselves present at the interview at 
their parents’ invitation.  This may have resulted from parents’ interpretation of my 
recruitment letter which indicated that I was seeking to interview “other family 
members”, which they had perceived as meaning members of their ‘nuclear’ family.  I 
was ambivalent about the presence of young children, wondering whether it was in 
their interests to be party to the interviews.  At the same time, I believed it was their 
                                                                                                                                                                      
9 See Appendix A for copies of information sheets for participants and the consent form. 
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parents’ decision to have them attend, and it provided me with some opportunities for 
unplanned data gathering.10
 
Some incidents that emerged during interviews suggest that while qualitative family 
research can be both helpful and therapeutic, problems arise when the researcher is 
perceived as a therapist, counsellor or an expert able to provide answers (Daly, 
1992:110-111). Like Daly, I had to be careful not to over-step the bounds of my 
professional expertise as a researcher without professional therapy training. I was 
aware of this when couples clearly disagreed about matters such as whether to, or 
when to, tell the child about his/her origins.  In such instances, I acknowledged that 
the issue was complex, but that only they could decide what was best in their 
situation. In some interviews where it became clear that the participant had some 
issues they wished to address, I referred participants to a trained counsellor or clinic 
psychologist working in the field who had agreed to assist.  Some participants asked if 
I could help them establish contact with the local support group for couples with 
children conceived by DI,11 and I was able to do this with the appropriate prior 
consent. 
 
Given the ‘sensitive’ topic discussed during interviews, it is possible that participants 
were left feeling ‘abandoned’ or vulnerable after ‘opening up’ to a researcher.  
Although it is not entirely possible to erase the unequal power relationship between 
the ‘researcher’ and ‘researched’ (Stacey, 1991), I tried to treat participants as 
collaborators in important social research, in an area where little is known, and 
endeavoured to foster an atmosphere of trust and openness between us. After each 
interview, I wrote to thank participants for their contribution to the project, and said I 
would keep them informed of its development.  I have since mailed out letters to 
participants, informing them about the project’s status; I will also let them know when 
the thesis is completed and tell them how they can access it through the University of 
Canterbury Library. 
 
The issue of who stands to benefit from this research must also be considered.  Many 
participants with children conceived through DI expressed the desire to participate in 
                                                          
10 Chapters Ten and Eleven include some brief comments made by children conceived by DI. 
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research that might help others in a similar situation.  They also wanted to contribute 
to a greater knowledge base that would inform members of society about donor 
insemination, thereby taking it “out of the closet”.  Many participants were also 
interested in finding out about the lives of other DI families, and therefore wanted to 
read the completed thesis.  Health professionals who participated in this research also 
expressed an interest in the psychosocial implications for donor families.  The 
question arises, then, as to how information is disseminated to these groups in order 
for them to benefit from the knowledge produced. This could be achieved through 
presentations to interested groups, and through publications in magazines, newspapers 
and academic journals.  These matters will be discussed further after completion of 
the thesis. 
 
Analysing the data 
The dual tasks of organising and interpreting data coming out of 52 interviews, each 
lasting an average of 1½ hours was on-going and time-consuming.  This, at times, 
brought home to me Lareau’s comment that “qualitative work is more cumbersome 
and more difficult than survey research at almost every stage: formulation of the 
problem, access, data collection, data analysis, and writing up the results” (1996:231).  
At the same time, as Lareau also comments, qualitative research may be the only way 
to gain insights into routine events in everyday life and the meaning that makes social 
reality: hence its value in sociological inquiry (1996:232).  As Tesch points out, 
qualitative analysis is done in almost constant interaction with the data (1990:113). 
This interaction took place initially during the process of interviewing, writing up 
interview notes, and hearing the taped interviews while transcribing them word for 
word.  Through constant interaction with the data I began to identify major themes.  
Many of these were pre-determined in the sense that they reflected questions 
appearing on the interview guide, which themselves emerged from knowledge about 
the debates and issues at the forefront of the academic literature on DI.  As well as 
these, some unanticipated themes emerged from the interview material. 
 
As a further step in familiarising myself with the interview material, I read through 
each transcript listing major themes emerging in each to get a sense of the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
11 Some regional infertility societies run support groups for parents of children conceived by DI. 
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commonalities and diversity that existed.  In retrospect, and in light of my use of 
NUDIST software in the data analysis process, this step may not have been necessary.  
At the time, however, I thought I needed to be very familiar with what I had before I 
could develop a workable index system in NUDIST.  Subsequently, I learned that the 
flexibility of the programme enabled whatever reconfiguring might be necessary 
along the way.  Reading through each transcript, however, gave me a good sense of 
the whole, which Tesch (1990:142) suggests is important when developing an 
organising system, particularly for unstructured qualitative data. 
 
As those who teach people how to use NUDIST software themselves have stated, the 
best way to get to know the programme is to use it (Qualitative Solutions and 
Research Pty Ltd, 1994:6).  I decided to use this programme for organising and aiding 
the interpretation of data because I thought it would save time on cutting and pasting, 
and endlessly flicking through transcripts manually.  Rather than saving time, 
however, using NUDIST mainly served to organise the manual activities of 
organising data differently, say, from a cut-up-and-put-in-folders approach (Tesch, 
1990:128).  NUDIST provided the facility to both store data documents and index 
them according to major themes and subthemes, which are called ‘nodes’. For 
example, I labelled the first node “Pathways” as a way of identifying aspects of the 
data that related to the lead up to conceiving a child by DI. Subsequently, this and the 
many sub-nodes that emerged from this ‘parent’ node were interpreted and used to 
formulate Chapter Four: Pathways to Donor Insemination. 
 
After consulting with someone who had used the programme, I began my NUDIST 
analysis by creating an index system based on seven major nodes.  In my mind these 
constituted possible main chapter areas for my thesis, and they also corresponded with 
areas of questioning included in the interview guide. From the seven major nodes I 
developed a ‘tree’ comprising 127 nodes.12  Developing this index system and coding 
the interview transcripts took place over several months.  It was an intensive process 
that required a lot of concentration and thus it was difficult to work on more than one 
transcript in a day. Tesch (1990:155) describes this process as de-contextualising the 
data, or segmenting the whole into meaning units or analysis units.  Because I did not 
                                                          
12 See Appendix B for a list of the nodes developed in NUDIST for the purposes of data analysis. 
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want to ‘miss’ anything, I coded virtually everything in the interviews which, in 
retrospect, was not entirely necessary.  The process of developing the index system 
involved keeping like categories together and creating new nodes when data did not 
appear to ‘fit’ into existing nodes.  The nature of the data meant that material often 
‘fitted’ into multiple nodes, which meant making later decisions about where in the 
thesis it could be included to greatest effect.  Coding data into multiple nodes also 
facilitated contextualising the data.  For example, the interviewee might be talking 
about the effect of his Catholic upbringing on his concerns about secrecy in DI.  In 
this case, the interview material would be coded to nodes 1312 and 42. 
 
After indexing the data, I produced reports for each node of the ‘tree’ created in 
NUDIST. Each node report contained the variety of responses to a particular question, 
or attitudes to a particular aspect of the experience of having a child by DI. Tesch 
(1990: 122) describes this process of assembling all the data coded to each particular 
category as ‘re-contextualisation’ because each node deals with one concept, or ‘pool 
of meanings’.  Once the data relating to one particular concept were assembled in one 
report, they were ready for interpretation.  Tesch (1990:114) notes that unlike 
quantitative analysis, in qualitative data analysis, organisation and interpretation do 
not take place as two discrete processes; rather they are intellectually intertwined and 
sometimes happen at the same time. Thus, some of the identification of major themes 
and sub-themes, and the linking of these to the literature and to sociological theories 
that might be used to explain them, happened during the processes of transcription, 
data coding, or re-examining written transcripts.   
 
Nonetheless, most of the interpretation proceeded from examining the interview 
material once it was reassembled in each node report generated in NUDIST. During 
this process, I examined each node report for sub-themes within major themes, to get 
a sense of the variety of participants’ experiences, responses to questions, and the 
discourses they used to make sense of their lives. Many of the sub-themes that 
emerged during this interpretive exercise formed the basis of separate sub-titled parts 
of each chapter.  Within each sub-titled section, participants’ talk was organised by 
grouping together like responses and then arranging them in a sequence to create a 
coherent whole that presented and analysed a particular aspect of people’s experience. 
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As part of this process, participants’ talk was compared and contrasted with other 
participants’ responses to the same questions to determine similarities and differences.  
Individual participant’s talk was also scrutinised for the use of any conflicting or 
contradictory discourses, to tease out the complexities, ambiguities and contradictions 
in people’s lives. 
.  
According to Lupton (1992:145), discourse analysis has two dimensions: the textual 
and the contextual.  While the textual dimension is concerned with the structure of 
talk or text (e.g. grammar, syntax, use of rhetorical devices, etc.) the contextual 
dimension of a discourse analysis links structural descriptions to the social, political 
and cultural context in which they take place (Lupton, 1992:145).  The discourse 
analysis carried out when interpreting the data for this study focuses on context.  It is 
concerned with making explicit ways in which certain type of talk occurs, and how 
this links with social interaction and particular situations.  In the coding process I 
therefore took care not to lose the context in which comments were made and 
discourses drawn on.  If, during the process of coding transcript material, I thought the 
context was unclear, I referred to the participant’s whole transcript to 
‘recontextualise’ their comments.   
 
Participants’ talk was analysed to determine the way discourse reproduces ideology 
and hegemony and to establish links between discourse, social interaction and 
particular situations (Lupton, 1992:145).  For example, I paid attention to the words 
people used when referring to the sperm donor (i.e. was he a ‘dad’, a ‘biological 
father’ a ‘real father’ or ‘the donor’?).  As well as attending to the language used, I 
asked questions about how the meanings attached to these words reproduce general 
understandings about the nature of ‘fatherhood’ in a particular social context, and how 
these meanings inhere in people’s attitudes and actions.   As Lupton has pointed out, 
more than a content analysis, which attends to the surface or manifest meanings of 
texts, a discourse analysis is concerned with the symbolic and latent meanings of texts 
or verbal communications (Lupton, 1992:147).   
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Conclusion 
As a researcher and interpreter of the data, I make no claims about the objectivity or 
universal truth of my interpretations, which are shaped by the particular sociopolitical 
context in which they were produced (Lupton, 1992:148).  However, I have 
endeavoured to make explicit my own position as a person with particular experiences 
of ‘family’ and ‘kinship’, and as a consumer of fertility services.  As a sociologist, I 
have available to me a range of analytical concepts and theories that are drawn on in 
my interpretation of the data.  The sensitive aspects of this field of research meant that 
much of what was said had a psychological dimension, on which I was not qualified 
to comment.  Some may wonder how idiosyncratic are the accounts I have presented, 
but as Pahl (1995:78) has argued, “the reader has to trust me, the research instrument, 
to be honest and not to create false impressions through sly editing”.  As previously 
stated, I make no claims about the generalisability of this material to a particular 
population.  At the same time, I attempt to present a range of people’s experiences 
that are likely to be similar to the experiences of others.  In some cases, this is 
supported by evidence from other studies.  My interpretations of peoples’ talk may be 
contested but, like Pahl (1995:78), to write about the people I have interviewed for 
this study I have had to make my own judgements. 
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Chapter Three 
Families, Kinship and Assisted Conception 
  
 
[N]ature and culture have become increasingly isomorphic while remaining distinct.  …nature 
is being commodified, technologised, re-animated and rebranded in ways that expose its 
artifice.  No longer able to authenticate or pre-exist culture in the predictable ways it once 
could, nature could be seen to have moved out of the picture in the multiple and intertextual 
significations of globalising cultures (Franklin, Lury and Stacey, 2000:9,10). 
 
 
Introduction: a theoretical preamble 
In families with children conceived by donor insemination, notions of human 
‘relatedness’ are complicated by the presence of genetic material received from a 
(probably unknown) third party. Discussion about changing families, family practices 
and kinship, provides a useful context for analysis of networks of relatedness in 
families using donor insemination. The past decade has witnessed renewed academic 
interest in both the study of families and the study of kinship.  According to Smart 
and Neale (1999:2), the study of families had lost significance for sociologists with 
the decline of functionalist thought in the 1960s, and the increasing focus of the 
mainstream sociological ‘gaze’ on the ‘public sphere’ rather than the ‘private 
sphere’.1 In the mid-1990s, ‘the family’ once again became a focus of sociological 
theorising.   Smart and Neale (1999:4-5) suggest that ‘the family’ is now being taken 
up as conceptually and theoretically significant for three main reasons.  First, 
empirical findings have alerted scholars to significant changes in family life and 
relationships, precipitated by trends such as higher divorce rates, and an increase in 
‘reconstituted families’, which demand further analysis. Second, the changing ‘face’ 
of family life has led to heated political debate, with conservative factions pointing to 
a decline in family values and the demise of ‘the family’(Blankenhorn,1995; Popenoe, 
1996), and the corresponding view that these arguments should not go unchallenged 
(Stacey, 1996; Coontz, 1992).  The third reason for renewed interest in ‘the family’ 
relates to an increasing focus on ‘the family’ and intimate relationships by mainstream 
                                                          
1 For a more detailed discussion of the marginalisation of the study of family sociology, see Smart and 
Neale (1999:2-4). 
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theorists, such as Giddens and Beck,2 who have indicated that these require analysis if 
one is to understand changes occurring elsewhere in late modernity. 
 
The new focus on families and intimacy has moved away from the more structuralist 
view of ‘the family’ as a static institution among many other social institutions.  
Contemporary theorists emphasise the diversity of family life rather than the demise 
of ‘the family’ (see, for example, Coontz, 1992; Brubaker, 1993; Gittens, 1993; 
Stacey, 1990, 1996; Silva and Smart 1999; Smart and Neale, 1999). These writers 
highlight the need to take seriously fluidity and change rather than seeing it as 
something dangerous and undesirable (Silva and Smart, 1999:2).  The use of the term 
‘the family’ as appropriate terminology has been problematised by theorists such as 
Giddens, who generally avoids the term altogether, preferring instead to focus on 
intimacy, child-parent relationships, sexuality, and the body (Smart and Neale, 
1999:7).  Morgan (1996), an important theorist of ‘the family’, who is more interested 
in the interiority of family relationships than are the so-called grand theorists of 
modernity, uses the term ‘family practices’, which encapsulates the overlap with other 
social practices and avoids conceptualising the family as a unitary, functional social 
institution.  Instead, Morgan focuses on fluidity, change, gendered practices, adult-
child relationships and shifts within intimate relationships and between relationships 
(Smart and Neale, 1999:22).  A strength of Morgan’s focus on ‘family practices’ is 
that it implies that people are “doing family rather than passively residing within a 
pre-given structure” (Silva and Smart, 1999:5).  As Morgan himself points out, he 
uses the term ‘family’ in a transformed way, as a constructed quality of human 
interaction, rather than a “thing-like object of social investigation” (1999:16).  He 
therefore chooses not to abandon the term ‘family’ altogether, but to think of it as less 
of a noun and more as an adjective or a verb.   
 
In the 1990s the concept of family has come to signify the subjective meaning of 
intimate connections, rather than formal, objective ties based purely on biological or 
marriage ties (Gubrium and Holstein, 1990; Silva and Smart, 1999:7; Stacey, 1999).  
The work of writers such as Weston (1991) have highlighted that a unitary 
conceptualisation of  ‘the family’ also implies that everyone participates in the same 
                                                          
2 Smart and Neale (1999:6-19) provide an overview of the contribution of these sociological theorists 
to the study of families and intimacy in late modernity. 
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sorts of kinship relations which are based on the bonds of marriage and heterosexual 
reproduction.  This, she claims, has positioned gay men and lesbian women as anti-
family and “exiles from kinship” (Weston, 1991:22).  Weston (1991) argues that, like 
heterosexuals, gay men and lesbian women can also claim to create families, which 
include friends and lovers who are actively chosen, rather than emerging from a 
biological connection. In her view, biology is a cultural construct, rather than a self-
evident “natural fact” and, as such, is no less a symbol than is choice (Weston, 
1991:35).3  Issues raised by Weston (1991) about the formation of families through 
choice and love, rather than biogenetic substance, are explored in this thesis, primarily 
in the context of heterosexual parenting through donor insemination, but also in the 
context of lesbian parenting through DI. 
 
Weston’s critique of kinship can be linked to other analyses of kinship, notably 
Schneider’s A Critique of the Study of Kinship (1984), which challenged what he 
claimed were Eurocentric assumptions at the heart of anthropological study.4 
Schneider (1984:197) argued that the axioms that were the foundation of the study of 
kinship were, in fact, insupportable in the context of all cultures. He argued, therefore, 
that the only basis on which kinship studies could proceed was to take kinship as an 
empirical question, not as a universal fact (Schneider, 1984:200). In the light of these 
comments, in this study kin relations are explored as an empirical question.  The 
thesis explores the meanings people in New Zealand attach to kinship and ‘family’ 
and whether or not Euro-American conceptions of relatedness, based on the facts of 
procreation, inform dominant understandings about kin relations in this country.  
 
Schneider’s critique of the study of kinship in anthropology marked a turning point as 
questions were raised about its place in the discipline. Like the shift of the 
sociologists’ gaze from ‘the family’, the shift away from kinship in anthropology 
                                                          
3 See also Stacey (1999:374) for a discussion of gay and lesbian families as among the diverse family 
forms that characterise what she describes as “the postmodern family condition”.  
4 According to Schneider (1984:187-188), three axioms underpinned the anthropological study of 
kinship.  First, kinship was one of the four privileged domains, or rubrics, of social science, each of 
which was perceived as a natural, universal and vital component of society.  Second, kinship has to do 
with the reproduction of human beings, and relations between those who are party to the reproductive 
process, which is formulated as a sexual and biological process.  Third, sexual reproduction creates 
biological links between persons that have important qualities distinct from the social or cultural 
attributes which may be attached to them.  These biological ties are considered to be ‘natural’ ties 
inherent in the human condition and distinct from the social or cultural. 
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marked a general shift in the discipline from structure to practice, and from practice to 
discourse (Carsten, 2000:2), though each of these exists simultaneously with differing 
emphases.  Renewed interest in the study of kinship in the 1990s can be attributed to 
feminist work, studies of gay and lesbian kinship, and Strathern’s After Nature 
(1992a) (Carsten, 2000:3). Much of the recent anthropological work on kinship in so-
called Euro-American cultures has focused on new reproductive technologies, on 
gender, and on the social construction of science (Carsten, 2000:3).  In particular, 
anthropologists have been concerned with sets of issues about ‘nature’ and ‘biology’, 
and the relationship between the ‘biological’ and the ‘social’. Challenging notions that 
take for granted a division between the ‘biological’ and the ‘social’, Carsten (2000) 
sets out to show that in many cultures the boundaries between the ‘biological’ and the 
‘social’ are decidedly blurred and, in some cases, not visible at all. Carsten (2000:4) 
has chosen to move away from the term ‘kinship’ and the pre-given analytical 
distinction between the ‘biological’ and the ‘social’ that this implies.  Instead, she 
uses the term ‘relatedness’ though, this too, she contends, is open to many of the 
criticisms that might equally apply to ‘kinship’ (Carsten, 2000:4-5). 
 
The notion of the destabilisation of the analytical opposition between ‘biological’ and 
‘social’ kinship is central to the conceptual and theoretical basis of this thesis. The 
thesis provides illustrations of couples and family members both constructing and 
deconstructing this opposition as they talk about the meaning they give to the use of 
DI in their families.  To analyse this talk, the thesis draws on much of the work of 
social anthropologists who have written specifically about the cultural implications of 
new reproductive technologies.5 The central project of these authors is to 
‘defamiliarise’6 the natural basis of human procreation and reproduction (Carsten, 
2000:11). Strathern (1992a, 1992b) explores the cultural implications of the use of 
new reproductive technologies, arguing that in late twentieth century English culture, 
and Euro-American cultures more generally, what have been deemed ‘natural’ 
processes can no longer be taken for granted. She contends that developments in 
reproductive medicine do not just comprise new procedures but also embody new 
                                                          
5 See, for example, Strathern, 1992a, 1992b; Edwards, Franklin, Hirsch, Price and Strathern, 1993, 
1999; Ginsburg and Rapp, 1995; Franklin, 1997; Franklin and Ragone, 1998. 
6 This term is used to refer to the ways in which taken for granted assumptions about natural processes, 
such as conception, are taking place within a woman’s body, beyond the gaze or intervention of 
humans. 
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knowledge (Strathern, 1995:347). Through the use of procreative technologies 
dispersed kinship is constituted in dispersed conception: it includes those who 
“produce” the child with assistance as well as those who assist (Strathern, 1995:353). 
Thus, she maintains, there exists a group of procreators whose relationship to one 
another and to the child is contained in the act of conception itself and not in the 
family as such.  Thus, in her view, while Euro-American kinship thinking may be 
predicated on the “facts of life”, learning more about the facts of life will not, these 
days, necessarily tell us more about kinship (Strathern, 1995:359-360).   
 
Like Strathern, Franklin (1995, 1997) contends that the hitherto unavailable choices 
extended to consumers by the new reproductive technologies, which are often 
constituted as ‘giving nature a helping hand’, have resulted in a destablisation of 
nature.  Franklin (1995:333) asserts that while stories about “the birds and the bees” 
referred to a ‘natural’ unfolding process, 
 
the new narrative of assisted or achieved conception tells a different story.  This world 
becomes visible and knowable through technological means, creating new forms of 
accessibility to and improvement of reproduction.  The necessity for technological assistance 
thus comes to be seen as a product of nature itself.  In this slippage, whereby the “helping 
hand” of technology is both conflated with, and yet also displaces, nature, a key shift in the 
cultural meaning and organisation of reproduction must be seen to lie (Franklin, 1995:333-
334). 
 
 
In this view, technology can no longer be construed as “interfering with nature”; 
rather it assists ‘natural’ events such as conception and therefore can be 
conceptualised as standing in for ‘nature’. Nature and technology thus become 
mutually substitutable.  While destablised nature can appear to be less credible, 
Stacey (2000) argues that denaturalisations are quickly transformed into 
renaturalisations, and decontextualisations into recontextualisations.  Thus, the 
commodification or instrumentalisation of nature “presents little threat to its 
continuing pervasiveness as authenticator” (Stacey, 2000:140). 
 
New ways of thinking about kinship, made possible through the new narrative of 
achieved conception, challenge modernist distinctions between the artificial and the 
natural, the biological and the social, and between nature and culture. While much of 
Strathern’s work highlights the centrality of pre-given biological facts to Western 
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understandings of kinship, writers such as Haraway (1991) have investigated the 
cultural construction of a scientific realm of ‘natural facts’.  Through her work on 
primatology, Haraway (1991) has shown that the boundaries between nature and 
culture are much more permeable than biological or social scientists might assume.  
Haraway (1991) questions the existence of ‘biological facts’ in a separate realm from 
culture.  Instead, she argues that ‘scientific facts’, supposedly awaiting discovery in 
the ‘natural world’ are, in fact, actively constructed by scientists located in particular 
historical and social worlds.   The notion that ‘natural facts’ are constructed and not 
discovered is radical, according to Carsten (2000:11), because it goes against 
dominant Western assumptions about the ‘natural world’. 
 
Haraway (1991:8) maintains that we have accepted at face value the so-called “liberal 
ideology” of social scientists in the twentieth century that maintains a deep and 
necessary split between nature and culture. Such ideologies, she argues, have 
legitimated beliefs in the natural necessity of aggression, competition and hierarchy 
(Haraway, 1991:22).  She also points out that, while feminists have successfully 
deconstructed the nature/culture dichotomy, they have been less successful in 
challenging the sex/gender dichotomy.   This, in turn, has meant they have been less 
powerful in deconstructing how bodies appear as objects of knowledge and sites of 
intervention in ‘biology’ (Haraway, 1991:134).  
 
The ‘destabilisation’ of nature and the disruption of the binaries of nature/culture and 
biological/social offer new ways of thinking about kinship and, more broadly, 
‘relatedness’ between human beings (Carsten, 2000:24). Some of the studies 
appearing in Carsten’s volume point to an analysis of kinship that is more dynamic 
and creative than one based on a simple division between the ‘social’ and the 
‘biological’.  For example, Carsten refers to anthropological studies that point to a 
combination of sentiment, substance, and nurturance as grounds for relatedness 
(2000:22).  This links to some of the concerns of my thesis in relation to the 
significance couples who have conceived by DI give to the substance of donated 
sperm, and how this connects to other ways they conceptualise relatedness. Edwards 
and Strathern examine the multitude of possibilities the biological/social divide 
presents for the inclusion and exclusion of persons (2000:162).  What these authors 
are particularly interested in is not so much what is considered to be ‘social’ or 
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‘biological’, but what happens at their intersection (Edwards and Strathern, 
2000:150).  They argue that a distinguishing feature of twentieth century notions of 
kinship in Euro-American cultures is the division and combination of social and 
biological facts.7  
 
Drawing on recent theorising on families, kinship, and ‘relatedness’, this chapter 
examines the ways in which people in families with children conceived by DI talk 
about biological/genetic and social relationships within their family and extended kin 
group.  The chapter draws on social anthropological theory about kinship to highlight 
the social construction of ‘biological’ and ‘social’ parenthood.  It also examines how 
conceptualisations of the ‘biological’ and the ‘social’ and ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’ may 
be both distinguished and combined.  The talk of those interviewed highlights the 
permeability of concepts that have often been positioned as diametrically opposed.  
The first section of this chapter looks at how those who have children through forms 
of assisted conception simultaneously utilise, disrupt and transform cultural 
assumptions about the ‘natural facts’ of life. Their talk illustrates Strathern’s 
(1992b:15) argument that the procreative choices that new reproductive technologies 
afford will affect thinking about kinship, and other ideas about relatedness between 
human beings. This section also pays attention to the concepts of the ‘blood ties’ and 
‘the natural’ and how these are socially produced.  The second section looks at the 
nature/nurture dichotomy and the way parents and family members of children 
conceived by donor insemination use and challenge this opposition when considering 
the contribution of hereditary and environmental factors in the creation and 
development of their child.   Issues raised in this chapter about biology and ‘nurture’ 
are also considered in later chapters, for example, in connection with the significance 
attached by some people to family resemblance, and the ways in which the donor is 
conceptualised.8
                                                          
7 The authors argue that the nature-society combination/divide is central to the work of actor-network 
theorists such as Latour. 
8 See Chapter Eleven for a discussion on the significance of physical relatedness in the form of family 
resemblance, as a way of constructing and conceptualising human relatedness.  Barnard (1994:787-8) 
argues that there are three possible levels of analysis in connection with physical relationships:  true 
genetic relationships between individuals, ‘biological’ relationships (as defined by people of the society 
in question) and social relationships.  The middle category refers to socially constructed ‘biological’ 
knowledge, which is not universal but culturally specific.  According to Barnard (1994), physical 
resemblance falls into this category because it may or may not be based on a genetic relationship 
between individuals. 
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Kinship, family and the social construction of ‘natural facts’ 
Strathern (1992a:45) acknowledges the way anthropologists have distinguished 
‘nature’ and ‘culture’, but stresses that the axioms that Schneider (1984) critiques are 
nonetheless the basis of kinship’s identity in the discipline.  For Euro-Americans, at 
least, both Strathern (1993) and Schneider (1968 [1980]) suggest, kinship is a context 
in which people talk about relationships based on biology.  Strathern argues: 
 
Whether or not the relationships are consequently activated, for Euro-Americans there is no 
getting around the tie that exists with those persons whose genetic substances combined at the 
child’s conception.  This is taken as a fact of life (Strathern, 1993:14). 
 
Strathern therefore maintains that biological connections between persons, formed 
through the act of procreation, are the cornerstone of Euro-American thinking about 
kinship. According to Strathern (1993:17), to talk about kinship in Euro-American 
culture is to refer to the way in which social arrangements are based on natural 
processes.  This overlapping of the concepts of the social and the natural supports 
prevailing orthodoxy in many social science disciplines that the subjects of study are 
‘social constructions’.  In the case of kinship, Strathern maintains, what is at issue is 
the social construction of ‘natural facts’, which themselves are revealed to be social 
constructions (1992b:17). Strathern argues that ideas about kinship and the formation 
of families are overlaid with notions about the natural “facts of life” (Strathern, 
1992b:3). These natural facts of life, she says, are thought of in broad terms as 
‘biological’ and, more narrowly, as ‘genetic’. 
 
The idea of a genetic parent, for instance, brings together what is known about human heredity 
and the fact that a relationship is entailed, because, for Euro-Americans it is virtually 
impossible to talk of a parent in a human context without evoking the idea of potential social 
relations (Strathern, 1992b:3). 
 
In a culture where biological ties and parenthood are inextricably linked, the genetic 
parent is assumed to be the ‘real’ parent (Strathern, 1992b:16).  The man who raises 
the child, who has had a relationship with the child, arguably from conception, is 
qualified as the ‘social’ father, or he has some other label such as foster-father, step-
father, or adoptive father (and the same applies to mothers).  In a sense, he is 
secondary to the ‘real’ or ‘genetic’ father.  Disrupting this notion, my research shows, 
however, that a number of discourses about connectedness exist that draw 
simultaneously on the power of ‘blood ties’, as in the notion that “Blood is Thicker 
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than Water,” and the power of social connection.  Illustrating this point, Richard and 
Belinda, parents of a daughter, Madison, conceived by DI, were distressed when a 
friend asked if their daughter resembled her ‘real’ father (meaning the donor). They 
said: 
 
Richard:  And, what did she say?  She said, “Gosh she looks like…” 
                     
Belinda: No, she said, "Does Madison look like her real father?" and I said, "Of course she 
does. She's got a double crown, so her hair sticks up a bit like Richard's."  And she 
said, "No, no, her real father.  Haven't you got photos of this donor?" … And I just 
said, "Angela, Richard is her real father."  And I just left it at that.  I was so annoyed.  
 
This example illustrates Ragone’s contention that individuals who participate in 
collaborative reproduction “routinely manipulate categories of meaning as they 
pertain to issues of relatedness” (2000:70). Belinda uses resemblance to make 
connections, specifically physical connections between Madison and her father. 
Physical resemblance is used as a way of invoking relatedness even where there is no 
genetic tie (Ragone, 2000:67).  This illustrates Barnard’s (1994:786) contention that 
“[e]ven in Western societies, ‘biological’ kinship is often as much a metaphor for 
social relations as a statement of relevant biological fact”. Belinda recognises the 
discourse that prioritises physical connection, she utilises it and, at the same time, she 
resists the notion that a  ‘real’ parent is the biological/genetic or donor parent.  In this 
way, Belinda can be perceived as reworking the nature/culture dichotomy as a 
strategy to identify her husband as the sole father of their child (Ragone, 1996:360). 
 
Strathern (1992) suggests that Euro-Americans privilege ‘blood’ ties over social 
connections/linkages.  She asserts that “the concept of a blood ‘tie’ symbolises the 
further fact that relatives are seen to have a claim on one another by virtue of their 
physiological makeup” (1992b:18). Sarah and Tim, the parents of children from a 
variety of biological and social origins,9 said that their family members and friends 
were concerned about the potential for interference in their lives from people who had 
a biological claim to their children.  These included their adopted children’s birth 
parents and, potentially, their sperm donor.  Sarah commented as follows: 
 
                                                          
9 Rob their first child was adopted (a ‘stranger’ adoption); their second child Phoebe was adopted from 
within Sarah’s family (Sarah’s sister gave birth to Phoebe two months before Charlotte’s birth); and 
Charlotte, their third child, was conceived by donor insemination.  Recently they took on a foster 
daughter, Amy, a friend’s child, who is older than their other three children. 
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Sarah:  Well, they get a bit worried, all the family get a bit worried about us getting stretched, you 
know.  Like, I was talking about the other day, we had Rob’s birth family, and then Amy’s 
family, and that’s actually something aside, and what’s going to happen if Charlotte’s donor 
ever wants to meet her?  And they kind of feel worried, but they are worrying unnecessarily in 
the future, because you know… 
 
KH:  It’s just possibilities that might not happen? 
 
Sarah:   But people are scared of the unknown.  You know, they have a fear of it and Tim and I don’t 
have that fear.  We just get on board when it happens. 
 
Sarah revealed that her family members, who have a ‘social’ claim to her children, 
were threatened by the risk of a prior claim by the children’s biological relatives 
(Rockel and Ryburn, 1988:147). She claimed that family members and friends 
expected that she would feel ‘closer’ to the child that she had borne herself than to her 
adopted children and foster daughter. Sarah disputed this.  At the same time both she 
and her husband Tim acknowledged that having a child that was biologically related 
to them both had been their “first choice”.  Sarah retained a “wee hope” that she will 
conceive with Tim, but was concerned about the effect that having a child biologically 
related to them both would have on their other children, who were not genetically 
connected to both parents.  She commented: 
 
Sarah: Actually, we’re quite worried if we do have a child naturally, because all this bullshit from 
friends and family – “Oh, you’ve finally got one of your own” – and they’ll all be watching 
me to see whether I interact with it the same.  And people say to me already, oh, you know, 
“Do you feel closer to Charlotte, because you’ve had her, than the others?” 
The assumption reportedly expressed by her family members and friends was that 
biological ties between parent and child are somehow intrinsically ‘closer’ than social 
ties, or that biological ties foster closer social ties.  This relates to the idea that unless 
a relationship is grounded in some intrinsic or natural connection, then Euro-
Americans are likely to think of it as ‘artificial’, and to be thought artificial is to be 
open to uncertainty: reality lies elsewhere (Strathern, 1992b:27).  Most social 
relationships, including relationships between parents, however, do not have ‘biology’ 
as their basis. So this is understood as something particular to certain ‘family’ or kin 
relations, such as between parents and children, or between siblings.  Moreover, in 
Euro-American kinship ideology the child represents the symbolic fusion or unity of 
the couple (Ragone, 2000:70). The language and the understandings that construct the 
specialness of these ‘connections of blood’ exist side-by-side with other significant 
social relations not constituted in this way.  In Families We Choose, for example, 
Weston (1991) critiques the notion of the centrality of biological ties as the primary 
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basis of kinship.  She contends that kinship in lesbian and gay families is founded on 
the basis of choice and love, rather than a shared biogenetic connection.  Weston 
argues that, while some have located gay men and lesbians beyond the bounds of 
kinship, and labelled them as “anti-family”, gay men and lesbians form their own 
distinctive family type, which is the product of choice and biology (1991:40).10  
The idea that biological/genetic connections are somehow ‘closer’ than social ties is 
also played out in the public discourse that men are more likely to bond with a child 
to whom they are genetically related. One mother of a child conceived by DI said that 
women in her antenatal group (whom she had not told about her child’s DI origins) 
commented that a genetic tie was necessary for a man to bond with his child.  Some 
fathers included in this study had had initial concerns about how they would relate to 
a child who was not genetically related to them.  Peter, the father of a daughter 
conceived by DI, observed:   
 
Peter:  It hasn't really been [an issue].  It's quite surprised me actually, ah, it was probably more 
difficult when Erica was a baby because I didn't relate so well to Erica as a baby.  But now that 
she's been a toddler, and you know, she's a little girl now.  It's never really… it's actually 
become less and less of a factor. 
 
 
Peter’s perception of the lack of genetic tie between himself and Erica reveals an 
interesting tension.  He is saying that it was never an issue, but he also acknowledges 
that it was an issue, but has become less and less important as the social bond has 
been established. This social bonding has to occur between all parents and their 
offspring.  But the significance given to biological connection means that emotional 
bonds are assumed, and therefore perhaps facilitated.  Peter appeared to feel more 
‘secure’ in his connection with Erica after the social bonds were formed, but many 
men might have difficulty relating to a baby.  Alice, Peter’s partner, appeared to 
believe that the strength of the social bond between Peter and their daughter, that 
would continue to develop over time, would ensure the child’s genetic tie to the donor 
was insignificant in comparison.   
                                                          
10 In Weston’s view, “families we choose” incorporates the lovers, former lovers and friends that gay 
men and women choose to count as ‘family’.  The inclusion of a biological factor in this concept of 
family does not invoke the biological connection between parent and child, but instead the belief 
upheld by many gay men and lesbians that they do not simply ‘choose’ to be homosexual.  Rather, they 
have some predisposition to respond erotically to those of the same gender, and that the ‘choice’ to be 
gay was therefore an outcome of this self-awareness.  Thus, Weston’s argument points to a different 
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Alice:  I think she's going to grow up fairly firmly knowing that Peter is her…'social' father sounds 
like it's so inconsequential, it's not the right term…but her father in kind of all other senses.  I 
mean, they have a very good relationship now.  Um.  So she's going to grow up quite secure in 
that, but she knows there's this other person off to the side who helped us… 
 
Alice privileges social ties over biological/genetic ties: the donor, or the 
biological/genetic father of the child is relegated to a position “off to the side” and 
marginal to the core relationships between Erica and her parents. This relates to 
conceptualisations of technologies used in assisted human reproduction as merely 
lending a “helping hand” in the process of conception, enabling an infertile couple to 
have a child of their own.11  In Alice’s view, the ‘social’ father takes precedence as 
the father “in all senses”, other than having provided the genetic material for his 
child’s conception. Alice’s comment on the inadequacy of the term ‘social father’ 
challenges social/cultural understandings that privilege biological over social ties, and 
that position the social role secondary to the biological/genetic role.  Furthermore, her 
comments about the significance of the relationship between Peter and Erica are 
consistent with Ragone’s discussion about the way the intention to conceive a child is 
seen as a decisive factor in determining parenthood.  For example, in court cases 
relating to gestational surrogacy in the United States, when the surrogate mother had 
decided to keep the baby, the court had found in favour of the commissioning parents.  
This was not because of their genetic tie to the child, but because it was their intention 
to become parents that had led to the conception and birth of the child (Ragone, 
2000:61).   
 
Alice relates her perception of the significance of biological ties to her own 
experience of having a father who was adopted.  She claimed that her father 
discovered “by accident” that he was adopted when he was 21 years old, but he had 
never “bothered” to trace his birth family.  After his death, Alice had found out some 
details about her father’s birth mother’s family, and had thought about tracing her “for 
curiosity’s sake”.  She appeared to be interested in finding out her father’s 
genetic/biological background because of a sense that something was missing by not 
knowing anything about her father’s predecessors.   
                                                                                                                                                                      
notion of biology from the concept of biological ties created through human reproduction (Hayden, 
1995:45). 
11 As discussed earlier in this chapter (Franklin, 1995:333-334) refers to the ‘slippage’ that occurs 
whereby the “helping hand” of technology is both conflated with, and displaces, nature.  
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Alice: …it always felt like Dad’s side stopped with Dad, because he was adopted and, you know, in 
that kind of sense he was…it felt like there wasn’t much point taking that family tree back any 
further. 
 
Although she claimed to be curious about her father’s birth family, Alice 
distinguished between the meaning attached to her father’s relationship to his birth 
mother and the meaning attached to the relationship between a child conceived by DI 
and the anonymous gamete donor.  
 
Alice: There is a difference between a donor father and someone who’s had a relationship with the 
mother.  And there’s a different kind of meaning of that, but I think there’s still… from the 
child’s point of view, there’s still that need to put a few jigsaw pieces sort of in the right 
place…I don’t know…or there might be. 
 
Alice acknowledges that biological ties have significance for human affairs 
(Strathern, 1992b:18), but that the degree of significance and the way this might be 
played out in individual people’s lives is variable.  In relation to her young daughter’s 
life, its significance is as yet unknown.  As she considers these issues, Alice draws on 
‘adoption’ discourse that constitutes adoptive parents as the real parents and ‘natural’ 
fathers and ‘birth’ mothers as ‘inferior’, lesser parents.  At the same time, she draws 
on a children’s rights discourse of ‘the right to know’ about biological ancestry 
(Rockel and Ryburn, 1988:59-60; MCART, 1994:32-33; New Zealand Law 
Commission, 2000:67).12
 
As Alice pointed out, the concept of biological/genetic ties can be explored through 
the idiom of genealogy or family trees. When asked about their interest in or 
knowledge of their family tree, some research participants reported that they had 
become interested in their family lineage after becoming a parent through DI.  Neil, 
who himself was adopted, decided to trace his birth parents when he became a father. 
In response to a question relating to the significance for him of biological ties and 
knowing his ancestry, Neil replied: 
 
Neil: It wasn't and isn't that important to me.  It was really just the combination of nothing in the 
future and nothing in the past. And also, thinking that at some stage, my...our children may 
wish to find out for themselves their genetic origin, and that I felt having...if I went through 
the process myself, then I'd be in a better position to understand the sorts of issues that might 
                                                          
12 In New Zealand, the Adult Adoption Information Act 1985 gives adult adopted people and birth 
parents access to information about about one another, while providing safeguards for those who want 
privacy (Rockel and Ryburn, 1988:59-60). 
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come up for them.  So, it's very hard for me to say, for myself, ah, what specifically, apart 
from that, was important. 
 
Neil’s talk about the meaning of biological ties reveals a dual direction.  He wants to 
know his biological origins for his children’s sake, but also because they are not his 
genetic children.  It reveals that his ‘biological’ links are only backwards in time. 
Although he and his family now have on-going contact with his birth mother, Neil 
clearly thinks of himself as part of his adoptive family, the Moores, rather than as a 
member of his birth family.  He therefore had adopted the Moore’s ancestry as his 
own, though it is less clear whether he expected his children to do so because, from a 
young age, they had developed a relationship with his birth mother, their other 
grandmother. Neil and his wife Patricia commented on his ‘lineage’:  
 
Neil:   I’ve got one little booklet which is entitled “How the Moores came to New Zealand” and I’ve 
got another little collection of background information about my birth mother’s family.  I 
relate more to the story of how the Moores came to New Zealand, but there’s no genetic 
lineage there. 
 
KH:   So your children could also ‘adopt’ the Moores as their ancestors? 
 
Neil:   Mm.  Well, of course we have regular contact with my birth mother.  There are some presents 
there [under the Christmas tree] from Nana. 
 
KH:   So they call her Nana? 
 
Neil:   Yes.  I never call her Mum. 
 
KH:   Do you call her by her Christian name? 
 
Neil:   Yes.  There’s certainly a clear distinction for me. 
 
Patricia: I think that they’re [Neil’s biological parents] just the…I suppose, a key, if you like; that Neil 
grew up with Mum Moore and the bond is there. What Neil is saying is that the connection he 
has is closer with the Moore lineage because that’s where the bond is; that maybe the 
bloodline doesn’t necessarily have to be so important because really the importance is in that 
bond within the family that’s developed. 
 
Neil’s birth mother now has a social persona: she is not just interesting as a genetic 
connection.  She can be the children’s nana, but not Neil’s mum. This scenario 
illustrates the fluidity of families and the possibility of having several mothers, 
fathers, and grandparents by different routes (Smart and Neale, 1999; Silva and 
Smart, 1999).13  
                                                          
13 Adding to the complexity of their family connections, in more recent years Neil and Patricia’s eldest 
daughter has ‘added’ to her ‘family’ by forming a relationship with a genetic half-sister: a girl in 
another family with the same genetic father.  This was facilitated by the Donor Family Register, a 
voluntary register of families with children conceived by DI, which is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Five. 
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Other families with children conceived by DI also contended that bloodlines were less 
significant than social relationships.  Joe, the father of three sons conceived by DI, 
expressed little interest in his own family tree.  In relation to it, he said: 
 
Joe:   Oh, I'll leave that to somebody else to sort out.  The thing is that I'm first generation New 
Zealander, so to trace my genealogy back would be a right pain. 
                                                                  
Ella:   Yes, Mum's got a family tree hasn't she? 
             
Joe:   Yeah, we've got one on my mother's side.  I may have seen it once or twice - doesn't rate high 
with me. 
 
Joe and his wife Ella told of his father’s delight when their first son conceived by DI, 
and his father’s first grandson, William, was born. 
 
Joe: William was the prize. 
 
Ella: He was their first son. 
 
Joe: Grandson.  He'd had four granddaughters before that. 
 
Ella: So whether he had Joe's blood or not.  It didn't matter.  He was special. 
 
Joe: He carried the name on. 
 
Ella: Yeah (laughs). 
 
Joe: It meant a lot to my father.  I don't know why. 
 
Ella: William was always special to Dad because he was the first grandson. 
 
Joe: I think what it was as much that he was the first boy. 
 
Ella: Yeah, I thought that it might make a difference that he wasn't the same blood, you know. 
 
Joe: It didn't. 
                                                                              
 
Joe and Ella revealed that, although their son was not tied ‘by blood’ to his 
grandfather, his birth symbolised the continuance of the family name.  This supports 
Hayden’s argument that biology is an important symbol of relatedness that can be 
articulated and embodied in many ways, including through naming practices 
(1995:50).  Joe theorised that his father’s perception of the significance of blood ties 
embodied in the sharing of biogenetic substance was embedded in his own experience 
of family life.  His father was orphaned (and perhaps brought up by people who were 
not his biological kin) and so it is possible that he valued social relationships rather 
than genetic connections.  At the same time, however, his apparent pleasure in the 
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arrival of a grandson who continued the family name invokes the figurative sharing of 
a biological connection.  
 
Particular experiences of ‘family’ were therefore important in determining the ways in 
which people drew on discourses that divided and/or combined notions of biological 
or social ties in defining kin relations. Kathy’s eldest daughter, Melissa, was 
conceived by DI, and her younger daughter Nicole was conceived without assistance 
after fifteen years of marriage. She appeared particularly conscious that others might 
perceive her daughters as ‘half-siblings’, a term she studiously sought to avoid 
because it implied that her daughters’ relationship was somehow ‘less than’ it would 
be if they were ‘full’ siblings.  She linked her views on this to her own family 
background. 
 
Kathy:   [My mother] probably doesn’t treat Melissa any differently [from Nicole], but she comes from 
a step-parenting situation herself in her own family.  Her mother remarried.  And I guess that’s 
my issue: she’s always heightened her half-brothers and sisters, by saying ‘my half-sister’.  
She doesn’t refer to Lily as her sister.  And I’ve always…even before I had children…disliked 
that.  I thought, family is family. 
 
Kathy was uncomfortable with her mother’s insistence on referring to her ‘half’ 
siblings.  She did not enjoy close ties with her biological relatives, and claimed that 
her family of origin was ‘dysfunctional’ despite the assumed bond created by 
biological ties: 
 
Kathy:   At 14 I'd gone to live with other people…a young man at the time that I actually went out 
with…with his family.  I remember thinking, “this is actually a proper family”.  It was the first 
time I'd actually realised a proper family. 
 
KH: So you didn't feel yours was? 
 
Kathy: Oh, it was totally dysfunctional, an absolutely awful family, terrible. 
 
KH: And your parents? 
 
Kathy: Didn’t see eye-to-eye. …They stayed together for the sake of the children (she laughs).  No, it 
was awful.  It was just a totally dysfunctional family.  It was Mother who actually threw me 
out at 14.  We were sort of pretty angry kids anyway.  I mean, we’d been put into kids’ homes 
over the years when she needed a break, and shunted and shovelled, so yeah. 
 
For Kathy, a ‘proper’ family was defined socially, not in terms of biological 
connectedness.  Other participants commented that biological ties did not necessarily 
lead to close family relationships.  Jane, the mother of twins conceived by DI, said: 
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Jane:  …you can have families that can be quite disjointed as well, even if you’ve got the blood ties.  
I know my family is completely disjointed really, because of Mum being sick a lot, and you 
know how families [she makes the sound of something being torn apart] because of 
stigmas…my mother was sick a lot…with having breakdowns and there was a stigma with 
that…Yeah, our family pulled apart really.  My father tried to keep it together, but I think 
that’s really…so the point about the blood thing is, you might have relations that are tied by 
blood, but they mightn’t be close. 
 
 
According to Jane, the social stigma of her mother’s illness had somehow discredited 
her family, ‘spoiling’ its identity and by inference that of its members (see Goffman, 
1963) to the extent that it affected the quality of their social relationships.   
 
Other parents, because of their somewhat negative experience of ‘family’, showed 
little desire to reproduce their family’s genes.  Sean, a father of a young daughter 
conceived by DI, commented that he did not care to carry on his family genes because 
he did not particularly like his blood relatives.  In this way, DI can be constructed as 
having a ‘silver lining’ in that one can avoid perpetuating ‘unfavourable’ genes.  This 
was revealed when I asked: 
 
KH:  Did you think of it being a problem having a child genetically related to one of you and not the 
other? 
 
Pippa:   Yes, well that was quite easy because Sean’s not got much family, or we don’t see them… 
 
Sean:   (He laughs).  More to the point, I don’t like the ones that I’ve got!  So I’m not particularly 
keen to preserve the Clark genes. 
 
Pippa:   No.  We were both upset initially, and I think I was quite…I really wanted a little Sean or 
whatever, but then I kind of moved on from that, and it wasn’t such an issue for Sean, like a 
lot of guys, once he’d got through the mourning stage. 
 
Sean and Pippa raise the issue that the significance of the biological connection lies in 
the social connection, or relationship, between the couple who seek to parent or have 
a child together.  The conception of a child is an expression of the love and 
commitment of two people to each other, rather than necessarily a desire to perpetuate 
particular genes or bloodlines.  More than just to each other, it is a commitment to a 
joint set of actions and responsibilities that inhere in parenting as a practice. 
 
Many participants appeared to question the significance of biological ties by 
suggesting that what was more important was that couples were able to have children, 
no matter how that was achieved. Strathern argues that procreation can now be 
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thought about as an act of preference or choice: the child itself becomes the 
embodiment of the act of choice (1992b:34).  According to Strathern, “we live in a 
world where we think that a child ought to exist by choice.  This idea of choice is 
already embedded in a matrix of other analogies – this matrix is the Enterprise 
Culture” (1992b:35).  The point of political concern here, Strathern asserts, is the 
hidden prescription that we ought to act by choice: in contemporary Euro-American 
culture in a sense there is no choice not to consume (1992b:37-38).  In the same way, 
in the context of assisted human reproduction, parenthood is constructed as the 
intentional or deliberate choice to conceive and bear a child, as opposed to this 
possibly happening unintentionally  (Ragone, 2000:61). 
 
Tim and Sarah wanted to be parents, but were unable to conceive by themselves 
because of male infertility. So they exercised choice in order to achieve their goal of 
having a large family, albeit not in the way they had originally planned.  Nevertheless, 
having adopted a child, exercising choice by using conceptive technologies that 
enabled them to have a child by DI was a source of anxiety for Tim.  He expressed his 
original concerns about having a family comprising children of ‘mixed parentage’. 
 
Tim: When we discussed having a donor child, I said it would be nice but it was still hard, and then, 
um, because I thought, we'd already adopted one, you know, and going for a donor child as 
well... I just sort of thought there may be problems not too far down the line, which is ridiculous 
really, when you look at it now, but at the time, I thought, oh no, we've got an adopted child, a 
donor child, then have one of your own, and you've got all these little mixed little children and 
you're going to have a mixed up family, you know.  Starting off mixed up.  All these things are 
going to come out when they're teenagers and you know, we were looking too far ahead 
basically. 
 
Tim invokes a discourse about the significance of biological connection in families 
through shared biogenetic substance. At the same time, having experienced being a 
father to children of mixed ‘origins’, he suggested that his fears might have been 
groundless.  Adding to the spectre of a ‘mixed up’ family, Sarah wanted to donate her 
eggs to an infertile couple, but said that Tim would not support her in this. 
 
Sarah: Tim would not go along with me.  He'd still be supportive, but he's got a question mark over it 
all now.  And the other thing is, this mixed bag, you know: stranger adoption, family adoption, 
donor child, foster child, egg donor child somewhere out there, and then we'll have our own.  
You know, he has got this fear of the whole bloody thing coming back and hitting me with a 
vengeance. 
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Sarah took some consolation in the fact that in contemporary New Zealand society it 
has become almost commonplace for children not to be living with both their 
biological parents, primarily because of divorce and reconstituted families.  She thus 
drew on a discourse about fluidity, change and potential fragmentation in the context 
of family relations (Smart and Neale, 1999).  She said:  
 
Sarah: Well, another thing that happened way back in the beginning that helped us with our decision 
with the kids all coming from different directions was, just a friend was...I was talking it over 
with a friend, she said "Look Sarah, walk into a primary school today, of seven year olds, and 
ask the children who live with their biological mother and father to put their hands up,” and 
she says “less than a third of children these days live with both their biological mother and 
father.”  There's step-parents, and step-brothers and half-brothers and half-sisters and... and it's 
actually a whole society thing.  Our children, we hope, are going to be ahead of the 8-ball 
because they have come together from different backgrounds because of love.  They're not 
where they are because of non-love.  And so, although that was a real simple thing that she 
said, it was a really pertinent thing for the way our family came together, or I found it was.  
 
And I tell you, once you get the baby, all those other fears that your friends and family …it 
just goes out the window, eh.  A baby is a baby.  And it’s just that people that can’t have 
children naturally, we’ve just got to deal with so much more shit than everybody else has to. 
 
Like Weston’s (1991) gay and lesbian families, Sarah posited a model of family that 
is formed through active choice rather than biological ties. To her, exercising this 
choice meant that they had children who had become part of their family because of 
their well-considered desire to become parents, and to care for their children. Sarah’s 
comments link to notions about change and diversity in family forms in late twentieth 
and early twenty-first century Western societies, where no rigid definition of the 
‘proper’ family exists, and new normative guidelines are emerging (Silva and Smart: 
1999:4).  It also links to the new focus on ‘family practices’ which, embracing fluidity 
and change, focuses on gendered practices and adult-child relationships, rather than 
‘the family’ as a static, isolated institution (Morgan, 1996; Smart and Neale, 1999:22; 
Silva and Smart, 1999:5). 
 
Like Sarah, who found that family members expressed concerns about the mixed 
biological/genetic origins of their children, Joanna, the separated mother of two DI 
children conceived by different donors, said that her mother had expressed similar 
concerns: 
 
Joanna: I don’t think she was thinking when she was talking, because I’ve been with [her new partner] 
for about four months and Mum was saying…I don’t think she was thinking…she was saying, 
‘Oh next thing you’ll probably get pregnant or something.’ And I said, ‘Oh well, that’s not so 
bad,’ and she said, ‘You’ll have all these half-brothers and sisters running around then won’t 
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you?’ and I said, ‘Pardon?’  I don’t think she sort of clicked what she’d said, but she’s never 
said anything like that before. 
 
 
Joanna raised the issue of the ‘step’ phenomenon, which is widely constructed as a 
source of tension in some families.  While the number of step-families may appear to 
have grown amidst rising divorce and re-marriage rates (Smart and Neale, 1999:4; 
Silva and Smart, 1999:9-10; Fleming, 1999), the theme of the tensions that can exist 
between half-brothers and half-sisters is as ancient as the fairytale Cinderella.  
 
Nature vs Nurture 
Debates in the scientific literature about the relative importance of heredity and 
environment were variously used by parents in the study to make sense of the origins 
of some of their children’s characteristics.  The nature/nurture debate itself has its 
origins in the work of Sir Francis Galton who, at the end of the 19th century, 
postulated that hereditary influences rather than environmental factors account for 
why some individuals succeed in life while others fail (Paul, 1998:81).  Paul claims 
that this view was somewhat controversial at the time, and that the debate between 
“hereditarians” and “environmentalists” has become more sophisticated over time.  
What is most remarkable about it, she contends, is that it is a debate that “refuses to 
die” (Paul, 1998:81). At times, pronouncements have suggested that the debate is 
over.  For example, a former editor of Science, Koshland, indicated that evidence 
supported an interactionist view:  “sensible people” would reject the hereditarian view 
that genes determine everything, and the environmentalist view, that they determine 
nothing (Paul, 1998:82).  The debate, according to Paul, has nonetheless continued in 
various forms influenced by events such as the Cyril Burt scandal14 of the 1970s, and 
the development of arguments supporting the environmentalist position.15  At the 
same time, Paul argues, even those who were most critical of the view that 
intelligence was determined by heredity, took for granted that the differences within 
populations were to some degree heritable.  Subsequently, according to Wright 
(1995:48, original emphasis), the debate was transformed into a “statistical war over 
                                                          
14 According to Paul (1998:37-39), Cyril Burt had carried out research on groups of identical twins that 
found that the IQ scores of identical twins were always closely matched whether they were raised 
together or apart.  His results were later found to be fraudulent and his work discredited.  Surprisingly, 
Paul maintains, authors of genetic textbooks nonetheless continue to cite his results. 
15 For example, the work of Jensen and Herrnstein indicates that social class might account for some 
differences in IQ between populations (Paul, 1998:85). 
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percentages – how much of our personality or behaviour or intelligence or 
susceptibility to disease is attributable to our genes, as compared with such 
environmental factors as the family we grow up in…”. 
 
As Paul argues, debates framed in terms of the relative importance of social and 
genetic factors are very difficult to resolve.  Some authors have argued that 
environment and heredity are too closely entwined to enable a separation and accurate 
measurement of any genetic contribution (Paul, 1998:86).  Further complicating the 
issue of whether genetic makeup can ever be separated from its environment, 
Strathern cites the work of Johnson, an embryologist (1992b:122-123).  According to 
Strathern, Johnson has demonstrated that “personal identity is the outcome not just of 
unique genetic combination, but of a unique history of continuous development which 
affects the way that genetic factors themselves take effect” (1992b:122).   In this way, 
the individual is always in interaction with the environment. But, she adds, Johnson is 
suggesting more than this by emphasising that everything beyond the person 
potentially may influence what this person becomes (Strathern, 1992b:123).  The 
problem of ‘measurability’, however, remains. But, as Paul points out, that the 
nature/nuture debate continues is less a matter of good science versus bad science: it 
is highly politically charged (1998:91).   
 
Critics of binary logics such as nature/nurture, mind/body and sex/gender claim that 
the maintenance of these dualisms has served particular political ends  (Gatens, 1996; 
Haraway, 1991).   Gatens argues that theorists who uncritically assert that the human 
subject is predominantly determined by heredity or environment posit a naïve causal 
relationship between the body and the mind, the environment and the mind, or the 
environment and the body, which implies a neutral and passive conception of the 
subject (1996:8).  She suggests that if we think of the body as neutral and passive, and 
consciousness to be socially determined, then we are suggesting a behavioural 
conception of subjectivity.  But it remains unclear, she argues, as to whether a 
behaviourist conception of conditioning has any validity when applied to humans.  
Freud, she contends, stressed that perception was an active rather than a passive 
process (Gatens, 1996:8).  
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According to Haraway (1991:8), the liberal ideology of social scientists in the 20th 
century has supported the maintenance of a deep and necessary split between nature 
and culture.   Haraway examines theories of production and reproduction which, she 
maintains, rest on the liberal doctrine of the autonomy of nature and culture 
(1991:42).  Although, she argues, these theories do not condone a position of 
biological reductionism, they nonetheless present a picture of human universals, and 
of human nature as the foundation for culture (Haraway, 1991:42). Second wave 
feminists, according to Haraway, criticised the binary logics of the nature/culture pair, 
but this did not extend to the derivative sex/gender distinction, because maintaining 
this divide was politically useful in combating biological determinist arguments 
constantly used against feminists (1991:134).  Because of this, sex and nature 
remained passive categories and formulations of an essential identity as man or 
woman was left untouched and politically dangerous. This has led to a conception that 
nature is simply there, and the categorical and over-determined aspect of ‘nature’ as 
an oppositional ideological source is overlooked (Haraway, 1991:134).  The on-going 
tactical usefulness of the sex/gender distinction has led to “dire consequences for 
much feminist theory, tying it to a liberal and functionalist paradigm” (Haraway, 
1991:136).  The task, Haraway suggests, is to ‘disqualify’ the analytic categories like 
sex or nature that lead to univocity (1991:135).  Towards this end, she cites Butler’s 
contention that the “concept of a coherent inner self, achieved (cultural) or innate 
(biological), is a regulatory fiction that is unnecessary – indeed inhibitory – for 
feminist projects of producing and affirming complex agency and responsibility” 
(Haraway, 1991:135). 
 
In this study, a scientist in one of the fertility clinics commented that while the 
pendulum appeared to swing in relation to the nature/nurture debate, there would 
always be attention to both.  She suggested that one influence might appear more 
evident at one time than another in relation to particular persons. Nature and nurture 
were conceptualised as two entities that could be differentiated and/or combined.  Our 
conversation about the importance of heredity and environment proceeded as follows: 
 
KH: Thinking about these issues about how important it is to actually know your genetic history, 
or your family history, a lot of people I talk to, recipient couples are more inclined to say 
their child is their child, and they have a loving relationship.  
                                         
Scientist:  And they've got a complete satisfying family.  
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KH: But there's always this notion about the importance of having some notion of one's heritage.   
                                                   
Scientist: And perhaps that may become more important as these children grow up themselves and are 
having children, and the whole sort of genetic linkage perhaps becomes more significant. I 
was going to say, this woman from the States that I knew, it was quite interesting, her 
parents had actually divorced at some stage; after she grew up I think.  But she still had a 
really close relationship with her father.  If anything she was closer to her father than her 
mother.  In spite of the fact that he wasn't her biological father, and he was no longer married 
to her biological mother, the social father was very important to her. 
 
KH: But it's just a missing gap in terms of your own makeup isn't it?  There's always this 
nature/nurture debate that crops up from time to time. 
 
Scientist: Yes.  Which actually seems to have been swinging a little bit in the line of the genetics 
lately, from my reading of literature.  There seems to be more things coming out in which 
they suggest there is a reasonably significant genetic component.  But obviously the nurture 
one's always got to be important.  
                                                         
KH: Yes.  I was wondering, from your point of view as a scientist, how much does human DNA 
contribute to what a person ends up being like? 
                
Scientist: I suspect quite a lot.  I think.  You only have to look at your own children, if you have a 
couple, to realise how different they are from one to another, with pretty similar sorts of 
inputs from you.  You can have treated them, you know, at a certain stage, similarly.  
Obviously as time goes on these interactions change, but they can seem quite different right 
from the moment they're born.  And most parents say this.  They'll say their kids are 
different.                                                 
 
The scientist stressed the importance of the social relationships established in the 
context of growing up in a family, but also gave some credence to the importance of 
genetic factors in determining personhood.  She referred to literature indicating a 
‘swing’ towards arguments that favour the significance of heritability in determining 
who a person becomes.16  The fertility clinic scientist also attributed this view to her 
own experience of having children who were unalike in many respects even though 
raised in the ‘same’ environment.  To suggest, however, that one’s children might be 
the same implies that they inherit the same genetic material, which they do not, unless 
they are identical twins. Individuals born into the same family at different times and 
inevitably living separate albeit interconnected lives will also experience a different 
environment, modified by the presence of other siblings.  Further emphasising the 
                                                          
16 See Wright (1995) for a recent discussion of the contribution of behavioural genetics to the swing 
towards the importance of heredity.  Paul (1998) cites authors publishing in the 1990s, such as 
Seligman and Murray, who argue that poverty and the failure to succeed cannot be clearly attributed to 
people’s circumstances. In Seligman’s view, “genes explain who gets ahead in America, and why” 
(cited in Paul, 1998:89).  Other influential studies that support arguments about the importance of 
genetic inheritance include the famous Minnesota studies of twins who were separated at birth, and the 
Colorado Adoption Project, which concluded that children resembled their biological rather than their 
adoptive parents (Gladwell, 1998:56-57). 
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importance of environmental factors, a recent theory suggests that peers have a 
stronger influence on what a person becomes than do parents (Gladwell, 1998).   
 
Many parents of children conceived by DI raised the issues of heredity and 
environment in the making of a person. Most contended that people were the 
‘product’ of both their genetic heritage and their environment, though some stressed 
either nature or nurture as being more significant, while see-sawing between the two.  
Some parents with children conceived by DI were particularly conscious of heredity, 
or the part that genes played in their child’s makeup, because of the circumstances 
surrounding their decision to use DI as a method of conception, or because of 
particular outcomes.  Allan and Sandra, who had triplets, Edward, Georgia and Juliet,  
after DI ‘treatment’ that involved the use of the fertility drug Clomiphene, said: 
 
Sandra:  Well, being multiples we're very aware of the genetic and hereditary versus environment 
situation.  And so I think we can see definitely so much that's genetic, but we can also see so 
much that's environmental, because they have similar attitudes, they do things the same way as 
each of us.  So obviously that's come through observation of us doing things, rather than 
talking even, but doing things. 
 
Allan: But their basic character is totally different.  The three of them, they're totally different 
characters.  
 
Sandra: The personality, yes.                                                       
 
Allan: The temperament.                                                            
 
Sandra: Yes.  Just the way they go about things.                                    
 
Allan: Although that tends to change a wee bit.                                    
 
KH: And it's hard to know where that comes from. 
                                
Sandra: Well we treat them more or less the same.  So, therefore, we feel that the specific differences 
almost have to be genetic.  And the way that we treat them differently now is because of their 
different personalities. 
 
KH: You were saying that two of them were more like your side of the family? 
 
Sandra: Physically.  That's only in looks. 
                                          
Allan: We've got one boy that's fairly much a boy.  He doesn't want to know very much about girls’ 
things.  We've got one girl that's very much a girl and doesn't want to know very much about 
boys' things.  And we've got another girl who's interested in both.  She'd like to be a tomboy, 
to get on with Edward and yet she wants to be very much a girl at times.  But she needs to 
keep in good with both, whereas the other girl gets on very well with just herself.  Edward 
needs a little bit of company but not as much as Georgia.  Georgia needs a lot of company. 
Juliet doesn't need any.  Edward needs a little bit.  And I suppose that’s the marked, the most 
marked difference between the three.  Whether that's genetic or a throwback on her side, or 
something different...we'll never know. 
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Sandra intimated that they treat the children the same and yet they do not.  This 
illustrates the interactive themes of biology and social environment. Allan raises the 
point that although one can ruminate on the possible origins of certain human 
characteristics, what has caused their children to be who they are remains largely 
speculative. 
 
Another mother of two daughters conceived by DI commented that she was unsure 
whether her older daughter’s interests were genetically or environmentally 
determined:  
 
Patricia: When I was pregnant, we were given information on a sheet [the donor profile], and things 
cover his hobbies: he likes puzzles and reads a lot of books, and Tracey's the same.  She's very 
interested in puzzles and loves books.  So do we, so I don't know whether that's a genetic thing 
or not. 
 
Patricia thus raised the prospect that genetic predispositions may be realised or 
reinforced by environmental factors.  Behind this lies the practice of ‘matching’ 
donors and recipient couples which assumes the genetic determination of some human 
characteristics.17
 
Some parents of children raised the issue of genetic and environmental influences in 
relation to their child’s intelligence levels.  Stephanie, the mother of three children 
conceived by DI, each with a very high IQ, remarked that it was difficult to determine 
the most significant contributor to this: the donors’ genes, her genes, or the scholastic 
environment in which the children lived their day-to-day lives.  When asked about 
this, she said: 
 
Stephanie:  That's difficult, because, you see I've got my degree almost on straight As.  So where does 
it come from?  And does it matter really? … It's hard to know because people didn't 
identify children's ability so discretely when I was young.  But you see I know that I was 
selected out for a university project and looking back now, I realise that it was because I 
was very able.                            
 
So, was it the donor, or was it me?  And I mean, certainly in the environment.  You see, the 
kids have been brought up in an environment where...well, last night the television went 
off at quarter to eight I suppose.  I went upstairs and was studying.  John [her husband] was 
working on the computer.  And so, the kids just know that that's the way we work, and so 
they are in that environment all the time, and they've had both John and I studying for the 
last four, five years...both of us studying.  And so, they think it's normal.  They're used to 
having lots of text books floating around, and so I think all these things contribute.            
 
                                                          
17 The practice of ‘matching’ semen donors and recipients in fertility clinics is discussed in Chapter 
Five. 
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While Stephanie speculated about the relative contribution of genetics or environment 
to her children’s high levels of intelligence, Mary and Brendan, parents of two 
children conceived by DI, speculated whether their son Jason’s intelligence was 
inherited from the donor. They said: 
 
Mary: I can see there are things about Jason that I feel he's a lot like me.  And some of the things, 
I think emotionally wise, I think he is a lot like me.  But, um, I think that genetically he's 
probably brighter than what Brendan and I are.                                                       
 
Brendan: Yeah, that's quite obvious.                                                 
 
KH:   Did it make you wonder whether one of the doctors might have...             
 
          Brendan: Yeah, well in fact I think they did indicate that it would probably be one of their doctor 
staff, at the time.  Because at the time they indicated the only donors they had was doctors.                               
 
Mary: Doctors or medical students, or something.  They were getting a lot of university students 
or medical students that were helping them out at that stage.  
 
While they thought of the possibility of Jason’s intelligence being inherited from the 
donor, Mary commented later that some of her mother’s ‘side’ of the family had gone 
to university, so she wondered whether her son could equally have inherited his 
academic ability from them.  
 
For Carla, the mother of a daughter who was conceived by DI, the genetic 
contribution to her daughter’s makeup from the donor was significant in that it meant 
that she would avoid the debilitating hereditary diseases evident in her husband’s 
family. Carla commented on the importance of genes in determining health status, and 
argued that while the environment had an influence on a person’s development, “a lot 
of things are born into you”.  She drew on public narratives and personal experience 
of children adopted into “good” families who turned out to be “bad”, ostensibly 
because of their genetic inheritance.  She even said that she hoped that their donor did 
not have a criminal background, suggesting that a propensity towards criminality was 
heritable. 
 
When asked if he thought homosexuality was environmentally or genetically 
determined (or both), Derek, a gay man who had donated his semen to a lesbian 
couple, Sophie and Ria, had this to say: 
 
Derek:  I think it's totally genetic.  I mean, when I was 14, my friends were looking through 
Penthouses, and pointing at pictures, and telling me how horny those pictures made them.  I 
thought, well, why doesn't that do that for me?  What's wrong with me?  And the experiences I 
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went through, I know there is no way that I could have had any other orientation.  My father 
was incredibly anti, he gave me all the books on sex education from every aspect, except 
homosexuality, and when I'd finished reading all these, you know, over a year he'd sort of 
taken me through everything.  And I thought, well, where do I fit into this?  Do I have to do 
that?                                                                      
 
KH:  And it was repugnant to you?                                                
 
Derek:  Totally.  It revolted me.  And I really believe that the issue is love, and this child is going to be 
surrounded by love, and I think when it comes to sex, when the child goes through 
adolescence, their sexuality will come out, and I really do not think that has any relationship to 
the environment.  I think the environment gives them a fabulous understanding of the 
dynamics of same sex couples, and homosexuality and lesbian and also the difference between 
the two.  They'll have a really good understanding of that. 
 
KH: And presumably heterosexuality and homosexuality would be visible to the child.                                                        
 
Derek: Definitely.  With all the relations.  There are Sophie's parents, and sisters and brothers, and 
with Ria's mother.  Ria’s biological mother is now living with a woman, but Ria was adopted.  
But you know, she's going to be surrounded by a good mix.                                         
 
Like many of the men and women in Weston’s study of gay and lesbian families, 
Derek maintained that his homosexuality was innate, rather than environmentally 
determined (1991:39). Although he argued that being gay was genetically determined, 
his argument appears contradictory in that he does not appear to think of 
homosexuality as inherited.18 His parents were not gay and he assumed that his 
daughter, who would be raised in a lesbian-headed household, would one day 
‘discover’ her own sexual identity, which would not be determined by the fact that her 
three ‘parents’ identified as lesbian or gay.  He also suggested that his daughter would 
be surrounded by people who modelled either homosexual or heterosexual 
relationships, so, from this point of view, her environment would provide a good basis 
from which to ‘choose’ her sexual identity.  
  
Pippa, mother of a daughter, Elspeth, conceived by DI, raised the issue of the 
significance attached to genetic ties in the bonding between parents and children. 
Sean, Pippa’s husband, did not think his lack of genetic tie to his daughter had been 
detrimental to his bonding with his daughter.   He played down the significance of 
heredity and commented that Pippa had an identical twin who was “not particularly 
identical any more”.  Pippa said that since she and her identical twin had grown up 
and led separate lives, they had made the conscious decision not to look the same.  
This raised the spectre of the role of agency and freedom of choice in determining the 
                                                          
18 This presupposes, however, that what is inherited has to be evident, whereas genetically it could be 
recessive. 
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path of human development, even for those who share the same genetic inheritance.  
The question arises, however, whether it is freedom of choice that makes identical 
twins different. Wright (1995:62) cites behavioural geneticist Eaves, who argues that 
the quest for freedom is genetically determined, and that “freedom means something    
about the capacity of a human organism not to be pushed around by external 
circumstances”.  In this view, freedom could equally make identical twins alike, or 
not alike.  Both Pippa and Sean contended that whether genetics or environment was 
implicated in what a person is like at any stage of their life was not significant: what 
was more important to them, was the relationship they developed with their daughter.   
 
Sean:  How she is, is not particularly important.  She is as she is, and she's our daughter.                                                             
 
Pippa: I just want her to grow up happy and healthy, and if she doesn't have that much in common with 
us, she might not have anyway.  I know some children who can't stand their parents.                                       
 
Sean:  That's right.  I mean, thank God I've got nothing in common with my family!                                                                    
 
Pippa:  If you were too much like your Mum you'd have me worried.  She's really nice but she's got 
some characteristics that I would just shrink to have, eh Sean? 
 
Sean:  Yes. 
 
Sean and Pippa’s comments exemplify the simultaneous use of discourses of 
environmental and biological determination.  On one hand, they suggested that their 
daughter’s genetic makeup was unimportant compared to the quality of their 
parent/child relationships.  On the other, they appeared to acknowledge that certain 
family characteristics might be genetically determined, and Sean believed (or hoped) 
that he had avoided inheriting some ‘undesirable’ family traits. 
 
In contrast to Sean’s position on the relative unimportance of biological ties, Sean’s 
mother, was keenly aware of the lack of a biological tie to her granddaughter.  She 
worried that her son would not love a child conceived by DI as much as Pippa did 
because of the lack of a genetic tie.  For this reason, she favoured adoption for them, 
rather than DI.19
 
 
Joan professed to feel that there was something missing in her relationship with her 
granddaughter, knowing that she was not related to her genetically.  She remarked: 
 
                                                          
19 See Chapter Four for further discussion of this issue. 
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Joan: There's something missing there.  And yet I love her just the same.  But, someone said one 
day… “You must be very proud of her.”  And I thought, “Well I can't be proud for myself, 
because I haven't had anything to do with it.”  So there are little things missing.  Mm. 
 
KH:   So you might be proud if she was somehow part of your [biological heritage]?                                                               
 
Joan:   Yeah.  I'm proud of her, but for myself I haven't got anything to be proud of, have I, because 
she isn't anything to do with me that way...genetically, she isn't.  But whether it has 
advantages other ways, I don't know.  You see them as they are without that strange binding. 
 
Joan is proud of her granddaughter, but at a distance. She introduced the idea that 
blood ‘ties’ inexplicably bind people together.  In this respect she conforms to what 
Strathern has identified as the view in Euro-American cultures that biological ties are 
fixed, immutable and primordial (Strathern, 1992a).  At the same time, she felt that 
perhaps the ‘strange binding’ caused by genetic ties could cloud one’s perception of 
one’s relatives, and without this, perhaps, she could therefore have a more ‘honest’ 
relationship with her granddaughter. Nonetheless, because of the significance of the 
biological connection for her, she did not consider her granddaughter a ‘real’ relative, 
or someone who would be interested in her own ancestry.  Joan therefore did not think 
Elspeth would be interested in her old family photos which she thought she might 
pass on to her niece who, unlike her granddaughter, was her ‘blood’ relative.   
 
Like Joan, Andrew, father of two DI daughters, spoke of the ambiguities of being the 
father of children conceived by DI: they were his children and yet they were not his. 
He and his wife Annie said of their relationships with their children: 
 
Annie: Well, you do sort of think of them as my children.  I quite often hear you saying, “They're 
your children.”                                           
 
Andrew: They are. 
 
KH:   But they're yours too in the sense that you are their father, if not the biological father.                                                 
 
Andrew: Yes.  The birth certificate suggests that, so legally yes. 
 
KH:   And emotionally?                                                            
 
Andrew: No. 
 
KH: They're not your children?  
 
Andrew:   Well, they're not.  They're not my lineage, no.                             
 
KH: So that biological connection is important to you?                          
 
Andrew:   To me personally, yes.  But I accept that I've got...I've got two lovely kids that I can't have.  
I've got them.  You've got conflicts here I know, but that's how I operate, how I think…It's 
no different from Annie having a prior arrangement with someone else and having children.  
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Andrew explored the idea that his children were not his children in the sense that they 
were not related to him biologically.  At the same time, he acknowledged a social tie 
with his daughters and a bond that was growing over time.  He said: 
 
Andrew: I've still got a complete tie to them, but I can just say...that's me saying it coldly, “they're not 
my kids.”  They are very much my kids.  I'm developing their personalities.  I'm influencing 
their personalities as they grow up, so they're very much my kids, have always been my kids, 
but you've got this wee cold hard fact at the end; they're not my kids, which is getting lesser 
and lesser and lesser, and they're getting my kids more and more.  It's part of the process 
of… 
 
Annie: It’s just time. 
 
Andrew simultaneously drew on understandings about his children being his, and not 
being his, even though these understandings were in tension with each other.  It is not 
that they are one or the other. Even though the children felt more like they were his as 
he developed a social relationship with them, Andrew acknowledged that they had 
always been his children and he had a “complete tie” to them.  His analysis illustrates 
how the discourse Strathern (1992a, 1992b) identifies as dominant is not the only 
discourse operating in Euro-American culture. This is an illustration of other 
discourses in use.  
 
Kathy, divorced mother of a daughter conceived by DI, was acutely aware when her 
child was born that she was her genetic child, rather than her husband Joel’s.  This 
was partially because their daughter was conceived when, against his wishes, Kathy 
had attended the clinic for one final insemination, this time with a female friend, and 
became pregnant with Melissa.20  As a result, Kathy felt responsible for the decision 
to have Melissa and was uncomfortable assigning their daughter her husband’s 
surname only.  This decision was further reinforced by the knowledge that Joel’s 
surname was not the name of his biological father, but his stepfather, a fact that he 
had found out as an adult.  For Kathy, the family name was symbolic of a genetic 
connection and bloodline.  Her awareness of her daughter’s genetic connection to an 
unknown person rather than her husband was heightened by finding out soon after she 
was born that her daughter’s blood group was different from his. 
 
                                                          
20 According to Kathy, Joel had been with her for the two previous inseminations and then had directed 
her to have no more because he could not “handle it”.  Having resisted his directive, and attended the 
clinic for another (this time successful) insemination, she subsequently felt she had become pregnant 
without his approval.  
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Kathy:  When they told me at 4am that this was a different blood group, I remember thinking, you 
know, this is an enormous decision I've made because I kind of felt solely responsible at the 
time, and at the time, Joel and I had to discuss what name we would put her under, and I felt 
very uncomfortable at the time putting her under just the name Foster. It went to the name 
Reid-Foster in the end, because I felt it was unfair to give her a name that had no connection 
insofar as genetics [was concerned].  Reid is my maiden name, and Foster is Joel’s name and I 
chose at that point...before that I had become Reid Foster and I chose at that point, we decided 
to name Melissa Reid-Foster.  That was important to me because I felt that the connection 
came through me, and really, I felt, needed to be more solidly on my part. 
 
 
While Kathy’s rationale for naming their daughter was based on the fact that Melissa 
had no biological connection to her father, it seems significant, however, that Joel was 
not the active, intentional social father at the time that Kathy conceived.  This 
highlights the point raised by Ragone (2000:61) that parenthood is associated with the 
intent to conceive, to take the initiative to create another human being and take on 
responsibility for parenting. Kathy’s subsequent concerns about the lack of a 
biological connection between Joel and Melissa thus suggests that social and 
relational issues are getting coded by genetic connection. Nonetheless, family was 
important to Kathy, and she was interested in her own family genealogy, which she 
knew about, dating back to the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries.   
 
KH: So you're interested in genealogy? 
                                          
Kathy: Yes.  I mean family is important to me.  I mean it's a solid thing. 
 
KH: So it's important for identity?                                             
 
Kathy: It is an identity.  I guess, as a child I had a lot of difficulty having an identity anyway because 
we'd moved here from overseas and we had no family connection here. 
 
KH: Where did you come from?                                                    
 
Kathy: They came from England and Europe and moved around.                         
 
KH: So you think that might be why it's important to you?                       
 
Kathy: It's possibly why it's important to me.  Family is important.  But also knowing who you are is 
who you are.  Saying you're from Harry Brown when you haven't...I mean there's nurture and 
nature, as I described to these children…which is how I've put it to them.  It's a combination 
of both.  
 
Some extended family members of an infertile male reported having initital concerns 
about the arrival of a child who was not genetically related to their family member.  
Jeremy and Christine, whose niece Madison was conceived by DI, said that they had 
discussed the issue of the child not continuing their brother’s/brother-in-law’s blood 
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line.  When asked if they had thought of Madison as somehow ‘different’21  because 
she was not biologically related to her father, they said: 
 
Jeremy:  Yeah.  We did talk about that between us, and we always said that we would certainly try to 
treat her as equal as anybody, and, um… 
 
Christine: I think the answer is yes, I would, that I would think that she's a bit different and…before 
she was born, yes, but…                                  
 
KH:   Did that change when she was born?                                         
 
Christine:  Probably not right when she was born, but more as you get to know her as a child, and you're 
more around her and she just becomes a part of the family and Richard and Belinda's baby 
and her, you know, "origin" becomes irrelevant because you're all just being families with 
children. 
 
Jeremy and Christine perceived a need to try to treat their niece as if she were not 
‘different’. The fact that this need is identified, however, indicates that the two 
grandchildren are not seen as equal. They were also concerned that Jeremy and 
Richard’s parents would relate to their grandchild, who was conceived by DI, in the 
same way that they related to their son, Thomas, who was their biological grandson. 
 
Christine: We did talk about her being treated differently and things like that, but I don't…I think it was 
more how your parents would treat her in comparison to Thomas, rather than how we would 
treat her because, oh yes, I've thought through that further.  Because they were both 
grandchildren, but I guess my feeling was that Thomas was their grandchild, um whereas 
genetically Madison wasn't, and I was very aware that they would have to treat them the 
same, whereas for us she is only our niece, if you can understand the distinction.  They have 
to treat them the same, but she's our niece and he's our son and so…                                                                   
 
Jeremy:   It's a different relationship…it's a very different relationship, whereas for my parents they're 
both a grandchild and…equal ranked grandchildren, so…                                                            
 
Christine: And they are.  Your parents try very…yeah…they do try hard, and I think, yeah, but I think 
now that she's here…    
                              
Jeremy:  Less and less so. 
 
Again, Jeremy and Christine’s comments indicate that there was a perceived need to 
try to treat the children as equals, when “in fact” they were not.  Another paternal 
uncle of three nephews conceived by DI, expressed disappointment at not being able 
to see inherited family characteristics in the boys. 
 
Matthew:  Yes.  It's a shame we can't see the van den Berg personality...not personality...    
                                                             
KH:  Character traits?  
 
                                                          
21 The conceptualisation of children conceived by DI as ‘different’ or ‘special’ is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter Eleven. 
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Matthew: Yeah, exactly, of our side of the family, and I suppose the Dutch heritage, although there 
is...I believe one of the donors was of Dutch origin for two children, I believe.  But, I don't 
know.  It's just...I don't see any...apart from the blond hair, you don't see any of Joe I believe 
in the children.  Mind you, not that it's always the case...I mean your children don't always 
look like either the mother or the father or both, but just, it would have been nice to say, “oh, 
he's got Joe's nose, or his ears or his eyes”, or something. Or, “that's a young Joe”, or you 
know, although our parents aren't around any more, it would have been nice to be able to say 
“Joe looked exactly like that when he was seven years old”, or whatever.  But I mean, that's 
not the case now anyway, because they can't say that, but... 
 
Matthew’s comments raise the issue of family resemblance, and the way that 
comments about shared family likenesses serve as a signifier of biological links 
between parents and children and connectedness to the wider family network.  
Chapter Eleven includes a more in-depth discussion about the way that people draw 
on the public narrative of physical resemblance to craft family identities and 
relatedness. 
 
While some participants were concerned about biological ties or the lack thereof in 
their families, others professed to have little interest in concepts such as bloodlines, 
inheritance or biological ties.  For these families, the social relationships were 
regarded as more significant and interesting than bloodlines or knowledge of one’s 
family genealogy. Sharon, the paternal grandmother of Chris and Diane’s son, who 
was conceived by DI, said she had little interest in genealogy or biological ties. She 
claimed that she and her husband Doug had not thought about their grandson as being 
somehow ‘different’ because of the lack of a genetic tie to them.  She said: 
 
Sharon:  Well, even if Chris is our son, knowing him and that he really wanted a family, um, no, it 
never entered our head. At one stage, when Diane and we were talking, she did say to us, well 
her Mum and Dad would be in a different situation to us, because, you know, it would still be 
part of their, you know, genealogy, or whatever, but that never went through our head, you 
know, at all.                                                                        
 
When asked about the significance of being biologically related to family members, 
Sharon replied: 
 
Sharon:  I don't think there is any.  If the love is there, it's there for any child.  Well, as far as we're 
concerned, um, I'm afraid that we've got lots of families around that, well, that we're an extra 
granny and granddad to, um.  I mean, actually sometimes I say, gee, the family's getting a little 
bit big sometimes [she laughs].  Probably because my Mum and Dad come from Scotland and 
I had no immediate family, and I think probably you just sort of bring in others and you take 
on their children too. 
 
Like Sharon, Diane and Chris, the parents of Scott, who was conceived by DI, 
privileged the social ties over genetic ties when they said: 
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Chris:  It's the environment...the environment's got more to do with it than the actual genetic side.   
                                                    
Diane: A certain amount of it must be genetical [sic], but, you know, biological...you know, you can see 
that he's just the image of Chris in a lot of things that he does, and mannerisms and that sort of 
thing, even though he doesn't look like him.  And interests, you know, he’s picking up the same 
interests… 
 
This illustrates the way in which kinship can be constructed through physical 
resemblance and other sorts of likenesses, such as sharing similar mannerisms and 
interests.  Revealing the extent to which such likenesses can embody kin relations, a 
‘social’ father of a son conceived by DI who appeared in Snowden, Mitchell and 
Snowden’s study said, “I keep thinking, well perhaps he is mine” (1983:141).22  
 
Diane’s parents held views similar to Chris and Diane’s about the relative significance 
of biological and social ties in the context of kin relations.  Diane’s mother, Marion, 
said that the family rarely spoke of their forebears, that she and her family had little 
interest in the previous generations, and that she had been quite satisfied to know just 
‘the basics’ without delving deeply into her family history.  She tended to think of 
biological ties in terms of passing on certain health-related predispositions, rather than 
in kinship terms, and said: 
 
Marion: …sadly we've got an alcoholic line running right through our…or seem to have…through our 
family, so we're very aware of that.  Um, and Diane's watching that one and going to have 
him…she's already started to sort of educate him on the thing because we feel that it's 
very…it's inherited…it's in the genes.  So, we've got that worry, but other than that you know, 
you look out for the usual things like asthma and that sort of stuff, but that's about all.                                          
 
Marion thus drew on a medical or health discourse in relation to notions of heredity, 
and emphasised the strength of the social tie between her son-in-law and grandson.  
Like Marion, Janine, the maternal grandmother of Erica, who was conceived by DI, 
stressed the closeness of the relationship between Erica and her father Peter.  Janine 
professed some interest in her own grandparents, but like Marion, she thought of 
genetic inheritance in relation to possible predispositions to forms of disease.  When 
asked if she had any particular feelings about bloodlines, inheritance or biological 
ties, Janine said: 
 
Janine:   I don't know.  I suppose, you know, I think I sort of look back.  Sometimes I ask Mum even 
now about her grandparents and things like that.  But not really for bloodlines.  Um, and I 
guess that if there was an adoption, if Mum had been adopted, for instance, I would be asking 
                                                          
22 Chapter Eleven includes a discussion about physical resemblance and the social construction of 
biological ties. 
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her about her adoptive parents rather than the...yeah, no I don't think the bloodlines are 
important.  
 
KH:   So for Erica, she'd find out about Peter's parents and family?               
 
Janine:   Yes.  The only thing that I can see she would need to know, that could be important is health, 
you know, genetic health lines or anything like that.                                                                          
 
 
One maternal grandmother of a DI child claimed that an interest in issues of 
inheritance or bloodlines was only relevant to those with money or property, and that 
her family did not belong to that social class.  Discussion emerged in the interview in 
connection with the continuation of family names that illustrated the way in which 
family names act as a symbol of biological links, even if the biological link does not 
exist.  Joanne, the maternal grandmother of Madison, who was conceived by DI, 
thought that her granddaughter should be raised as a Johnson and a Morgan (the 
family names of her biological mother and social father) and that the donor would not 
enter the picture in terms of Madison’s genealogy.  She said: 
 
Joanne: But I really do wonder with the donor thing if that sort of thing is going to go back to the 
donor father.  Where it would be...to be hoped in Madison’s case, Belinda and Richard are 
going to instil in her that she's a Morgan and a Johnson, you know, that's what I imagine.  I 
don't know what Belinda feels about it, but you know, now and again Richard gets upset about 
her learning [the language of his family of origin] and that, and I'm saying, "No Richard, it's 
good for her to learn two languages", you know and I find I'm encouraging the other side.  It 
affects me not at all, but I just find it's easier to...and I think that's what I would try and 
encourage Richard and Belinda is that she's from the Johnsons and the Morgans, and not really 
look for that other person, because, yeah, I hadn't really thought about that (she laughs). Yeah, 
in the family tree, when it comes along.  But then surely the donor gives, so they haven't got 
another offspring for their family tree, they give to a couple so that it's their child, so therefore 
it's a Johnson/Morgan mix.  It's not a somebody-else in the wings.  I don't know. You raise a 
lot of questions (she laughs).  
 
Joanne reveals an interesting tension when considering whether or not her 
granddaughter could ever be considered part of the donor’s family tree.  On one hand, 
she hoped her granddaughter would be raised as progeny of the Johnsons and the 
Morgans and not as part of the donor’s family tree. This raised the prospect of the gift 
of gametes transferring ‘relatedness’ from one person to another set of persons. 
According to Edwards and Strathern (2000:159), through the symbolism of the gift, a 
potential future chain of relationships and claims that could have been traced through 
the child’s genetic tie to the donor is truncated, “deactivated in advance, by pitting 
one set of truths (‘biological’) against another (‘social’)”. At the same time, Joanne 
could not ignore the ‘reality’ of her granddaughter’s biological origins, leading her to 
question whether this was the “right way” to conceptualise the relationships. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter illustrated how people in families with children conceived by DI draw on 
discourses of the biological and the social to make sense of their familial and kin 
connections.  Recent sociological theorising on families points to the diversity of 
family forms, and the changing and fluid aspects of families in Western societies in 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. These analyses suggest that families 
using donor insemination to conceive their children should be seen as just one of a 
number of families negotiating complex kin relations.  Some parents indicated an 
awareness of the diversity of forms of relatedness in contemporary households and 
saw their families as relatively conventional in comparison to reconstituted families. 
Also highly relevant to this analysis of families with children conceived by DI is 
contemporary social anthropological theorising which focuses on the implications of 
the use of assisted conception for notions about ‘family’ and ‘kinship’.  These 
theorists explore the ‘destablisation’ of the natural basis of human procreation and 
reproduction, and challenge the notion that biological ties are the cornerstone of 
kinship and family formation. Social anthropological theorising on kinship and 
‘relatedness’ has focussed attention on issues about ‘nature’ and ‘biology’ and the 
relationship between the ‘biological’ and the ‘social’.  Theorists such as Carsten 
(2000) challenge and destabilise the taken-for-granted dichotomy between the 
‘biological’ and the ‘social’, and have shown that the division between the 
‘biological’ and the ‘social’ is somewhat blurred.  Moreover, Edwards and Strathern 
(2000) have highlighted the ways in which the ‘biological’ and the ‘social’ can be 
distinguished and/or combined. 
 
Drawing on recent sociological and social anthropological theorising on ‘the family’ 
and ‘kinship’, the chapter has shown how discourses of the ‘biological’ and the 
‘social’, ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’, are often simultaneously used to attribute meaning to 
familial and kin connections. An analysis of research participants’ talk reveals an 
interweaving of the themes of the biological and the social, nature and nurture.  While 
the movement back and forward between these discourses often appears 
contradictory, it is often also used to justify a person’s situation, or to make it appear 
less threatening.   Biology is revealed as an important symbol of relatedness that can 
be articulated and embodied in many ways such as through naming practices. Parents 
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of children conceived by DI actively construct social connection between fathers and 
children, often in the idiom of biology and physical resemblance.  Couples thus 
rework the nature/culture dichotomy to make sense of their familial relationships as 
they perceive them.  While some privilege biological ties over social ties and vice 
versa, in many cases the importance of both biological and social ties appears 
simultaneously in the people’s talk.  For many couples the major factor in the 
formation of families is the social connection between two people who are committed 
to a joint set of actions and responsibilities that inhere in parenting as a practice.  As a 
result, the ‘origins’ of the child are secondary to the family relationships established 
over time.   
 
Most parents believed that their children were the product of both heredity and 
environment; thus the themes of biology and the social environment interacted. While 
discourses of nature and nurture were often combined, in some instances heredity was 
separated out as important, particularly in terms of the determination of health status, 
and to some extent in the child’s level of intelligence and physical appearance.  For 
some participants, the lack of a biological connection qualitatively affected the 
meaning of the relationship between the parent and child or grandparent and child.  
What is revealed here, however, is that social and relational issues are being coded by 
genetic connection.  For some, biological connection was a means of establishing an 
identity; for others, it was of little interest other than in the context of medical or 
health issues.  For most, the ‘biological’ and the ‘social’, ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’, were 
intricately intertwined and inseparable in the process of conceptualising family and 
kin connections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART TWO 
 
Negotiating DI Practices 
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Preface to Part II – Negotiating DI Practices 
 
 
This section of the thesis focuses on the social and clinical processes involved in 
conceiving a child by DI.  Chapter Four examines the issue of infertility and couples’ 
responses to a diagnosis of male infertility, and their decision-making in relation to 
pursuing the project of parenthood.  Drawing on the theory of narrative identity, the 
chapter draws attention to the disruption to people’s narrative identity caused by 
infertility, and the subsequent replotting of lives that takes place for couples who find 
out that they cannot conceive a child without assistance.  The chapter shows that 
couples’ experiences of infertility and choosing to become parents by ‘alternative’ 
means is embedded in wider kin relations, and shaped by dominant discourses about 
the meaning and significance of biological ties.  For most couples, the decision to 
conceive with the help of an anonymous sperm donor was fraught with ambivalence, 
but this route to parenthood was regarded as the best, or only option in the 
circumstances. 
 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven explore the clinical context in which couples have 
conceived through DI.  Chapter Five examines the discursive and relational strategies 
used by two New Zealand DI programmes which act as brokers of sperm and 
intermediaries between donors and recipients.  The construction of sperm donation as 
an ‘altruistic gift’ and the complexities and difficulties of recruiting and screening 
donors are a focus of attention.  The chapter draws attention to the paradoxical effects 
of a system organised around the principle of anonymity that also takes into account 
the perceived ‘rights’ of children conceived by DI to identify the donors in the future.   
 
The politics of access to DI treatment are the focus of Chapter Six. While DI 
programmes were traditionally established to ‘treat’ couples with male factor 
infertility, since the passing of the Human Rights Act, 1993, fertility clinics are not 
permitted to discriminate against groups of people such as lesbian couples or single 
women who seek to conceive by DI. Health professionals, however, act as the 
ultimate gatekeepers to access to the scarce resource of donor sperm.  The final 
chapter in this section focuses on couple’s shifting and changing identities as they 
negotiate the multifaceted world of the fertility clinic and emerge having achieved the 
success of entering the normal pregnancy trajectory. 
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Chapter Four 
Pathways to Donor Insemination 
 
 
My infertility resides in my heart like an old friend.  I do not hear from it for weeks at a time, 
and then, a moment, a thought, a baby announcement or some such thing, and I will feel the 
tug – maybe even be sad or shed a few tears.  And I think, “There’s my old friend.” It will 
always be part of me (Barbara Eck Menning, founder of Resolve,1 cited in Noble, 1987:36). 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines how couples came to have a child by donor insemination.  It 
looks at the critical moments, the contingencies and the processes involved in making 
a decision to have a child in this way, and the particular route(s) taken towards this 
life experience.  The chapter explores the stories that individuals tell about their 
experience of infertility, their desire to have a child and their decision to use DI as a 
method of achieving parenthood in circumstances where their first choice – to have a 
child biologically related to both parents – has been thwarted. Most of the couples 
included in this study claimed to have suffered some of the emotional difficulties 
often associated with infertility that are discussed in the academic literature and 
appear in ‘infertility stories’ told by the popular media.2  In the context of this study 
of families who have one or more children conceived by DI, stories that create an 
identity of ‘infertile’ have been told from the position of having circumvented 
                                                          
1 Resolve, a United States non-profit organisation devoted to issues revolving around infertility, was 
founded in 1974 by Barbara Eck Menning. A similar organisation in New Zealand, the New Zealand 
Infertility Society, was established in 1989 and incorporated in 1990 to: provide a national network for 
people affected by infertility and a national voice on issues; advocate for improved equity and effective 
care; provide a forum for discussion; raise public awareness on infertility causes, treatments, 
implications and impacts; provide consumer representation on medical, legal, ethical and policy issues; 
ensure information is available in the community so that people can make informed life choices to 
protect and enhance fertility; support research into infertility. 
2 The psychological and social consequences of infertility have been widely discussed in the literature 
on infertility and assisted human reproduction.  See, for example, Bierkens, 1975; Menning, 1980; 
Harrison, O’Moore, O’Moore and McSweeney, 1981; Adler and Boxley, 1985; Sandelowski and Jones, 
1986; Miall, 1986; Matthews and Matthews 1986; Williams, 1990; Abbey, Andrews and Halman, 
1991, 1992; Daniels, 1992; Becker, 1994. Examples of personal stories of the experience of infertility 
appear frequently in the popular press and in Infertility Society newsletters (see, for example, 
Pathways, the magazine of the New Zealand Infertility Society). 
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infertility (if not having ‘cured’ it).3  Parenthood has been achieved through DI.  
Thus, for the couples participating in this research, each story of infertility exists 
alongside a ‘DI success story’. 
 
The chapter draws on a number of sociological theories, including Mills’ notions of 
private troubles and public issues (1963), recent sociological theory on the 
constitution of narrative identity (Somers 1994; Plummer, 1995), and analysis of the 
discursive production of selves (Davies and Harre, 1990).  Social theorists of narrative 
have drawn attention to the ‘storied’ nature of culture and society.  For example, 
Plummer (1995:5) contends that  
 
… society itself may be seen as a textured but seamless web of stories emerging everywhere 
through interaction:  holding people together, pulling people apart, making societies work.  
 
Plummer (1995:16) is not so much interested in the narrative structure of stories, but 
with the grounded social and political conditions of their emergence.  
Like the sexual stories now being told when once, not so long ago, they were 
shrouded in silence, so too are stories of surviving and surpassing infertility being 
produced, coaxed and consumed (Plummer, 1995:21).  Everywhere interaction 
emerges around story-telling:  public narratives are created by the public telling of 
private troubles, and people in turn make sense of their private troubles and personal 
suffering by drawing on these public narratives. Social theorists such as Somers 
(1994) and Plummer (1995) consider the ontological nature of narrative: narrative is 
not merely representational of a situation or an event, but actually constitutes meaning 
and identity.  Furthermore, Somers (1994:614) argues that new research shows that 
stories guide action and that people construct identities by locating themselves or 
being located in a repertoire of emplotted stories.  She argues: 
 
…it is through narratives and narrativity that we constitute our social identities...all of us come 
to be who we are (however ephemeral, multiple, and changing) by being located or locating 
ourselves (usually unconsciously) in social narratives rarely of our own making (1994:606, 
original emphasis). 
 
Somers suggests that we draw upon a repertoire of stories available to us to make 
sense of our lives and the lives of others.  These are the public narratives from which 
                                                          
3 The issue of infertility ‘treatment’ circumventing rather than curing infertility is discussed in Chapter 
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our ontological narratives derive.  Somers (1994:625) argues that the “narrative” 
dimension of identity presumes that we can understand social action only if we 
recognise the various ontological and public narratives in which actors are emplotted.  
Moreover, we need to recognise that the narratives people use to make sense of their 
lives are mediated through a vast array of social institutions and practices. 
 
The stories that people tell of the discovery of infertility and the subsequent pursuit of 
alternative ‘options’ for having a baby show how people discursively position 
themselves in a society which values parenthood as an important ‘rite de passage’ or 
initiation to adulthood (Cameron, 1990).  According to Cameron, New Zealanders do 
not have discrete “reasons” for having children: the rationale is communicated in a 
complex of interactions that are not explicit (1990:122). Furthermore, it is not just any 
child that people want, but their “own” child; and it is not just any kind of parent that 
they want to be, but a “real” parent (Cameron, 1990).  This chapter examines the 
discourses that couples and their kin draw on to make sense of the experience of 
infertility, their desire to have children, and the options available to them to achieve 
the desired goal of parenthood. 
 
Reactions to infertility:  private troubles and public issues 
For most couples, the path towards having a child by DI began with their unsuccessful 
attempts to conceive and the subsequent discovery of medically diagnosed male 
infertility. For most, the news of infertility came as a shock.  Some men reported that 
finding out that they were infertile was a “real blow” that left them feeling 
“devastated and isolated”.4  While it took some time to come to terms with, the 
majority found ways of coping with this outcome.  Men’s ability to do this had 
profound implications for their self-esteem and intimate relationships, as revealed by 
the following examples of the experiences of Caroline and Mike and Andrew and 
Annie.  Mike and Caroline recalled their experience of finding out that Mike was 
azoospermic (he had no sperm): 
 
Caroline:  It certainly hasn’t affected our relationship at all.  In fact going through it at the time 
probably enhanced it more than anything, because it was something that was really personal 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Six. 
4 Other references to participants’ reactions to infertility appear later in this chapter, for example, in 
connection with considering the alternative strategies for parenthood. 
 99
just to both of us.  And I was probably really quite concerned just for Mike, you know, the 
fact that it’s probably more acceptable for a female to be infertile than what it is for a male.  
Eight years ago, it certainly was.  I mean it’s okay [for a woman] to turn around and say, 
“well, you know, I’m sorry but I can’t have children” but for Mike to turn around and say 
“well, actually I can’t have kids, because I don’t have any...or my sperm don’t have any 
goodies in them or whatever it is!”  I mean, it’s quite different and it’s quite hard I think for 
a male to accept. 
 
KH: [To Mike] Did you find it actually quite difficult to accept? 
 
Mike: Oh yeah, I did.  It was quite hard.  It’s quite a shock.  I wasn’t really expecting it when I was 
asked to give a second sample.  But I suspect that it was, the first time, a zero.  They didn’t 
say that, but just said, “would you like to come in and give a second sample?”  I got told 
over the phone.  [The doctor] was Caroline’s doctor, not mine, and he told me, but he was 
quite good.  But at the time I got over it without any problem.  I didn’t feel like advertising it 
to anyone in particular. 
 
In contrast to Mike and Caroline’s experience, Andrew and Annie stood out as having 
had a particularly difficult time, over a protracted period, confronting the issues 
associated with Andrew’s azoospermia. The following part of this section focuses on 
their particular case, not because their narrative is representative, but because it 
highlights some of the complex and intense emotional issues that can arise for 
individuals and couples in connection with infertility. 
 
Annie and Andrew had been trying to conceive for three years before they saw a 
doctor to determine the cause of their infertility.5  As in Mike’s case, two semen 
analyses showed that Andrew was azoospermic.  They said: 
 
Andrew: June 1990.  That's when I was told I couldn't have children.  We were infertile, basically.  At 
that stage the doctor told us that we could look at the donor insemination programme.  We 
took a year [to decide]. 
                                                                                
Annie: That was at the same time wasn't it?  That bad news, and then this good news straight 
afterwards.  I don't know whether that was actually a good thing.  
  
Andrew: There was no pressure.  It was just an idea he threw out to soften the blow, from my point of 
view.  It is a shock to find out you can't have kids. The cause is unknown, although the 
assumption is mumps a long time ago, followed by glandular fever…. I had glandular fever 
very severely at 18-19 years of age, which took about five years to go.  So I had it quite 
severely.  So that's partly the reason I guess.  But then no-one can tell me.  
 
                                                          
5 Three years appears to be a long time when considering that infertility is generally constructed as the 
failure to conceive after a year of unprotected sexual intercourse (Coney, 1999c:11). According to 
Coney, this definition of infertility is based on the statistic that 80% of women will get pregnant after a 
year of unprotected intercourse.  However, after three years 93% will do so (Coney, 1999c:11).  A 
book recently published by a New Zealand fertility clinic advises that decisions about when to 
investigate infertility depends on the couples’ wishes, but should generally be initiated as soon as some 
concern is felt (Fertility Associates, 1998). Most other participant couples had begun infertility 
investigations after about a year of ‘trying’ to conceive, though some women who quickly suspected 
something was wrong, sought medical advice after only a few months. 
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Annie:    It would be nice for you to know, wouldn't it?  But never mind.  
 
For Andrew, June 1990 was a critical moment in his life: he learned that he could not 
become a biological father. He drew on the narrative of the “we” of infertility, which 
constructs infertility as a ‘couple problem’ rather than an individual problem 
(Dickens, 1990:23-24).  Annie had doubts that it was helpful for them to hear about 
DI as an option for having children before they had had a chance to grieve and 
perhaps ‘come to terms’ with their infertility.6  Andrew, on the other hand, believed 
the doctor mentioned DI as a positive counterpoint to the negative results of his semen 
analysis. Andrew and Annie had on-going concerns about the lack of a satisfactory 
explanation for Andrew’s azoospermia.  In relation to determining the cause of male 
infertility, the director of a New Zealand fertility clinic said: 
 
Dr C: Well, there are a number of reasons, but by far the most common cause is what we call 
idiopathic, we really don’t know.  Things like undescended testes, for example, but for by far 
the most, there’s no explanation.  Pituitary problems themselves do account for a few. 
 
In the absence of strong evidence of the reasons for their infertility, Andrew and other 
infertile men and their partners recounted stories of critical moments in their lives that 
might account for their infertility.  These were narratives about episodes or incidents 
such as childhood illnesses, “coming off the handle bars once too often”, being kicked 
in the testicles by a bull, hit by a squash ball, or born one of a twin.  But, in the 
absence of a scientific explanation about exactly how or when infertility ‘happened’, 
the uncertainty remains. This illustrates Shilling’s argument that amidst growing 
technological advancement and ability to control the body in high modernity, many 
uncertainties remain about what the body is and how it should be controlled 
(1993:183).   
 
Uncertainties about bodies and how they function (or do not) add to the feeling of loss 
of control over their bodies and their life choices that many infertile couples 
experience (Noble, 1987:30). At a recent symposium hosted by the New Zealand 
                                                          
6 Noble (1987:30-36) identifies the stages of grieving that many infertile couples experience as defined 
by Elisabeth Kübler-Ross and others.  These include: shock, denial, anger, isolation, guilt, depression, 
grief, and (hopefully) resolution. Annie was concerned that she and Andrew did not go through this 
grieving process before considering donor insemination as an alternative to childlessness.  Menning 
(1980) argues that doctors should not casually suggest DI in the absence of proper screening or 
counselling of couples.  DI, she contends, should be considered as an alternative to infertility, not as a 
treatment. 
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Infertility Society, a number of attendees contended that for infertile people, feelings 
of loss of control over one’s body and the decision to become a parent is the major 
cause of stress associated with infertility.7  Extended family members of infertile 
people also experienced feelings of loss of control or helplessness when confronting 
their relative’s infertility.  Some parents of infertile men said they were distressed to 
find out about their son’s infertility and wondered if they could have done anything to 
prevent it. The father of one infertile male said that he wondered if their son’s 
infertility was caused by an undescended testicle, which he and his wife noticed when 
their son was at primary school.  He said: 
 
Jim:  And we noticed it in the bath, I’m sure.  We took him to the doctor and they made an 
adjustment.  It might have been a bit late.  That's just what I think might have happened, but 
whether that is right I don't know.  I've got no evidence one way or the other, but he did have a 
problem there when he was going to primary school, and we got it fixed when we knew about it.  
So, maybe that was the reason. …You don't go around with a boy when he's seven or eight or 
something looking at him and saying "Is everything all right down there?  Have they dropped?" 
and what have you (Jim and Marjorie laugh). But maybe you should, maybe you should, you 
know.  I just feel a little annoyed with myself that we probably didn't find out earlier, if that was 
the cause.  I don't know.  But, nothing you can do about it now, I suppose.  
 
Jim’s comments suggest that he felt a degree of guilt or responsibility for his son’s 
infertility. However, the degree to which unknown variables might have contributed 
to the infertility highlights the impossibility of covering every contingency.  As a 
result, as Jim pointed out, there is little that couples with male factor infertility can do 
but explore other strategies for becoming parents, which means creating alternative 
self-identities. 
 
Finding out that one cannot be a biological parent as planned requires people to re-
examine and replot their lives (Kirkman, 1999). Drawing on theory of narrative 
identity, Kirkman (1999) has studied the ways in which women with infertility 
develop new narratives for and about themselves.  She argues that if we accept that 
our lives are constituted through narrative, we can then understand “the profound 
challenge confronting a person whose identity, narratively constituted, has been 
disrupted by the discovery of infertility” (Kirkman, 1999:1).  This idea about the 
disruption of identity indicates the degree to which being a parent is generally 
assumed as part of adult identity.  Kirkman maintains that revising the plot of one’s 
life means more than making “a decision” about what to do next (1999:4).  It means 
                                                          
7 ‘Winning with Stress’, NZIS Symposium 2000, 11-12 August 2000, Christchurch New Zealand. 
 102
having to interpret the life already lived, the goals and directions of one’s life and 
understandings about self-identity.   
 
Individuals responded differently to the diagnosis of male infertility, depending on a 
number of factors, including the type of diagnosis and the degree of commitment to 
fulfilling the role of biological parent.8  For Andrew, the news of infertility totally 
disrupted the story he had told himself (and perhaps others) about his life as a 
husband, a father and as a human being.  He said of the events that occurred after the 
news of infertility: 
 
Andrew: We went through the process of deciding whether to stay married. 
                                                                               
Annie: Oh yes.  Andrew wanted a divorce because he couldn't give me children, and that was a very 
big thing for you, wasn't it?  
 
Andrew: Yeah.  
 
Annie: It never came into my mind, but...  
 
Andrew: The purpose of life is to reproduce.  That's my thought, so therefore, take that purpose away, 
what does one have?  Not a lot.  And why should I deny someone else that purpose when I 
can't deliver? …I had no purpose in life: suicidal tendencies, loss of job, financial pressure.  
I'd been the complete person, but I'd lost my reason for living.  Why are we here?  You take 
all those fundamentals.  I might not be normal but that's the way I view life.  So...might not be 
normal...  
 
 
Andrew and Annie’s dialogue reveals a sharp distinction between their own personal 
narratives as individuals who reacted to infertility in different ways, and their shared 
narrative as a married couple who were planning to have children together. Andrew 
positioned himself as unworthy of staying married because he could not fulfill what 
he perceived as his purpose in life as a husband: to procreate with his wife. Clearly for 
Andrew, a dominant narrative in the constitution of his identity as a married man was 
becoming a biological father.9 Thus, for Andrew, infertility became a significant 
“private trouble”: the values that he deemed important were considerably threatened 
by his inability to become a biological parent (Mills, 1963). Andrew’s expectation of 
                                                          
8 Noble (1987:30) maintains that the depth of loss each person feels about infertility varies from 
frustration to extreme depression.  Matthews and Matthews (1986:646) hypothesise that “the greater 
the commitment to biological parenthood, the greater will be the identity shock brought about by 
infertility and involuntary childlessness, and the more negative the effect on self-esteem”. 
9 Writing on the emotional effect of infertility, the chief executive officer of Britain’s Fertility 
Association, ISSUE, claims that for infertile men the feelings of failure and powerlessness are 
especially acute.  This is because men are brought up to be providers, to be successful and they are 
generally in the position of power (Rice, no date). 
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himself as an individual supports Cameron’s contention that for most pakeha New 
Zealanders, having children is important to their sense of biological and social 
completeness (1990:99.).  In this sense, infertility is also a “public issue” (Mills, 
1963:395-396) because the values cherished by the public at large are not fulfilled by 
infertility. The perception of himself as less than a complete person led to a loss of 
confidence and a sense of futility10 which carried over into other areas of his life: his 
work, relationships with others and his marriage.  Eight years after the initial 
discovery of infertility in 1990, Andrew and Annie said: 
 
Andrew: I've just got over the grief of not being able to father children now, recently, in the last 9 
months, 12 months.  A long process.  
                                                                              
KH: And basically you went through that process on your own?  
 
Andrew: Basically, yes.  
 
Annie: Wouldn't talk to me for the first five years.  It's actually only in the last 9 months that we've 
actually talked about it.  Is that true?  
 
Andrew: Yes.  
 
Annie: I couldn't bring it up.  It was just "Don't talk about it.  I don't want to talk about it."  So I was 
just sort of shut off.  
 
Andrew’s extended period of  raises the question of whether a refusal to express one’s 
emotions and receive feedback from others delays the process of being able to 
develop alternative narratives for living one’s life. Williams (1996) argues that people 
with chronic illness undergo a process of ‘narrative reconstruction’ whereby a 
person’s biography is reorganised to take account of their illness and changed 
relationship with the world in which they live. Similarly, Becker (1994) contends that 
discontinuities in life force people to reconstruct some semblance of continuity in 
their lives. Andrew claimed to have “shut off” his emotions: pursuing parenthood 
was, he thought at the time, more important than acknowledging his feelings about 
being infertile.  To restore a sense of continuity after the disruption of infertility 
(Becker, 1994), he focused on constructing himself as a ‘father’ to two daughters 
conceived by DI. This was part of the project of shaping his life “as a rational, 
autonomous, responsible individual seeking to maximise [his] potential and 
achievements as a worthy person” (Lupton and Barclay, 1997:18). 
                                                          
10 A recent national survey of the experiences of couples with fertility problems in the UK reported that 
20% of repondents said that they had experienced suicidal feelings. One in three also reported not fully 
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Lupton and Barclay (1997:17-21) have argued that parenthood is a “project of the 
self”.  They cite Zygmunt Bauman’s (1996) claim that individuals in contemporary 
societies embark on “pilgrimages” which, unlike in pre-modern times, are 
accomplished without leaving home.  Each pilgrimage constitutes the ‘unfinished 
project of the self’, the on-going attempt to fashion self-identity in a world that is full 
of uncertainties and risks (Lupton and Barclay, 1997:17). Andrew’s decision to 
embark on fatherhood through DI as a ‘project of the self’, while concealing his 
emotions, can be linked to dominant discourses in Western thought which privilege 
reason above emotion. Williams and Bendelow (1996:125) cite Bordo (1986) who 
referred to the ‘Cartesian masculinization of thought’ – the separation of mind from 
body, nature from culture, and reason from emotion.11  In this view, emotions are 
dismissed as ‘irrational’, private, inner sensations which need to be “‘tamed’, 
‘harnessed’ or ‘driven out’ by the steady (male) hand of reason” (Williams and 
Bendelow, 1996:125).12   
 
At the time of the interview, Andrew had reached a point where he believed that it 
was beneficial for him to talk about his infertility.  He said:   
 
Andrew: I feel more relaxed about it.  I feel I can talk to anyone about it now, whereas before I 
couldn’t…none of your darn business.  I wouldn’t be talking to you today if I didn’t feel 
comfortable about it, and I guess, it’s just time I guess.  I went to a psychologist and they 
couldn’t help me.  I’m a strong personality.  No-one tells me what to do.  I make up my own 
mind.  I can be influenced but, yeah… 
 
Annie had tried for several years to get Andrew to see a psychologist, and when he 
finally did, the session had not been a success as far as he was concerned.13  The 
‘trials and tribulations’ experienced by Andrew and Annie in connection with his 
                                                                                                                                                                      
understanding the nature of their own or their partner’s infertility (Kerr, Brown, and Balen, 1999). 
11 According to Williams and Bendelow (1996), this dominant view in Western thought has also 
contributed to the neglect of emotions in sociological thought and practice.  They maintain that only in 
the past decade or so has a distinct body of work emerged in the sociology of emotions. 
12 Although not fully explored here, Lupton and Barclay (1997:21-24) suggest that a psychoanalytic 
approach may be more useful than discourse analysis when exploring people’s emotions and passions.  
Its usefulness, they claim, lies in its focus on “the emotional, the contradictory, the fragmentary and 
disordered subject rather than the ‘rational’, the conscious and the unified subject” (1997:22). 
13 Psychologist, John Snarey, contends that a longitudinal study of married men, including infertile 
men, revealed that early responses to the discovery of infertility and the way they dealt with the 
problem tended to have a lasting impact on their lives.  The study measured levels of marital happiness 
and “generativity”, the term referring to the mid-life stage in Erikson’s theory of the life cycle (Snarey, 
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infertility illustrated Kirkman’s (1999:8) suggestion that “infertility is a complex 
vicissitude which women [and men] tend to experience rather like Tolstoy’s unhappy 
families: in their own way”.  Their story also bears the hallmarks of the modernist 
stories identified by Plummer (1995:54).  Having endured many years of suffering in 
silence about his infertility, Andrew had reached an epiphany, a point where the 
silence had to be broken, and as a result he became transformed.  Theirs is a story of 
surviving and maybe surpassing infertility. 
 
For most couples faced with male infertility, the passage of time became significant. 
Time was spent trying unsuccessfully to conceive, having tests, waiting for test 
results, grieving for the loss of a child they will never have, exploring the options, 
waiting for medical appointments, going onto waiting lists for fertility treatment, and 
so on.  Joe and Ella said:  
 
Ella:   Then the sperm count came back and it was nil, and from then on we just sat round trying to 
decide...we sort of left it for six months or so. 
 
Joe: More than that...about two years I thought.  It was a fair while, because we were 
dumbfounded.  Yeah I reckon we were there nearly two years, I really do, until we sorted out 
what we were going to...basically we found out and went into shock and that lasted about 12 
months and then we started finding out about the sort of avenues we could take.  
 
Ella: Mm.  We didn't really realise we had to wait.  
 
Joe: No.  That added to it I think.  It might have been six months while we sat on our hands and did 
nothing, and then we started talking about what we were going to do, and then we tried to find 
out where to go. 
 
 
Like Andrew and Annie, Joe and Ella had a sense of being stunned by the discovery 
of infertility and of time spent waiting. Time was also perceived by some as an 
important factor in the process of coming to terms with infertility and ‘moving on’ to 
the next phase in one’s life.  Helen and Patrick, said: 
 
Patrick: You know, when you find out you can't have children, it's a real blow.  
 
KH:  Did you find it took some time to comes to terms with?  
 
Patrick: Sure.   When I went home up to the North Island I told my mother, she cried, she blamed 
herself…. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
1988). A recent report on infertility services in New Zealand states that “infertility causes as deep and 
enduring a sense of loss as many chronic illnesses” (Gillett, Peek and Lilford, 1995:66). 
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Helen: Yeah. I think that infertility is the big hurdle.  That is the tough one.  It's not the donor 
insemination or the can you or can't you...it's just this black and white thing that's right there, 
you can't change it.  So you have to learn to accept that before you can move on.  And that was 
harder than having the donor. 
 
 
In contrast to those men (like Mike, Andrew, Joe and Patrick) who had no sperm, for 
those who had at least some sperm, the outlook appeared less black and white.  Some 
men with a diagnosis of oligospermia (a low sperm count) responded by adopting a 
variety of ‘lifestyle’ changes in the hope of raising the sperm count to improve the 
chance of being suitable candidates for IVF (which, if it worked, would enable them 
both to be biological parents). Diane and Chris claimed that the time they spent 
focusing on drug and vitamin regimes in a bid to raise Chris’s sperm count gave them 
the time to grieve for the loss of their ability to have a child biologically related to 
them both. Diane said:   
 
Diane:  So that went on for about three years in total from when we started to when we actually 
decided...well, we were told that IVF wasn't an option because the sperm count wasn't enough.  
So then we decided to go for DI and at that stage it was, more or less, a natural progression 
wasn't it?  We'd gone through three years of like trying everything we could to try and follow 
up Chris's aspect of it and by the time we made the decision to actually go for DI, it was 
almost a huge relief because we were stepping off that roller-coaster onto a slightly different 
one….14
 
I do think that it’s quite important that you do have that time to...for other couples I 
mean...that you do have that time to come to terms with things 100%, because I think, then, if 
you do that, then the road will be much smoother. If you suddenly jumped into it, you 
know…if we’d jumped into it back when we first found out [things might not have turned out 
so well]. 
 
 
Although the possibility of them both becoming biological parents was eventually 
closed to them (and ICSI15 was not available at that time in New Zealand), Diane and 
Chris were able to experience their decision to have a child by DI as a “natural 
progression”.  This occurred in a series of episodes framed as “roller-coaster” rides, 
which ultimately led towards achieving their goal of parenthood. 
 
                                                          
14 The metaphor of the roller coaster is frequently used by infertile people to describe the emotional 
highs and lows that accompany pursuing parenthood through a variety of methods of assisted 
reproduction.  While these methods offer ‘hope’ and the chance of becoming pregnant, the frequently-
experienced failure to achieve pregnancy through AHR leads to contrasting feelings of disappointment 
and despair. 
15 Intracyctoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) is a medical procedure which involves the injection of a 
single spermatazoon into the oocyte with the aim of achieving fertilisation and the subsequent 
implantation of the zygote (fertilised oocyte) in the uterus.  This method of conception is discussed 
later in this chapter. 
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Infertility stories tend to highlight the private and personal aspects of the pain and 
suffering incurred by infertility.  In this way, infertility appears to be constructed as a 
private trouble, rather than a public issue (Mills, 1963:395).  However, another 
narrative about infertility emerged in this study: infertility is not an uncommon 
experience.16 In other words, while many initially felt that they suffered alone, they 
began to realise they were not alone in their plight.  Angus and Joanne, the maternal 
grandparents of a child conceived by DI, said: 
 
Joanne:  [DI] is quite commonplace.  That's what quite amazes me how many children are donor 
children nowadays really.  It's quite common really.  
 
KH: You mean you've suddenly heard more about them?  
 
Joanne: Yeah, yes.  Maybe it is because we never listened before.  I don't know (she laughs).                                                     
 
Angus: It's quite amazing.  I have two people at work this week who came up with similar things 
happening with their children.  
 
KH: I suppose it makes you think that perhaps infertility is more of a problem these days than it 
used to be?  
 
Joanne: Well, I do wonder.  
 
Angus: We actually talked about it with the two people I spoke to...we talked about different things 
and we were trying to come up with some bright ideas about why it is happening.  And we 
looked at all the different scenarios of, you know, maybe it's chemicals, and yet some of the 
chemicals that we dealt with 50 years ago were more dangerous than what the ones are 
nowadays, so we were trying to balance it up.  
 
Joanne: I think it’s stress of life.  I honestly do.  The pace of life... 
 
 
Rather than perceiving infertility as purely a private trouble, these grandparents 
framed it as a public issue possibly related to aspects of contemporary life, and 
therefore affecting people from all walks of life.  This illustrates how public narratives 
are created by the telling of private troubles. 
 
                                                          
16 The lack of a standardised definition of ‘infertility’ makes it difficult to estimate its prevalence. 
According to Greenhall and Vessey (1990), British studies have shown that one in four women have 
had difficulties with conceiving or periods of sub-fertility at some time in their lives.  About one in 
eight women experience sub-fertility when attempting to conceive their first child and one in six their 
second child.  It is estimated that only 3% of women remain involuntarily childless (Greenhall and 
Vessey, 1990; Gillett, Peek and Lilford, 1995).  The only New Zealand data available comes from a 
survey of contraceptive practice of 1,000 women conducted between 1983-1986.  This indicated that 
3% of married women aged 25-54 could be classified as infertile, but the authors suggested that their 
definition may have led to underestimation of the prevalence of infertility (Paul, Skegg et al, 1988, 
cited in Brander, 1991:10; Gillett, Peek and Lilford, 1995:13).  Gillett, Peek and Lilford (1995:9) 
estimate that infertility affects about 25% of couples at some time in their reproductive lives, and 3,500 
new referrals for infertility services are made each year in New Zealand. 
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Some couples had family members who they knew also had been diagnosed with 
male infertility, or who they suspected had similar problems to their own. Brendan, 
whose infertility was caused by a malfunctioning pituitary gland, said that two of his 
nephews had the same condition. Brendan’s sister said of her two sons: 
 
Shona: When they went to high school, or just before, I took them to the doctor at Port Chalmers and I 
told them about Brendan, so he decided he would test them for it, so he sent them to 
Christchurch and we waited for three weeks and yes, it was the same condition.  
 
KH: Are there any symptoms?  
 
Shona: The genitals don't grow.  They don't progress into puberty.  They were just at high school age, 
so they were lucky compared to Brendan, because Brendan was 21 when he found out, 
whereas my kids were on treatment [hormone injections] that enabled them to go through 
puberty.  They've got to have the injections all the time.  
 
Shona had become both an aunt and a grandmother through DI. Male infertility was, 
therefore, a family health issue for Brendan, Shona and their kin. 
 
Support Networks 
While some couples chose to keep the matter of their infertility to themselves, others  
shared information about their infertility with ‘supportive’ others, including friends, 
family members and counsellors, or joined infertility societies and support groups. 
Some couples, and the women in particular, had become actively involved with their 
local Infertility Society as a way of ‘networking’ and becoming more knowledgeable 
about the options available to them. Belinda and Richard, who had initially sought 
counselling, later joined the Infertility Society.  Belinda said: 
 
Belinda: I think first of all, [we got support] from the counsellor, because I was taking it quite badly, 
you know, I found it quite hard, to cope with all these new things.  It was very mind-
boggling, but the counsellor knew about the Infertility Conference that was here in 1995, so 
I took time off work and tootled off to learn and broaden my horizons about the whole thing.  
So it was actually there that I met a girl I worked with, who, unbeknown to me, was 
involved in the Infertility Society, and I didn't join the society as such.  I joined the 
committee.  There we found our information.  There I found out that I should be off to see 
Dr A. 
 
As a way of increasing support from family members, Belinda and Richard also 
invited close relatives to attend Infertility Society meetings so they too could be better 
informed about male infertility. 
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Alice and Peter had joined the local Infertility Society when they first began DI 
treatment.  They said: 
 
Alice: [Fertility clinic staff] actually sort of encouraged, or suggested the Infertility Society was 
available.  And we ended up getting quite a lot of information through the newsletter over the 
first few years.  It's only recently that we've started going to meetings. We were waiting so 
long for someone to get the donor support group going again, that I ended up volunteering my 
name to do it.  So, since then I've had calls from the clinic to call other people about such and 
such. We've had one meeting.  We're about to have another one at the end of next month. 
 
Peter: There were three or four interested couples at that time including ourselves. 
 
Like Alice and Peter, Diane and Chris wanted to keep abreast of information about 
infertility and new reproductive technologies through information disseminated by the 
Infertility Society and by reading books on the topic.  Diane said: 
 
Diane: We belong to the Infertility Society and if we were in Auckland I'd probably belong to a 
support group or something.  I've actually thought about setting up a DI support group, but I've 
yet to do it.  The clinic don't have a newsletter as such, do they, though in the New Zealand 
Infertility newsletter they usually have a little update, and I'm always reading bits and pieces.  
Like, if there's a new infertility book in the library I'll take it out and whip through it, just see 
what's in it. 
 
Like Alice and Peter, Diane perceived that belonging to a group or society with 
members who shared a similar parenting experience would be beneficial.  Similarly, 
Sophie and Ria, a lesbian couple who had conceived a child with the help of a known 
donor, had thought of establishing a group for lesbian parents, because, although they 
knew of other lesbian couples with children, they did not know them personally.  
They said: 
 
Ria:  It's becoming more and more obvious to us that it's important for us to be part of the gay 
community and part of a community where there are more and more lesbian mothers, so that 
we can create as normal a space for Lydia as possible.  
                                                                              
Sophie: There's a guy who I was talking about before, he's got friends, a lesbian couple, who are quite 
keen on setting up a lesbian mothers' play group which would be quite good.  I sort of 
mentioned it to Jennifer, and she was quite keen. 
 
KH: It would be good to have a supportive network of gay people, but it's just a small community 
here I suppose?  
  
Sophie: Yeah it is.  I think there's quite a large community up in Auckland.  They've got play groups 
up there, and quite a closeknit support group happening up there, but it would be nice to start a 
little one down here. But I've heard of...I've probably counted about six, maybe even eight 
lesbian couples who have had babies down here, that I've heard of. 
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Both Diane’s and Ria and Sophie’s circumstances raise the issue of the difficulty of 
establishing support groups of people in small communities who have constructed 
parenthood through similar ‘alternative’ means. 
 
Attending Infertility Society meetings was not regarded as beneficial by all couples.  
Some had attended meetings and/or support groups but had not felt entirely 
comfortable with the experience.  Carla and her husband Ben had decided to use DI to 
avoid passing on hereditary diseases in his family (polycystic kidney disease and heart 
disease) but had been unable to link with others in the Infertility Society who had 
chosen DI for similar reasons.  Carla said: 
 
Carla:  I went along to a meeting of the Infertility Society, but it was before that I knew that I had 
endometriosis, and I almost felt like I didn't belong there, because I had chosen DI and these 
poor people had had this imposed upon them from birth, sort of thing.  And even though it was 
really important for me to talk to people about this donor insemination business, I was like, I felt 
really uncomfortable.  So we belonged, and I've still got lots of the newsletters and things, but 
we didn't go to the meetings because we felt almost that we'd done something wrong by 
choosing this when other people had to suffer it because of nature.  So, in that way we felt really 
isolated, because I don't know of anybody else that's done it through choice, through a medical 
condition. Nobody.  And at the support group that they got up and running afterwards, none of 
those were doing it for the same reason as us either. 
 
 
Because they had chosen to use donated sperm, instead of their ‘own’, Carla felt that 
they were positioned as ‘outsiders’ within a group of people who were essentially 
involuntarily infertile.  Thus, she felt marginalised within a marginalised group. 
 
For some couples, attending Infertility Society meetings with others who shared the 
same difficult plight of being infertile, was not perceived as supportive. Mary and 
Brendan said: 
 
Mary: We went along to one of their meetings about infertility and donor insemination and all that 
sort of thing.  
 
Brendan:Yeah, it doesn't really interest us to get involved with that at all. 
                                                                              
Mary:  No, and I found it was just awful because they were just all people like us that couldn't have 
children, and I remember saying to one of them, because I knew that we were on the list and 
we were number such and such.  And all she said to me, is "Oh, you've done quite well.  We're 
such and such, and we're way down the list" ...you know (she laughs), and it just made me feel 
terrible.  I thought, well that's not much support is it? She was further down the list than what 
we were.  And I thought, this is supposed to be a support group.  But it was just a whole lot of 
people feeling really sorry for themselves that they couldn't have children, and, um, it was just 
not really much support at all. 
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Experiences such as these question whether support groups comprising similarly 
disadvantaged people really do support. They also raise the issue of the possible 
benefit of seeking one-to-one professional help to address some of the grief issues that 
emerge as a result of infertility.  
 
Like Belinda, Sarah had decided that she needed individual counselling to cope with 
issues that emerged for her as a result of what she perceived as the trauma of 
infertility.  She said: 
 
Sarah: I was abused as a child and I knew as soon as we found out that we couldn't have kids, I 
knew…you know how they say, one trauma often brings back another past trauma, and I knew 
that I would need counselling, and Tim didn't want to have a bar of it. I got into a very 
vulnerable position where I nearly made some bad judgements, and Tim still wanted to have 
nothing to do with it, and I just said, "Don't come and be counselled, but come and sit next to 
me, which he did, and, course, once you're there…(she laughs). 
                                                                              
And it was quite good.  You know, he wasn't going there for him, but we had a male and a 
female and he talked to the guy and I talked to the lady, and then we came back together.  It was 
only three sessions and it was just enough to get out some of the stuff that we really wanted to 
say that you couldn't say to them directly.  And then I stayed on for another couple [of sessions] 
to deal with the abuse that I had had as a child.  And it was just, I mean, it's not trivial by any 
means, because it's had a bearing on our relationship.  Of course, he only went for the couple of 
sessions, and he was okay (she laughs).  And he was quite pleased...he was more worried about 
my childhood experience than this whole infertility stuff, but I knew the whole combined 
traumas, I would need someone to talk to, because, I just couldn't cope with it all at once. 
 
While Sarah sought professional counselling, some couples turned to close friends 
and family members for support.  However, some family members felt that they could 
not provide the support their infertile relatives needed because they were unfamiliar 
with infertility or DI, and also felt powerless to help. Peter’s brother said: 
 
Roland: I'd be quite happy to talk to Peter about it.  But you feel pretty useless in terms of trying to 
provide some sort of support for the person, because you know so little about it yourself…he 
knows more because of the contacts he's had…you don't feel as if you can contribute a lot, 
except perhaps views that are exactly contradictory to what might be best for them.  And you 
feel very reticent about actually making comments that steer them down a route that might be 
quite different. It was always a very softly softly approach with me, because, I mean, I'm a 
fairly dogmatic type of person.  You can be too outspoken sometimes with these things, and I 
think it's good to just be a listener for them.  I think it was something they did want to talk 
about because I sensed that they did want to get family reaction, but not that they necessarily 
knew that at the time.  They were just trying to be open, so there was no great mystery about 
something that was going on in the background that everyone talked about but no-one talked 
about. 
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Like Roland, Jeremy and Christine felt somewhat inadequate when it came to 
supporting their infertile family members, Richard and Belinda.17 They believed that 
they were the “wrong people” to be supportive of Richard and Belinda at a time when 
they appeared to most need support because Christine was pregnant with their first 
child.  They said: 
 
Christine: I think that when they told us that DI was what they were going to do, we just said to them 
that we were really pleased that they could do that. I was glad because I'd had such a 
difficult time with Belinda and her with me that I was glad that she was going to be 
pregnant, because then that [problem] would be solved.  She could be pregnant and I knew 
that that, above anything else, was what she wanted to be, and it was awful because we 
wanted to help them, but there was absolutely nothing we could do.  
 
Jeremy: We were the wrong people to support them at the time.  
 
Christine: They probably needed us.  But we couldn't really be there could we? Well, we could, but 
then I think mainly it was every time Belinda saw me getting bigger and bigger and it 
really was rubbing salt in the wound a lot. 
 
 
Christine and Jeremy appeared to believe that the difficulties in their relationship with 
Belinda and Richard at the time were partly because of Belinda’s envy of Christine’s 
pregnancy.18  For her part, Belinda did appear to find other people’s pregnancies a 
difficult reminder of her own inability to get pregnant with her husband Richard.  
Referring to the time after they discovered Richard’s infertility, they said: 
 
Richard: [To Belinda] You were just like a walking zombie for about six months. 
 
Belinda: I was a total zombie at work.  I’d burst into tears for no… 
 
Richard: Especially working in a bank, you know.  I mean you’ve got two, three other young girls, 
young ladies there… 
 
Belinda: All falling pregnant all the time.  It was a constant reminder.  It was horrible. 
 
Richard: That was the hardest thing.  As soon as somebody became pregnant, or… 
 
Belinda: I’d come home and be all upset. 
 
Richard: And then my brother and his wife became pregnant, and they knew that we were having 
problems.  But, you know, you can’t stop them having their own family! 
 
Belinda: And every time we went to…no we couldn’t stop them having their excitement and that, 
but every time we went to Richard’s parents, the whole conversation was just phased 
                                                          
17 Jeremy and Richard were twin brothers but, whereas Jeremy was fertile, Richard was diagnosed with 
germinal cell aplasia (he did not possess the cells that produce sperm in the testicles). 
18 It is possible that Christine’s pregnancy merely exacerbated an already, at times, tense relationship 
with Belinda: in the interview, Christine referred to them being “very different” from one another.  
This is also hinted at above when Christine refers to the “difficult time” she and Belinda had with each 
another. 
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around babies, and I just sat there and thought “I don’t want to be here”.  That was the 
hardest thing.  And then we went there one time, and they were getting the crib out of the 
roof, and they asked us to stay for lunch, and I just said “No, I’m out of here, I’m not 
putting up with this”.  They didn’t realise what they were doing, but I just found 
it…yeah.  I wanted that excitement first, ‘cause Richard’s the oldest twin, you know (she 
laughs). 
 
Richard:  By eight minutes (he laughs). 
 
Belinda appeared to believe that because Richard was the first-born twin, that he and 
she had a ‘right’ to be the first to conceive and bear a child: that this was the ‘natural’ 
order of things.  This supported Becker’s finding that infertile people undergoing 
fertility treatment espoused the belief that life should be “predictable, knowable and 
continuous” (1994:90). Belinda was also distressed by, and critical of, Richard’s 
parents’ focus on Christine’s pregnancy because it was a painful reminder of their 
inability to conceive. According to psychologist Aline Zoldbrod, envy or jealousy of 
others who are pregnant is common among infertile women (1993).19 A recent 
national study of couples’ experiences of infertility and fertility treatment in the UK, 
however, found that while many survey respondents experienced emotional 
difficulties associated with infertility (including tearfulness (97%), 
depression/isolation (84%), anger (84%), inadequacy (72%)), only 2% claimed to feel 
envy/jealousy of pregnant women (Kerr, Brown, and Balen, 1999:936).  While envy 
and jealousy are not very laudible emotions, and few may claim to experience them, it 
is possible that Belinda was experiencing a range of emotions associated with her 
experience of infertility.  In her struggle to make sense of her situation, she found it 
difficult to contend with others’ pregnancies. 
  
Ultimately, although most couples were able to get some support from some quarters, 
many felt that they experienced their infertility and treatment on their own.  When 
asked who provided the most support through the process of coming to terms with 
their infertility and having children by DI, Helen, the mother of two sons conceived 
by DI, said: 
 
Helen:   We did it all pretty much on our own.  And it is something that you have to deal with yourself.  
Although family might know about it, they’re only aware of the big picture.  It’s bad enough 
                                                          
19 Commenting on this phenomenon, Zoldbrod argues that jealousy of others who are able to get 
pregnant and carry a child to term is “probably the most troublesome and shameful feeling surrounding 
infertility.  Whoever is envied, and whoever does the envying, envy has a destructive, dehumanizing 
effect on both” (1993:10). 
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to go and have a baby, but going to have donor insemination [adds to the stress]. And then you 
have to write a cheque for a baby, if you like. 
 
Helen raised the issue of the dual stress that couples had to contend with themselves:  
the problem of infertility, and the need to pay to become parents through the use of 
reproductive technologies. The latter links to arguments against the introduction of the 
market economy into the area of parental love, and criticism of the commodification 
of babies through the use of reproductive technologies.20
 
Considering the options for parenthood 
The decision to conceive a child by DI was generally made in the context of 
comparing this option with others. While revising the narrative ‘plots’ of their lives 
included some degree of acceptance of the loss of a biological connection at least 
between the father and the potential child, each couple retained a narrative identity as 
a parent (Kirkman, 1999).  When exploring the alternatives to not having children, 
Peter and Alice decided that they would at least try some of the options available to 
them to become parents.  They said: 
 
Peter: We weren't really good candidates for anything except donor, at that time, and ICSI hadn't sort 
of come on the scene quite then and we weren't prepared to go to Australia.  We'd sort of 
made this agreement that we weren't going to do anything too heroic, and we were going to be 
sort of reasonable and rational about it because we had um...  
                                                                               
Alice: Some friends who had lots of operations and who did IVF, and, you know...  
 
Peter: They didn't have a very good time, and although that was quite a few years beforehand, we 
sort of… we both see other opportunities as well, and saw it opening up in perhaps a different 
path for us as a couple. So, had we not been able to have any children, we probably would 
have made a good life for ourselves anyway, although, we would have always had regrets had 
we not sort of tried. 
 
Alice and Peter’s deliberate engagement in the project of becoming parents relates to 
arguments explored by Shilling (1993) about the relationship between the body and 
self-identity in high modernity. Whereas in traditional societies, he argues, people’s 
identities were received automatically through ritual practices which connected 
people and their bodies to long established social positions, high modernity makes 
self-identity deliberative (Shilling, 1993:181, original emphasis).  According to 
Shilling: 
 
                                                          
20 These arguments are explored in Chapter Five. 
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…identities are formed reflexively through the asking of questions and the continual re-
ordering of self-narratives which have at their centre a concern with the body.  Self-identity 
and the body become ‘reflexively organized projects’ which have to be sculpted from the 
complex plurality of choices offered by high modernity without moral guidance as to which 
should be selected (1993:181). 
 
 
The following subsections explore the different strategies for achieving parenthood 
considered by the participants in this research: adoption, ICSI, and DI with a known 
or an anonymous donor. 
 
Adoption: a road less travelled 
When considering the options for parenthood, most had given some thought to 
adoption.  In relation to the choices available to them, and their decision to use DI, 
Alice and Peter said: 
 
Alice: Well at that point our options were either donor, adoption, or none, weren't they?  That was 
what we had - all that was available.  And I think we liked the low-tech side of [DI], didn't 
we?  
                                                                               
Peter: The low tech and the kind of ease of access was quite important. And low cost…I guess that 
was a consideration… 
 
Alice: But also we liked the idea that the child would be kind of more ours in a sense than if it was 
an adopted child.  
 
Peter: Yes.  If it was sort of biological...  
 
Alice: Sort of half biologically ours.  Also there's that sense of...ownership's not the right word ...but, 
you know, with open adoption these days it's so complex and you're sort of taking on another 
family, and it's all a lot more difficult.  
 
Peter: The relationships are a lot more complex I think.  
 
While they had considered adoption, Alice and Peter liked the idea of having a child 
that was “half” theirs in a biological sense,21 and were uncomfortable about the 
complexity of the relationships they associated with adoption.22   
 
Sarah, the mother of two adopted children, Rob and Phoebe, a child conceived by DI, 
Charlotte, and a foster child, Amy, corroborated Peter and Alice’s concerns about the 
possible demands of open adoption on families with adopted children.  She said: 
                                                          
21 In their study of families with children conceived by DI, Snowden, Mitchell and Snowden (1983:87) 
commented that this was the most often cited advantage of DI in comparison with adoption. 
22 Many of the issues that emerge in this study about couples’ preferences for DI over adoption were 
raised by couples included in Daniels’ New Zealand study of 54 couples who had children by DI, most 
of whom had previously considered adoption (1994). 
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Sarah: The social issues of having a donor child are just far superior to adoption.  We could have put 
our name down for adoption again, but we would rather have another donor child, because you 
get to do the...experience the whole process.  Um, you are more accepted by everybody 
else...not that we need that.  But it's just so many less complications. Like, last week, we had 
to get Rob's birth family all organised, you know, because they want to have visits and stuff.  
So we saw Rob's birth family, Amy's birth family, then Aunty Judy arrived, so that was three 
birth mothers in a day, and I just thought, thank goodness we don't have to do anything for 
Charlotte's. 
 
Although they had accepted the social obligations as “part of the deal” of open 
adoption, Sarah said that they nonetheless felt somewhat “stretched” at times and, in 
retrospect, would opt for the fewer social commitments associated with having a DI 
child.   
 
While some women said they preferred DI to adoption because they wanted to 
experience pregnancy and the birth of a child, some men saw no reason to deny their 
wife the opportunity of going through pregnancy and childbirth.  Andrew said that if 
they were to adopt, he would have preferred to adopt an older child rather than a baby.  
He and Annie said: 
 
Andrew: Being a father isn’t about having a baby, it’s about developing a young person, I guess.  
Others might see having children as more the baby stage.  I feel that later on is when you 
develop a strong bond perhaps.  Is that what I’m saying?  I don’t know.  The other thing, I 
guess, you don’t want to cheat your wife out of the experience of having babies, either.  
Adoption cheats them to the extent that it’s not part of you.   And I know that Annie felt that 
‘it doesn’t matter if it’s not part of me’, but in my view I was still cheating her out of the 
opportunity of being able to have a baby herself. 
 
KH:  [to Annie] Did you like the idea of going through a pregnancy? 
 
Annie: Yeah.  I think that was something I sort of wanted.  It did appeal to me to have a baby rather 
than adopt, though adoption was there for me, but it wasn’t for Andrew. 
 
Andrew: I’ll justify that by saying that friends of ours who...their second marriage, where she is not 
going to have the ability to have children because he’s fixed...I can see that she felt robbed 
that she couldn’t have children.  It’s just the way you think.  An important part of a woman’s 
[identity] …  it’s the way women are.  You’ve had a complete life if you’ve had children 
maybe.  Is that correct?  Or is it in my mind? 
 
 
Andrew constructed pregnancy and birth as an important part of a woman’s identity. 
Later, he also indicated that he would feel emotionally closer to his wife’s biological 
child than he would to an adopted child. 
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Connected with the preference of many couples to have at least some biological 
relationship to the child was the idea that DI was preferable to adoption because 
children conceived by DI were less likely to suffer from issues relating to their 
relinquishment for adoption by their birth parents.23  Diane, the mother of Scott, said:   
 
Diane:  The other thing I feel quite strongly is that because people often compare adoption and DI, 
and I don't actually think...there's certain similarities…but like with adoption, you can't get 
away from the fact that a baby's actually been given away by the natural parents.  Whereas the 
only reason that Scott's here is because we wanted one so much and someone was good 
enough to actually donate some sperm.  So I hope that the rejection issues that adoptees 
have…I hope that Scott doesn't have those. 
 
 
When stating her preference for DI, Diane drew on discourses about the possible 
harmful psychological consequences for the adopted child.24 For most couples, DI 
was considered the “second best” option after having a child biologically related to 
both of them, while adoption was considered a possible third option if DI had failed.  
For many, however, adoption did not even appear to be an option because of the 
institutional constraints of the time.  Meredith, who had enquired about adoption, 
said: 
 
Meredith:  I was in my thirties, and the waiting list was actually closed, and by the time it had opened 
up and I filled in a form, they rang me up and said, you know, you're wasting your time.  I 
was too old, and I wouldn't be considered.  Or, from their point of view, they didn't feel that 
people…the girls who had babies would consider somebody my age, and that it was better to 
let me know now.  So DI was the only option. 
 
Other couples who had investigated adoption discovered significant barriers to doing 
so: being over 30 years old, the small numbers of babies available for adoption and 
the lengthy waiting list.25  Added to this, some considered adoption undesirable, 
citing the negative experience of others.   Mike, the father of two children, said: 
                                                          
23 For example, in The Primal Wound, Nancy Newton Verrier hypothesises that the severing of the 
connection between the child and biological mother causes a “primal or narcissistic wound, which 
affects the adoptee’s sense of Self and often manifests in a sense of loss, basic mistrust, anxiety and 
depression, emotional and/or behavioural problems, and difficulties in relationships with significant 
others” (1993:21, original emphasis). Parents considering adoption are often aware of these assertions 
and seek to avoid being parents of children at risk of such ‘wounds’. 
24 While adopted children are also constructed as ‘much wanted’ and ‘chosen’ by their adoptive 
parents, Verrier (1993) argues that the fact that the child was at one time connected to another mother 
can never be completely ignored.  She argues that while adoptees might understand the reasons why 
they were relinquished for adoption, the feeling of abandonment as a baby nonetheless remains with 
“each and every adoptee all his or her life (Verrier, 1993:25, original emphasis). 
25 An article in North & South magazine (Nissen, 1990) reported on the reduced numbers of babies 
available for adoption in a socio-political climate in New Zealand that supported young women to keep 
their babies, rather than have them adopted.  The article claimed that the then Department of Social 
Welfare (now the Adoption Information Services Unit in Child Youth and Family) had no qualms 
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Mike:  The reality was that adoption was virtually impossible, and literally you had no guarantee as to 
what you were getting.  My brother and his wife had two children of their own and they had a 
blood disorder and they adopted two, and the two they've got are…they’re a real handful, and 
for want of a better word, below average IQ.  So, I mean, I was aware of that, and I thought, 
yeah that's fine, but if you get someone's unwanted baby, they don't want the baby, how have 
they looked after it?  Where has it come from?  You know nothing about it.  So, for me, 
adoption was quite undesirable, under those terms.  People had been using DI or AID or 
whatever you like to call it for many, many years, especially in terms of our cattle, beef 
industry…agriculture had been using it for fifty years, so it's not as if it was untried. 
 
Mike’s concerns about the ‘risks’ of adoption link to notions that in the ‘risk society’ 
opportunities, hazards and ambivalences of biography increasingly have to be 
interpreted and dealt with by individuals alone (Beck, 1999:75). Drawing on his 
evaluation of the outcome of adoption within his family, Mike had decided that 
adopting someone’s “unwanted” baby carried greater risks than having a child 
conceived under the auspices of medical science and legitimated by agricultural 
practice. While views such as these are based on a narrow field of experience, and 
cast adoption in a negative light, it should be remembered that Mike is speaking from 
the position of being happy with the outcome of becoming the father of two daughters 
conceived by DI. 
 
While these couples had opted for DI rather than adoption, for many family members, 
and relatives of the infertile male in particular, adoption appeared at first to be a more 
familiar and acceptable option than DI.26  By and large, family members said that 
they were not consulted about their relatives’ choice to conceive a child by DI.  
Rather, they were told that this was the plan and their views on the decision were not 
sought. Reflecting on the time when she heard that her son Sean was infertile and that 
he and his wife Pippa were going to try to have a child by DI, Joan said: 
 
Joan:   I think at first I was sad for him, that he couldn't have children of his own, which came as a bit 
of a shock.  Then, I think my second reaction was, I think I'd prefer them to adopt…I just 
thought that somehow or another the affection for the child might be more even.  I was a bit 
afraid that Pippa would love the baby more than Sean.  I didn't really know.  It was just a first 
reaction. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
about telling couples in their 30s they were too “old” to adopt, and that their job was to place babies in 
the “best possible situation with regard to the birthparents’ wishes” rather than to supply babies to 
people (Nissen, 1990:71). 
26 Some relatives of mothers participating in this study suggested that DI as an option for having 
children was perhaps less of an “issue” for family members on the female side because they had a 
biological connection to the child no matter who was the genetic father.   
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KH: So you thought that it would be important for your son to bond to a child, that he be 
genetically tied to that child?  
 
Joan: Yes, yes.  Well I know how I felt myself with my own...with him when he was small.  I think 
that every parent thinks that their child is perfect and that maybe he wouldn't feel the same. 
 
Joan was concerned that an asymmetry would exist between her son and daughter-in-
law in terms of the love they felt for their child if they had a child conceived by DI. 
She implied that her daughter-in-law would have the unfair ‘bonding advantage’ of 
being genetically tied to the child while her son was not.27 As a result, she believed 
that adoption would provide a fairer solution to the problem of her son’s infertility.28  
Like Joan, Christine, another family member, favoured adoption for her infertile 
brother-in-law Richard and sister-in-law, Belinda. She said: 
 
Christine:  I think the only concern I had was I was scared that maybe one day their marriage would be 
unhappy, and because the child was genetically Belinda's, that that would cause even more 
friction and that was...if I ever had any hesitation about them making that solution, that was 
it...that I was scared that it would backfire on Richard. 
 
Christine was concerned that Belinda might have more of a claim to their daughter 
than Richard because of her biological connection to the child, and could potentially 
place Richard at a disadvantage.   
 
ICSI:  the ‘complete’ genetic/biological connection 
Concern about asymmetry between parents when one is the biological parent and the 
other is not is one reason for the appeal of new conceptive technologies, such as ICSI, 
that enable some infertile men (who must have at least a few sperm) to become 
biological fathers.29  ICSI essentially enables people with male factor infertility to 
pursue their ‘first choice’: to have a child genetically/biologically related to both 
parents. The technology thus epitomises the new ways in which nature is being 
technologically assisted (Franklin, 1995).  ICSI, which has been practised in New 
                                                          
27 For a discussion of the issue of asymmetry between the parents of DI children, one of whom is the 
biological and social parent and the other only the social parent, see Lauritzen (1993:89-95).  For a 
discussion of the issue of asymmetry among the couples in this study, see Chapter Eleven. 
28 While research has shown that some couples prefer DI to adoption because they perceive that being 
able to experience the pregnancy facilitates bonding with the child for both the mother and the father 
(Daniels, 1994), Joan appears to be more concerned about DI creating an ‘unevenness’ in the bonding 
process. 
29 For men who have no sperm in the ejaculate, techniques such as microepididymal sperm aspiration 
(MESA) and testicular sperm extraction (TESE) can be used to remove sperm from the epididymis (a 
duct behind the testis along which sperm passes to the vas deferens) which can then be used in ICSI 
treatment (Coney, 1999c:14) 
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Zealand only since the mid-1990s, was not an ‘option’ for many of the couples 
included in this research, at least when they were attempting to conceive their first 
child.  Since its arrival, however, ICSI has constituted another option for couples to 
pursue in their parenthood project: one with the added attraction of enabling both 
parents to be biologically related to the child.  When asked if the relatively recent 
availability of ICSI as a means of assisted conception had affected the demand for DI, 
the director of a South Island fertility clinic said: 
 
Dr A: It's probably a little bit lower because there are options now for people that weren't there 
before.  I mean, some of those with vasectomy reversal would go to IVF/ICSI type, with 
sperm extraction.  But there is still a group of people that can't afford those sorts of treatments 
and will choose DI.  Or there's others who've tried those things but haven't enough to go on so 
will go to DI.  But, I mean, there are still people who you can't treat with IVF.  
 
KH: Yes.  So there will be a need for DI?  
 
Dr A: Yeah, there'll be a need. You see you're comparing treatment at the moment that costs...they're 
changing at the moment...but the cost has been about $350 each cycle of treatment.  And if 
you compare that against an IVF cycle then there's quite a considerable difference.30  There 
are people who have difficulty affording DI.  
 
Sean, who was azoospermic as a result of a missing vas deferens, and his wife Pippa 
had been offered ICSI as an option but decided that DI was a more ‘reliable’ 
alternative.  They said: 
 
Pippa:  They said they'd have a look at Sean's testes and see if there was any sperm, and it was all 
going to be quite expensive.  
 
KH: So you looked at the possibility of doing ICSI?  
 
Sean: Yes.  But it seemed expensive, intrusive and unreliable.  
 
Pippa: Yes, it seemed unreliable.  We could spend quite a lot of money and get nowhere.  It wasn't as 
if Sean had some sperm, say, a thousand, but he had nothing, so we thought it was a bit of a 
long shot really.  We didn't want to go down that path. 
 
 
Dr C raised the issue of the importance of considering the relative success rates of 
ICSI and DI when couples were considering the options.  He said: 
 
Dr C: When considering the options, you need to look at the outcomes, and by far the most successful 
option still is donor insemination.  And compared to ICSI, where although ICSI might have an 
                                                          
30 In June 1998, the new price list for various treatment options through this clinic shows that donor 
insemination cycles cost $450.  In comparison, a cycle of IVF costs $4,400 with an additional $1,500 
for ICSI.  Thus, a single cycle of ICSI costs  $5900, over 13 times the cost of a DI cycle.  See 
Appendix C for price lists provided by fertility clinics. 
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excellent chance on a per cycle basis, donor insemination is cumulatively the most successful, 
because most couples continue on for six to eight cycles.  In our programme we have had two 
women who have achieved a pregnancy on their 32nd cycle.  But what we normally do now, is 
couples who reach say nine or twelve, let's say nine goes at donor insemination, without success, 
we do offer the IVF programme with donor, or they can convert to ICSI if they have sperm. 
 
 
According to Dr C, DI was cumulatively a more successful option for achieving 
assisted conception than ICSI because people could generally afford more cycles.31  
 
Several couples who had had a child by DI, had had the opportunity to use ICSI 
technology which would enable them to have a child that was biologically related to 
them both. However, as some couples found out in the process of trying to have a 
second child, female infertility factors, such as reaching a premenopausal stage in 
their reproductive life cycle, had then intervened so ICSI was no longer a viable 
alternative.  Alice and Peter, who had had a daughter, decided to wait for ICSI 
technology before trying to conceive another child.  They said: 
 
Alice: We had heard ICSI was coming very soon and so we thought that, well, rather than have a 
donor baby, we will see if we can have one so it's a full biological child for both of 
us…because that was our first preference. 
                                                                              
Peter: Yeah.  And we were advised that we were good candidates for it, so, it was worth waiting, but 
I think Alice probably pushed us more along the ICSI path than I felt it necessary to go 
initially. I was a little bit concerned that having another child with different biological origins 
just might make it a bit too complex, you know, in terms of family relationships, and sibling 
rivalry…. 
 
Alice: It was probably about two years after we could have gone back on the DI programme, by the 
time we came up for ICSI, and the technology was there and we had to go for tests and 
everything again, and then discovered that my FSH levels were all kind of elevated, which are 
sort of indications of aging, early aging, or pre-menopausal kind of things happening for me, 
which meant my fertility has really gone down, and... 
 
 Peter: We weren't good candidates anymore. 
 
Being positioned at the cross-roads of the introduction of new reproductive 
technologies that offered parents their first choice, to both be genetically related to 
their child, produced a paradoxical situation for Alice and Peter. Like many women 
who wait to conceive until the time is ‘right’, Alice found that the right time for her to 
conceive had passed. This suggests that certain ‘natural’ conditions, such as the onset 
of pre-menopause, can impede nature being assisted in other ways. Peter and Alice 
                                                          
31 Although cost is a major factor in the number of cycles couples attempt, it is also possible that, 
because DI is a simple, non-invasive procedure compared to ICSI, more cycles can be tolerated. 
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had a sense of having missed a critical “window of opportunity” for getting pregnant 
again by DI while waiting for the arrival of ICSI. Events such as these also reinforce 
the notion that it may not be possible to write our own life narratives “de novo”: 
things happen or fail to happen to us (Kirkman, 1999:8).   
 
Peter’s remarks suggest that having had a child by DI can have the effect of making 
the ‘first choice’ of having a ‘full biological’ child less desirable and even 
problematic for parents of children conceived by DI. Having lived and accepted an 
identity as non-biological father of his daughter, Peter was less inclined to pursue an 
identity of biological parent of another child.  He raised the issue of potential rivalry 
between ‘half-siblings’ were they to pursue ICSI as an option for conceiving a second 
time. Diane and Chris had considered trying for a second child with ICSI technology 
but, unlike Peter and Alice, had rejected it.  Diane said: 
 
Diane:   The biggest thing when it came to having a second child was that ICSI was available and we 
actually decided not to do that, not for financial reasons, but because we didn't feel the need, 
eh.  It's Chris’s ultimate decision, so, you know, he probably could have had a biological child 
if he wished, but we chose not to, we chose to do the DI again. 
 
KH: So they would be full siblings?32  
 
Chris: Mm.  
 
Diane: Yeah.  Though not just for that reason, I just couldn't be bothered getting back on...well at that 
stage...it's quite a joke when you think about it now...we could not be bothered getting on to 
the whole roller coaster with the infertility thing.  As it turned out we did that anyway (she 
laughs), because it's...you know...because we haven't been able to get pregnant again. 
 
Diane and Chris had rejected ICSI primarily because having had a child by DI with 
whom they had happily bonded, it seemed less important to have a child who was 
genetically theirs. However, like Alice, when trying to conceive again, Diane 
discovered that she had become premenopausal: her oocytes were categorised by 
fertility specialists as too “old” when she failed to conceive again by DI.  As a result, 
Diane and Chris opted to board yet another “roller coaster” by attempting to have a 
child using donor eggs and donor sperm.  If this were to be successful, Diane and 
Chris would have a child who was not genetically related to either of them.  The lack 
                                                          
32 I asked this question because most couples said that once they had conceived a child by DI they 
preferred to use the gametes of the same donor for a second child so their children would be fully 
biologically related, rather than half-siblings.  This, however, did not appear to be the major concern 
for Diane and Chris when deciding to conceive a second child. 
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of a genetic tie did not appear to be an ‘issue’ for them, but, of course, a biological tie 
to the child would exist through Diane. 
 
Other couples had rejected ICSI on the basis that they had children who were not 
genetically/biologically related to both parents, and they did not wish those children 
to feel “less than” a child who was biologically related to them both. Sarah, who had 
two adopted children, one foster child and one child conceived by DI, said: 
 
Sarah: That's another question people ask us, now, with ICSI, would we do it? And no.  We wouldn't. 
It’s not to do with anything financial.  I mean, when Mum first found out about it she said, "Oh, 
when I win Lotto I'll give you guys some money", and I said, “well don't worry about it.”  We 
don't want our kids to feel we had to keep going to get a biological child. If we wanted to have a 
bigger family, we'd get DI, or possibly adopt again.  But we don't want them to ever feel put out 
that we had to keep going and going.  If we had a natural pregnancy, well, okay…. So, we 
would never do that.  And I've seen ICSI throw couples into absolute chaos again.  You know, 
because you deal with all your male infertility.  You remedy the problem, or you don't remedy 
the problem. Some couples I know have just come to terms with just living childfree.  Now all 
of a sudden ICSI's come and it's just reared all this stuff up all over again, and they were in a 
good place, you know?  
 
Sarah’s desire not to undermine the value of the children they already had, and the 
rejection of ICSI on this basis, nonetheless reproduces the notion of the primacy of 
the biological tie. Sarah’s comment about her mother’s offer to help them pay for 
ICSI if she won the lottery raises the spectre of possible social/family pressure on 
infertile couples to avail themselves of reproductive technologies that enable them to 
forge genetic links with their offspring (and therefore to the grandparent) (Ragone and 
Willis, 2000).  Sarah also raised the issue that a new technology such as ICSI, which 
for the first time enables men with low sperm counts to become biological fathers, has 
obvious appeal but, like all ‘pathways’ to parenthood, presents challenges as well as 
possibilities.   
 
A nurse working in the donor programme at a fertility clinic commented on the 
dilemmas that emerge for couples choosing between DI and ICSI.  She said: 
 
Nurse A: Demand for DI is changing now with new procedures for male factor infertility, whereby 
they can actually get into the testes and extract some sperm. Some couples have to weigh up 
the cost, and for some couples it's not viable because of the cost.  But also then they have the 
chance to have their own children, but again it may depend on what the husband's condition 
is as to whether he passes on the condition to the child, even with ICSI.  They may produce a 
male child who has a similar male factor problem, and again we're not going to know this 
until the child's an adult.  And there have been families caught in the dilemma where they've 
had a DI child.  Now ICSI's available, what do they do?  Do they opt for ICSI, or opt for 
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another DI child using the same donor?  So that causes dilemmas for some couples too.  It’s 
when we’re at the crossroads of new technology. 
 
The advent of new technologies such as ICSI, which create new pathways to 
biological parenthood, also raises the issue of the shifting of ‘goal posts’ for couples 
attempting to conceive, and the difficulty of deciding not to pursue the options that 
might lead to biological parenthood.  Although no couples mentioned it, Nurse A 
raised one of the problems associated with ICSI: the possibility of men passing on sex 
chromosome abnormalities that cause male factor infertility to any male children they 
might conceive using their own sperm (Fertility Associates, 1998:80).  This could 
constitute another valid reason for rejecting ICSI and favouring DI, though it appears 
that many couples are willing to accept this ‘risk’ in the bid to have their ‘own’ 
genetic/biological child.  Another nurse working in a DI programme spoke of the 
attraction for couples of trying to conceive by ICSI: 
 
Nurse B:  One couple have two donor children and have come for...and that was a known donor...it 
wasn't an anonymous donor, it was a known donor.  And they have had one or two ICSI 
cycles.  They felt that it wouldn't matter if it didn't work because they felt they'd completed 
their family.  It didn't really worry them, but it's interesting.  I'd be interested to know just 
what motivates them to sort of keep going.  Whether it is the fact that they think they might 
be able to perhaps use their own gametes, I don't know. But it really quite fascinates me, you 
know.  For a start, this one particular couple, they were just having one. Well they're coming 
back for a second, you know, so that their goal has altered from being just one go to hoping 
to achieve a pregnancy. 
 
In the case Nurse B refers to, the chance to have a full biological child appeared to be 
irresistible for the couple.  However, it is also possible that they wanted more children 
and were able to afford ICSI.  Nonetheless, this raises the issue of the importance of 
biological parenthood to some people.33 It also raises the question of whether, in what 
Strathern (1992b:35-36) refers to as our Enterprise Culture, it is regarded as 
irresponsible not to avail oneself of all the technologies available. Alice and Peter 
talked about the difficulty of stopping fertility treatment in the face of expanding 
possibilities of becoming pregnant and fulfilling the desire to parent not just one, but 
hopefully more than one child.  They said: 
 
                                                          
33 Williams (1990) examined adoptive mothers’ motivations to attain biological motherhood when they 
were already ‘social’ mothers.  She found that women were motivated by factors such as being able to 
experience biological motherhood, “to give my husband a child”, and being able to have a two-child 
family.  One woman was motivated by the feeling that one should be able to look back in the future and 
say that one did one’s best to achieve biological parenthood.  It is possible that similar motivations 
exist for couples who try to conceive by ICSI.  
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Alice: It's a very hard thing too because you know technology is going to come along, and you know, 
as soon as you give up, a few years down the track they'll be able to do something.  So it is 
really hard. 
                                                                              
Peter: We've sort of been encouraged by Dr A too, because he will never say anything for sure. And 
he always, there's always like enough margin there for kind of something unpredictable to 
happen.  So you never really feel that you can say for sure that you're out of the running. And 
you've really got to come to…it's a personal decision to actually pull out rather than 
necessarily being out of the running I think. There's some possibility…there is some hope, but, 
I've been a bit sort of run down by raised expectations and then disappointment, and it's sort of 
been quite a progressive thing where the stakes get higher and the disappointment gets greater, 
so…(he chuckles). 
 
The difficulties involved with making the decision that one is “out of the running” 
highlights the contingent aspects of achieving pregnancy and the birth of a child. In 
the words of a fertility specialist, “pregnancy is a chance event”.34  While on one 
level, advances in reproductive medicine appear to have moved fertility and infertility 
into “the realm of the controllable” (Ragone and Willis, 2000:308), much about what 
actually leads to pregnancy and the birth of a child is unknown and controllable only 
up to a point.  Professor Hutton has argued that assisting conception is not an exact 
science: much of reproductive medicine, he said, lies in the realm of “the 
subjective”.35 In other words, while reproductive technologies are designed to assist 
natural processes, this is only in the realm of what is “natural” anyway. Thus, he 
emphasised that because of the complexities surrounding the highly contingent events 
of conception, pregnancy and the birth of a baby, people should not look to medical 
‘treatments’ as improving the chances above what happens in nature, which yields a 
20-25% pregnancy rate per menstrual cycle.   
 
Talk of “choices” and “chances” in fertility treatment suggests that embarking on a 
treatment cycle to achieve assisted conception is akin to gambling – though ‘loaded’ 
gambling in the sense that insemination is attempted when the chance of success is 
greatest.  Statistics of success rates36 represent the odds but, even though they may be 
low, the chance of success always looms as a real possibility.  As Peter pointed out, 
                                                          
34 Professor John Hutton, “Choices and Chances”, address to the New Zealand Infertility Society 
Symposium, Friday August 11, 2000, Christchurch, New Zealand. 
35 Professor Hutton’s use of the word “subjective” here implies that reproductive medicine is not an 
exact science like in some of the physical sciences where outcomes can be more readily controlled and 
predicted.  This explanation is perhaps used as a defense for not achieving high rates of pregnancy 
through assisted reproduction, which some people might expect.  He suggests that given that high 
success rates do not occur in the realm of ‘natural’ conception, it is not realistic to expect ‘perfect’ 
results through technological assistance. 
36 DI success rates are discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven. 
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expectations can be raised and the disappointment resulting from the failure to beat 
the odds can accumulate in the process of experiencing repeated cycles of optimism 
followed by the disappointment of failure.  But the odds of achieving success remain, 
adding fuel to the optimism that the next cycle might yield the desired result.  Hence, 
the perennial difficulty of what is commonly referred to as “getting off the infertility 
treadmill” (Thorpe, 1994). 
 
Considering a known donor 
All couples in this study, except one lesbian couple, were recipients of sperm from an 
anonymous, rather than a known, donor. Several couples, however, had initially 
considered asking a brother of the infertile male to be their donor, thereby indirectly 
creating a biological link between the father and child. In relation to this choice, a 
nurse working in a DI programme said: 
 
Nurse A: Some people feel they'd like to know who the donor is, and they have perhaps asked the 
husband's brother, if they felt comfortable to ask him, or perhaps in the family environment, 
the family have known of the couple's situation, and perhaps the brother has offered.   So 
with that arising, we have to screen them the same way, and again, they have to have 
counselling - the donor and his wife, the recipient couple, um, separate counselling sessions 
and then one together to go through all the different issues that may arise.  
 
KH: So, if there is a known donor, is it usually a brother?  What about friends?  
 
Nurse A: We have had a situation where it was the wife's sister's husband.  It's usually a brother.  I 
can't think if there've been any friends.  It has usually been a relative. 
 
 
Very few couples who had gone through this donor programme had used a known 
donor. Dr A said: 
 
Dr A: We’ve probably used known donors, oh, for a bit over eight years.   
 
KH: About what percentage would use a known donor? 
 
Dr A: Oh, not very many.  It’s not very many. And they’re probably usually the more outgoing, 
astute sort of people.  I’m not sure whether it’s intelligence, or…it does seem to be people 
who have a more sort of open view of the world. 
 
Sarah and Tim, a couple who had one adopted son when they were considering 
having DI, had asked Tim’s brother to be a donor. Tim said: 
 
Tim: We did initially talk about maybe asking my brother, and that fell flat on its face. 
 
KH: Did you actually ask him? 
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Tim: Yep, and it was a bit of a big ask. But I just thought, hey well, we’re going to go through it 
and it’s going to be such a long waiting span.  We wanted to have a little sibling for Rob. As it 
was, we just poured everything into it, like we were hanging out for kids.  So, um, we 
mentioned it to my brother.  He was actually reasonably keen, and then his wife wasn’t keen 
on it at all.  And we didn’t want to get...it’s hard, but we just wanted to get things going, you 
know, and it was probably a bit, hey, why not?  I mean, if he wants to and he’s happy, I mean, 
he’s got his family, he’s not going any further.  That was before he had a vasectomy and stuff, 
so, and ah, she wasn’t that keen on it.   But it probably worked out okay in the end.  It 
probably was better, because I can imagine, with his wife, there’d be all this comparison... it 
might be a little bit close to home. But I mean, at the time I thought, well, once we’ve made 
our decision we were comfortable with it. Sarah got a little bit upset about that, but I said “No. 
We’ve taken a long time to work through this, and that’s their choice.  You’ve got to respect 
that.” 
 
 
While Tim had actually asked his brother, but his sister-in-law vetoed the proposition, 
others who had considered asking a brother to be a donor had discounted the 
possibility even before raising the issue. Peter and Alice said: 
 
Alice: When we had the interview with the social worker that you had to have before you go onto DI, 
she mentioned other possibilities, like using a known donor.  We actually sort of briefly 
considered one of your brothers didn't we, then we thought no.  It's just...  
 
Peter: It's just too messy.  
 
Alice: It was just...it felt like it would have been more awkward for Peter in a sense, and for us in 
terms of family relationships than having an anonymous donor.  
 
Peter: Even if a family member was able to kind of not interfere in the upbringing of a child, or be 
quite detached from the whole arrangement, you'd always feel that you were being kind of 
scrutinised, or your performance was being assessed in some way, because they would have a 
certain amount of ownership in the child as well. And so, although initially that seemed like 
quite an attractive option, we ruled it out and never even talked to him about it actually. 
 
Peter and Alice anticipated that a brother with a genetic connection to their child 
would position himself as having some form of ‘investment’ in their child, and 
perhaps evaluate their performance as parents. Similarly, Tim was concerned that his 
sister-in-law would compare their child with her own. In their New Zealand study of 
couples who had used personal donors, Adair and Purdie (1996:2560) found that 
some recipients had chosen a friend as a donor to avoid such complications.  In some 
cases in which a brother was a donor, the relationship between the two families had 
deteriorated, which was related to the donor’s partner not being involved in the 
decision to donate. This indicates the difficulty of divorcing the concept of ‘gamete 
donor’ from that of ‘father’ and the social expectations and connotations that inhere in 
the identity of the latter. 
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Jeremy and Christine, family members of Richard and Belinda, said that there had 
been some discussion in their wider family about the possibility of Jeremy, who was 
Richard’s twin brother, being a donor for Richard and Belinda.  Jeremy and Christine 
were uncomfortable with this idea.  They said: 
 
Jeremy: We certainly never offered and they never asked.  No, we never talked about it at all.  
 
KH: What would have been your response if they'd asked?  
 
Jeremy: No. No.  
 
Christine: Yeah we decided we'd have to say no.  We decided that...  
 
Jeremy: No.  We didn't think it was appropriate. I don't think we...um, no I don't think I could cope 
with it, and I don't think Christine could either.  No we weren't prepared to do that because...  
 
Christine: We decided it would just be too much potential for it all to go wrong. Much as it was a nice 
idea, and because the boys were twins I could see how good it could be, but I could also see 
it had the potential to go completely wrong and completely ruin the family, and so we 
decided that...and I personally myself, I didn't think that I'd cope with seeing another child 
that I knew was Jeremy's and not mine, so... 
 
The potential difficulties associated with gamete donation within extended families 
raises questions about the social meaning of gametes. Novaes (1989:641) argues that 
donation is not just a physical act:  semen, oocytes, embryo, pregnancy and children 
are strongly charged with meaning in most, if not all, cultures and exchanges of these 
substances, roles or persons are admitted only in socially prescribed relationships. 
While not explicitly stated, Jeremy and Christine’s discomfort at the idea of his 
donating semen to enable Belinda to conceive may be related to ideas about 
monogamy, and to the desire to avoid a situation that might imply an extra-marital 
relationship between Jeremy and his sister-in-law.   
 
The discomfort felt at the prospect of using a sibling as a donor thus raises issues 
about ‘attachment’ to gametes, and the different meanings attributed to sperm 
donation and egg donation.37  Research carried out in the United States by Sauer et al 
(1988) compared the attitudes of couples on ovum donation programmes with those 
on sperm donation programmes.  The study found that most patients using donated 
eggs had considered using a sister as a donor and 61% had secured an agreement.  In 
contrast, few (11%) of the couples undergoing DI preferred using a brother as their 
donor and none had asked one to participate.  These findings may be attributed to the 
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different social meanings attached to sperm and egg donation explored by Haimes 
(1993a).  In her analysis of the Warnock Report (1984), she found that semen 
donation was seen as ‘deviant’ sexually (associated with masturbation, adultery, and 
illegitimacy) and motivations to donate as somewhat suspect.  This raises the question 
whether, in the case of using a brother as a sperm donor, others might assume 
adultery.  If, for example, a familiar and intimate person, such as a brother/brother-in-
law, is to ‘give’ sperm then it could be construed that he might equally have done so 
‘naturally’, and who would know he had not?  In contrast, egg donation was 
conceptualised as familial, clinical and asexual, and the donors altruistic.  As a result 
of these dominant cultural conceptualisations, it appears that couples are generally 
more comfortable asking a sister, rather than a brother, to donate their gametes.  
 
Instead of asking a sibling, lesbian parents, Sophie and Ria, asked a gay male friend to 
be their donor.  When asked if they had considered conceiving through a DI 
programme, they said: 
 
Sophie:  I haven’t really heard much about it.  I wasn’t aware that it was open for lesbian couples or 
anything like that.  It was something that we just never considered. 
 
Ria: I don’t think I would consider trying to get pregnant through a clinical insemination, unless I 
tried all other avenues and it didn’t work for me, and I was desperate, maybe I would.  
 
Sophie: It just seems so clinical, for one thing.  And expensive.  Whereas for us, it was totally free.  
 
KH: And you were just able to ask a friend [to be a donor].  
 
Sophie: I know, we were very lucky, we were so lucky to know Derek really.  We’ve often thought 
that it would have been different in Sydney.  I think it’s important for us to have someone 
close that we know, so that he can be part of the child’s life. 
 
 
Sophie and Ria wanted to acquire a male ‘parent’ who would be part of their child’s 
life.  In contrast to the situation for heterosexual couples, where both a genetic and a 
social male parent exist, to them, their male donor was unproblematically the child’s 
‘father’ and not construed as in competition with the other female parent. 
 
Unlike Sophie and Ria, Petra and Jennifer, another lesbian couple, had opted to use an 
anonymous donor through a DI programme to conceive a child.  However, they had 
decided to follow this path after originally considering other options.  They said: 
                                                                                                                                                                      
37 These issues are discussed in more detail in Chapter Ten. 
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Petra: I don't think we would originally have assumed we were going for donor insemination.  I think 
when we talked about [having children], which was in quite abstract terms when we first met, 
we'd always assumed that we would.  Well, my progression was, either go straight, probably 
wanted children more than I thought I needed a lesbian relationship.  Then, have a child with 
someone who we knew, and then thinking about the mechanics of that, it was, so how would 
three people parent? It's quite hard to keep a two-person relationship going, but a three or four 
person relationship, especially around a little person, would be really chaotic.  So that's when 
we began to move to a sort of...it would probably be easier if it were someone who was out of 
the picture until Olivia’s older.  
 
Jennifer: The whole system in England is different, because [donors remain anonymous], and because 
of that, maybe if we'd stayed in England we may have made a different choice. But because 
we liked the programme here and liked the fact that it was an [identifiable] donor later in 
Olivia’s life, we felt quite comfortable with going through with that… If we had gone for 
somebody, a known donor, a friend basically, in the UK, then we would have started a whole 
different set of negotiations, in terms of asking what kind of contact they wanted to have with 
any offspring and all of those things.  It would have been a totally different question.  Like 
taking a different road...we chose a different road. 
 
In choosing to have a child through an anonymous donor programme that recruited 
potentially identifiable donors, Jennifer and Petra were reconciling their desire to be 
the only parents of their child, and the recognition of their child’s ‘right’ to identify 
the donor when she was older. Had they chosen a friend to be a donor, they 
anticipated having to undertake a different set of negotiations. 
 
Choosing donor insemination 
For many couples with male infertility, DI presented as the only viable option if they 
wanted to have children.  Peter and Alice said: 
 
Peter: Well, it was certainly not the best option, from my point of view.  
 
Alice: Compared to normal.  
 
Peter: Compared to normal...being a biological parent.  I didn't have any reservations about going 
ahead with it, but it was difficult to know, you know, you can't know how you're going to feel.  
So I guess I was always kind of a little bit reserved about how I might sort of feel, or react, or 
whatever.  There's just no way of knowing until you're faced with the situation.  And so, it just 
seemed like the best choice at the time, so we sort of went for it. 
 
Before their daughter was born, Peter was somewhat concerned about how he might 
feel about a child who was not genetically connected to him.38 Peter’s parents 
expressed some disappointment, on Peter’s behalf, that he could not become a 
                                                          
38 See Chapter Eleven for a discussion about fatherhood after DI. 
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biological parent.  When asked about their reactions to Peter and Alice having a child 
by DI, they said: 
 
     Marjorie: We were delighted regardless of the situation.  You know, we were very happy about it.  It 
didn't affect us at all really.  We were quite happy about it.  
 
     Jim: It's sad I think that Peter…I think Peter was the problem…that they weren't able to have a 
child themselves.  That was a bit disappointing probably, inwardly, without mentioning it.  
 
Marjorie:   For Peter's sake I think.  
 
     Jim: Yeah, yeah sure.  It didn't worry us, but we just felt that there was…Peter would have felt 
disappointed at that stage.  Guessing his attitude, but he was quite happy to go through the 
programme…you know it was an alternative to nothing.  
  
Like Peter, Joe had concerns about how he would react to children who were not 
genetically related to him.  He and his wife Ella said: 
 
Joe:  Well the only concerns I had was that I was just really unsure how I would react to it, not 
being my, my genes, or whatever you like to call it.  I was a little unsure.  
 
KH: You mean about bonding with the child?  
 
Joe: Yeah.  If things get really tough do I scream at them and say, "you're not my bloody kids.  Get 
out of here!" sort of thing, or what?  I mean you still say that, but...(he laughs).  
 
Ella: No, no.  We discussed that and I said to Joe you've got to be careful of a lot of things you say 
in ways that you don't really mean.  
                                                                              
Joe: Things all of a sudden take on a new meaning.  
 
Joe was aware that he could not easily ‘disown’ his DI children, if, for example, he 
was annoyed with them.  This illustrates Ragone and Willis’s (2000:317) contention 
that in Euro-American kinship ideology, while social ties can be severed, “the blood 
relationship cannot be lost”, nor can one have an ex-blood relative. 
 
Not all couples were in complete agreement about pursuing DI.  Meredith, whose 
husband Karl declined to participate in this research, said that Karl was initially 
reluctant to have a child by DI.  But, because of her age, Meredith felt they needed to 
act quickly.  She said: 
 
Meredith:  Finding out that he was infertile was a real shock to him, I think, because it's a male sort of 
ego thing too, isn't it? It's part of being a man.  So, and it all happened quite quickly.  We 
found out about that and because of my age, you see, being older, we needed to sort of get 
onto things straight away.  We didn't have time to just think about it, because by that time I 
just really, really wanted to have a child. I think it's something to do too with once you know 
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you can't have something, the more determined you are, aren't you?  I mean, I know I 
shouldn't put it like that...but... And we'd bought a big house with four bedrooms…and we 
were all ready to have children.  Then all of a sudden, when you're told you can't, it gives 
you a bit of a setback, doesn't it? 
 
 
This suggests that Meredith drove the decision to pursue DI while her husband was 
still coming to terms with his infertility.  The situation raises the issue of the difficulty 
for some couples of coming to a mutual decision to go ahead with fertility treatment, 
because of their differing responses to their infertility, and attitudes towards seeking 
treatment (Gillett, Daniels and Herbison, 1996).  It also reinforces a point made earlier 
about the need to deal with infertility before trying to deal with the issues of DI.  
Meredith raised a point often associated with infertility, that the loss of the choice to 
have a child leads to a feeling of a loss of control over one’s life (Noble, 1987).  Like 
Meredith and Karl, Mike and Caroline decided quickly to try to conceive by DI but, 
unlike Meredith and Karl, they both felt comfortable with the prospect of using donor 
sperm. Mike and Caroline said: 
 
Mike: It was the best option.  I had never thought about not having children, so the prospect of 
me or us not having children was quite daunting, and that step of accepting someone else's 
sperm was not very difficult for me.  
 
Caroline: I think that if one of us had had a really strong view against it, then I think the other one 
would have respected that and probably we might have gone another track.  But, as it was, 
we both decided that this was right. 
 
 
While Mike accepted that they needed to use somebody else’s sperm to achieve 
parenthood, Caroline was initially “revolted” by the idea of DI.  She said: 
 
Caroline: …when [the doctor] mentioned it, I thought, no I couldn't possibly do that.  It absolutely 
revolted me.  I just couldn't bear...you know, fancy putting somebody else's sperm inside 
you...it did, it just revolted me.  I just thought it was revolting.  And Mike was the one who 
thought, oh maybe it's not a bad idea. 
 
 
As well as feeling physically ill at the prospect of being inseminated, some women 
also felt that by being inseminated with another man’s sperm, they were “cheating” on 
their husbands.  Pippa said: 
 
Pippa: I felt a bit guilty about it initially, about wanting to do it.  
 
KH: Why?  
 
Pippa: I don't know.  I felt that I cheated on Sean.  
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KH: You mean a bit like...  
 
Pippa: Adultery.  But then I thought it's either that or we have an adoption, and at least if we had a 
baby through donor insemination it would be related genetically to one of us.  And I wanted to 
be pregnant, and breast feed and all of that, if we could.  
 
KH: So, did you think that Pippa should have a chance to do that? 
                                                                               
Sean: Yes. 
 
Both Pippa and Sean drew on a discourse about the importance of women being able 
to experience biological motherhood as a reason for choosing to have a child by DI.  
For Pippa, this intersected with discourses about adultery and illegitimacy. 
 
In contrast to the negative or ambivalent feelings some individuals encountered when 
choosing DI, Diane, the mother of a DI child, said: 
 
Diane:   We've read that some people think it's like adultery and all this sort of thing, and I mean I just 
can't imagine.  That's such an extreme view. If you felt like that, you shouldn't do it basically. 
I've read a lot of information on the whole infertility field: DI and all the rest of it.  Just things 
I've read in books I haven't been able to relate to at all.  I've always been quite matter-of-fact 
about the whole issue, and it's almost like you're reading something completely foreign. 
 
 
Diane and Chris were positive about their entire experience of having a child by DI 
and wanted to share this perspective with others as a means of helping them through 
the process in the future.  Another couple, Allan and Sandra, were also positive about 
the option of being able to use donor gametes. They drew on discourses about the 
exciting possibilities offered by science and medicine to remedy bodily malfunction.  
Allan said: 
 
Allan:  In twenty years time, people in our situation, with cloning technology, you know, they may be 
able to take cells, not necessarily from the testes, just any part of the body, take out the nucleus, 
and clone, and then you can pass on your DNA genetic material.   But to me, you're part of the 
world.  The whole world's your family to some extent.  Everyone in the world, no matter what 
colour, is part of the human race. I suppose, after having two families and sort of extended 
families, you know, with Mum having a child before she was married and that sort of thing, you 
know, you perhaps don't build a pedestal around the notion of heredity - having to have a male 
heir and all that sort of thing.  You realise that those sorts of things are really pretty superficial. 
 
 
Allan appeared philosophical about using another man’s sperm to have children. By 
conceptualising the human race as one big family he appeared to minimise individual 
‘ownership’ of gametes, and the centrality of biological relatedness in Western 
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kinship ideology.  Thus, he emphasised ‘family’ as a social rather than a genetic 
phenomenon. 
 
Liberal views about the sharing of reproductive material across families stand in 
direct contrast to some religious views on the use of third party gametes in assisted 
reproduction.  The Roman Catholic Church’s position on DI is that it is morally 
wrong because it interferes with the sanctity of marriage (Lauritzen, 1993). It is 
therefore significant that about one third of participants in this study who had children 
by DI were brought up in Catholic families. Many were critical of the Catholic 
Church’s position on reproductive matters, maintained that its stance was irrelevant in 
contemporary society, and argued that the Church’s views had little influence on their 
decision to have children by DI.  Mike, the father of two daughters conceived by DI, 
said: 
 
Mike:  The Catholic Church is quite strong on their beliefs about both preventing childbirth and 
assisting childbirth.  I think the people at the top of the church have done a lot of things that are 
not logical in today's world. I think they've lost the plot, so I find it very hard to take that 
religion very seriously. I'm a little sceptical about religion.  I'm aware of international...I've 
spent some time in Bosnia and I know what people have done in the name of religion, so it 
doesn't add up.  So, I mean, when you get that, and you get the Church stating that you can't do 
things like assisted reproduction, then what they're doing is effectively saying that we had no 
right to do what we did, and I believe what we did was appropriate, so...Their policy is an 
interpretion of something that was translated a few hundred or a thousand years ago, and 
someone's subjected it to an interpretation. 
 
Mike’s position, and the views of other parents who identified as non-practising 
Catholics, illustrates Shilling’s argument about the desacrilisation of social life in 
modernity (1993:2). He argues that in high modernity, the power of religious 
authorities to define and regulate bodies has diminished, while the power of nation 
states in general, and the medical profession in particular, to exert control over bodies 
has increased.  While science has increasing control over our bodies, Shilling 
maintains, “it has failed to replace religious certainties with scientific certainties of 
the same order”(1993:2).  As a result, he contends, science has failed to provide us 
with values to guide our lives, leading to an increasing privatisation of meaning in 
modernity, which leaves people alone to establish and maintain values to make sense 
of their own lives. 
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Despite repudiating the Church’s teachings on assisted reproduction, many parents in 
the study, who were raised as Catholics, retained Catholicism as a part of their 
identity.  Thus, it might be argued that Catholicism is  part of a broad cultural identity, 
as suggested by the adage, “once a Catholic always a Catholic”.  It also could be 
argued that conception and birth are considered ‘sacred’ events in Euro-American 
culture, whether or not people ‘practise’ a particular religion. While claiming that 
their faith was somewhat “shaky”, Simon and Clare sent their DI daughter to a 
Catholic School.  They said: 
 
Clare:   It’s my biggest fear actually, that she’s going to come up with a question in a Catholic school. 
 
Simon: A morning story. 
 
Clare: Depending on the teacher, I might have to forewarn them. 
 
Another mother of two children conceived by DI said: 
 
Annie: Well, I guess I have been brought up a very, very strict Catholic, and I knew that my religious 
background would not agree with this.  That was something that was in the back of my mind 
but, having said that, I'm not a religious person, so I didn't take too much notice of that, but it 
was always in the back of my mind. 
 
While Annie positioned herself as “not religious” she was conscious of going against 
some of the values espoused by her upbringing.   Similarly, a Catholic upbringing 
appeared to have influenced the views of Steve, the father of twins conceived by DI, 
who was concerned about what he perceived as a stigma attached to having children 
by DI.39  Although he maintained that his Catholic upbringing was “out of his 
system”, he nonetheless drew on Catholic discourses to explain his position. He said: 
 
Steve: [DI is] a sort of thing that some people may react adversely to, and think it was the wrong 
thing to do, and you know that some people around have got that opinion, and it's out there in 
the community.  People sail along until something pops up that's controversial.  Then, they 
immediately show their true colours, you know, run the battle flags up and all that sort of 
thing.  It's just like when I first got married, and I got married in the Salvation Army, and I 
was brought up a Catholic.  I mean to say, immediately the nuns found out about it, I was, as 
you might say, excommunicated because there was a stigma placed on it, you know.  I don't 
know if you've found that in society today…that it is there. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has focussed on the critical moments, contingencies and decision-making 
processes that constitute the ‘experience’ of infertility and alternative strategies for 
achieving parenthood. Analysis of the narratives of couples and their family members 
indicates the importance attributed to the biological/genetic connection between 
parents and children.  Couples draw on this dominant discourse to construct having a 
child ‘naturally’ as their ‘first choice’ and DI as a ‘second best’ option that facilitated 
a genetic/biological connection to the mother, if not the father, of the child. Given the 
significance attached to biological connections within families, the decision to 
conceive to DI after a diagnosis of male infertility was fraught with ambivalence and 
complexity for both couples and their kin.  The chapter makes a unique contribution 
to this field by indicating the significance for couples of familial responses to their 
infertility and the ways in which a couple’s difficulties in conceiving are embedded in 
wider kin relations. 
   
Analysis of couples’ narratives illustrated that the discovery of infertility disrupted 
couples’ narrative identities and created the need to examine their individual and 
shared identities and their goal to become parents. Similarly, analysis of the talk of 
kin of infertile males indicated that they too had to re-evaluate their identities in 
connection with developing relationships with a child or children not genetically 
related to them.  The chapter therefore highlights that infertility and the conception of 
a child using donor sperm has implications not only for parent/child relationships, but 
also for relationships between grandparents and grandchildren, aunts, uncles and 
nephews and nieces.  Illustrating this point, many infertile men and their extended 
family members anticipated that their relationship with a child who was not 
genetically related to them or their ‘side’ of the family would be qualitatively 
different from a relationship involving genetic ties.  
 
The chapter raises the issues of infertility as both a private trouble and a public issue. 
It highlights particularly men’s reactions to infertility, their ways of coping with the 
emotional issues associated with this diagnosis and the implications for couples’ 
relationships.  It also indicates that a diagnosis of male infertility has implications for 
                                                                                                                                                                      
39 The issues of stigma and marginalisation were seldom overtly raised by participants and are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Eight in connection with issues of secrecy and disclosure. 
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wider kin, most who had no first-hand experience of infertility and felt unable to 
provide adequate support because they lacked knowledge about it and alternatives for 
parenthood.  While many couples grieved alone, others sought support at some time 
from counsellors, family members, friends and infertility societies.  The difficulty of 
both getting and giving support from others raised the issue of the need for 
appropriate systems of support for couples conceiving by DI and their wider family 
networks.  Some couples had attended infertility society meetings but did not feel 
supported by those in the same predicament as their own. Analysis of the interview 
material shows that while they may have shared their ‘troubles’ with others, 
ultimately couples had to confront the issues themselves and choose their own 
pathways to becoming parents. 
 
Analysis of couples’ decision-making processes in relation to strategies for 
parenthood revealed a number of complexities and paradoxes.  Most couples rejected 
adoption for a variety of reasons. DI, on the other hand, was favoured because it 
offered the biological connection to the mother, if not the father, and a chance for the 
parents to experience together the pregnancy and birth of a child. Contradicting this 
stance, some family members of infertile males had initially preferred adoption for the 
infertile couple. They believed that the lack of a genetic/biological connection 
between and father and child in DI placed the father at a disadvantage in relation to 
the mother, in terms of bonding with the child, or if the marriage was to end. Thus, 
while couples emphasised the significance of the existence of a biogenetic connection 
between at least one of them and the child, extended kin of infertile men stressed the 
asymmetry between the parents. This again, illustrated the strength of the discourse of 
the primacy of biogenetic relatedness and the claims that are perceived to ‘naturally’ 
inhere in these ties. 
 
The arrival of ICSI as a strategy for parenthood created dilemmas and paradoxical 
situations for some couples considering having more children.  Whereas it provided 
an opportunity for them to have their ‘first choice’ of shared biological parenthood, 
this option appeared more problematic after having had a child conceived by DI.  This 
indicated that while a biogenetic connection to both parents is perceived as ‘ideal’, in 
reality, after experiencing other forms of parent/child connectedness, the genetic tie 
can be perceived as less significant than the social bonds that are later formed.  Some 
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parents argued that it would not be in the best interests of their existing children 
because a sibling with a biological connection to both parents might be perceived as 
‘preferred’. Others were less concerned about the lack of a ‘full’ biological 
connection with their child after strong social bonds were formed, or took a more 
instrumental approach and rejected ICSI on the basis that it was expensive and 
potentially less successful than DI. 
 
The chapter raised issues relating to the use of family members as sperm donors, 
indicating that the choice of a brother of the infertile male as a sperm donor was 
problematic.  This raised questions about the social meanings of sperm donation and 
the cultural connotations relating to sexuality and adultery and the implications of 
these for family relations. Most had rejected asking brothers to be donors on the basis 
that it could cause undue complications for family relations. These concerns were 
connected to possible claims the brother and his wife might have to the child, and also 
‘claims’ the wife might have to her husband’s sperm.  For most of these couples, 
using sperm from an anonymous donor was regarded as easier and potentially less 
complicated.  One lesbian couple had chosen a known donor, a gay male friend to be 
the ‘father’ in their child’s life. Another lesbian couple, however, chose an 
anonymous donor for the same reasons that heterosexual couples chose an anonymous 
donor: so they could be the sole parents of their children. 
 
This chapter therefore highlights that the decision to procreate using the sperm of an 
unknown third party is fraught with ambiguity and complexity. This was chiefly 
because DI challenges cultural norms about ‘ideal’ or ‘proper’ ways of forming 
families, the primacy of the biogenetic connection between parent and child and 
social and cultural meanings attached to gametes.  The issues raised have implications 
for policy and practice in DI programmes and also highlight the issues that might arise 
for couples and their families after the birth of a child conceived by DI.  For most 
couples, while not their first choice, DI appeared to be most viable means of 
achieving parenthood.  Many parents and their extended kin, however, were initially 
ambivalent about choosing DI.  Despite some of the difficulties encountered in 
choosing this means of conception, as active agents and decision-makers, these 
couples were nonetheless generally able to justify to themselves their choice of DI as 
a strategy to achieve the much-desired and socially-sanctioned goal of parenthood.   
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Chapter Five 
Anonymous Gifts, Constrained Choices and Competing Rights in 
Donor Insemination Programmes 
 
 
It is the gift of life.  It's a special gift when someone gives a part of themselves, whether it be 
their heart, or their eyes or whatever.  Anybody who can give somebody life like that must be 
a special person. - Helen, mother of two sons conceived by donor insemination 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the discursive strategies that are used to recruit donors and 
establish sperm ‘banks’ by constructing semen donation as an altruistic ‘gift of life’.  
It also explores how relationships between the various social actors in DI programmes 
are initiated. Central to the analysis are issues of trust, choice, control and rights. 
General understandings about how DI programmes operate are analysed in their local 
context. The discursive and relational strategies employed by medical professionals 
are a major focus of attention, particularly the way that they act as brokers of sperm 
and intermediaries between sperm donors and recipients. The chapter examines the 
processes involved in screening donors, maintaining donor records and donor 
anonymity, linking donors and recipients, and maintaining contact between 
intermediaries and donors, in light of the possibility that, in the future, individuals 
conceived through DI may wish to make contact with donors through fertility clinics.  
The text thus reveals the dynamics of a set of networked relationships which centres 
on the act of donor insemination.   
 
The establishment of donor insemination programmes 
The use of donor semen in ‘instrumental’ insemination, as a medical strategy to 
address the problem of male infertility, dates back to the eighteenth century (Bateman 
Novaes, 1998).1  Donor insemination traditionally has been viewed as an unorthodox 
and, for some, a morally suspect medical procedure used for the purpose of helping 
infertile couples conceive and form a family (Bateman Novaes, 1998:110). Bateman 
Novaes argues that the social, legal and moral objections to DI led to secrecy and 
                                                          
1 For a more detailed discussion about the history of DI and how it came to be constructed as a medical 
‘treatment’ for male infertility, see Bateman Novaes (1998:107-110). 
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anonymity becoming the main organising principles of the practice.  Partly because of 
the moral and legal questions surrounding it, according to health professionals, DI in 
New Zealand was often practised in an ad hoc manner with no formal structure or 
record-keeping procedures in place.2  These informal practices, often carried out by 
general practitioners, also reflect the low status afforded the treatment of infertility in 
the medical hierarchy.  The introduction of more ‘hi-tech’ procedures such as in vitro 
fertilisation and embryo transfer provides gynaecologists with an exciting and high-
status area of research, and a technically more complex practice (Wacjman, 
1994:167).   
In the 1970s and early 1980s, New Zealand doctors working within university 
research-related units located in public hospitals practised DI as a ‘side-line’ to their 
other work in gynaecology and obstetrics. According to Ken Daniels, a researcher in 
this field, the development of a DI programme in Christchurch, New Zealand, was 
partly in response to requests for DI from the Spinal Injuries Unit at Burwood 
Hospital.  According to health professionals interviewed for this research, more 
formally established DI programmes with record-keeping procedures were established 
in the 1980s.  Some of the operational difficulties were addressed when issues relating 
to the legal status of the donor were clarified through the Status of Children 
Amendment Act, 1987.3  The director of a South Island fertility clinic was involved in 
the establishment of a DI programme in the late 1980s.  He said: 
 
Dr A:  It was a clinic set up for couples with male infertility... at that point we were treating maybe 
more or less severe sperm defects than we would now, because we have other ways of dealing 
with it.  I mean usually the men had at least moderate oligospermia and usually severe, or 
azoospermia.  And even at that point, upwards of about 10 or 15% of the men had had 
vasectomies and failed reversals.  So the programme was actually very successful... very good 
sperm, good quality frozen semen, a lot of pregnancies.   And it ran reasonably well.  I went 
overseas… and it worked at a slightly lower key during that time.  And then I came back and 
about that time I was just getting involved with IVF. 
                                                          
2 As an example of the ad hoc, secretive and informal way in which DI was often practised, a retired 
General Practitioner interviewed for this research had, at least on two occasions in the 1960s, used his 
own semen to inseminate a woman patient whose husband was sterile.  The doctor claimed to have 
gained ethical approval from within the hospital system before performing the inseminations.  He had 
asked a close friend to be the donor, but, unable to enlist his help, had used his own semen in the 
insemination.  The woman was not informed of the donor’s identity and the doctor was uncertain as to 
whether any records remained about the procedure having taken place.  Daniels (1998b:77-78) reports 
a similar case occurring in New Zealand in the late 1950s. 
3 The Status of Children Amendment Act, 1987 recognises the consenting partner of the woman who is 
inseminated as the legal father of the DI child. Clause 5, 2(b) of the Act states: “the man who produced 
the semen used in the procedure shall not have the rights and liabilities of a father of any child of the 
pregnancy, either born or unborn, unless at any time the man becomes the husband of the woman”.  
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Dr A was a key actor in the setting up of a DI programme which also enlisted the 
services of a nurse and a scientist.  He highlighted the pivotal roles of 
cryopreservation techniques and of sperm as actors4 in the DI network. Thus, he 
revealed the significance of non-human as well as human actors in the DI network.  
According to actor-network theorists, such as Law, the social is “nothing other than a 
patterned network of heterogeneous materials” (1992:381, original emphasis).  This 
view suggests that social networks are composed, not only of people, but also of 
machines, animals, texts, money, architectures, and so on. In sum, according to actor-
network theorists, the social is not simply human; it is all these other materials as 
well.5
The establishment of DI programmes was facilitated by the development of 
cryopreservation, the ability to store and freeze semen in liquid nitrogen, in ‘banks’, 
for later use (Bateman Novaes, 1998).6 According to Dr A, sperm freezing and 
banking began to be used in New Zealand in the early 1980s.  This procedure meant 
that for the first time the provision of semen and the insemination process could be 
separated in space and time (Bateman Novaes, 1998:111). Prior to that, fresh semen 
was used which meant that donors and recipients had to be brought together in the 
same place at more or less the same time, although they never met. The ability to store 
frozen semen has led to the development of new institutional structures and complex 
networks of participants involved in the preparation, storage and distribution of frozen 
semen (Bateman Novaes, 1998:111). It has also enabled the quarantining of semen 
which became an important medical imperative after the discovery of AIDS in the 
                                                          
4 This relates to ideas posited by actor-network theorists about the significance of non-human as well as 
human actors in networks of social relations.  Although actor-network theory (ANT) is introduced here, 
it is not used in this chapter. I draw on its descriptive and illustrative qualities rather than its analytic 
focus. 
5 Actor-network theory offers an analytical stance (rather than an ethical position) that is relational and 
process-oriented, treating agents, organisations and devices as interactive effects (Law, 1992:389). 
Rather than focusing on the ‘social impact’ of medical technology, ANT reconceptualises the 
technology-society relationship by examining how they are mutually constitutive, and providing a way 
of understanding technologies and devices as “participating in and performing social relations 
alongside human actors” (Prout, 1996:202-203). 
6 Bateman Novaes (1998:111) describes the semen bank as a “metallic container in which straws, 
containing semen prepared with a cryoprotective medium, are kept frozen in liquid nitrogen (at about -
191C)”.  Although technically possible as early as 1949, cryopreservation of semen was for some time 
restricted to the cattle industry.  Bateman Novaes (1998:112) claims that banking of semen for human 
DI purposes was first established in France where medical practitioners were concerned to offer a 
better quality medical service than that offered in the “quasi-clandestine conditions of existing DI 
practices”. 
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early 1980s.  Clinics in New Zealand follow international guidelines that allow the 
use of frozen semen only after a quarantine period of six months.  Because it may take 
this length of time for an HIV infection to be detected, the quarantine period allows 
for a second test to be carried out on the donor after this period of time. This practice 
significantly minimises the risk that the donor had been exposed to the virus that 
generally leads to the development of AIDS.7 It also had the effect of extending the 
time involved in recruiting sperm donors because any newly-banked sperm could not 
be used for at least six months.  Dr A said: 
 
Dr A:  …we were quarantining in, initially it was probably about 1984 or 85, or it would probably be 
1984 that we started quarantining for three months and [at the clinic he worked in previously] 
we were quarantining as well.  So that's been around before the law [Status of Children 
Amendment Act, 1987] came in.  So when you set up something now you have to think at least 
six months ahead.  It takes longer than that to get the donors recruited.  Now, at that time, all the 
donor recruiting was done by me.  I did all the interviews and things like that.  We had [a 
scientist] who was actually doing the sperm freezing before we had a nurse who was to do most 
of the inseminations, although initially I did all the inseminations.  But by the end of the year 
'87, things were up and running and going reasonably well.  I was interviewing maybe 2-3 new 
couples a week at that point and we had a queue for a reasonable length of time. 
 
Donor Recruitment 
The availablility of frozen donor sperm is contingent on maintaining a supply of 
donors.  To ensure an on-going supply, in some countries, such as the United States, 
semen donors are paid for their contributions to sperm banks (Macklin, 1996:109-
110).  A system in place in the UK for some time that permits payment to sperm and 
egg donors of up to 15 pounds plus “reasonable” expenses was recently reviewed and 
upheld (HFEA, 2000:28). This decision, however, ran contrary to strong arguments 
posited against payments to donors that appeared in the prior discussion document 
(HFEA, 1998).  In France and Germany, donors are not paid (Blank, 1998:140).  In 
the New Zealand context, too, semen donors generally are not paid: the provision of 
donor semen is largely constructed as an ‘altruistic gift’ given anonymously to 
unknown recipients.  This general understanding of sperm donation as an altruistic act 
follows the development of policies in other countries, such as France, which 
endeavoured to transform this procreative arrangement into a morally and socially 
acceptable act (Novaes, 1989:643).  In this context, semen donation became 
conceptualised as an altruistic “gift from one couple to another”8 (Novaes, 1989:643) 
                                                          
7 Copies of information given to clients by fertility clinics appear in Appendix C. 
8 The assumption here is that donors will be part of a married couple who have children themselves and 
are therefore capable of empathising with the plight of infertile couples who also want children. 
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in contrast to fostering the image of sperm donors as thoughtless men who “do it for 
the bucks” (Daniels and Lewis, 1996:9).  While it has been argued that the lack of a 
financial incentive merely discourages a particular ‘type’ of donor (Daniels and 
Lewis, 1996:4), offering some financial compensation has nonetheless been regarded 
as necessary by many clinics to ensure an adequate supply of semen (Daniels and 
Hall, 1997).  Concerns have been expressed about the possible cessation of a semen 
supply as a result of a suggested change in Britain and Canada from a payment based 
approach to one of non-payment (Daniels and Hall, 1997). Daniels and Hall (1997), 
who advocate a non-payment based approach, cite evidence, such as the situation in 
France and New Zealand, where semen donors are not paid, to suggest that non-
payment does not necessarily lead to the cessation of supply.   
 
According to health professionals working in DI programmes in two South Island 
clinics, the recruitment of ‘altruistic’ donors is a perennial problem.  In the two 
fertility clinics included in this study, a female employee is responsible for carrying 
out the donor recruitment, interviewing prospective donors and any laboratory work 
associated with making frozen semen available to recipients seeking to conceive by 
DI.  In relation to the difficulties of recruiting enough donors to give recipients some 
semblance of  ‘choice’ of donor, a fertility clinic worker said: 
 
Lab Technician B: Historically, it's been very difficult.  When I first started here, there had been 
periods where they almost had to close the clinic because we didn't have enough donors.   I 
was fortunate in that, not long after I started at the hospital, we did a recruitment campaign 
and we actually got a huge response.  We did a press release and we did local TV, and we 
did articles in the paper, and we got quite a lot of interest from that.  And we ran an ad in the 
paper.  So, from that period, we actually ended up with about 20 donors, and you lose at 
least 50 percent of them by the time... some don't come in, some come and don't want to 
continue, a lot of them aren't suitable for whatever reason.  So we've still got a hangover 
from that period, but it isn't easy to recruit donors.  I would probably get five [in a year] if 
I'm lucky. 
 
Lab Technician B highlighted the ways in which advertising and other media 
exposure can be enrolled to do the ‘work’ of bringing in men who, potentially, can 
ensure that the DI programme remains operational.  Reference to the high ‘dropout’ 
rate among those who initially expressed an interest in becoming a donor raises the 
issue of the stringent screening processes which eliminate many potential donors and, 
therefore, add to the difficulties of maintaining an adequate ‘supply’ of donor semen 
in DI programmes (Golombok and Cook, 1994).  The question also arises as to 
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whether the screening process might deter potential donors who do not wish to expose 
themselves to questions about their sexual practices, or to finding out that there was 
something ‘wrong’ with their semen. 
 
Another obstacle to donor recruitment for these New Zealand DI programmes is that 
becoming a semen donor requires a high degree of commitment, often with no 
financial compensation, even for ‘expenses’.9  The person in charge of recruiting and 
screening donors at one South Island fertility clinic said of the demands made of 
donors:   
 
Lab Technician A:  They know when they get the pamphlet10 we send out that they have to have the 
consent of their partner. They must be prepared to be identified by the children at a later age. 
They know that.  They know there's a lot of openness.  They'll get a lot of personal questions 
asked, like, you know, going to the sexual health clinic, and we look at their own lives, to 
make sure they have no health risks.  It is a commitment.  It's not just a matter of coming and 
giving one specimen.  It's a commitment over usually two or three years for the donor.  It is 
quite a commitment for the donor and they find it does take up their time.  They've got to be 
available. 
  
 
Given the level of commitment required for becoming a sperm donor, the question 
arises as to why men choose to become a donor.  According to the health 
professionals participating in this study, most donors are motivated by ‘altruism’11 – 
the desire to help an infertile couple have a much-wanted child.  Dr A said: 
 
Dr A: I've always said that the major reason they come along is their wife pushes them on because 
they're too fertile, and that's just sort of flippant remark, but...there are a number of couples 
who go along because they've got friends [who have male factor infertility]. A lot of them are 
blood donors, and they're sort of that type of altruistic type of person.  Occasionally, the 
reasons they're doing it, we don't understand and usually, if we feel uncomfortable about that, 
then we're not going to push on.  I mean, you occasionally get men who come along and say, 
“well I think I've got very good genetics and I want to pass them on to mankind”...[interviewer 
laughs]…well not quite as blunt as that but...and although that may be beneficial to some 
couples.…I once had a phone call from someone who was at a party and had heard someone 
shout out that he was going to be a sperm donor.  That man's sperm didn't freeze very well (he 
laughs). Yeah, there are a few that do those sorts of things.  
 
Dr A’s remark that women are the likely instigators of men’s semen donation is borne 
out by recent New Zealand research on donors and their families which revealed that 
                                                          
9 Fertility Associates, the largest provider of fertility services in New Zealand do, however, pay sperm 
donors for expenses. 
10 See Appendix E for information for prospective sperm donors provided by fertility clinics. 
11 Similarly, a recent New Zealand study showed that men became donors for two main reasons.  First, 
they enjoyed being a parent and wanted to help another couple to have the same experience, and 
second, they had experienced infertility themselves, or knew someone else who had (Adair, 2000:4). 
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many men had become donors at their wife’s suggestion (Adair, 2000:4).  This relates 
to arguments that suggest that women are more likely than men to care about (or are 
positioned to care about) the problems of others, including infertility (Wellman 
1992:103; Williamson 1995).  Also illustrating this point, a sperm donor I interviewed 
for prior research stated that his partner had “pressured” him into becoming a donor. 
This contention highlights Wellman’s (1992) argument that men are domesticated and 
managed by women, and that this occurs in ‘delicate’ areas pertaining to masculinity. 
 
Dr A also raised the spectre of the gatekeeping role of the health professional in the 
selection of donors, and the power of the doctor to determine who is ‘suitable’ to 
participate as a donor in the DI network.  This parallels the role of the doctor who 
determines who is permitted to take part in the act of anonymously giving blood and 
the endeavour to save life (Titmuss, 1970:70).  It also highlights the difficulty of 
determining whether the ‘gift’ of donated semen is a ‘good’ one and that, in 
determining the circulation of such ‘gifts’, to some extent the doctor has to presume 
the honesty and truthfulness of the giver.12  This point was highlighted by Dr A’s 
comment that his working life “revolves around trust” which supports Lupton’s 
argument that trust is a key component of the medical encounter (1996). 
 
Dr A also raised the question of what constitutes an ‘acceptable’ motive to become a 
donor. Clearly, motivations that are not in keeping with the dominant discourse of 
altruism, and are perceived to be overly ‘self-centred’, are not considered desirable 
and might lead to a donor not being accepted as part of the programme. Research has 
shown, however, that donors are motivated for a variety of reasons, such as the desire 
to help others, or the money.13 Moreover, Titmuss (1970) has argued that no donor 
type can be characterised by complete, disinterested, spontaneous altruism.  
Nonetheless, Titmuss (1970:89) and Komter (1996:302) argue that gifts that are given 
in the spirit of true altruism (i.e. giving ‘something for nothing’ with ‘no strings 
                                                          
12 This screening ‘work’ is partially performed by technical processes such as medical tests, including 
blood tests, semen analyses, and trial freezing of semen samples, which play a crucial part in 
determining whether a man is potentially a ‘good’ donor.   
13 Daniels (1998b:82-83,89) argues men’s motivations to become donors are largely determined by 
whether the clinic constructs semen provision as a commercial or a ‘gift’ transaction.  In the American 
context, Hirshman (1991:371) cites a study by Frank and Vogel (1988) that found that donors were 
motivated by a mixture of reasons including financial incentives, altruism, a sexual thrill, and wanting 
to procreate their genes. 
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attached’) come closest to Malinowski’s concept of the ‘free gift’.14   In this view, 
anonymous gifts given to unknown strangers are regarded as morally superior even to 
those that are given as a form of reciprocal exchange.  At the other end of the 
continuum lies the concept of market exchange, which, in the context of this study, 
raises the controversial issue of the buying and selling of human gametes. 
 
Discourses of ‘altruism’ and ‘buying’/‘selling’ human gametes 
The issue of whether a market economy should exist in the domain of the exchange of 
human body parts or fluids, including gametes, is strongly debated (see for example 
Raymond, 1990; Hirshman, 1991; Daniels and Lewis, 1996; Macklin, 1996; Brown, 
1999; Daniels, 2000b). Many of these authors draw on Titmuss’s seminal work The 
Gift Relationship (1970) on blood donation. Titmuss argued that the UK system of 
voluntary, unpaid blood donation was morally, medically and economically superior 
to the American system where many blood suppliers are paid (McLean and Poulton 
(1986:431).15 According to McLean and Poulton (1986:341), Titmuss suggested that 
paid suppliers of blood were more likely to conceal their personal medical history, lest 
they be prevented from selling their blood, than those who were unpaid, which could 
lead to the greater risk of tainting of the blood supply. Titmuss was correct but it took 
the advent of AIDS, which was in part spread by blood transfusion, to reinforce this 
point.  But, as Macklin (1996:107) points out, this argument against commercialism 
relates to the quality of the blood supply which does not clarify why buying human 
body products, in itself, is somehow morally wrong. 
Arguments against paying for human gametes or embryos appeal to ethical concerns 
about the commodification of the procreative process (Macklin, 1996:115).16  Or, as 
Hirshman suggests, they relate to the belief that a distinction should be made between  
“sacred products (such as blood [and presumably gametes]) and profane products 
(such as automobiles)” (Hirschman, 1991:359). Such arguments, according to 
                                                          
14 According to Komter (1996:300), Malinowski ranked kinds of gifts on a dimension of reciprocity:  at 
one extreme was the ‘pure gift’ for which nothing was expected in return (typically the closer the social 
ties the more gift giving is ‘free’); the other end of the spectrum was typified by a kind of market 
exchange in which both parties were motivated by maximising their profits. 
15 It should be noted, however, that Titmuss’s arguments have been widely disputed, particularly by 
neoclassical economists, who argue that altruistic and commercial models can exist side by side. For 
arguments against Titmuss’s position, see Hirshman, 1991:359; McLean & Poulton, 1986:434-436. 
16 For a discussion of some of the arguments against paying for human gametes, see Macklin 
(1996:115-116). 
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Macklin (1996), appeal to moral sentiments that some forms of exchange among 
humans should not involve the exchange of money.  In Macklin’s view, this is a 
judgment about the kind of society that we value (1996:116).  She questions whether 
such moral sentiments are strong enough to warrant the prohibition of commercial 
transactions of human gametes and concludes that regulation,17 rather than 
prohibition, of commercial transactions in this area is the preferable course of action 
(1996:119).  
In contrast to this view, a number of jurisdictions, including Canada, are currently 
drawing up legislation to ban the buying and selling or human gametes and embryos 
(Daniels, 2000b).  Similarly, in New Zealand, two bills currently before Parliament 
seek to ban commercial trading in human gametes. One of the bills, which is modelled 
on British, Canadian and Australian legislation, seeks to ban the sale of body parts, 
blood, embryos, gametes, foetal tissue, foetuses and babies (New Zealand, 1996:ii). 
The other seeks to prohibit “trading in human gametes and embryos” (New Zealand, 
1998:iii).   
Despite arguments against the intrusion of market dynamics in the domain of human 
life and procreation, gamete donors are still paid in the United States.  Recent media 
publicity about the sale of human oocytes for fees of $5,000 (or more) highlights the 
extremes to which commercialism in this area can be taken (see, for example, Mead, 
1999).  At the same time, it highlights the social context in which the gamete 
‘donation’ occurs. A co-author of recent European guidelines for gamete donation is 
cited as stating that the commercialisation of gamete donation in the United States 
stems from the inequalities of the health care system and the premium which 
Americans are prepared to pay for certain genetic traits (Brown, 1999:29).  The latter 
argument suggests that what people are paying for is the gametes themselves, and the 
potential genetic endowment embedded in them.  Others have argued, however, that 
within the commercial model operating in the United States, it is deemed more 
socially, ethically and legally acceptable that donors are paid, not for their actual 
gametes, but for the “inconvenience, time, discomfort and for the risk undertaken” 
(Mead, 1999:60). This, according to Mead (1999), is why egg donors, in the United 
                                                          
17 This argument relates closely to arguments about prostitution, i.e. paying for sex, as distinct from 
other ‘bodily’ services such as therapeutic massage or hairdressing. 
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States at least (though not in the UK, where, as previously indicated, payment of up to 
15 pounds plus expenses is permitted), are paid so much more than sperm donors. 
In the case of egg donation, Macklin (1996:109) argues that it is “hard to find a basis 
for claiming that payment for the risks, discomfort, and inconvenience a donor 
undergoes is ethically sound but payment for the product extracted as a result of the 
process is ethically wrong”.  In the case of sperm donation, Macklin (1996:110) 
contends that the presumption seems to be that they are paid for the “product” but 
concerns about commodification have not emerged.  Some writers, however, have 
expressed concerns that the construction of semen provision as a commercial 
transaction, as well as the secrecy and anonymity which pervades the practice, have 
served to deny the social and moral significance of the donor’s actions (Novaes, 1989; 
Daniels and Lewis, 1996:17; Daniels, 1998b:97-98).   Daniels and Lewis (1996:14) 
contend that financial incentives for sperm donation have been used by health 
professionals as a means of negating the gift dynamics involved in the transaction that 
might necessitate an obligation to give something in return.  At the same time, 
financial motivations may be regarded as more straightforward and less ‘suspect’ 
than, say, ‘altruisitic’ motivations to become a sperm donor (Daniels and Lewis, 
1996:12).18   
Dr A raised the issue of whether altruistic or financial motivations to provide semen 
were more desirable: 
 
Dr A:  I mean, I don't know whether it's more pure to do it for altruistic reasons, or for financial 
reasons, if you think about it.  I mean we're brought up with the dogma that it's wrong to pay for 
gametes and there's a law that's in the process of parliament where we're supposed to not pay for 
gametes.  But I'm not absolutely sure whatever reason is the right reason. [Sperm is] worth more 
than its weight in gold.  [Getting paid] might be a more definable pure reason to do it…. I think 
probably for eggs it may be better and more ethical to actually just pay for them. 
 
These views relate to arguments that challenge the rigidity of the gift/commodity 
dichotomy. With reference to these arguments in connection with prostitution, Prasad 
contends that: 
…while gift exchange can be made either sincerely or cynically, commodity exchange can 
only be made sincerely. That is, gifts can be given either sentimentally and generously, or 
                                                          
18 Daniels and Lewis (1996:13-14) assert that health professionals have traditionally sought donors who 
were not interested in any followup or knowledge of the outcomes of their ‘donation’ to avoid 
unwanted intrusion by the donor into the recipient’s nuclear family.  Constructing semen provision as a 
commercial transaction between anonymous persons was therefore regarded as a way of completing the 
transaction. 
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with the rhetoric of sentiment and generosity invoked ritually to cloak other dispositions. 
Commodity exchange, in contrast, does not require sentiment on the part of the participants 
and does not draw forth the ritualized pretense of sentiment. The commodity form offers 
freedom from the necessity of appearing selfless, generous, grateful, or otherwise sentimental 
and can therefore be construed as free from hypocrisy, while hypocrisy can be ascribed to the 
gift form (1999:185, original emphasis). 
Contrary to dominant discourses that decry the commercial model in transactions 
involving human gametes, Dr A appeared comfortable with the notion of placing 
some form of monetary value on human gametes.  In the case of egg donation, in 
particular, he maintained that the risks, inconvenience and discomfort involved 
warranted some form of financial compensation to the donor.  This position relates to 
arguments about the unfairness of not paying donors, particularly when they 
potentially risk their health, as in the case of egg donation (Macklin, 1996:109).  This 
argument, however, contradicts dominant ethical/legal discourses in New Zealand 
about the need to avoid the commodification of humans and the sale of any form of 
human body part.  As a result, at the clinic where Dr A is the director, neither semen 
nor egg donors are paid. Rather than targeting medical students, a traditional source of 
semen donors (Daniels and Lewis, 1996:13), Dr A claimed that he preferred to target 
more mature donors.  These donors are more likely to fit the profile of an ‘altruistic’ 
donor who is not primarily motivated by receiving payment.19 He said: 
 
Dr A:  I suppose the type of donor has changed a little bit.  I've not used medical students or anything 
like that, partly because I don't think they're old enough to make decisions related to those sort 
of things.  Well, they don't know what life's got in store for them really. So I've always viewed a 
maturer group of donors. 
Dr A’s comments illustrate the contention that the ‘types’ of donor recruited by 
clinics and the meanings attached to the donation will be largely determined by the 
way semen donation is constructed (i.e. as a commercial transaction or an altruistic 
act) within the culture of the clinic (Novaes, 1989:643). 
When asked if sperm donors were paid in their donor programme, the scientist 
working in the same clinic said: 
 
Scientist:  They never have with our programme.  It's been a donation.  We've offered perhaps one or 
two people in the whole 10 years expenses, which is meant to be travelling expenses, but 
most people don't ask.  I think the only ones who asked never got accepted as donors anyway 
because they weren't suitable for other reasons, so I don't think we've ever actually paid 
anyone for a donation. 
                                                          
19 A recent newspaper advertisement for sperm donors placed by one of the clinics reflects this 
position.  It reads:  “Sperm Donors. Healthy responsible men needed, 25-45 years” (Press, 18 October 
2000:3). 
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In contrast to this clinic’s approach, the other South Island DI programme did offer a 
financial incentive to sperm donors: a ‘flat’ fee of $150 was offered to donors for a 
minimum of ten ‘donations’ - $75 up front and $75 when they completed the 
transaction.  But, in keeping with the dominant discourse of the ‘altruistic’ model, 
while the amount offered was not insubstantial, it was not enough to provide a major 
incentive to potential donors.  Lab Technician B, who recruited and screened donors 
for this DI programme, said: 
 
Lab Technician B: Well, we do pay a small amount.  We've sort of gone through periods of not 
paying, but we have for the last few years paid a very small amount.  But it's not something 
I tell anybody.  I do tell them that they get paid if they ask.  I say,  “Yes you do, but if 
you're doing this for the money, you're wasting your time.”  And I won't tell them until 
they come in how much they get paid, and I also don't pay them in one lump sum.  I pay 
them...I split it...they get paid $150...it's just a flat $150 and they get $75 when they've 
finished donating all the samples, because I ask them for a minimum number of samples, 
ten....ten doesn't seem to scare them so much...but more than that...so it's a minimum of ten 
samples they have in the bank. And I just discuss it with them, and you form a rapport with 
them and usually I'll say, because I'm aiming for a certain number of straws…. An average 
number is probably 75 to 80 straws.  
 
KH: So, you think being paid motivates people to donate?  
 
Lab Technician B: No, I don't, no.  I think it's probably something we may review, because I think 
what happens is...I mean I've had the odd one who it has been and they often say that it is 
motivating, but it's not the only one...you can tell the ones that it is the only one.  I mean 
it's nice, if they're a student in particular and they're struggling a bit, anything is a help, but 
you can usually tell whether that is their main incentive. 
Daniels (1998b:89) argues that a financial motivation is more likely to be associated 
with student donors which suggests that this DI programme, located near a medical 
school, is more likely to target students as potential donors.  Lab Technician B 
indicated that they recruited donors from “all walks of life” but most were university 
educated.  
Screening Donors 
Before being accepted by the DI programme, potential donors submit to rigorous 
health checks, including sexual health, and producing specimens of semen and blood.  
Lab Technician B referred to the donor screening process: 
 
Lab Technician B:  What happens is a blood screen for HIV, Hepatitis B and Hepatitis C…and the 
semen is quarantined for six months from the time of the last ejaculate, and after that length 
of time we bring them in again for HIV and we also screen again to make sure they haven't 
thrown anything up during that time.  They would be turned down for the programme if they 
had any STD. We don't send them to the STD clinic here.  What we do is, we have a health 
questionnaire, but they're basically things like diabetes, high blood pressure, any coronary 
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disease, anything like that, and have they had any symptoms which may indicate that they 
had an STD. I also ask them if they've ever had an STD or hepatitis.  They give a brief 
family history, and they're also asked about any hereditary disorders, and it's just a list that 
we get them to go through.  And then there's a donor declaration that they have to sign, and 
they have to let us know if they have any symptoms of an STD or if they participate in any 
activity that may put them at risk, and they're also asked to report anything during the period 
of the programme. 
As well as screening for any possible contagious disease, clinical staff said they had 
to feel that the donor was being honest and truthful about his family medical history.  
With regard to making this judgement about prospective donors, the person in charge 
of recruiting and screening donors at the other clinic said: 
 
Lab Technician A:  We have to feel comfortable with the donor, that the donor is being open with us. If 
I didn't like a person, that wouldn't be a reason for excluding a donor.  We'd have to be 
comfortable that everything was okay, that they were being honest and completely open, and 
telling you everything there was to know about them.  They have to pass all the medical 
family history things, and then the sexual health clinic screen, which is pretty thorough, and 
then bring a sample in for a trial freeze.  So those are really the three things. And from now 
on they're going to have to go and see a male counsellor outside of our centre as well, just to 
talk through the implications before they actually come in to you, so they've really thought 
through the issue of having genetic offspring out there, although they're not their children. 
 
Lab Technician A highlighted the importance of trust in the donor screening process 
and the need to make subjective judgements about the donor, which constitute a 
different form of appraisal than the medical tests donors are required to ‘pass’ before 
being accepted into the DI programme. Similarly, Lupton’s study of lay persons’ 
experience with medical practitioners indicated that people wanted to “feel 
comfortable” with their doctor, which highlights that trust is required on both sides 
(1996:160). 
According to Dr A, only about a third of potential donors get to the stage of 
submitting semen for a trial freeze.   Only after reaching this stage are potential 
donors required to attend a counselling session to ensure that they have considered the 
implications of anonymously donating semen that could lead to the birth of a child to 
whom they are biologically related in someone else’s family.  This counselling 
session constitutes yet another part of the screening process that might eliminate 
potential donors from the programme.  The counsellor does not turn down donors, per 
se, but reports to the clinic director any concerns he/she has about their suitability. 
With respect to the RTAC20 requirement that donors are counselled, Dr A said: 
                                                          
20 The Reproductive Technology Accreditation Committee of Australia (RTAC) became the 
accreditation body for all fertility clinics in New Zealand in 1990 at the instigation of some service 
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Dr A:  To a degree, I've tried to keep the hurdles down to the donors to encourage them, and I feel it 
may be another hurdle that's put in their way.  I can understand why people think it needs to be 
done, but I also wonder whether we're going to counsel everyone before they make a decision.  
And reproductive technologies are posed with so many things.  I mean, it's much easier to get a 
heart transplant (he laughs). 
 
Dr A’s comment hints at the possible tensions that exist for health professionals.  
Whereas clinics are primarily in the ‘business’ of ‘making babies’, they nonetheless 
have to adhere to a raft of ethical and medical (if not legal) requirements to address 
the possible ‘risks’ to all parties to procreative processes involving the use of third 
party gametes.21  This also speaks to the collision between what Law (1994:77) refers 
to as two different modes of ordering: administration and enterprise.22  According to 
Law (1994:75-76), stories of enterprise tell stories about agency and celebrate 
opportunism, pragmatism and performance.  In contrast, administration as a mode of 
ordering entails stories about generating the perfectly well-regulated organisation, 
about hierarchical structures and about management as the art of planning, 
implementing, maintaining and policing that structure (Law, 1994:77).   The 
requirement to ‘police’ the screening of donors on the basis of their health status, and 
additionally, to ensure that they have considered the ‘social’ implications of their 
contribution to the birth of a new human being, illustrates the heightened concerns 
about risk and uncertainty in contemporary society (Petersen, 1997).   According to 
Castel, contemporary society, labelled “high modernity”, is characterised by the 
emergence of new preventive strategies in social administration which “dissolve the 
notion of the subject or a concrete individual, and put in its place a combinatory of 
factors, the factors or risk” (cited in Petersen, 1997:192).  One possible ‘risk’ relates 
to the issue of donors providing less than perfect gametes.  Another possible risk 
                                                                                                                                                                      
providers who were concerned about the lack of a government-instituted system of accountability in 
the field of assisted human reproduction in New Zealand (Daniels and Hargreaves, 1997:3) 
21 At a meeting on 5 June 2001 at one of the fertility clinics included in this study, a doctor referred to 
new criteria for screening donors which included lowering the maximum age of donors from 45 to 40 
years old.  The new criterion has been instituted because medical research has shown that the incidence 
of schizophrenia is greater in people whose fathers were over 40 years old when they were conceived.  
This relates to recent research carried out in Israel which found that men aged 45-49 were twice as 
likely to have offspring with schizophrenia as were men under 25 years old (see Malaspina, Harlap et 
al, 2001). This new criterion represents a further barrier to recruiting donors.  Previously, RTAC 
guidelines had allowed semen donors to be up to 55 years old.  See Appendix D for RTAC guidelines 
relating to the use of donor gametes. 
22 Law (1994) argues that there is no social ‘order’ as such.  Rather, there are modes of ‘ordering’ 
which are never complete and jostle together to generate the social.  He argues that these modes of 
ordering are strategies for patterning the networks of the social (1994:20).  Law outlines four modes of 
ordering: enterprise, administration, vision and vocation (1994:75-82) 
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relates to the potential of being identified by their donor offspring in the future, and 
whether, in fact, they will be available to be contacted.23
In the current New Zealand context, the potential of being identified in the future by 
individuals conceived with the use of their donations is one of the major issues that 
donors have to consider before becoming a donor.  The director of another South 
Island clinic expressed concerns about this: 
 
Dr C: ...you may know that all the clinics in the country have a policy of accepting donors who are 
prepared to be identified.  We never had that formal policy, except that we advise our donors 
and after counselling as well, and it's interesting that I don't think there'd be any donor who is 
not prepared to be identified. We have donors come in who say they're not, but after counselling 
they have changed their minds. So, whether they've looked at it and realised….The issue about 
the identifiability is a difficult one though, and one I'm concerned about.  I mean, for example, 
because it's not in the legislation, what do the clinics do to ensure that they remain in contact?  
The real problem will come 10, 20 years away, knowing my own research, [donors] may shift, 
and although they say they will be happy to meet the child, they don't have to.  
Dr C identified the ‘risk’ for people conceived by DI who, according to dominant 
discourses in the field of AHR in New Zealand, have the ‘right’ to be able to identify 
their genetic father in the future.24 Without legislation in place to ensure that this 
‘right’ can be exercised, it cannot be guaranteed.  
Other forms of ‘risk’ potentially inhere in the issue of donor identifiability.  Questions 
arise about the effect on the donor himself, or his family network, of having DI 
offspring who seek to meet him.  In connection with the possible ‘risks’ to donors and 
DI offspring, Dr A said: 
 
Dr A:  …the philosophy of the clinic is that it’s the child’s right to know.  All of our donors that we 
have are in agreement that they may be contacted in the future.  We tell everybody that.  We 
can’t guarantee that because there’s no obligation for the donor not to change their mind….You 
know, you can envisage a situation, say, that if we allow four conceptions and some couples 
may have another conception with that donor.  If the first family that turns up at the donor’s 
door turns out to be, to coin a phrase, real rat-bags, then he may not be willing to make himself 
available for other people.  And unless there’s an obligation within the law, then there’s not 
much we can do about that. 
 
                                                          
23 In connection with the issue of identifiable donors, Daniels (1999b:7) cites the report of a medical 
professional following a workshop on issues related to AHR.  The report stated:  “Many centres are 
looking for donors who are prepared to be identifiable to the children in the future and, contrary to 
previous belief, most donors are prepared to do this.  It was suggested that only men prepared to be 
identifiable should now be considered as donors”.  
24 One of the guiding principles of the Ministerial Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technologies 
was the right to know one’s genetic origins (MCART, 1994:33).  The Committee argued that this 
principle was important within the New Zealand context because of the significance of whakapapa 
(knowledge of one’s ancestry) for Maori, and that many pakeha recognise knowledge of one’s 
biological origins as important for the discovery of identity. 
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Because of the possible implications for donors’ partners and children, donors are also 
asked by the DI programme to gain the consent of their partner, if they have one, 
before they will be accepted onto the programme.25  One DI programme did not 
require the written consent of partners; instead, donors are asked if they have their 
partner’s consent, and partners are invited to attend an interview with the potential 
donor to help the couple make an “informed decision”.26  The other clinic, however, 
required written consent from partners of potential sperm donors.  According to the 
director of this South Island clinic, a donor’s partner has the ‘right’ to be involved in 
the consent to supply semen for the DI programme and also in the determination of 
who has access to the semen.27   
 
Although health professionals suggested that it was the donor’s ‘right’ to determine 
who had access to his sperm, donors (and their partners) are required by clinics to 
make a decision about who can have access to ‘their’ semen.  Thus, donors (and their 
partners) enter into a legally-binding agreement with the clinic about the ‘types’ of 
recipient that may use their sperm (MCART, 1994:54). This form of ‘targeting’ is not 
considered by the Human Rights Commission to be in breach of the Human Rights 
Act 1993.  The information pamphlet sent out to the donors by one of the clinics 
stipulates that, although the Human Rights Act 1993 requires the clinic to offer DI 
without discrimination, because the donor is “making a gift, he is free to choose 
where his gift goes”. It should be noted, however, that while the donation of semen is 
constructed as an ‘altruistic gift’, when donors are asked to ‘target’ particular 
recipients of their ‘gifts’ the notion that the gift is given in the spirit of Malinowski’s 
‘free’ or ‘pure’ gift is undermined. At the same time, it does distinguish it from a 
commercial transaction where no such preference is stated.  When asked about the 
categories of recipients stipulated by their clinic, Lab Technician A said:   
                                                          
25 A recent study of New Zealand donors revealed that half the donors who were married/partnered 
were no longer with their original partner (Adair, 2000:4-5).  Some of the current female partners had 
concerns that possible demands on their partner by DI offspring might result in time taken away from 
their own family. 
26 See Appendix E for donor information. 
27 RTAC guidelines on the storage and use of donated gametes (see Attachment E in Appendix D) 
stipulate that if a donor is married or has a long-term partner, “centres should encourage donors to ask 
their partner to consent in writing to the use of the gametes for treatment” (emphasis added).  The 
social worker who currently counsels anonymous sperm donors at this clinic said, at a meeting I 
attended at the clinic on 5 June 2001, that although he attempted to see donors’ partners to discuss the 
implications of their partner’s semen donation, frequently this was logistically difficult and did not 
happen.   
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Lab Technician A:  There used to be just [heterosexual] couples coming through, but now, because of 
the Human Rights Act, we're also treating single women, lesbian couples.  The categories that 
we put in front of the donors are married couples, de facto couples, single women, lesbian 
couples, people with a history of a psychiatric problem and people with a criminal 
background, and couples of a different ethnic origin.  So they're the different groups we might 
have coming through, and some of the donors have quite strong feelings about any one or 
other of those groups.  So, they're asked that at their initial interview.  They tick what they 
think there and then.  We give them a copy of that to take back and sort of stress that they can 
come back and change that, and then some will come back and change.  Usually they do it 
straight off.  
                                                                               
Most are comfortable with married couples and de facto couples…would be the most general.  
Most specify for a criminal record that it would depend on what it is and how long ago.  
Probably most...some aren't worried about ethnic origins, some are.  And then, fewer are 
happy about single women or lesbian couples, so that's harder to get donors for. 
 
 
Donors at this clinic are asked to rate how “comfortable” they feel (on a five-point 
scale from “very uncomfortable” to “completely comfortable”) about their semen 
being used by the categories of recipient stipulated on the clinic’s questionnaire on 
semen use. This is given to donors and their partners to complete (see Appendix E).  
In addition, donors are asked to stipulate whether they wish to withdraw consent to 
use their semen for any particular categories of recipient.  These procedures, and 
particularly the rating scale, appear to offer a great deal of scope for the exercise of 
discrimination or social control by the clinic, implied by the categories they offer. It 
remains unclear as to how the clinic uses information from the rating scale to offer or 
withdraw semen from certain donors to particular recipients. For example, if a donor 
stated that he was “indifferent” about whether single women or lesbian couples had 
access to his sperm, would they in fact have access to it?  As a result of this process, 
the DI programme had only one or two donors who were prepared to donate semen to 
single women or lesbian couples.  Dr A said: 
 
Dr A:  Certainly, that’s probably where the greatest pressure on the system is at the moment, primarily 
because we don’t have so much semen available for those people [single and lesbian women], 
because the donors are asked what group of people they would like to have their semen used for, 
or are there any specific reasons they wouldn’t want [to donate to certain people]. That’s the 
donor and usually the donor’s partner because they have a right to be involved in that.  
Interesting that [some women claim that] semen comes under the [Matrimonial Property Act].28
 
                                                          
28 Dr. A’s reference to the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 was made in jest.  The Act does not include 
reference to human gametes, so there is no basis in law for this clinic’s decision to require written 
consent from partners of sperm donors. Dr A’s comments referred to his perception that many women 
felt they had a ‘claim’ to their partner’s sperm and were uncomfortable with the notion of them 
procreating outside their own nuclear family and with another woman.  This relates to discussion in 
Chapter Four about using a known donor. 
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In contrast to this situation regarding the accessibility of donor semen to single and 
lesbian women, the person in charge of recruiting donors for the other South Island DI 
programme said: 
 
Lab Technician B:  I couldn't tell you the number.  It's interesting though...I mean, it surprises me 
actually.  I'm really surprised. I mean there are definitely, probably, maybe half of them. The 
ones that I've talked to recently...none of them consider it a problem, and they don't have any 
problems at all.  I'm quite amazed actually…especially the ones who immediately say, “I don't 
have a problem with it.  It's not a problem, as long as they have a good home environment.”  
 
This DI programme appeared to have recruited a more ‘liberal’ group of donors than 
the other clinic.  This might partly be a reflection of differing clinical practices, 
including that this DI programme was more likely to recruit donors from the 
university than the former clinic.29
As well as asking donors (and, where appropriate, their partners) to make a decision 
regarding who may receive their sperm donations, DI programme staff also informed 
donors that they should think about telling their ‘own’ biological children of the 
existence of any DI offspring, who were genetically their children’s half-siblings. 
 
Lab Technician B:  I just put that to [donors] in the interview and they have to think about that...that 
they should think about telling their children or any future children. I sort of prime them, so that 
I make sure that they're thinking about it before they go to [the counsellor] so that when they go 
to her, they've actually had time to consider it and discuss it with her.  
In contrast, the lab technician at the other clinic appeared to be more proactive in 
recommending that donors tell their children of any DI offspring. The scientist in the 
same DI programme commented that donors face the issue of how to tell their 
children about their DI offspring.  She said: 
 
Scientist: What we also need is a book for donors and how to tell their children, because they face the 
same issue.  They need to tell their children that there are half-brothers and half-sisters in the 
community.  And it’s very much the same sort of thing.  It’s perhaps just a little bit less 
immediately personal but I’m sure it’s still quite difficult for the donor and his partner.  So 
someone needs to write one for us. 
 
KH: That’s a good idea, because they might not even have all their own children at the time they 
donate. 
 
Scientist: No, that’s right.  They may not.  Some of them are single and will then subsequently get 
married and have children much later.  Some have got them already, but they’re quite small 
and too young to be told.   
 
                                                          
29 To determine specific reasons as to why this might be the case would require further research 
including interviews with donors. 
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At a recent meeting at the clinic, the counsellor of anonymous donors claimed that 
some donors had said that they did not think their children needed to know about their 
donations.  This perception is supported by recent research on donors in New Zealand 
which revealed that most had not told their children primarily because they were 
regarded as “too young”, although most were adolescent (Adair, 2000:5).  According 
to Adair, the 23% of donors who had told their children of their involvement in a DI 
programme received no negative reactions from their children, most of whom were 
“only mildly interested” (2000:5).  Adair suggests that, given the concerns of many 
donors’ wives about romantic attachments between half-siblings, informing children 
about the existence of any half-siblings in the community seems advisable. 
The Collection, Storage and Sharing of Information in Donor Insemination 
At the two clinics included in this study, donors are asked to provide non-identifying 
information about themselves which is then provided as a ‘profile’ for recipients to 
view when choosing a donor, and is sent to them in the event that they had a baby by 
a particular donor.30  Lab Technician A, who recruits donors at one of the clinics, said 
about the non-identifying information that donors provide: 
 
Lab Technician A:  It’s basic physical features, like their height, hair colour, all those sorts of things.  
The donor’s own health history, if he’s had any illnesses, and his eyesight, whether he’s left or 
right handed, smoking and drinking, his education level, his employment, what sort of job he’s 
in, and then a basic family history of his parents and his grandparents.  So there’s a bit of family 
[information]...just roughly their physical features and what they did, and then some personal 
comments which we like to get from them.  Why do you want to be a donor?  Is there anything 
else you’d like to say about yourself…what sort of personality, and any comments from your 
partner?  I hear from the nurses that recipients are quite interested in those personal comments.  
They just like to get a bit of a feel for the person. 
 
Non-identifying information provided by donors is typed up into a profile which is 
then placed in the appropriate folder (labelled according to recipient ‘type’) from 
which recipients can choose a donor.  Each donor profile is identified by a donor code 
which is printed on the top of the page.  To make sure the donor remains anonymous, 
the clinic reserves the right to edit non-identifying information that might potentially 
identify the donor.  Nurse B said: 
 
Nurse B:  The girls, when they do the profiles, are very careful about what they allow the donors to 
write. The profiles mention your occupations, and the things you're interested in, your 
sporting, musical, artistic...you know, all those sorts of things.  They're sort of fairly broad 
profiles, and I remember interviewing, because we nurses used to interview the donors, and I 
                                                          
30 Donor Non-Identifying Information forms are located in Appendix E.  
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remember interviewing one donor and he was a helicopter pilot. When he wrote out his 
profile he wrote, “helicopter pilot”, and [Lab Technician A] said, “Well you can't actually 
put that in because there's not many helicopter pilots.  And if anybody came in who knew 
something about helicopter pilots, it wouldn't take, I mean you wouldn't have to be a rocket 
scientist to work out, just looking at the physical features to work out who you were.” So 
when they actually do the profiles, they do guide, or they ring and make suggestions, that 
perhaps we would change this or that, if it was going to be something that was rather 
specific. 
At this clinic, while donors write their own profiles, they are scrutinised and modified 
to make sure that donor anonymity is preserved.  In contrast, at the other South Island 
DI programme, donors handwrite their profiles which are then photocopied for 
recipients’ viewing.  Considering that handwriting might be an easy identifying 
marker, this seemed a ‘risky’ practice in relation to preserving donor anonymity.  This 
is particularly the case given that the clinic’s nurse said that she selected the profiles 
of three donors that she deemed suitable for the couple and posted them out for them 
to make a choice.  Lab Technician B said: 
 
Lab Technician B: [At] our clinic we just photocopy the non-identifying information [form filled out 
by donor] and [recipients] are given that.  They’re actually given a few of those to choose their 
donor from. But, it’s things like education, what they like doing, don’t like doing.  They also put 
their physical characteristics and age range.  The last question is to do with parents and 
grandparents.  We’ve just got a general question, “How is your health?  Do you suffer from...? 
Do you drink? Do you smoke? What is your motivation?  Anything else you want to say? 
While recipients receive a textual representation of the donor, clinical practices are 
designed to ensure that the donor remains anonymous and therefore a generic, rather 
than a specific individual.  The attention given by health professionals to preserving 
donor anonymity raises the question as to who benefits from the anonymity which is a 
central organising principle of DI programmes.  Haimes (1990:158) suggests that 
distancing mechanisms such as donor anonymity are usually assumed to be in the best 
interests of the donor, the child and the recipient couple. After examining reports on 
the use of assisted human reproduction in Britain, written in the mid-1980s (including 
the Warnock Report, 1985), Haimes (1990) argues that anonymity serves as a device 
“to protect the anomalous family and to promote the ideology of ‘family life’” 
(Haimes, 1990). Donors are rendered “invisible” so that “families-by-donation” can 
conform to the ideological and structural requirements of “normal families” (Haimes, 
1990:167). Daniels (1998b:83) has argued that payment to donors is a distancing 
mechanism to bring finality to the transaction and remove the notion that donors are 
owed anything further, such as information about outcomes, counselling or social 
recognition.   
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Haimes has also argued that clinicians themselves have benefited from donor 
anonymity, particularly in the past, because it has protected them from the scrutiny of 
others who might have doubts about the practice of DI (1993c). This might be the 
case particularly if clinicians sometimes are donors. Haimes suggests that important 
legal and social developments in relation to gamete donation in the 1980s and 1990s 
have probably led to clinicians being less concerned about promoting secrecy and 
anonymity.31  But, Haimes (1993c:1519-1520) argues, two important factors support 
the continuation of donor anonymity as a central organising principle in DI:  first, the 
fact that recipients are still strongly in favour of donor anonymity; and second, that 
gamete donation takes place “in a society which still feels a great deal of uncertainty 
about the significance (physiological as well as symbolic) of genetic relationships in 
the development of the individual and in the development of families” (Haimes, 
1993a:1520). 
As another distancing mechanism for preserving anonymity, in each of the two DI 
programmes, different staff members have contact with donors and recipients.  The 
scientist in one of the DI programmes said: 
 
Scientist:  We set up some time ago, a sort of division between the donors and the recipients. And we 
felt that there were certain advantages to having different people deal with the donors and 
deal with the recipients.  Then each one becomes somewhat an advocate for the group that 
they deal with and tends to look out for their interests and we feel that that's worked fairly 
well. Before that, there was perhaps potential for putting undue pressure on donors from 
someone who was very involved with a recipient and wanted something for them…. For the 
donor it always is a donation.  It's something he's giving, something he's doing, and there 
shouldn't ever be pressure brought to bear on him, and his interests always have to be 
considered, and his wife and family too.  They're individuals in their own right, and with 
their own rights.                                           
In this DI programme, donors are recruited and screened by andrology laboratory staff 
and recipients interface with DI programme nurses. In the past, the scientist was 
involved with donor recruitment and undertook all the scientific lab work, such as 
sperm freezing, but now she had very little contact with donors, except to write the 
newsletter which donors receive from the clinic.32  With regard to the newsletter, 33 
Lab Technician A said:   
                                                          
31 These developments include growing public interest and knowledge about infertility, the growth of 
ovum donation which has provided an alternative framework  for understanding the motivation of 
gamete donors and the passing of legislation in some countries to provide access to identifying 
information about donors when the children are adults (see Haimes, 1993a:1519). 
32 According to the scientist, this method of on-going contact between the fertility clinic and the donors 
has enabled them to stay in contact with 90 percent of their donors. In contrast, because they have no 
on-going contact with recipients, the scientist claimed that this project, and her involvement in trying to 
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Lab Technician A: They have a newsletter about twice a year, and that just tells them what's going on 
in the clinic and if there's any changes in the centre. And then within that newsletter, each donor 
will get the information of how many inseminations there has been in total, and whether there 
have been any pregnancies, and also whether there have been any live births, because obviously 
not all pregnancies result in a live birth. So they are informed whether they have any children 
and what sex they are. [Donors] seem to almost universally be keen to get that information.  If 
they don't get the newsletter they ask when another newsletter is coming out (she laughs)! So 
they are keen to know. 
 
According to Daniels (1998b), contrary to general beliefs, several studies on donors 
carried out in New Zealand and other countries has shown that many donors are 
interested in knowing the outcome of their donations.  This included knowing about 
numbers of pregnancies and births and, in some cases, wanting to receive photographs 
of the offspring (Daniels, 1998b:90).  Other recent New Zealand research on donors 
also found that many donors were interested in receiving information from the clinic 
about any DI offspring (Adair, 2000).  Lab Technician B, who recruits donors at one 
of the fertility clinics, said that many donors are very interested in whether or not 
children have been born as a result of their donations.  She said: 
 
Lab Technician B:  Some of them, the odd one says, ‘I’m not interested.’  Most of them are very 
interested to know, certainly interested to know that there are children.  And we tell them that 
there are children and they are interested in that.  And some of them... I have had the odd one 
say he couldn’t go on with the programme because they couldn’t cope with the fact that a child 
of theirs was in a home that they didn’t know what it would be like…they had control 
over…and they really had gone to a point, and then no, they couldn’t…they never got to the 
point of donating.  They’d gone through talking to people, and at the end of the day they really 
found it very difficult...I’ve had two or three people like that.  And, yes, they are interested in 
the children. 
 
Furthermore, Lab Technician B said about the limited information passed on verbally 
to donors she recruited: 
 
Lab Technician B:  They’re just told.  They are told they have x number of children and they’re told the 
sex, and that’s all they’re told.  They’re not given any indication of when they were born, where 
the children are living, nothing.  That’s it.  And they know that.  And I just tell them that they 
must understand that although there’s a child, they’re not able to make any contact with that 
                                                                                                                                                                      
recruit recipient couples had highlighted that the clinic had lost touch with many of their recipient 
couples.   
33 A copy of a donor newsletter dated December 1995, appears in Appendix E.  Amongst other 
information, the newsletter provides statistics on the numbers of babies conceived by DI through this 
programme, by sex, born between 1987-1995. In their December 1995 newsletter, clinic staff working 
with donors wrote that donors who indicated on their non-identifying information form that they were 
willing to be contacted by any offspring in the future, could ensure that this was possible by leaving 
details with their family solicitor. The clinic was planning to establish this as a mechanism to ensure 
that donors could be contacted by DI offspring in the future. Thus, it appeared that the purpose of the 
newsletter is not so much to provide “news” as a means of control:  to maintain contact with the donor. 
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child.  It’s a one-way street.  And they just accept that.  They do.  They know that.  We’ve had 
the odd one who would like to, but, yeah, they accept it. 
 
With no legislation in place governing access to information, according to current 
clinic practices that aim to preserve anonymity between donors and recipient families, 
donors have to accept that they cannot make contact with their biological offspring. 34  
Any move towards a meeting between the donor and his DI offspring would have to 
come from the individuals conceived by DI. The question arises, however, whether 
donors have the right to receive non-identifying information about recipients.35  When 
completing the donor questionnaire at one of the clinics, donors are asked if they 
would be interested in receiving this information.  The scientist at this clinic said:  
 
Scientist: [An issue] that’s always been vaguely niggling around is would the donors like non-
identifying information on their successful couples?  That’s something we ask them all with 
their forms, and most of them say they would be very interested in this information but 
we’ve never actually provided it. …They know if [DI offspring] exist, but unless they 
specifically ask, they don’t even know how many to one family.  I just print out a total and 
that says three boys, two girls.  So they know the total numbers and they know roughly when 
they were born because these six-monthly newsletters pin it down to a period of six months. 
 
Like the scientist, a mother of three children conceived by DI also raised the issue of 
families sharing information with donors. She said: 
 
Stephanie: …some people are very threatened, again probably I'm considered a liberal, but my attitude 
is if you believe that the children should have access to the information about the donor then 
I think there's some reciprocity in there.  And I don't feel threatened by that, but I know a lot 
of people do.  And that's another issue that I think needs to be addressed. …when I donated 
eggs, that was one of the specifications I set down, that I wanted to know the outcome.  I 
didn't really want to be in their life, but I wanted to know the outcome.  And I also 
wanted...the reason I wanted to meet the recipient was that because I felt that it would be 
more difficult for them to convince themselves that I didn't exist, if they actually met 
me...had seen photographs of my family and done all those sorts of things.  And so, you 
could never actually make them tell the child, but you actually were cutting off the ability of 
them to actually deny...which made them more likely to tell. 
 
                                                          
34 It should be noted, however, that the assisted reproductive technology bills currently before the New 
Zealand parliament give donors the ‘right’ to access information kept by fertility clinics, or the 
Registrar-General on children conceived with the use of their donated sperm.  The bills recognise the 
rights of persons conceived by assisted conception, the rights of genetic parents, and the rights of 
adoptive parents to information about the parties to such procreative arrangements (New Zealand, 
1996; New Zealand, 1998).  At the time of writing, it was anticipated that the report of the Government 
Select Committee on these two Bills would be published in November 2001. 
35 In a previous study, a donor I interviewed indicated to the fertility clinic that he would be “very 
interested” in receiving non-identifying information about couples who had children conceived with his 
sperm.  He also said that he would feel comfortable with contact from the recipients via a letter when 
the child was no less than 14 years old, unless the parents felt that it was necessary prior to that time.  
Nonetheless, he was cautious about actually meeting any offspring saying that he would want to know 
exactly what they expected to achieve by such a meeting. 
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Although a recipient of donor sperm, Stephanie was able to position herself as a donor 
because she had donated eggs to another couple after she had had her three children 
and ‘completed her family’.  As a donor herself, she wanted to know the outcome of 
her donation, and also to actually meet the recipients, with the specific objective of 
ensuring that they would be more likely to tell their child how he/she was conceived. 
This highlighted her strong commitment to the notion that individuals conceived 
using donor gametes should be told of their origins.  Stephanie’s support of the 
sharing of information between parties to a DI conception subverts the notion that 
families with children conceived by DI need to conform to the ideological and 
structural requirements of “normal families” as discussed by Haimes (1990) in 
relation to recipients’ desire for donor anonymity. Stephanie’s experience also 
highlights the fundamental difference between sperm and egg donation programmes 
in the New Zealand context.  Whereas DI programmes have an over-riding concern 
with donor anonymity, egg donation programmes generally do not because ovum 
donation has been framed as altruistic donation in contrast to the suspected pathology 
traditionally associated with semen donation (Haimes, 1993:1519).36
Maintaining donor records 
Many countries that have addressed the regulation of DI practices require record 
keeping but they differ as to what should be done with the information (Blank 1998).  
Some countries, such as the UK, have established centralised registers of information 
on all assisted conceptions and gamete donors (Blank, 1998:147).  Most countries, 
however, seek to preserve donor anonymity and therefore allow access to non-
identifying information only.  Exceptions to this exist in Sweden, Austria, the State of 
Victoria in Australia, and Switzerland (1998) and Holland, which have instituted laws 
that require that identifying information about about sperm donors be accessible to 
donor children when they reach the age of eighteen (Blank, (1998:146).  The 
Australian Medical Procedures Act 1988 provides for the establishment of a central 
registry to hold certain non-identifying and identifying information but the latter may 
be accessed only with the written permission of the person enquired about (Blank, 
1998:146). 
                                                          
36 The differences between the way that sperm and egg donor programmes are constructed and the 
different social meanings attached to sperm and ova are discussed in Chapter Four and Chapter Ten. 
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New Zealand fertility clinics are required, by the accrediting body, RTAC, to collect 
information about donors, but at present there is no legal obligation for clinics to do 
so (MCART, 1994:86).  The DI programmes included in this study maintain records 
so they can link donors with particular pregnancies and this information is kept by 
individual clinics.  Record-keeping is therefore maintained at the local clinic level 
which secures medical control over information. Questions have arisen, however, as 
to whether there should be a centralised register of births as a result of gamete 
donation (MCART, 1994:86).  This would secure management control by the 
Registrar-General over information at the national level.  As previously stated, the 
two bills, currently before Parliament, relating to the regulation of assisted human 
reproduction in New Zealand, make provision for the establishment of a central 
register.  Subject to certain limitations, this ultimately would enable both donor 
offspring and donors to access identifying information about one another (Assisted 
Human Reproduction Bill, 1998; Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Bill, 
1996). 
In relation to the prospect of the establishment of a central register of information 
related to donor conceptions, the director of one of the DI programmes said: 
 
Dr A:  I would think there ought to be a register set up for donors so that...a national...when a child is 
born there should be a name on a register somewhere.  I think it should be held in a place that 
doesn't have access to busybodies and things like that... with very limited access to it.  I mean 
that's really what we're doing in an essence.  We get to keep track of those things.  But I don't 
know what's going to be happening to me in 20 years either. 
 
Dr A appeared to have some doubts about losing control over the information at the 
local level because of the possibility of breaches of confidentiality.  His comment 
about uncertainty of his personal future raises the spectre that records might be lost if 
kept at the local level.  It also suggests that, like other centralised registers such as the 
National Cervical Screening Register, a register of donors and their DI offspring 
attempts to construct standardised networks that ensure certainty in a field of 
uncertainty (Phibbs, 2000).  The medical practice of DI, for example, has been 
perceived as creating uncertainty about fatherhood and the ‘risk’ to individuals 
conceived by DI of not being able to trace their genetic father.  These factors are 
attributed to the secrecy and anonymity traditionally surrounding the practice (Price, 
1997). 
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Centralised registers are implemented and used as management tools and as 
surveillance mechanisms that constitute a regulatory control by state actors of a 
particular population.37 According to Austrin and Phibbs (1996:17), in Foucauldian 
terms these registers can be seen as modern technologies of power through which a 
constructed medical gaze is able to penetrate and organise a population. They may 
also be used to smooth over competing claims within a contested medical field 
(Austrin and Phibbs, 1996:19). For example, the operation of a register containing 
information that links donors, recipients and DI offspring, might allow access to 
information about the parties to a DI conception, even if one of the parties wishes to 
remain anonymous.  In contrast to arguments that favour the development of a 
national register, a scientist working in a DI programme was not in favour of 
centralised record-keeping.  She said: 
 
Scientist:   Well, my personal view is I'm not in favour of it, though Dr A seems to be of the notion it 
probably will happen eventually, but I sort of feel that the number of clinics in New Zealand 
is so small.  There are so few of us, it's so easy to communicate between them, that it could 
be something that could be kept quite securely at the level of the clinic where the person is 
treated.  In terms of security for people who don't want to know... the couples I think they 
need to be in control of this information.  If they want people to know they need to tell them.  
They don't want anything to be found out without their actual control over it.  So, in terms of 
that, the fewer people who know, and the less widespread the information is, the better, and 
any sort of central register, there's obviously going to be people typing it, it's going to be 
available, and New Zealand's a small country.  There's always scope for mistakes and leaks 
and things. 
The scientist raised an important point about who should own personal information. 
Her views indicated that issues of control over access to information are central to 
arguments about whether records should be maintained at the local level or centralised 
in a national register to facilitate the sharing of information to those who are deemed 
to have the ‘right’ to access it. 
Questions have also arisen about the desirability of sharing information between 
families with children conceived by the same donor. In 1997, a Donor Family 
Register was piloted by Fertility Associates in Wellington New Zealand. The idea for 
the register was conceived by Sylvia Nixon, a nurse working in Fertility Associates’ 
DI programme. At a public launch of the Donor Family Register at an Infertility 
Awareness Day, hosted by the NZIS, on 16 August, 1998, she said: 
                                                          
37 See Austrin and Phibbs (1996) for an analysis of the implementation of two registers in the medical 
field in New Zealand: the Cervical Screening Register, a centralised register administered by the 
Department of Health, and the Implants Containing Silicone-gel Register, a decentralised register 
administered by individual plastic surgeons with the co-operation of the Department of Health. 
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Sylvia:  Back in 1988, a donor family support group, which I hosted, was shocked into stunned silence 
momentarily by an observation from one mother (who happens to be here) that there was a 
strong likelihood that some of the children present were half-brothers and sisters.  A few 
awkward glances were exchanged and obvious discomfort felt by some couples.  But of 
course, she countered, only Sylvia is the one with that information. Hello!  That light bulb 
went on again.  She was in fact correct.  Some of the children present were related through the 
donor and I was the only one who could readily access that information.  That responsibility 
remained with me.  
Sylvia became aware that it might be in DI families’ interests to know which other 
families had children by the same donor, particularly as many parents have concerns 
that half-siblings might meet, be attracted to one another and form a relationship. So 
she began to devise a mechanism by which families could share and access 
information – either non-identifying or identifying – between themselves.  She said: 
 
Sylvia: The objective for the register is to provide an accurate accessible means of allowing 
information to be shared by families conceived by the same donor, and perhaps more 
importantly, a way that the offspring of these families, as young adults can check the number 
and gender of their half siblings.  All donor families will have basic information stored.  That 
is they are family X to donor Y with a male born in 1988 and a female born in 1991.  This is 
the only information that will be released to other linked families until such time as that family 
gives permission or otherwise.  Looking to the future, having suitably identified themselves, 
donor offspring as adults will also be given the opportunity of storing and accessing 
information.   
When I raised the topic of the Donor Family Register, the scientist at one of the DI 
programmes argued that there was no need for a central register of DI families. She 
said: 
 
Scientist:  I think that information is actually available. Yeah.  And if they wish to meet other couples 
and the other couples were willing.  As long as you've got two willing couples, you can put 
them in contact with each other. I know we've talked about it, and I had the feeling that to 
some extent it had happened.  Then the issue arises as to whether the donor's children would 
want to meet the others.  But then that can't be done without the donor himself at least until 
they reach a slightly more advanced age.  But I know quite a long time ago we had the 
notion that perhaps the connections between the half-siblings is more important that between 
the children and the donor father even.  That to know your half-brothers and half-sisters 
might be a more longterm relationship and a more significant one.  It's like having another 
whole batch of cousins, and a whole extension to your family.  It could be a really good 
positive thing for a lot of kids.     
       
Two recipient couples included in this study, with children conceived with the use of 
sperm from the same donor, had had telephone contact with one another.  This was 
initiated by one of the mothers with two daughters conceived by DI, who had 
contacted the clinic to ask for information about other families who had used sperm 
from the same donor.  This was spurred by her concerns about her daughters later 
developing relationships with genetic half-siblings.  She said: 
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Caroline:   …when I hear about all the couples that are having donor insemination…it worries me that, 
gosh, you’ve got to be careful about who our daughters then decide to get involved with.   
 
KH: You mean in case they meet a male... 
 
   Caroline:  Who may be related to them.  But then again, there are so many children out there who don’t 
know who their fathers are anyway, that... the chances of it happening I suppose are very 
slim, but it is a little bit of a worry. 
Caroline had been in contact with the other family who had children of a similar age 
to her own.  She had told Toni, her eldest daughter, who was 8 years old, about the 
existence of these genetic half-siblings.  She said: 
 
Caroline:  I mentioned it to Toni the other day that there was this other family down here who had used 
the same biological father, so I said, “in theory they’re like your half-brothers and sisters” 
and she... her eyes lit up and she said,“oh I’ve got half-brothers and sisters!” And I said, well 
yes, but very loosely.  You would never call them a half-brother or a half-sister, they would 
just be acquaintances, but biologically...it’s a little hard for her to understand. 
Caroline raised the issue of the difficulty of knowing how to frame the relationships 
that might exist between her two daughters, and the triplets who were conceived by 
DI using sperm from the same donor.  The two families had not yet met, though they 
now lived in the same city, and the question remained as to whether or when they 
might initiate such a meeting. 
Sylvia was aware of a number of recipient families in the North Island who had taken 
the initiative to form relationships with other families with children conceived with 
sperm from the same donor.  She said: 
 
Sylvia: …some couples, now more open about their involvement with DI, on seeing that they 
recognised similar characteristics about their children, chose to share their non-identifying 
information about their donors and indeed establish links.  For example, one donor has almost 
without exception produced children with the most stunning strawberry blond hair.  Two other 
families have daughters of very similar build, and these children discovered each other at the 
same ballet school.  The resulting liaisons have been of mutual interest and satisfaction to 
those concerned.  
The Donor Family Register was therefore conceived as a tool to help families with 
children conceived by DI to make connections with other families with children who 
were genetically related to them through the donor. The future of this register remains 
uncertain but its existence nonetheless raises important questions about the social 
meaning of genetic connections: the possible value of knowing which children are 
genetically related to one another as a means of avoiding consanguinous relationships, 
and the possibilility of establishing kin-like relations. 
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Linking anonymous donors and recipients 
The processes by which donors are linked with particular recipients are generally 
framed as ‘choices’.  For example, donors choose the categories of recipient to whom 
they are willing to give their semen, thereby controlling access to their semen.  At the 
same time, recipients choose from a selection of donors, a choice that is nonetheless 
controlled by a number of intervening factors.  Certainly recipients have not always 
had the opportunity to choose from a selection of donors and, in many cases, health 
professionals have played the primary role in ‘matching’ donors and recipients, 
thereby controlling the links between particular donors and recipients. According to 
Price (1997:221), ‘matching’ a sperm donor to a recipient was an important part of the 
culture of concealment in DI. Matching donors and recipient fathers on the basis of 
physical characteristics was done to enable the child to ‘pass’ as the genetic offspring 
of its social father (Price, 1997:222).  According to Dr A, this practice has changed. 
 
Dr A: I mean, initially you wouldn’t actually even let people choose the donor, you see.  You’d say, 
“This one matches you.” (he laughs). 
 
KH: And were they then able to choose because there were more donors, or because of the Human 
Rights Act, or what? 
 
Dr A: Oh, it just seemed the right thing to do, you know.  Because, I mean it’s difficult enough for 
us to decide what’s the right thing for them, and they might as well make the decision.  
They’re going to be just as right as we are (a brief laugh).  I mean it does mean though that 
they do get to go through the whole profiles of a number of donors.  There’s a potential risk to 
the donors’ anonymity by that.  Well, you know, you can...the information is...if you knew 
someone you might be able to pick them up from that. 
Dr A implied that recipients now have a measure of control over their choice of 
donor.  But, of course, the choices they have access to have been controlled 
previously by those who recruit the donors and the donors’ choice to give to particular 
types of recipient.   According to Dr A, allowing recipients to choose from a number 
of donor profiles presented a ‘risk’ to donor anonymity because it might be possible to 
identify a donor from reading his profile.  This reveals the extent to which 
maintaining donor anonymity is a central organising principle, particularly between 
donors and recipients, even in the context of a DI programme that asks donors to be 
identifiable to potential DI offspring in the future. 
A number of recipient couples included in this study said that were not offered a 
choice of donor. When asked if they chose their donor, Jane and Steve said: 
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Steve: No. ...the comparisons were done between the pair of us. They matched up between Jane 
and...  
                                                                              
Jane: They told us, more so you than me. And I was trying to work out, well, how did they work 
that one out?  I did find that quite questionable afterwards.  "Oh, we've got the perfect one" 
and I thought, well how did you do that?  
 
Other recipients who were not given a choice of donor suggested that they were just 
given sperm from straws of frozen semen that were available at the time.  Joe and 
Ella, who had four children conceived by DI, claimed they did not have a choice of 
donor for their first two children.  Joe said: 
 
Joe:  I think, for the first one, Dr A just got a straw didn't he? I mean it wasn't sort of  “here's a profile 
of your donor,” it was “here's a straw, let's go.”  Basically, that's what it boiled down to. They 
didn't have that many options. And we didn't particularly care either, to be honest. 
 
This scenario highlights the constraints of choice imposed by a lack of donors in the 
DI programme and the doctor’s decision to inseminate the recipient with whatever 
sperm was available at the time.  
Like Joe, Tim, the father of a daughter conceived by DI, said he was not interested in 
choosing a donor, but his wife, Sarah, would have liked to have had that opportunity.  
They said: 
 
Sarah: [At the clinic] they were just going to match hair and eye colour, so we didn't get donor profiles 
or anything like that.  We had three goes.  The first two were unsuccessful.  On the third go they 
said would we like to choose our own donor. I probably wouldn't have minded looking at the 
profiles, but Tim, at the time, said “just let them choose.”  
 
Tim: Oh, I don't know.  It's just too much of a hassle, I mean, eye colour and height and similar 
colouring is probably about it isn't it (he laughs) if you wanted to get a close match? You don't 
need to know whether they were a doctor, what their profession is, or anything else like that 
really.  
 
Sarah: We were on the waiting list for 20 months, so, ah, it was a pretty long time, because back then 
they didn't have donors as readily as they have now, and I think on that last go they didn't even 
have any brown haired, brown eyed, but they said, “Would hazel eyes be OK?” and we just said, 
“Give us something that works” (she laughs). 
 
Paul and Fiona, another recipient couple were also unconcerned about not being able 
to choose their donor.  They said: 
 
Paul:  …it was never really an issue for me anyway.  I was just of the view that every person is an 
individual and to try and have some influence on it [choosing a donor] was sort of like tempting 
fate or something like that.  I just sort of thought, well, they'd talked about matching eyes and 
matching hair colour and matching those sort of things and, as far as I was concerned, that was 
fine.  The other thing was, even within families you've got such chalk and cheese differences 
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with the same parents, you know, that it always came back to, you could find someone who 
was...  
Fiona: That you wouldn't think they were in the same family. 
Tim’s, Paul’s and Joe’s lack of interest in choosing a donor raised the question of 
whether the men were less interested in the donor than the women.  New Zealand 
research into the attitudes and feelings of recipient couples with children conceived by 
DI showed that men were more likely than women to have negative feelings about the 
donor, know nothing about him and wish to know nothing about him (Gillett, Daniels 
and Herbison, 1996:140).  This seeming lack of interest may, however, partly reflect 
clinical practices at the time: ‘choice’ was not framed as an ‘issue’ because it was not 
offered.  It is possible, too, that having made the ‘big’ decision to conceive a child 
using donor sperm, some men consider the issue of who the donor is to be of minor 
significance.  In contrast, for women, the use of a donor in itself might not be as 
important as who the person is, particularly as it is they who, in a sense, will be 
‘carrying the donor’s child’. The question also arises as to whether infertile males are 
uncomfortable about the donor’s role in the procreation of ‘their’ child. When I 
commented that perhaps knowledge of the donor served as a painful reminder for men 
of their infertility, Dr A had this to say: 
 
Dr A:  Oh, it is painful for some. Not all of them, some of them are reasonably involved, but even the 
most aware do have an avoidance factor.  There are occasionally those who seem to be very 
interested, but I think it's more the woman that's interested.  I'm not sure why that is. 
 
Illustrating the contention that women were generally more interested in the donor 
than men, Kathy, a divorced mother of daughter conceived by DI, was uncomfortable 
with the lack of choice, and lack of information she received about their anonymous 
donor.  She said: 
 
Kathy:  No-one gave us a choice, not at all.  We weren't profiled at all well when I look at it.  Back in 
those days there was talk that they did try to profile them as closely as they could to the 
parents and, in all honesty, they encouraged us to lie to the child and said “we want you to 
sign the birth certificate and basically no-one needs to know.”  That's what we were told on the 
programme.  No-one needs to know.  And I wasn't comfortable with that….so no, we weren’t 
given any choices of donors….We were told he was a 6 foot, fair-haired, hazel brown-eyed 
doctor….I have since contacted them again and asked for further information which they were 
not forthcoming with at all. 
 
Kathy was concerned that her child’s looks and colouring were very different from 
hers or her husband’s. Although uncomfortable with the secrecy surrounding DI, 
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Kathy had taken her husband’s advice not to ask DI programme staff about their 
practices because she wanted to conceive a child. 
In contrast to Kathy’s experience, most recipients who had conceived through donor 
programmes more recently were able to choose their donor from a folder of profiles.  
A nurse working in a donor programme described the process of donor selection: 
 
Nurse A:  We have four profile books: one for married couples, one for de facto couples, one for 
lesbian couples and one for single women.  This is because some donors will donate perhaps 
only to married couples, some will donate to everybody, so we have to respect their wishes.  
So, after they've had an initial interview, they've done their blood tests, and they're ready to 
start treatment, they make an appointment and they come and look at the donor profiles 
which are pertinent to them, and are given time to peruse that and they make a selection of 
two or three choices.  So that, perhaps, if their first choice has his fourth pregnancy and he's 
unavailable, then we'll transfer to the second choice, and that's recorded in their file.  So, 
they are in control of making the choice. 
 
Nurse A highlighted the way in which the clinic constructs ‘choice’ for both donors 
and recipients. Donors are asked to select recipients on the basis of marital status and 
sexual orientation, and recipients choose a donor on the basis of a representation of 
him in the form of a text of ‘non-identifying information’.  Thus, recipient choice is 
constrained by donors ‘targeting’ categories of recipient, and by whether or not the 
chosen donor was still available.  
Some couples raised the issue of the difficulty of choosing the prospective genetic 
father of their potential child from a profile containing non-identifying information.  
Alice and Peter commented that it was like choosing someone “from a catalogue”.  
They said: 
 
Alice:  And we were told to pick three or four weren't we, because the ones we'd chosen might not be 
available.  So we were able to choose within that time, weren't we?  But I think that the first one 
or two choices we actually couldn't get because [the donor was not longer available]… 
 
Peter:  It was all a little bit unreal though, because the information was kind of, it was detailed, but it 
wasn't detailed enough.  And so, it would have actually been really helpful to have a photograph 
(he laughs). I mean, the name isn't important, but a photograph would be useful in order to make 
the selection, because we're sort of pretty visual animals really.  But I mean, it was reasonable 
that we didn't have a photo, I suppose, so we did it anyway.   
 
Alice:  A police identikit drawing could do (she laughs).  
 
Like Alice and Peter, Petra and Jennifer, a lesbian couple, claimed it was difficult to 
conceptualise the donor as a particular person from the non-identifying information 
available.  Petra said: 
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Petra: Because when we read the information, we said, “it sounds like so-and-so”, who’s a friend, 
who’s actually Olivia’s godfather.  And then we said, “oh, but it also sounds like so-and-so”, 
who’s a bastard, you know.  And so, you just get enough to join the dots and you could make 
several things out of joining the dots, so we tried not to. 
 
In a similar vein, Caroline described the process of choosing a donor as “the most 
hilarious situation”.  She and her husband Mike were grateful that the nurse in the DI 
programme actively guided them in their choice of donor.  They said: 
 
Caroline: From what I understand, now the nurses are not going to know the donors.  They're going to 
be kept quite separate so they can't make preconceived judgements on who might be a better 
donor for a person.  Whether or not that's a good thing or a bad thing, I don't know, but in 
our particular case I was quite pleased with [the nurse’s] judgement.  
 
Mike:  Well, I mean, we had to make judgements out of a piece of A4 paper with words someone 
else had chosen to write, and you know what you can do with words.  So we were rather 
thankful that someone had the ability to make a judgement based on more information than 
we had available to us.  So I think it would be a big mistake to take that middle person out of 
the link. 
 
Although Caroline and Mike valued the help of the nurse as an advisor in the process 
of choosing a donor, as previously discussed, recipients at this clinic are now required 
to make the choice on their own which has the effect of removing the responsibility 
from the clinical staff.  A nurse working in a DI programme said that the process of 
choosing a donor was often at the end of a long day of consultations with clinic staff, 
which potentially created a pressured situation in which to choose.  She said: 
 
Nurse B:  When [recipients] come in, I always say to them, if you want to have another look at your 
donor profile before we do this, or if you want to have another think about it, don't hesitate.  
More often than not, when they've made their decision they're happy with that.  I think they 
just feel, well, come on let's get on with it.  They've been on a waiting list for a good while.  
Why should they sort of hesitate now? Strike while the iron's hot.  They know that it's not 
the exact replica of their partner. So, they just sort of do their best. 
 
Many recipients who had the opportunity to choose a donor, opted for a donor with 
similar physical characteristics to their own; in particular, many couples sought to 
match the donor’s and the potential child’s father’s characteristics, so the father could 
‘pass’ as the child’s genetic parent.  Sean and Pippa, the parents of a daughter 
conceived by DI, had this to say about choosing a donor: 
 
Sean: I guess the key thing would be somebody who looks close enough to me that it's not going to be 
startlingly obvious, and the second thing is somebody with similarities to me.  The donor father 
is a headmaster…he's got vaguely similar interests to mine, so...  
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Pippa: We wanted somebody more like Sean, so Elspeth might have a similar...I don't know...have 
some similarities, maybe. 
 
Choosing a donor who was similar to Sean lessened the likelihood of their child 
looking dissimilar enough to perhaps invite questions from others.  Illustrating this 
possibility, Carla, a separated mother of a daughter conceived by DI, said:   
 
Carla:  …[when] I got pregnant with Justine, there were only three donors [at the clinic], so there wasn't 
a heck of a lot of choice.  And Justine's got beautiful big brown eyes, and both Ben and I are 
blue-eyed.  We didn't even have a choice about that….We tried to match things physically, like 
the eye colour and that, because a few people have actually commented on that, people that 
know about those sorts of things.  So that's been interesting.  And with me raising Justine on my 
own, people have said to me, “Oh, the Dad must have brown eyes.” And because we're not with 
Dad, they can't look.  So it's easier for me to say, yes, I think he had brown eyes. 
 
For some couples, the donor’s height was potentially more of an ‘issue’ than eye 
colour.  Alice, the mother of Erica, said:  
 
Alice: One striking thing that has happened, actually, is that Erica has always been quite big.  She’s 
been 70th percentile and I mean I’m small, average, and I was always third smallest in the class, 
and there’s some tall people in Peter’s family, but the donor was 6’4”.  So it’s very likely that 
she’s going to be much larger than me, and people have been commenting all the way through 
about her height, and sort of often asking where it comes from.  
 
While Alice and Peter had chosen a tall donor, a nurse working in the DI programme 
said that they generally lacked tall donors. 
 
Nurse B:  Another thing that we would like in our donors, I might as well put a plug in here, is that we 
would like them to be taller than about 5'8".  We have a lot of short people who come 
through as donors and some people look at them.  You know, for some people that's an 
important point.  Look at this, and they've got a 6'4" husband, and here they've chosen a 
donor who's got similar colourings and things, but he's sort of 5'6" or something.  And 
sometimes they will express that worry and I do my best to sort of go through meiosis and 
mitosis, and say, well these genes all get mixed up anyway.  You could well have someone 
in your family who's quite short.  Maybe it's the short gene that's picked up, you know, you 
can explain it in another way, rather than having to say, well, you know, this is a totally 
different child, if that's what you want to do. 
 
Nurse B’s “plug” for taller donors and her advice to recipients about managing 
‘difference’ within their families highlighted the assumption that many parents want 
to conceal that their child had been conceived using DI. 
Some couples said they each focused on different attributes in a donor.  When asked 
what attributes they were looking for, Henry and Prue, the parents of two sons 
conceived by DI, replied: 
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Henry:  Centre-fold of Cleo wasn't it, Prue, for you? (he laughs)  
 
Prue:  Oh, no.  I was looking more for hair colouring, you know, just went for physical 
characteristics.  
 
Henry: We tended to look for people with sandy hair or fair hair, but I was looking more at the 
interests of the individual.  I wanted to see that they were doing stuff that I wanted the kids to 
do.  So I was looking for the bloke who was doing stuff that I liked.   
 
KH: What sorts of things?  
 
Prue: I can't remember. 
 
Henry: There was one donor that we talked about and turned down, and he was a fisherman, and he 
seemed like a good bloke, and I said, “Here's a good fellow.” And she said, “No, he's too old.”                                    
 
In contrast to couples where the men appeared to know little about the donor, Henry 
recalled more about the process of choosing a donor, and about the characteristics of 
their sons’ donors, than did Prue.  
Whereas most heterosexual couples wanted donors with similar looks and/or interests 
to their own, and particularly to the male partner’s, for Petra and Jennifer, a lesbian 
couple, matching their physical characteristics with the donor’s was the least of their 
concerns.  They were relieved to find only two donors to choose between and said: 
 
Petra: We looked on that as a huge positive because the other thing that went through our minds with 
the donor insemination stuff, was we really didn't want to be Nazi about it.  Like, in the UK 
you get height and eye colour, and I just think those are dreadful criteria for choosing a father 
on.  So, we were really relieved that people had self-selected, and so if altruism and being 
open-minded are hereditary traits, then we already had those.  You know, we wouldn't want a 
bigot to father our child, and we certainly wouldn't want Olivia to have to go and trace 
someone who would be going to say “Ick!” to her [expressing distaste], so they'd self-selected 
out, so I mean... 
 
Jennifer: I think that it was really positive for me that Olivia’s father positively selected a lesbian couple 
as being okay to have.  
 
Petra: Yeah, it's a huge relief that if she goes and finds him later, he's going to be cool, hopefully. 
 
Like Petra and Jennifer, several heterosexual couples stressed the importance of the 
donor’s altruistic motivation to help an infertile couple, like themselves, have a 
‘priceless’ child.38   Richard and Belinda, parents of a daughter conceived by DI, 
Madison, said: 
                                                          
38 Zelizer (1985) argues that the 20th century has witnessed a profound cultural transformation in 
children’s economic and sentimental value.  In the earlier part of the century, children, who were once 
valued for their useful wage-earning capacities, became economically useless but emotionally 
priceless.  Zelizer argues that, despite the financial costs of raising children in contemporary families, 
voluntary childbearing is an indicator of children’s persistent emotional value to parents (1985:222). 
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Belinda: One thing that was really important to us was why he actually became a donor.  And, this 
particular one that we have got now, his reason was his wife had infertility problems and they 
only actually conceived one child. And I thought, as a couple, that's a pretty nice thing to do, 
just go off and help others.  
                                                                              
Richard: He was loving enough really to say, “Well hey, I'm able to help somebody out,” and that's 
what Belinda said before, the reason for some of these donors donating is actually very 
genuine, and not just a matter of saying, “Hey, I'm getting paid a hundred bucks for this,” 
because they don't get paid for it at all. 
 
Some couples said that they chose a donor based on “global” rather than specific 
criteria. Alice and Peter said: 
 
Alice: But we ended up choosing on sort of global things, didn't we, like personality, intelligence.  
 
Peter: Achievements, academic achievements…                                        
 
Alice: And interests.  
 
Peter: Interests, sports and...we thought that the donor we ended up with actually was a little bit 
arrogant. He sounded a bit arrogant.  But it's a little hard to tell, you know. Sometimes things 
come across, when they're written down, that certainly aren't intended that way.  So, although 
that's always been a little bit of an inside joke for us, it wasn't a big deal.   
For several couples, the donor’s family medical history was an important 
consideration in the donor selection process.  Mike and Caroline were interested to 
choose a donor with a good medical record.  They recalled the donor they chose: 
 
Mike:  He had a good family health background.  I understand that they all have but this one was 
not burdened with asthma or any of those things.  
 
Caroline: Yeah.  He didn't have that, and that was something we looked at - their health, whether they 
had asthma and things like that. 
                                                                              
Mike:   I'm not sure if people with those hereditary things can become donors.  I honestly do not 
know.  But I wanted to be sure that the limited information that we had indicated that his 
parents had lived to a ripe old age, that he didn't have any of these things that we would not 
want to introduce to a family. 
 
Other parents had not received a great deal of information about the donor and would 
have liked to have known more about his family medical history.  Sandra and Allan, 
had this to say: 
 
Sandra: I think sometimes I'd like to know a bit more of their medical history, but then I guess we just 
trust the clinic that they went very thoroughly through that.  
 
Allan:  A donor is not someone whose parents had died early, or...  
 
Sandra: Or had heart conditions, or diabetes, and those things.  
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Allan: So a lot of those hereditary things are screened out.  So, you know, he might have been a 
better sire than I would have been.  The only thing I did think of was, when I was establishing 
the pine plantation, I used to spray herbicides and I did wonder...you know you do read about 
all these Agent Orange, and all those sort of things.  And I did wonder whether, in fact, that 
would have affected [his sperm quality].  
                                                                         
Most couples did not receive a copy of their donor’s profile until after their baby was 
born.  Dr A said of this practice: 
 
Dr A:  We know which donor belongs to which pregnancy.  We don't let couples take a copy of the 
information until they've got a baby.  I mean, we let them look through it, but we try not to let 
them go away and write it all up. I can understand people wanting to remind themselves of what 
they've chosen, because it is a stressful thing to do.  The difficulty about it is that they're looking 
at a number of donors and it may not be that donor that they end up using to get pregnant. 
Illustrating that this could happen, one couple claimed: 
 
Andrew: The only information we have about the first donor, we don't think is the right one.  We don't 
have information on the right one. 
                                                                              
KH: How do you know it was the wrong one?  
 
Annie: Because I think there were four, and I'm not even sure how we got that, but I just know I'm 
pretty sure that that's not the right one.  I had to ring [the nurse] and she was going to look into 
it, and hasn't actually got back to me.  It was 18 months ago.  I'm pretty sure that that's not the 
right one [she points to the donor profile].  I think, for the second child, we've got the right 
one. 
Clearly, confusion can arise when couples who use a number of donors while 
attempting to conceive receive copies of donor profiles before a successful outcome is 
reached, and the profile of the donor who contributed to the conception is not clearly 
identified. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the discursive and relational strategies employed by three 
DI programmes in New Zealand39 that set up relationships between sperm donors and 
recipients and between recipient families who have used the same donor.  The chapter 
shows that in a process that is already medicalised, clinics also have power in 
mediating relationships between the various actors in the DI network.  While these 
relationships are organised around the principle of anonymity, this is rendered more 
complicated by the policy adopted by New Zealand clinics to recruit only donors who 
are prepared to be identifiable to DI offspring in the future.  
                                                          
39 This includes Fertility Associates in Wellington, the clinic that piloted the Donor Family Register. 
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Analysis of interview material has illustrated the ways in which health professionals 
in fertility clinics act as gatekeepers and boundary controllers.  It has identified the 
difficulties inherent in recruiting donors, and the stringent donor screening process 
that eliminates not only donors who are medically ‘unfit’ but also those who do not 
conform to an acceptable social profile determined by clinics at the local level. While 
DI programmes construct semen donation as an altruistic ‘gift’, unlike donated blood, 
it is strategically targeted to specific recipients through a selection process established 
by the clinics.  This selection process illustrated the extent to which DI programmes 
seek to reproduce the traditional nuclear family, rather than ‘alternative’ family types, 
such as those headed by lesbians or single women.  This, in turn, highlights the power 
of the medical profession to determine who has access to donor gametes, and what 
constitutes an acceptable family form. 
Central to the analysis of the establishment of relationships in the DI network are 
issues of trust, choice, control and rights.  Trust is shown to be as central to the 
medical encounter: medical professionals rely on donors telling the truth about their 
medical history, and recipients trust medical professionals to adequately screen and 
link them with an appropriate donor. Discursive strategies used by clinics to justify 
and shape their practices are the liberal discourses of ‘rights’ and ‘choice’.  Rights are 
sometimes complementary. For example, donors are considered to have the right to 
choose who can receive their ‘gift’, donors’ partners have the right to be part of this 
‘targeting’ process, and recipients have the right to choose a donor. Rights can also be 
seen to compete.  Individuals conceived by DI have the right to have access to 
knowledge about their genetic origins should they choose to at some future date.  
However, donors have the right to remain anonymous if they did not consent to being 
identified at the time of donating. The fact that these choices or ‘rights’ are not written 
into law illustrates the tenuousness of such ‘rights’ claims, and the potential for 
conflict between various claims that could be made in the future.  
Choices and rights, are shown to be constrained by those who have the power to 
define them. Many couples participating in this research were not offered a choice of 
donor and accepted whoever was chosen for them. While recipients are now given the 
opportunity to choose from a number of donor profiles, their ‘choice’ is nonetheless 
constrained by factors such as donor availability, and having to choose a donor from a 
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profile of unidentifying information because of the overriding organising principle of 
anonymity.   As discursive strategies, choice and rights are also shown to be central to 
the implementation of forms of protection by clinics which do not want to be 
subjected to criticism or legal claims in the future.  
With anonymity as the primary organising principle, the ‘right’ to access information 
about the parties to a DI conception is currently constrained and controlled by the 
health professionals at the local level.  If, however, legislation is passed that requires 
the establishment of a central register of donor conceptions, this information, and 
access to it, will come under the control of a centralised administrative system. This 
raises important questions about who ‘owns’ the information about the parties to a DI 
conception and who should have access to it. Given that clinics play a pivotal role in 
setting up the relationships between donors and recipient families, do clinics have a 
possible future role as mediators between the families at a time when more people 
conceived by DI might wish to contact the donors? Should this information be readily 
available to recipient families so they are made aware of other children in the 
community who are genetically related to their own children?  If so, how should this 
information be disseminated, and is there a role for clinics in terms of mediating 
initial contact between these families? These and other questions raised in this chapter 
are crucial to the development and implementation of policy and practice in DI. 
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Chapter Six 
The Politics of Access 
To DI Treatment 
 
Before the Human Rights Act came in in 1993, we weren't able to treat single women or 
lesbian couples, and it was our policy that we treated heterosexual couples in a stable 
relationship.  And that was the policy.  However, the law has changed, and we are not allowed 
to discriminate now. Nurse A, a nurse working in a DI Programme. 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the procedures instituted by two DI programmes in the South 
Island of New Zealand to manage access to donor sperm by prospective recipients.  It 
illustrates that organisational strategies in clinics that are discriminatory in their 
effects can still be consistent with legislative openness in New Zealand in relation to 
marital status and sexuality.  Through a cultural examination of the clinical context, 
the chapter reveals the ambiguities, complexities and contradictions that emerge as a 
result of the medicalisation of conception and pregnancy, processes that are generally 
constructed as means of ‘forming’ or ‘creating’ a family. In connection with issues of 
access, the chapter explores the barriers encountered by prospective recipients of 
donor sperm such as constraints on the availability of DI services and donor sperm, 
clinical policies and practices, and the financial costs involved. Also related to the 
issue of accessing donor sperm are the policies and procedures adopted by clinics to 
screen out those who are considered ‘unsuitable’ for parenthood. The chapter thus 
considers the ways in which fertility clinics are contexts for the construction of selves.  
 
Infertility diagnosis and referral 
Couples with male factor infertility were usually diagnosed by a general practitioner 
who subsequently referred the men to a urologist for further tests, or referred them 
directly to a fertility clinic.  Neil said in relation to this process: 
 
Neil:  And the sperm result initially showed a very low level of sperm, and what...it might have been 
through Family Planning because, well, first, basically the first physical examination by the 
urologist - they should choose an easier name to say.  He identified a lump, which he was 
concerned about, and in a very short space of time, like...well, “we’d like you to go in in two or 
three days time, and have an op to remove that testicle.”  He was concerned about cancer.  So 
our focus switched from infertility to my health.  And so that testicle was removed and another 
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sperm analysis and the count had dropped to zero at that stage. The tumour was benign and 
nothing has subsequently showed up during scans. … The next step after that operation was for 
me feeling somewhat devastated and isolated in terms of my genetic past and future, because at 
that stage I had no knowledge of my birth parents. 
 
Neil had trusted the urologist’s ability to make a professionally responsible decision 
in his particular case. The urologist’s detection of a tumour and the possible 
implications for Neil’s health took priority over concerns about his subfertile status. 
Having had the testicle and tumour surgically removed, however, his fertility status 
declined in the sense that he then became azoospermic. Six months later, Neil and his 
wife Patricia, returned to Family Planning where a female doctor referred them to a 
fertility clinic. 
 
Like Neil, Mike was referred by a general practitioner to a urologist before being 
referred to a fertility clinic.  His positive experience of accessing DI treatment 
constrasted with his prior experience with the urologist.  Mike said: 
 
Mike: I had also been referred off to a urologist.  He gave me an inspection and was quite...not 
flippant, but nonchalant in saying, “it feels fine to me but you know we could perhaps hang 
around with a scalpel and see what we could find”, and I thought, “thanks a lot”, but obviously 
to him it was not worth the effort.  And that had a very negative effect on me.  Plus, he was the 
professional and he said that the prospects of being able to do something, if there was something 
like a minor blockage, was quite, quite minute.  He said, “you've got a very, very low chance of 
success”.  And to me that was negative.  I don't know to this day what the reason for the 
infertility was.  So I don't know.  I'm left with that question.  I thought for some time how would 
I react to having children that weren't genetically my own, but I think I got through that very 
quickly, and the fact that we had a very proactive GP, very good initial treatment from the 
fertility clinic, and you know, it was a brilliant atmosphere.  There was a little board behind [the 
nurse] with photos of children.  You could see straight away that you wanted to be in a position 
where we had children and that this was the only clear way that we were going to get there...at 
least for 50 percent of them. 
 
 
Mike’s situation illustrates the difficulty for specialists of delivering ‘bad news’ in a 
positive way, but also highlights the need for sensitivity on their part when relaying it. 
In contrast with his encounter with the urologist, meeting with fertility clinic staff was 
empowering in that it made him feel optimistic that, like others who had had babies 
through the DI programme, he could attain the identity of ‘father’. Mike adopted a 
position as “consumerist” patient and “reflective” actor, actively calculating and 
assessing expert knowledge with the aim of maximising the value of health care 
services (Lupton, 1997a:374). 
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Like Mike, other recipients spoke of negative and unhelpful first encounters with 
medical specialists before they accessed DI services.   Joanna, the mother of two DI 
children, had initially delayed DI treatment after visiting a gynaecologist.  She said: 
 
Joanna:  First we went to [a gynaecologist] and he scared the living daylights out of me, so we didn't do 
it then.  I'd heard lots of things about him, mad butcher, and whatever.  That would have been 
9-10 years ago, it was just the way he sort of approached me, and I think I was only young 
then.  I was only about 23 then, and it sort of, yeah, it scared me then.  But then when I was 25 
we thought about looking into [DI]. 
 
 
Tania, the mother of a son conceived by DI, was critical of a doctor she encountered 
when she and her husband Mark were having their fertility investigated.  She said: 
 
Tania:   We went to [a fertility clinic specialist] to start off.  He was just awful. Then when we got 
Mark's results he said, “Oh, you cannot have a family, you'll have to have donor 
insemination", and shoved us out.  No tact.  So anyhow, we got put onto this lovely lady that 
does the inseminations.  And it was up to us what we decided to do.  Mark wasn't too keen for 
a start.  So we looked at adoption and fostering and then decided we would do it. 
 
By telling them that DI was the only option, Tania felt that the doctor positioned her 
and her husband as passive patients, rather than reflexive agents and consumers of 
services who could make up their own minds about how they would become parents 
(Lupton, 1997a).  Joanna’s, Tania’s and Mike’s criticisms of medical professionals 
were similar to those found by Lupton (1997a) in her study of lay people’s attitudes 
towards the medical profession.  Lupton found that participants tended to be highly 
aware of how a doctor interacted with them. They were inclined to judge doctors 
harshly if they felt that they had responded to them “in an ‘uncaring’ or abrupt 
manner, appearing insensitive to their feelings or not wanting to take the time to 
listen” (Lupton, 1997a:376). 
 
Accessing ‘treatment’ 
Traditionally, DI programmes were established by medical professionals to provide a 
way of ‘treating’ heterosexual couples with male infertility. While medical discourse 
generally constructs DI as a ‘treatment’ for male infertility, Novaes (1992:10), has 
argued that reproductive technologies, such as DI, cannot be defined strictly as 
therapeutic in the sense that they ‘cure’ a physical ailment or disease. She argues that 
the concept of infertility is a very particular social construct in which medical and 
social criteria are closely interrelated (Novaes, 1992).  Rather than describing a person 
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with a medically-proven problem of infertility, it describes a couple who is unable to 
conceive because one or both are infertile.  In the medical ‘treatment’ of infertility, 
the ‘patient’ is always the woman because she is the child-bearer.  Donor 
insemination highlights a paradox in the concept of infertility because it is carried out 
on a woman who is necessarily fertile and who could have become pregnant, if she 
had chosen to do so, by having sexual relations with another man.  In this sense, this 
form of infertility (at least for the woman) is social rather than biological which 
disrupts the medical/social infertility binary when referring to couples with male 
factor infertility as distinct from lesbian couples and single women who are generally 
constructed as socially rather than medically infertile. According to Novaes 
(1992:11), rather than a way of restoring ill persons to health, the medical act of 
insemination is better conceptualised as an intervention to “alleviate more general 
conditions of personal distress”. 
 
At the same time, medical assistance to conceive provides the technical expertise to 
achieve conception and also sperm from a medically-controlled gamete donor for this 
purpose (Novaes, 1992:10).   In a sense, in the context of DI, medical professionals 
act as brokers of sperm to those who cannot provide their own, or who prefer to 
conceive with the sperm of an anonymous donor screened by a medically-sanctioned 
donor programme.  Rather than ‘treating’ the cause of infertility, however, 
‘treatments’ such as DI merely offer a way of circumventing infertility, providing the 
opportunity for infertile couples to conceive a child. Thus, DI operates as a form of 
medicalisation of family creation. In relation to this, Novaes (1992:1) has argued that 
assisted reproductive technology is more than just a technical exploit attributable to 
‘progress’ in biology and medicine:  “it radically alters the usual framework of 
corporeal practices and social relationships which organise and give meaning to 
reproduction” (1992: 1).  Whereas conception is usually defined as the result of a 
sexual act by autonomous persons, reproductive technology transfers the act to the 
medical institution where relationships are generally defined in therapeutic terms and 
precedence is given to the quality, security and efficiency of the technical act 
(Novaes, 1992:1).  Thus, achieving the conception of a child in the clinical context 
involves negotiations between social actors taking up a variety of subject positions 
and discourses of professionalism, mothering, gender, and family.  
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For couples with male infertility, DI may be the only way they can become parents. 
But to achieve this, prospective recipients of donor sperm generally have to surmount 
a number of barriers to accessing treatment.  Crucial to the ability to access DI is the 
geographical accessibility of DI programmes and the availability of donor sperm. 
Several couples interviewed for this research had sought DI treatment in the mid-
1980s, at a time when only one DI programme operated in the South Island of New 
Zealand. The director of the only South Island DI programme operating at that time 
said of the establishment of the programme: 
 
Dr C:  I think it began about 1980, ‘79 -‘80 when donors were recruited in a more formal way, and 
patients had access to donors as well, but it really got well established in about 1983-84 when I 
[came back here], and also it coincided with the [other city] unit closing down with [the doctor 
providing DI services] leaving.  So for about a two or three year period, we were basically the 
only South Island centre, so we did have a lot of work at that time….until about 1986, I think, 
‘87, when the clinic was still basically a private clinic run by the [University].  It was not part of 
the hospital, or the infertility service as such. It was purely on a private basis. 
 
 
Some couples who eventually conceived through one of the South Island DI 
programmes were initially referred to the other for treatment.  Meredith said: 
 
Meredith: My gynaecologist wrote a letter [of referral].  Well, we're talking about...it must have been 
12 years ago [1986].  And we had several trips there, and every time we went to go, 
something would go wrong.  There'd be snow on the road or something, and we couldn't get 
through.  And then you'd have to make another appointment, which we'd have to wait 
months for again.  And, it was really...it was quite awkward.  And I had several tries down 
there.  I used to have tests here and then rush down.  
                                                                               
KH:   Tests to see if you were ovulating?  
 
Meredith: Mm.  To see if it was the right time.  Rush [there], and usually stay overnight I think.  I only 
did that twice, and then they opened up here. But it took quite a long time from when [her 
gynaecologist] first wrote, to getting onto the programme.  I think we had six months wait, 
and as I said, a couple of times we tried to get [there] and something would happen. And 
then they started here.  And because I was actually on the [other clinic’s] list and had started, 
I was first on the list [here].  So I didn't really have to wait here which was lucky.  So, I 
carried on here.  
 
 
Meredith’s experience emphasises the significance of time and timing in treatment 
cycles. Visits to the clinic had to fit in with the clinic’s schedule, her and her 
husband’s work schedules, and the time scale marked by her menstrual cycle which 
became subjected to on-going monitoring and surveillance (Cussins, 1998a:91).   
Later, they were able to access DI services locally which was less complicated.  Like 
Meredith and Karl, Joe and Ella were initially referred to the other South Island clinic.  
They said: 
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Joe: There was a little bit of blackmail involved, you know.  They were doing a study, which 
involved, well you had to agree to the rules of the study or you didn't go on the programme. 
 
KH: What sort of study was it?  
 
Ella: Well, we had to go without intercourse for a month...was it a month or six months? Well, we 
were under enough stress as it was.  And the travel, just the travel down there, and I probably 
would have had to have gone by myself...and just to go down there for nothing just for their 
study, I felt was a bit unfair.  
 
Joe: Yes, you didn't just go for the insemination times, you had to go there for other times as 
well…No, we discounted it.  Once we rang up and found out where we were here, we were 
going to finish up with her (he laughs) flat on her back quicker than if we had gone into the 
study in [the other city].  So we could actually fall into the programme here and achieve what 
we wanted to achieve quicker than in [the other city], so we just declined the opportunity there.  
 
Joe and Ella’s experience illustrates a tension between the interests of the clinic, 
which was seeking research data, and the prospective recipients, whose aim was to 
have a baby and thereby ‘start a family’.  It also illustrates Wasserman and 
Wachbroit’s contention that assisted reproductive technologies have complex and 
often contradictory effects: they increase opportunities and prospects for women, 
while reinforcing their treatment as objects (1992:445).   
 
Like Joe and Ella, Fiona and Paul found that they were able to achieve a pregnancy 
much more easily once they were able to access a DI programme locally.  They had 
tried unsuccessfully to conceive through one South Island DI programme, but were 
successful after they were referred by their specialist to the local DI programme.  
They said: 
 
Paul:  It seemed to move on so quickly because it seemed to drag prior to that didn't it?  It just 
seemed to go on and on and on, through our dealings with [the gynaecologist]. It just sort of 
got to the stage when we just thought nothing was happening…it was just month after month. 
It seemed, from a well-being point of view I think, particularly for Fiona, it just started to 
deteriorate really...the whole situation...and then once this started, it was almost, “gosh what's 
happening here?” 
 
Fiona: It was just so easy just to pop into [the local clinic] rather than think, oh I'll get on the next 
plane [to the other city] or, you know, and just being monitored a lot closer [here was much 
easier]. 
                                                                               
Paul and Fiona revealed the significant ontological changes that couples experience 
when going through an infertility programme for a cycle or repeated cycles of 
treatment (Cussins, 1998b:170). At one time, a consumer of fertility services can be a 
person juggling their work schedule to be at the clinic.  At another time, they can be a 
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generic patient in the waiting room, or sometimes ovaries and follicles on an 
ultrasound screen and so on.  The clinical setting and the techniques used to achieve 
conception allow these ontological variations to be realised and to multiply.  
 
Whereas couples like Paul and Fiona had had to travel to other cities to access DI 
services, others were referred to other clinics which had a better supply of donated 
sperm.  Pippa and Sean said:   
 
Sean: They referred us up to Auckland because there was donor sperm available there, and it didn't 
look like there would be in Wellington for some reason. 
 
Pippa: So we went up to Auckland, didn't like the doctor up there, felt uncomfortable with him. I 
didn't like him at all.  And it seemed quite difficult to tie it in with work and everything else.  
We were still thinking about it and it was kind of in the back of our minds.  But then 
Wellington rang up and said there's a donor available.  So that was a big relief really. 
 
Sean and Pippa’s situation illustrates the constraints placed on accessing treatment by 
the number of donors available in relation to the number seeking to access donor 
sperm.  In relation to the numbers of people going through their DI programme, a 
nurse in a South Island clinic said: 
 
Nurse A:  We average about 20 couples a month, who we treat.  Since the programme began we have 
treated over 400 people... we’re up to about 413, I think, at this present time.1  It varies from 
month to month depending on whether the people are away or what they’re doing or whether 
they want a break from the programme, but it’s averaging about 20 a month, and again that’s 
depending on the donors available too.  At the moment the numbers are slightly down 
because we have a smaller number of donors available and we can’t... we only allow four 
families per donor.  So we can’t let ten women use the same donor per month in case they all 
get pregnant for example, so we have to limit them at the moment. 
 
This clinic had a policy of limiting the number of families a donor could contribute to 
four.2  As a result, they limited the number of women who could be inseminated with 
sperm from the same donor.  For many couples, waiting to access treatment was a 
long, protracted process, even after they were accepted onto the DI programme.  Ella, 
the mother of three children conceived by DI, said: 
 
                                                          
1 A newspaper article designed to recruit sperm donors stated that in the 12 years that this programme 
had been operating, 262 babies had been born through the use of donor insemination – 141 boys and 
121 girls (Price, 1999). 
2 A reason for this was not given in the interview, and does not appear in the clinic’s information sheet. 
But, Richard, a recipient who went through this programme said that they had been told that this 
limitation was instituted to mitigate against the likelihood of genetic half-siblings of the opposite sex 
meeting and forming relationships. 
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Ella:  There's all this waiting...waiting to see a specialist, waiting to see this, and I had to go for a scan 
of my tubes, was it, before you could get on to the DI [programme].  And then you have to do 
an AIDS test.  With the last baby...before we conceived him we both had to go for AIDS tests 
for some reason (she laughs briefly). And apparently you have to do counselling now, and stuff. 
 
 
Ella’s experience emphasised the objectification of the body in the medicalisation of 
reproduction.  According to Lupton, “the body and its various parts are understood as 
constructed through discourses and practices, through the ‘clinical gaze’ exerted by 
medical practitioners”.  Thus, according to Armstrong, “a body analysed for organs 
and tissues is constituted by organs and tissues; a body analysed for psychosocial 
functioning is a psychosocial object” (cited in Lupton, 1997:99). Cussins (1998b) 
argues, however, that rather than being passive recipients of technological 
intervention, women actively accept the role of being the object of the medical gaze, 
participating in different kinds of objectification, with the knowledge that this may 
bring about desired changes in their identity. Thus, according to Cussins, 
objectification and agency can be co-constitutive in contrast to being oppositional 
(1998b:167).  
 
While it could be argued that passing through these “ontological commitments” may 
embody new options for the long-term self (Cussins, 1998b:169, 170), couples 
accessing treatment through a DI programme had little control over the processes they 
had to pass through to achieve unguaranteed conception and the birth of a child.   In 
some cases, the results of medical tests led to further delays in accessing DI treatment.   
Richard and Belinda said: 
 
Belinda: The next hiccup was (she laughs) I don't have the…I think it's called…the Rh antibody, or 
some particular antibody.  I don't have it, so it was important for the donor to have it.  So two 
of the three [selected donors] got chopped, so we…                                                                           
 
Richard: And the next one wasn't due to be cleared for a bit.  
 
Belinda: Yeah.  For about four months.  So here we were, all set to go, and "Oopsy, sorry, can't come 
on the programme quite yet". Wait.  So, I was waiting for this chappie to be cleared because 
he has to be frozen [the sperm] and cleared after six months to check for AIDS.  As soon as he 
was cleared, I knew I was ovulating, and I rang them, telling the girls, "Hurry up with that 
chappie" (she laughs). And the poor chap was on holiday (she laughs) and they made him 
come in.  
 
This situation illustrates the way in which the clinic acts as a genetic ‘watchdog’: 
because Belinda was tested for and found not to have the Rh antibody, she had to be 
‘matched’ with a donor who possessed the antibody.  While this is done to ensure that 
 186
children born as a result of DI are as healthy as possible, it nonetheless raises the 
spectre of medical control of reproduction and eugenics.  
 
In another case, access to DI treatment was delayed by the recommendations of a 
social worker who, according to this recipient, was assessing the psychosocial 
functioning of prospective candidates for DI.3  Meredith said about their encounter 
with the social worker: 
 
Meredith:  He gave us both a questionnaire and my answers didn't correspond with Karl's or something. 
Well we're...I think when you get married later in life you're more of an individual than if 
you get married young and you grow up together. We both have our own definite views, but 
it doesn't mean to say that you don't get on well.   But he said that the marriage wasn't going 
to last, and he thought it wasn't a good environment to put a child in, on one meeting, which 
I thought was a bit strange.  But he obviously had a job to do.  He was sent to do it.  He had 
these questionnaires to fill in and that was it. 
 
Meredith and Karl resisted the social worker’s evaluation of them, argued their case 
with health professionals in the DI programme, and were eventually accepted for DI 
treatment.  This situation reveals a number of tensions between the social actors 
involved in the DI programme.  While it demonstrates the power of the consumer to 
resist clinically-sanctioned screening processes, it also reveals a tension between the 
medical and psychosocial perspectives.  It also shows that the medic is the ultimate 
‘gatekeeper’ who has the power to over-ride the social worker’s recommendations, 
and the power of medical professionals to ultimately decide who has access to fertility 
treatment (Novaes, 1992). Daniels (2000a) has pointed out that whereas clinicians 
tend to focus on patients and clinical outcomes, psychologists, social workers and 
counsellors are primarily concerned with the psychological and social issues 
connected with forming a family by DI, including the issue of the welfare of the 
potential child.  It could be argued that in some ways this form of surveillance is more 
insidious than the medical watchdog.  Medics know, for instance, that if the Rh factor 
is not present there will be problems with the pregnancy, the birth, or the child.  
                                                          
3 I have had the opportunity to speak to the researcher who was carrying out research on the 
psychosocial aspects of infertility and fertility treatment.  He claimed that this research was not 
connected with any screening process in relation to accessing a DI programme. Nonetheless, some 
social workers and psychologists concerned with the psychosocial aspects of assisted reproduction 
have advocated the screening of couples before donor insemination to ensure that they meet “minimal 
criteria regarding their marital relationship, health and social adjustment” (Humphrey, Humphrey and 
Ainsworth, 1991:273).  This position has been criticised recently by Walker and Broderick (1999a:41-
42) who question the morality of this form of gatekeeping.  The controversial issue of ‘screening’ 
recipients is discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
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Social workers and psychologists, on the other hand, are on much less secure ground 
and their judgements much more at risk of prejudice or professional fashion. 
 
Not all couples had a long wait to conceive by DI. Caroline and Mike felt that they 
were ‘fast-tracked’ through the DI programme. Caroline said: 
 
Caroline: We got in very quickly, and I don't know how we managed to do that. But, we went and had 
the interview with [the nurse].  And we had said we knew we were leaving to go up to the 
North Island and that if we were able to, would it be possible to have treatment here since 
we'd started it here, and she managed to fast-track things for us, I think, quite quickly.  
   
 
Unlike Caroline and Mike, a couple who requested semen from a Maori donor 
experienced delays in accessing DI treatment.  This illustrates the difficulty of 
negotiating a particular ethnic identity in the context of DI programmes that primarily 
cater for, and who have access to, donors who are part of the white anglo-saxon ethnic 
majority. According to the health professionals interviewed for this research, South 
Island clinics tend to primarily cater for the New Zealand European population and do 
not regularly have donors from other ethnic backgrounds. One of the clinics, however, 
had had requests for Asian and Maori donor sperm, but was unable to supply it and, in 
one case, acquired sperm from an Asian donor in Australia  (Price, 1999).  When 
asked if they had donors from a variety of ethnic backgrounds, the person in charge of 
donor recruitment at a fertility clinic said: 
 
Lab Technician B:  We have very few [Maori donors] because we don’t have many Maori down here.  
We have very few Maori…we’ve had the odd one.  We have just recently had a Chinese 
[potential donor]...but because New Zealand has such a small Chinese community we don’t 
really need [Chinese donors].  What we tend to do is bring [donor sperm for other ethnic 
groups] in from outside.  And that’s what we’ve done in the past, and that’s what...I actually 
discussed it [with another staff member] and that was my feeling, but just confirming it, that 
really, the demand is not there for a start off and we tend to access sperm in these cases from 
somewhere else. 
 
Helen and Patrick wanted to conceive with sperm from a Maori donor.  Helen said: 
 
Helen:   It probably took six months to get [onto the DI programme].  
 
KH: Because they had to find a donor for you?  
 
Helen: Yeah, and that was from Auckland, and that took a long time.  They were very limited in what 
they could offer.  They had to do a swap of donor semen to get it.  [The Auckland clinic] got 
some from down here.  So there were two [donors] that we could choose from.  And we 
picked the most appropriate. 
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Anecdotal evidence suggests that it is difficult to access sperm from Maori donors. 
MCART recommended that the range of donors recruited by clinics, especially those 
from minority ethnic groups, needed to be widened (1994:54). The extent to which 
Maori and other minority ethnic groups seek DI services in New Zealand is not 
known.  According to an analysis of the submissions to MCART, many Maori favour 
the concept of ‘whangai’, a traditional form of adoption, or sharing of kin, as a means 
of addressing infertility in Maori (Dyall, 1999:36). Helen and Patrick had considered 
adopting a child from within Patrick’s family but this was not possible at the time. 
 
As well as initially encountering delays to accessing treatment, some recipients who 
wanted more than one child, and had had semen from the same donor allocated for 
this purpose, found that they did not have the option to decide when to conceive 
again. Belinda and Richard said: 
 
Belinda: We said we'd just like one more, a playmate for Madison.  But, I wasn't aware after Madison 
was born… I didn't understand that it's not until Madison is one year old that you're actually 
allowed to go back and try again….  
 
Richard: They’ve got no control over that normally. 
 
Belinda: They said, you've been through enough infertility struggle before you actually get this child, 
so now they are actually…they had to place some rules and regulations because it backfired 
on them before. …What happened was a lady wanted another child, but she didn't [get her 
husband’s consent]. She just went in and got another child, and consequently it broke the 
marriage up. So, they had to put some guidelines in and they feel that one year, you're 
giving…You actually have to go back through all the tests and sign all the consent forms 
again before we actually can try again…which is good. They've got to have…some input 
together. So we'll wait till Madison's a year old and then try for the playmate for her, because 
we feel two is better than one. 
 
 
While Belinda accepted the rationale for the clinic’s protocols, she nonetheless 
resented the loss of control in relation to deciding when she conceived a second child. 
The stipulation that one has to wait a year before accessing ‘treatment’ to have 
another baby does not appear to be applied in all DI programmes.  Recipients 
accessing treatment in some North Island clinics said that this ‘rule’ had not been 
applied to them.  This illustrates the way that regulatory decisions are made by 
clinical personnel at the local level in response to local events. Richard and Belinda’s 
sister-in-law, Christine commented: 
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Christine:  When Madison was about three months old, they got told that they can't go back into the 
donor system again until Madison is a year old, which struck me as being really cruel, 
because they had their options limited by Richard's problem anyway. So they couldn't 
choose when they wanted to have a child anyway.  Now, they've got this child and they're 
part of this DI system, but they can't then choose again when they want to have one.  They're 
still regulated with all this stuff, and it just…it actually really hacked me off, because I 
thought well, finally they've got this baby, and surely they should therefore then be able to 
just go on and decide like a normal couple when they want their baby, though of course 
they're using a third party to help with that baby. … And they’re like almost back to square 
one again having to wait…and then Belinda said they’ve got to go through tests and all sorts 
of stuff again… 
 
Like Richard, Christine drew on a discourse of what ‘normal’ couples are able to do 
with regard to reproductive choices, arguing that they too should have this freedom of 
choice, even if a third party was involved in the conception process. 
 
Some couples were not sure whether they wanted more than one child through the 
programme but, after conceiving a child with one donor, most couples had the 
opportunity to store sperm from the same donor for a possible future conception. 
Sperm from a specific donor is set aside for each individual couple who request it.  
Neil and Patricia, the parents of two DI daughters, took some time to decide whether 
or not to have a second child.  They said: 
 
Neil: I'm not sure when we first started to think about number two, but it was a long process of 
thinking and discussing with each other off and on, as to whether we wanted to have another 
child.  Certainly the appearance of the storage bill from [the fertility clinic] for the sperm 
storage… Basically they were putting aside a certain amount of sperm from that donor should 
we wish to have further [children]. We paid for that storage, so every year when the bill 
arrived...will we keep it for another year or what?  
 
Patricia: [We paid] $120 a year.  I think Tracey wasn't quite a year when we decided we didn't know 
whether we'd have any more, but perhaps we should set it aside anyway.  We could always say 
well no we're not going to...and it hadn't deteriorated or anything.  
 
The annual bill for sperm storage was a reminder to Neil and Patricia that they had yet 
to decide whether or not they would use it to conceive a second child.4
 
Not all couples were given the opportunity to choose to use the same donor for their 
second child.  Joanna, the separated mother of two children conceived by DI, Todd 
and Jessie, said: 
                                                          
4 Information provided by a fertility clinic on semen storage indicates that semen can be stored for up 
to 10 years providing the annual storage fee of $125 per couple is paid. Within this time limit, the 
couple can specify how long the sperm is stored in their name. However, according to RTAC 
guidelines (see Appendix D), donors are permitted to withdraw or vary the terms of their consent at any 
time, unless the gametes have not been used. 
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Joanna: We couldn't get Todd’s father anymore.  He wasn't on the programme anymore, which was a 
bit of a disappointment.  It was very hard.  When we were having Todd, not being horrible 
here, but they [the donors] were all like, doctors, accountants and everything, you know 
professional people, so you sort of had not much choice.  But now, you've got more choice, 
like you've got a lot of shearers, farm hands.  There's not many professional people, and we 
were trying to match up Todd’s donor to our next child, so you know, they had the colouring, 
but also the same education, sort of, and we found that quite hard to match them both up. 
 
 
Joanna indicated that although the choice of donor had expanded, their own choice 
was constrained by wanting to select another donor similar to their first donor.5  
 
Having accessed DI treatment, some couples spent many years ‘on the DI 
programme’.  Joe and Ella, who wanted several children,6 said: 
 
Joe:   I mean we were going... you know, we went there for six years?  
 
Ella: Four children.  I had them a year apart, so...  
 
Joe: Really from ’87 till ’94. 
 
Ella: You weren't allowed to go back onto the programme until the baby was a year old.  So we just 
kept going back.  
 
Whereas Joe and Ella had four children during the six years they were on the DI 
programme, Meredith and Karl spent eight years (two years on one DI programme 
and six years on the other) but had only one child as a result of recurrent miscarriage. 
Meredith said: 
 
Meredith:  I went for six years here.  I kept going and going and going.  I went for quite a long time.  I 
had four miscarriages from here.  And I kept going back again. I’d have a few months rest 
afterwards.  But, that’s why I was saying I can’t speak more highly of the girls here, because 
if they hadn’t been so nice and so good, I think I would have given up.  But each time I had a 
miscarriage, [the nurse] would come and see me, or she’d ring up, or she’d be one of the first 
people there, saying, well, when you’re ready, we’ll have you back again. 
 
 
Meredith finally gave birth to a son and was grateful for the support and 
encouragement she received from the DI programme staff who provided the impetus 
to keep trying until she achieved her goal of motherhood.  This situation illustrates 
                                                          
5 It is interesting to note that Joanna refers to the donor as her son’s ‘father’.  See Chapter Ten for a 
discussion of the ways in which donors are conceptualised and the language used when referring to 
them. 
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how the collusion between medical professionals and ‘patients’ serves to reproduce 
medical dominance (Lupton, 1997b:98).  It also illustrates that medicalisation has 
unanticipated consequences: solutions to human problems (e.g. the use of DI to ‘treat’ 
male infertility) can often create new problems (e.g. Meredith’s experience of 
recurrent miscarriage) (Broom and Woodward, 1996:360).   
The financial cost of treatment 
For fertility clinics, DI is merely one of several treatment options offered on a cost per 
cycle basis.  Fertility clinics operate as profit-making businesses and provide price 
lists for treatment services offered by the particular clinic, including semen storage.7  
In 1998, the cost of a DI cycle was $450 in one South Island programme and $500 in 
the other.  Although public funding has been available to a limited extent for IVF 
treatment, traditionally DI has not been publicly funded.8  Dr A said: 
 
Dr A:  Traditionally there's never been any funding [for donor insemination].  I mean, when we set it 
up in [this city], there was quite a bit of political stirring about it from the then Hospital Board.  
Certain members of the administration didn't think it was a very proper thing to be doing, and 
there was a bit of...I've got a fair few letters that relate to that.  I think some of them thought that 
to produce a semen specimen by masturbation wasn't very proper.  So, I mean, those things have 
changed since then, that it wasn't quite the right thing to do.  But, you know, the demand's still 
there.  But it's not the best option for a lot of people, but it's a financial option. 
By suggesting that DI was the “financial”, if not the “best” option, Dr A implied that 
they had other options (that also offer the ‘better’ option for men of becoming 
biological fathers) for those who could afford to pay for them.  Dr A’s comments thus 
invoke the norm of the “ability to pay” which underlies access to most fertility 
treatments (Cussins, 1998a:73).  Cussins’ (1998a) research in the American context 
showed that physicians in fertility clinics preferred to work with an “elite clientele” 
who could afford to pay for treatments, while nonphysician members of the team 
showed more concern about the exclusivity of fertility treatment.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
6 This DI programme does not place a limit on the number of children recipient couples may conceive 
through the programme.  However, health professionals stated that few couples have had more than 
two children through this programme. 
7 Price lists for ART procedures provided by the two South Island fertility clinics are located in 
Appendix C. 
8 Space does not allow for a detailed discussion of the complex and controversial issues related to 
access to public funding for fertility treatment in New Zealand.  Recently, however, the Minister of 
Health announced that the Health Funding Authority had approved an extra $3.7 million for fertility 
services, bringing total funding to $5.8 million.  This funding would include the purchase of, not only 
IVF, but also donor insemination and intrauterine insemination services (The Dominion, 2000; Letter 
to R Scott, Executive Officer, NZIS, from H Williams, Health Funding Authority, 3 August, 2000). 
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The cost of treatment was certainly an issue for a number of people interviewed for 
this research, particularly those on low incomes, or who had extended periods of 
treatment before conceiving a child. The counsellor working in one DI programme 
thought that financial considerations played a major role in decision-making about 
treatment options.  She said: 
 
Counsellor B:  I think the financial part of it plays a huge part in the decision-making.  And apart from 
the financial considerations, there is the time off work...so people are weighing all those things 
up, and the other major factor is that some people find IVF and ICSI quite an invasive treatment 
to go through physically, and they don't really want to go through that.  Another important 
factor is how important each of them considers the biological link to be - for some people this is 
not so important, for example, those who already have a child from a previous relationship, and 
this can make DI a more appealing option than ICSI.  But sometimes the factors that are 
influencing the decision are quite different for each member of the couple.  So, it might be, for 
example, for men the financial aspect is really important, and for the woman the physical 
aspects might be important, which doesn't cause too much problem if it means they're both 
deciding in the same direction, but if it means they're each favouring something quite 
different...[conflict can result]. 
 
 
Male recipients in my research tended to make more direct references to the financial 
cost of treatment than did women.  Some appeared to resent having to pay to have 
children, a process that ‘normally’ is free.  Joe and Ella said: 
 
Joe: The only thing is, it still costs the people individually money, when it should be free.  It's not 
something you wish on anybody, and on top of it you have to outlay some cash because it's...It 
should be free I think from the government.  Because it's low priority and people are willing to 
pay, there's no big...I mean, you get annoyed with it, but you pay because it's the only option if 
you want the children.  So you just pay.  You know, if you stood and fight you'd never have 
your children, so you don't waste your time fighting.  You get pragmatic about it. 
                                                                              
Ella: User pays.  
 
Joe: Yeah, but it shouldn't have to be.  That's what you pay your tax for, part of health services. 
 
 
Joe’s comments reflect a belief that fertility services should be available for those 
who need it, rather than on the basis of the ability to pay (Cussins, 1998a:73).  This 
belief is at the core of infertility societies’ political lobbying, both in New Zealand 
and abroad, for medical insurance coverage of infertility procedures and for the 
reclassification of these procedures from “elective” to “non-elective” (Cussins, 
1998a:73).9 In this way, so-called involuntary childlessness becomes classified as a 
medical problem in need of therapeutic intervention, rather than voluntary or 
                                                          
9 The New Zealand Infertility Society has lobbied for fertility services to become funded as part of non-
elective services.  However, a recent increase in funding of fertility services of $3.7 million, which 
brings funding to a total of $5.8 million, was determined by the Health Funding Authority on the basis 
that it was part of “core elective services” (Williams, 2000). 
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cosmetic.  A problem with this, however, is that the conflation of infertility and 
childlessness restricts the frame of reference within which infertility is discussed 
(Franklin, 1990:221). According to Franklin (1990:221), “[t]he problem is defined 
entirely within the parameters of the traditional nuclear family, with the result that the 
only knowledge available about the experience of infertility is that which reconciles it 
with the expectation of social conformity”.  
 
Like Joe, Andrew commented on the unfairness of having to pay to ‘have a family’, 
when most people do not have to.  He and his wife Annie said: 
 
Andrew: And it got more expensive.  It cost us a few grand to do it.  So we were committed to kids all 
right, financially.  Other people just need to go to bed or look at the old fella, and they're 
pregnant….  Life’s not fair. 
  
Annie: We have one friend who gets pregnant really easily and accidentally, and they have all sorts of 
dramas about that, and we're thinking...[we should be so lucky] (she laughs). 
 
For Andrew and Annie, the financial costs grew, especially in relation to having their 
second child, who was conceived on the 18th cycle.  They raised the stereotypical 
argument that those who do not want (or who ‘should not’ have) children often do and 
those who really want children and would make ‘good’ parents, often cannot have 
them.  A doctor Cussins interviewed suggested that those who could not afford 
fertility treatments were generally those who already had “too many” children.  This, 
according to Cussins, invoked the stereotypical view that the population is divided 
between those who have too many children (for whom there is contraception, if they 
would only use it) and those who do not have enough (for whom there are assisted 
reproductive technologies, which they have to pay for) (1998a:73).  
 
For some couples, the cost of DI was added to the cost of failed vasectomy reversals.  
Jane and Steve, who had previously hoped to conceive children without assistance, 
said: 
 
Jane:  We decided to go ahead with [DI] because, you know, that was the only chance we had because, 
um, it cost us...the whole reversal cost us all this money and you know, we didn’t get it back. 
 
Steve: It’s a sore point, you know, it cost us $3,000. 
 
Jane: Yeah.  What actually happened is, Steve had a reversal and they said there was a 50 % chance it 
would actually work, and it did.  But the only trouble is, he’s that good at healing, it healed itself 
all over again.  
 194
 
Steve: It shut down shop. The sperm count was up fairly high, up into the millions, and I was told by...I 
was under the specialist as well before that operation...and the results from that said that 
everything was all right at that time.   Subsequently... 
 
Jane: …it healed all over completely [the vasectomy reversal].  It just actually decided to go and block 
itself off completely after the reversal, so then we had to...sort of had to look at... 
 
Steve: Alternatives.   
 
Jane and Steve’s comments evoke an image of the ‘fertile’ body (i.e. having enough 
sperm) rendered infertile by a medical procedure (vasectomy) and attempts to 
reinstate fertility (through vasectomy reversal) thwarted by ‘natural’ healing 
processes. The couple constructed Steve’s body as an active agent: his ‘fertile’ body 
became problematic and unruly, having “decided” to heal over the wound created by 
the vasectomy reversal, thereby ‘sabotaging’ the exit of sperm.   
 
Some recipients said that cost was the major factor in determining the number of DI 
cycles they would have.   Neil said: 
 
Neil:   My impression was that the second time around it was more pricey than the first time. I don't 
know...it might have been five or six hundred.  It wasn't minimal. [Our limit was] six the first 
time around, but the second time around was a lower number.  Yes, we weren't going to...we had 
a child and for me there wasn't so much hanging on [to have another].  You know, if it was 
going to be it was going to be, and I didn't want to invest a great deal of energy emotionally into 
that, and so that when Patricia conceived again, as far as monitoring the birth, no, well, we didn't 
want to invest a great deal of sort of focus on that. 
 
 
Neil’s comments raise the question of the relative significance of emotional as 
opposed to financial costs involved in DI treatment.  Sarah said her husband Tim 
attributed his desire not to try for more DI children to the financial costs involved, but 
she was skeptical that this was the ‘real’ reason.  She said:   
 
Sarah:   Tim kind of said it was a monetary thing, but it wasn't really.  What he was trying to say is I 
just don't think he can go through that bullshit again.  With people saying, "Oh, you got 
pregnant" you know, and it's just another thing of...I mean, I have to read between the lines 
when he's talking about money, because we made a decision really early on that we'd never 
talk about money and children in the same sentence, because it was very offensive to me.  And 
then when he started talking about it, it was, like, he wasn't really talking about money, 
because we are in a far better position now that we were back then…. What he was saying was 
I don't think I can go through it all again, Sarah.  I'd really love you to have another baby, but 
going through the whole process again is a reminder, and we've got our children, you know, 
and then as it was, so, I had to make the decision.  So when the renewal came up, I just sent it 
back to say no thank you. 
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Like Sarah, Mary, the mother of two children conceived by DI, did not want to relate 
the cost of paying for DI services to how much her children were ‘worth’.  She said: 
 
Mary: Once there was something on TV and they were talking about the costs of donor 
insemination and all the rest of it.  And [her son] piped up...I don’t know how old he 
was...and he says, “How much did it cost when you had me?” And I said, “I can’t 
remember.”  There’s just no way (she laughs) I was gonna put a cost on him.  There was no 
way I was going to say anything to him, so I said, “Oh I can’t remember.”  I thought, well 
that’s just terrible for him to say that, but they were just saying that it’s about $3,000 a turn 
or something, and it was just on a TV programme we were watching. 
 
Brendan: [When we did it] it was cheap.  I think we paid about $40 didn’t we? 
 
Mary:  (she laughs) Yeah.  I was going to say two thousand. 
 
Mary had conceived her son at a time when services were cheap relative to current 
costs,10 and particularly in relation to other treatments such as IVF. She possibly 
thought that $40 might have sounded a little too cheap:  $2,000 sounded a more 
‘respectable’ price in terms of a child’s ‘worth’. 
 
For those on low incomes, the financial cost of treatment took on a particular 
significance.  Like Neil and Patricia, Helen and Patrick decided to limit the number of 
cycles they had the second time around.  Helen said: 
 
Helen:   We had a rough calculation of what it cost us to have Thomas, and with loss of wages 
combined it was $10,000.  But we were both working and it wasn't a problem.  We were 
paying $350 a month plus accommodation, plus six days lost wages.  So it was a big outgoing. 
[For the second child] I had to save up and I saved up $700, and I said to Patrick, we can only 
have two goes.  That's it.  And I said, we could stretch to three, but I said, after three we can't 
afford it.  We can't financially ruin ourselves.  And we can't take away from Thomas just for a 
want [wanting another child].  And I got pregnant [with Connor] on the first go.  I remember 
writing the cheque out. 
 
 
Helen raised the issue of other costs involved for many people undergoing DI 
treatment, including travel, accommodation and lost wages.  
 
While Helen and Patrick lost wages for a few days, others lost significant income by 
leaving paid work to concentrate on becoming pregnant.  Meredith, who suffered 
several miscarriages while on the DI programme, said: 
 
                                                          
10 This indicates that the cost of one DI cycle had increased over twelve fold in as many years.  This 
illustrates the extent to which reproductive medicine has become a business enterprise in its own right, 
rather than a ‘side-line’ to the main business of obstetrics and gynaecology. 
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Meredith:   I used to go along and have [injections to prevent miscarriage].  But then I still miscarried, 
and that was worse, because the miscarriage took weeks to happen because I'd had these 
injections to try and hold onto it.  But you see, so the fourth time I got pregnant I didn't 
know what was going to happen.  But I went back onto these drugs, these injections again.  
So I thought I'd try them again, and oh, by this time I wasn't working either.  I'd given up 
work so I could just [concentrate on having a baby]. I think I had about two or three years 
when I didn't work.  
 
Meredith’s situation highlights the experience that the costs involved in DI treatment 
are financial, physical and emotional, particularly when treatment extends over a 
period of some years.  It also raises the spectre of the problematic, but otherwise 
‘healthy’ body, disciplined by (expensive) hormone injections in the bid to make it 
conform to the “normal” pregnancy trajectory (Cussins, 1998a:75). 
 
Access to DI by lesbian couples and single women 
Donor insemination programmes in New Zealand were originally established to 
enable heterosexual couples with male factor infertility to conceive.  Other groups, 
however, such as single women and lesbian couples have requested access to DI, but 
in the past were often denied access on the basis of their marital status or sexual 
orientation (Daniels & Burn, 1997). As outlined in Chapter One, the passing of the 
Human Rights Act, in 1993, meant that single women and lesbians could no longer 
legally be denied access to DI services.11  But access by these so-called “minority 
groups” remains controversial in New Zealand (Daniels & Burn, 1997).  This 
controversy illustrates Wasserman and Wachbroit’s contention that reproductive 
technologies have complex and contradictory effects: while increasing opportunites 
for the creation of traditional families, they also enhance prospects for alternative 
family forms (1992:445).   
 
To attempt to gauge public opinion on whether or not “minority groups” should have 
access to assisted reproductive technologies Daniels and Burn, in conjunction with 
Heylen Research Ltd., carried out an opinion poll (1997).  From the results, they 
concluded that “a majority of New Zealanders feel that lesbian couples, single women 
and couples where women were past the age of menopause should NOT have access 
                                                          
11 According to Daniels & Burn (1997:80), the Human Rights Commission Act, 1977, made unlawful 
discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, ethnic or national origins, sex, religion, and marital 
status.  In 1993, the Human Rights Act extended these grounds to include disability, sexual orientation 
and family status.  Discrimination on the basis of age was introduced in earlier legislation (Daniels & 
Burn, 1997:80). 
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to AHR services” (1997:83).  As they point out, however, these opinions were in 
conflict with those of the Human Rights Act 1993, the 1994 Ministerial Committee 
Report on ART, and the Interim National Ethics Committee on Assisted Reproductive 
Technology (Daniels and Burn, 1997:83). 
 
According to Daniels and Burn (1997:80), the most common fertility treatment sought 
by lesbian and single women is DI. In line with reported public opinion on this issue, 
a number of fertility clinics have shown a reluctance to provide fertility services for 
persons who do not fit the criteria of couples with male factor infertility (MCART, 
1994:54). The committee notes in its report that many fertility clinics “hesitate” to 
provide services for lesbian women, but argues that, as the law stands, providers must 
not discriminate on the grounds of sexual orientation (MCART, 1994:55).  The report 
also stipulates that research evidence does not suggest that children raised by lesbian 
couples are at any greater risk than those brought up by heterosexual couples 
(MCART, 1994:55).12   
 
MCART appeared more wary of single women gaining access to AHR services 
claiming the existence of evidence that “single parent homes are financially far less 
secure than two parent homes” (MCART, 1994:56).  In its opinion, children born to 
solo mothers are potentially more “at risk” than those brought up by two parents. The 
committee therefore argues that if a clinic was not satisfied that a single woman could 
provide “proper care” for the child, they would not be in breach of the Act if they 
denied services to that woman (MCART, 1994:56).  While the Act clearly states that 
it is not possible to deny access to a class of persons, it is possible to deny access to a 
particular couple or persons on the grounds that they do not meet particular standards 
of suitability for parenthood.  
 
In relation to many other countries, New Zealand legal/regulatory practices are quite 
liberal in terms of allowing access to DI services by single and lesbian women.  
According to Blank (1998:143), most countries that have some sort of regulatory 
practices around DI do limit access to married couples or heterosexual couples in a 
stable relationship.  This is the case in Sweden.  In France they limit access to stable 
                                                          
12 For further research evidence see, for example, Golombok and Tasker (1994), Brewaeys (1997:100), 
New Zealand Law Commission (2000:133). 
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couples where the male is sterile or has a genetic disorder only.  In Italy, only married 
couples are accepted for DI.  Although single women are not precluded from access to 
DI in Denmark, co-habiting couples are given priority.  In Australia, legislation in 
Victoria limits access to married couples only,13 while South Australia restricts access 
to married couples, or de facto couples if their relationship has lasted at least five 
years (Blank, 1998:144).  According to Blank (1998:140-141) only Spain, the United 
Kingdom, and New Zealand appear to allow access to DI by ‘single’ persons, though 
it may also occur to a limited extent in Canada and the United States. 
   
According to Golombok and Tasker (1994), lesbian women had been denied access to 
DI in the United Kingdom on the basis that they would not provide an “appropriate 
home environment” for the child.  This is because the child would have two mothers, 
would be genetically unrelated to one of the mothers, and the donor would be 
unknown to both.  In relation to single women seeking DI, concerns had been 
expressed that it was potentially harmful for a child to be born to a single woman who 
was not intimately involved with a man (Golombok and Tasker, 1994:1972).  Several 
health professionals interviewed for this research expressed concerns about 
knowingly assisting in the creation of what some have labelled “fatherless families”.14  
Many appeared to be guardians of established understandings about what constitutes a 
‘family’, drawing on discourses about the superiority of the traditional nuclear family.  
At the same time, they had to work in a context where state regulation was shaped by 
new liberal discourses about non-discrimination.  A nurse working in one DI 
programme said that she was concerned that the focus of DI treatment had shifted 
from treating ‘medically’ infertile couples to ‘socially’ infertile single women and 
lesbian couples.15  She said: 
                                                          
13 A recent decision (28 July 2000) by Justice Sundberg in the Federal Court of the State of Victoria, 
Australia, however, stated that the marriage/de facto marriage requirement of the Infertility Treatment 
Act 1995 was inconsistent with section 22 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 and inoperative by 
reason of s 109 of the Australian Constitution.  This means that having a husband can no longer be a 
requirement of those sections of the Act.  This decision therefore allows for access to fertility treatment 
by women without male partners (ITA, 2000:1). 
14 As discussed in Chapter Two, and illustrating the controversy surrounding providing DI services to 
lesbian and single women, the clinic that facilitated my access to most of the recipient couples 
participating in this research denied access to lesbian couples who had conceived through their DI 
programme.  Moreover, they informed me that no single women had conceived through their 
programme.  The lesbian couple I subsequently interviewed for this research, who conceived through 
this DI programme, was accessed through personal contacts.   
15 ‘Medical’ infertility refers to a physiological impairment that prevents conception; ‘social’ infertility 
suggests an inability to conceive because of a woman’s lifestyle choice that precludes sexual 
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Nurse A:  Before the Human Rights Act came in in '93, um, we weren't able to treat single women or 
lesbian couples, and it was our policy that we treated heterosexual couples in a stable 
relationship.  And that was the policy.  However, the law has changed, and we are not 
allowed to discriminate now.  So, we have a number of single women and lesbian couples 
wanting treatment…. Our donors are exempt from discrimination because they are making a 
donation, so they have the right to say where their semen goes.  Now, because of this, we 
have at the moment one donor available who will agree to have his semen used with single 
women and lesbian couples, so it's a simple supply and demand problem.  We usually say to 
them if you wish to bring in your own donor, and that would help alleviate the problem, and 
they have to go through the same screening process as our donors, through sexual health, 
counselling, and that would alleviate the problems. But what society is generally saying to 
us, is that a lot of donors aren't comfortable with their semen going to single women and 
lesbian couples.  So, that, in itself, is a problem. 
 
Nurse A appeared to project her own concerns about helping lesbians and single 
women conceive onto “society” as a whole and onto donors who, she said, were 
generally not comfortable donating their semen to these women.  This view reflects 
the findings of the Heylen poll on the attitudes of New Zealanders to access to AHR 
services by minority groups (Daniels and Burn, 1997).  However, the question arises 
as to whether the type of donors recruited also tended to reflect the general culture of 
the clinic which, to a great extent, is shaped by the values and attitudes of the clinical 
director and those who work for him or her. Moreover, if these ‘categories’ of 
recipient were not presented to donors, how many would volunteer “no single or 
lesbian women”? When asked if he had qualms about ‘treating’ lesbian or single 
women, Dr A said: 
 
Dr A:  Ah, oh I suppose, emotionally, I probably do, on a personal level.  But you know, I can also find 
plenty of justification that that's not quite…you know, if you look at these people, they often 
have a wide network of support and things like that, and we do try to work out what sort of 
support networks they have. I certainly feel very uncomfortable…we don't allow people to 
become pregnant and then go on to the Domestic Purposes Benefit.  Now, that may or may not 
be justifiable within the law, but certainly the donors that we have are not keen on that concept.  
And I can understand their concern.  We don't actually have any donors who allow that to 
happen.  But the difficulty is you have to take everybody on face value.  You have to believe 
what they tell you, and I mean, my whole life revolves around trust.  And occasionally you find 
that what people are telling you is not quite what the reality is.  But you can't send out the police 
to check people out and things like that. 
 
Like Nurse A, Dr A indicated that it was the donors who controlled who had access to 
DI services.  They had the ‘right’ to decide who could have access to their sperm;16 
                                                                                                                                                                      
intercourse with a male partner.  As discussed earlier in this chapter, however, while women with an 
infertile male partner are considered medically infertile, because of their partner’s infertility, strictly 
speaking women who undergo DI treatment are ‘socially’ infertile because their reproductive capacity 
is necessarily unimpaired, and they can conceive with a different, fertile partner. 
16 This is in line with the Ethical Guidelines on Assisted Reproductive Technology published by the 
Australian National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) which stipulates that “the gamete 
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and since most preferred to assist in the creation of conventional, rather than 
unconventional forms of family, their wishes prevailed. Dr A’s discomfort about 
assisting conception in those other than heterosexual couples with male factor 
infertility, might also relate to the lack of legal recognition of families led by lesbian 
couples. Issues relating to the status of same-sex relationships and families led by 
same-sex couples are currently being debated and addressed by New Zealand 
Parliament.  The Law Commission, which has produced discussion documents on this 
matter, has requested public submissions on the issues.17  A recent report by the New 
Zealand Law Commission, published in response to submissions on adoption law 
reform, states:  
 
A significant number of lesbian couples are resorting to donor insemination in order to have 
families together.  In these families one mother is the biological and legal parent of the child, 
while the “other mother” has no legal status.  The usual practice is for the co-mother to apply 
to become an additional guardian.  This position is not considered satisfactory by many of 
these women, as they feel that their children are not adequately protected by the law (New 
Zealand Law Commission, 2000:209). 
 
 
Other staff working in the fertility clinic had qualms about treating single and lesbian 
women. Counsellor A was particularly concerned about access to DI by single 
women. She said: 
 
Counsellor A: Most of the people are really good value people, and would make really good parents, 
but yes, I do have qualms.  I'm not value free.  I think that's a little naive to expect.  And I do 
enter into debates with single women, a conversation, bringing up issues of "my only worry" 
and I say it like that, "That is my concern"…is these children without fathers, invisible fathers.  
And they usually say that there are a lot of solo mothers around, and I usually say, well, yes, but 
generally they know where they are.  "He was no good.  He hoofed it to Sydney." or "Oh, he's in 
[prison]" or "We don't have much to do with him.  He lives in Auckland and he's got married 
again."  There's usually a story.  There's usually that bit of the jigsaw. …So, that's that bit of 
identity that that child has got.  Even though he's absent, there's a story there.  Whether or not 
it's a good story, there's a story there.  But I do have worries about children being created with 
no father.  I worry for them, and I'm concerned about the store they put by meeting a donor. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
provider, and any spouse or partner of that person, must give consent to the keeping or use of any 
gametes…” (1996:6). RTAC guidelines for screening for gamete donation (see Attachment J in  
Appendix D) guidelines stipulate that “[d]onors should be given the opportunity to direct or limit the 
use of their material to certain categories of recipient, for example heterosexual couples, or specific 
cultural and religious groups.” 
17 The New Zealand Law Commission has recommended discussion of four possible options:  (1) 
amending the Status of Children Amendment Act 1987 to give legal status to planned lesbian-led 
families; (2) allowing lesbian couples to opt into the presumptions set out in the Status of Children 
Amendment Act, (e.g. by applying to the Family Court prior to undergoing donor insemination), rather 
than having the presumptions apply automatically; (3) state that same-sex couples in this situation must 
apply for step-parent adoption, (which has been allowed in Denmark, since 1 July 1999), or an 
enduring guardianship order; and  (4) maintain the status quo, which would need to be considered in 
the context of the child’s best interests (Law Commission, 2000:211-212). 
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In response to such concerns, Golombok and Tasker (1994) conclude that while 
systematic studies of children conceived by donor insemination to lesbian or single 
heterosexual mothers are lacking, existing research on lesbian or single-parent 
families does not indicate that these children would be at risk of psychological 
problems.  Currently, in New Zealand, the Law Commission is in the process of 
revising adoption laws.  In its most recent report, which includes reference to public 
submissions on the issues, the authors recommend that single persons and same-sex 
couples should not be prohibited from applying to adopt a child (New Zealand Law 
Commission, 2000).  It remains to be seen whether these recommendations become 
law. 
 
Counsellor A was particularly concerned that some single women were seeking to 
have children in their late thirties because of their “inability to form relationships” and 
that their primary motivation to have a child was to “fill the void in their lives”. She 
had fewer qualms about lesbian couples becoming parents through the DI programme.  
She said: 
 
Counsellor A:  The lesbian women I haven't got so many qualms about because they have chosen a 
lifestyle without men and they have a relationship…. They're very intelligent people that we 
have through, and they've got quite broad attitudes.  They, they're not rampant exclusive sort of 
lesbian couples. They're quite integrated people who have chosen a lifestyle because of genetic, 
biological, social, psychological reasons, and they do it knowingly.  That this is a lifestyle 
they've chosen.  It doesn't invalidate other lifestyles, and yeah.  And there are two of them in a 
relationship.  And of course they use a donor programme.  They've chosen not to have 
relationships with men. 
 
 
Also exhibiting qualms about the suitability of some single women for parenthood, a 
nurse working in the same DI programme expected that single women would find it 
difficult to cope raising a child on their own.  She drew on her personal experience of 
raising a family and her reliance on her husband’s support. She recalled the single 
women who had been through the DI programme: 
 
Nurse B:  There's one or two who've come through who I would have no qualms about at all because 
they've got big extended families and you meet half the family during the process of getting 
pregnant, and you just know that they will have...they will be fine. There's people 
everywhere who will give support, but there are others who, um, you know the odd career 
woman and so on, I think, goodness, what is she going to do when she's not flying around 
the world, or not doing this and that and the other thing?  I mean, you've got a stressful job, 
and you're not as young as you used to be, you know.  Because they're sure to be stressful, 
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kids. So as far as personal feelings with single people in particular managing their children, 
it does worry me, and I do feel personally that it would be the very best to have both male 
and female on site…. Professionally, I have no qualms at all about them. 
 
 
Nurse B’s comments revealed significant ambivalence about helping single women to 
conceive through the programme.  Although she claimed not to have qualms about 
dealing with them on a ‘professional’ level, she nonetheless was worried about the 
implications of women raising children alone.  She shifted between a discourse about 
the traditional family and the division of labour, and a new discourse about 
reproductive rights.  Ultimately, for her, childrearing was a collective activity for a 
woman and her extended family, or for a couple, but not a single person alone.   Nurse 
B had anticipated feeling most uncomfortable about dealing with lesbian couples, but 
had not found that to be the case in practice.18  She said: 
 
Nurse B:  I thought that I would have worries treating lesbian women.  I thought that I might find that 
an issue, but in actual practice I haven't found it an issue at all. 
 
KH: How many would you actually have coming through though of single women and lesbian 
couples?  Is it a very small percentage?  
 
Nurse B: No it's not a small percentage at the moment.  It's not.  They would be the most. Yes, yes.  
We've had four or five lesbian couples who have got pregnant over the last couple of years.  
I felt that there was a network somewhere, which I assume there is, and that we've had...we 
seemed to get a whole batch, seemed to get a whole lot all at once, and that was sort of a 
little bit mind-boggling.  But, however, you know, you manage. 
  
Nurse B seemed to indicate the numbers of lesbian and single women coming through 
the programme were the most that she had seen. Her ambivalence about treating 
lesbian women is clearly articulated:  on one level she found it was not “an issue” but 
on another she found the number of lesbian women coming through the programme to 
be “mind-boggling”. She drew on discourses about the ‘inappropriateness’ or 
‘weirdness’ of homosexual women conceiving and bearing children and the need to 
accept that these women also had a ‘right’ to access fertility services, which was more 
in keeping with contemporary concerns about ‘political correctness’.  The situation 
illustrated the conflicts that emerge between professional and personal discourses, and 
that this has to be managed within the professional context. 
                                                          
18 A newspaper reported that lesbian women were “put off” seeking medical treatment from 
homophobic doctors.  The Medical Association chairwoman, Pippa MacKay, was reported to have said 
that she was disappointed, but not surprised, by prejudicial treatment of lesbians by health 
professionals because doctors were “human, and behave humanly” and could not help sharing society’s 
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The views of the health professionals working in this clinic appeared to be reflected in 
the number of pregnancies achieved by lesbian or single women through this DI 
programme.  Dr A said about these two ‘categories’ of women: 
 
Dr A: In terms of clinical entities, the lesbian couples are different from the solo women in that you're 
actually more likely to get pregnancies in a lesbian couple than you are in a solo woman. That 
might sound strange, but the lesbian couples generally are a bit younger, whereas the solo 
women are usually women who for various reasons currently don't have a partner and don't see 
one, and realise that life is beginning to leave them by, and usually then they're in the older age 
group.   Therefore, you know, age is a thing that affects fertility. So that we don’t have…I mean, 
we have equal pressure from both those groups for availability of semen. 
 
When referring to single and lesbian women, Dr A appeared to distance himself from 
them by calling them “clinical entities” whose presence created a “pressure on the 
system” because so few donors were willing to donate their semen to them. 
 
When asked about the process of gaining access to DI treatment through this 
programme, Jennifer and Petra, a lesbian couple, said that the process was reasonably 
“straightforward”. Nonetheless, they encountered some resistances which were 
different from those that heterosexual couples encountered because of the social and 
legal ambiguities surrounding the status of same-sex couples and lesbian-led families 
in New Zealand. Like several other couples, Jennifer and Petra were on a waiting list 
for about six months before they were able to access DI treatment.  Jennifer said: 
 
Jennifer:  I was referred by my gynaecologist.  I'd been under a gynaecologist for a number of years 
for a previous condition and I spoke to him about our wish to have kids, and explained our 
circumstances and he said, “well, you tell me when the time's right for you, and I'll refer you 
to the fertility clinic.”  So that was straightforward, and we got a letter from them saying we 
were on a waiting list and there was a waiting list for six months.19  
 
Although Jennifer and Petra’s referral and acceptance on the waiting list for DI 
treatment was uneventful, they found it more difficult to access sperm from the same 
donor for their second child, which Petra planned to conceive. They said: 
 
Jennifer: It’s worth saying that that was an issue for the clinic, and when we initially said it, after I 
conceived with Olivia and said that we wanted sperm put aside, they were wanting to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
prejudices.  Nonetheless, she cautioned doctors not to convey their personal feelings on homosexuality 
to patients (The Press, 3 August, 1999). 
19 Six months is not an unusual waiting time.  A nurse working at this DI programme said that ideally 
they liked to keep the waiting list to three months but, because of the shortage of donors, the wait was 
currently eight months. 
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consider Petra as a separate family. Because every donor can only be used for four families, 
they wanted Petra to be as a separate family and to go onto the waiting list or whatever, and 
we argued that, no, we were actually one family and that was when... 
 
Petra:  Because we’d only be using the same amount of sperm as if Jennifer had all the kids. 
 
Jennifer: And it was an issue that the clinic hadn’t actually thought through, so we went back to see 
[the counsellor] and that’s when we actually met her, and talked it through with her, and 
basically, together we wrote a letter to [the programme director], saying the social reasons 
why it was an important issue for the family cohesion and all those kinds of things.  And, it 
was accepted.  We got a letter back from [him] saying they would reserve sperm for Petra. 
 
Petra: But, you see, now we’re not sure if they’ve classified us as two families, because... 
 
Jennifer: On the letter from [the director] it said, “But this will actually limit the number of other 
families who can actually use this particular donor”, which made us think he’d actually 
treated us as two families. 
 
This situation raises important sociological questions about what constitutes a 
‘family’ and who has the power to define it.  It demonstrated the tensions that exist 
between the clinical definition of what constitutes a ‘family’ and Jennifer and Petra’s 
view of themselves as a ‘family’.  It emphasises the medical view that women are the 
focus of treatment and each family can have only one child-bearing woman, or 
mother.  This view also reflects New Zealand law, which is currently under review, 
that recognises the biological mother as the only legal parent of the child, though the 
co-mother can apply to be an additional guardian (New Zealand Law Commission, 
2000:209). Jennifer and Petra had argued that, for social reasons, they constituted one 
family but, although the DI programme director eventually agreed to set aside sperm 
for them from their first donor, he indicated that this precluded another family from 
having access to that donor’s sperm. This indicated that, according to the clinic’s 
policy framework, the two women and their children constituted two separate 
families.   
 
In contrast to the views expressed by staff at the above-mentioned DI programme 
about assisting conception for lesbian couples and single women, staff in the other 
South Island DI programme did not specifically mention that they were concerned 
about offering a service for single women and lesbian couples.  The director of the DI 
programme volunteered that being a lesbian or a single woman constituted a clinical 
‘indication’ for DI treatment. He also suggested that “about half” of the donors at this 
clinic were willing to donate semen to single or lesbian women.20 Counsellor B 
                                                          
20 It should be noted, however, that the notion of “about half” is vague, especially when no actual 
numbers have been given.  According to the nurse working in the same DI programme, because of the 
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indicated that she had no qualms about lesbian parenting, but that lesbian parents and 
single women had different ‘issues’ to contend with than heterosexual parents.  She 
said: 
 
Counsellor B: There would be some different issues for [lesbian couples].  Who's going to carry the 
baby?  The partner who is not carrying the baby can feel quite left out of the process.  That's 
normal, but it's important to acknowledge that and think about ways of dealing with it.  There 
are all kinds of issues about how they can help their children handle difficult reactions of other 
people.  Also things like what they're going to call themselves. None of the couples I've seen 
have made a decision about that but we have talked about it.  It's their own to define really.  
They don't have to follow any kind of pattern for that.  And issues about what family members 
say and what kind of reactions they've had from talking about it with their family and their 
friends. 
 
With respect to single women seeking to conceive through DI, Counsellor B said: 
 
Counsellor B: I think it's very important for the woman to have a lot of stability and support in her life, 
to be able to manage juggling work and going through pregnancy and having the child...I would 
want to make sure that the child was not in danger in any way, [she later wrote on her returned 
transcript:  “which is not to say that I think children born to single women are any more "in 
danger" than those born to couples”].  I guess one of the main things I'm trying to do with all the 
people is trying to think about the rights of the potential human being, which is not easy to do.  
And all of us are trying to figure out what it would be like for the potential child.  Some people 
are really good at thinking about the issues for the potential child, and often they use the 
analogy of being adopted if they have had, or know others who've had that experience 
themselves, or if they've had a foster brother or sister or any of those kind of things.  That makes 
it easier to imagine what it would be like for the potential child. 
 
Counsellor B, a fairly recent graduate, was representing dominant discourses about 
reproductive rights and family diversity.  Rather than intimating that children born to 
single women or lesbian couples were more ‘at risk’ than those born in traditional 
families, she focussed attention on the different issues that both lesbian and single 
women had to address. In particular, she focussed on the hypothetical issue of the 
‘rights’ of the potential child. Counsellor B’s position makes an interesting contrast to 
that of Nurse B, who was caught between discourses about what constitutes the ‘ideal’ 
family, and new liberal discourses about reproductive ‘rights’, ‘choice’ and the 
acceptance of diverse forms of ‘family’. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
usual drop-out rate when screening donors, they had only a small number of donors who had been 
cleared who were willing and available to donate their semen to single women and lesbian couples.  As 
a means of comparison, a brief item in a women’s magazine indicated that 30% of donor sperm stocks 
at Fertility Associates in Auckland (a North Island fertility clinic) were used in the insemination of 
single or lesbian women (Grace, 1999:39).  Again, actual numbers of donors that contribute to this 
“30%” of stored donor semen are not reported. 
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Screening Recipients 
While sperm donors recruited by the two DI programmes officially submit to a 
rigorous ‘screening’ process, the screening of recipients, that is, deciding whom to 
include or exclude from treatment is a much more circumspect and informal process.  
This is primarily because if clinics were to refuse treatment to any prospective 
recipients, they would have to be able to justify their decision before a legal forum, 
such as the Human Rights Commission, and demonstrate that they were not unfairly 
discriminating against the recipients concerned.21 Daniels and Taylor (1993b:1476)) 
argue that, in the New Zealand context, providers of AHR services have considerable 
discretionary power in the formulation of selection policies for access to fertility 
treatment. General criteria for acceptance onto a DI programme in New Zealand, have 
included subjective factors such as stable relationship, happily married, and sound 
mental health (Daniels and Taylor, 1993b:1477).   Criteria relating to marriage have 
been omitted, however, after the passing of the Human Rights Act 1993.  When asked 
if the clinic had specific criteria for excluding recipients from accessing DI treatment, 
the Director of one of the two South Island fertility clinics said: 
 
Dr A:  We don't have...I mean, we do have criteria in that we don't have any semen available for people 
who would not be able to support their babies themselves, so that in itself is an exclusion 
criteria.  We...I mean, if we have qualms about somebody, it actually makes a lot of work 
because you have to justify that to them, and usually you give them your reasons why you think, 
and often if they're motivated enough, they will go back and look at it and try and change things, 
and we've had someone recently who just didn't seem right.  But we gave reasons why that was, 
and then she went and documented for us all those sort of things, and it seemed...sometimes 
those people come through a different GP to their own GP and that's always a little bit of a 
disturbing thing because why is it that the other GP is not referring them?  So, I think we act 
sensibly and in a caring but concerned way. 
 
In the UK, under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (United 
Kingdom, 1990), general practitioners are asked for information on patients who have 
approached a fertility clinic for treatment, specifically in connection with the issue of 
the welfare of the child (HFEA, 1999).  Under the terms of the HFE Act, clinics 
                                                          
21 Coney (1999d:41-42) cites two complaints brought to the New Zealand Human Rights Commission 
in relation to access to assisted reproductive technologies from persons claiming that they had been 
discriminated against on grounds of sexual orientation or disability.  In each of these cases, the 
complaint was upheld and treatment subsequently accessed.  Similarly, in Australia, it was reported 
that the Queensland Antidiscrimination Tribunal had ruled that a lesbian woman should have access to 
donor insemination.  The woman had been denied treatment on the basis that she was a lesbian (The 
Press, 1.2.97).  Another more recent court decision in Victoria, Australia, (28 July 2000) in the case of 
McBain v State of Victoria & Ors has resulted in lesbian and single women being granted access to 
infertility treatment (ITA, 2000). 
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offering treatment services must take account of “[t]he welfare of any child who may 
be born as a result of the treatment (including the need of that child for a father)… 
(HFE Act 1990, section 13, 5)” (HFEA, 1999).  The HFE Act does not exclude any 
woman from treatment, but in situations where there is no legal father, clinics are 
asked to pay particular attention to the mother’s ability to cater for the child’s needs 
throughout childhood (HFEA, 1999). 
 
A nurse working in this DI programme said that they generally did not turn people 
away if they lacked financial security, but that the clinic policy was not to create 
babies so mothers could go on the domestic purposes benefit (DPB).  She said: 
 
Nurse B: The single women that we have coming through are older because they’ve managed to build 
up some form of either a career, or they’ve got their own homes, because that’s something 
that [the counsellor] looks at quite carefully to make sure that they could actually maintain a 
child and that it would have a stable home environment.  So, more often they own their own 
homes, or they live with a brother or something like that.  But there’s sort of a home 
ownership attached, and um, so that does perhaps limit some people, I don’t know. 
 
Nurse B indicated that most of the single women accessing DI services were 
financially independent to the extent that they were home-owners. It could be argued, 
however, that while home ownership implies residential security, it does not 
necessarily imply financial security because of the on-going need to meet mortgage 
repayments.  Nurse B’s comments raise the spectre of discrimination based on socio-
economic status at this clinic.  She conceded that some women might need to go on 
the DPB for the period including the end of the pregnancy and the first year of the 
child’s life, but that most had arranged with their employers to have time off work, 
before returning to full or part-time employment.  Thus, it appeared that single 
women were asked to disclose information about their financial means and their on-
going ability to support a child themselves. 
 
When asked about selection criteria at the clinic, Nurse B said:  
Nurse B:  We don’t seem to have any criteria for exclusion, unless there seems to be a history of 
perhaps potential violence, or if they...the only one that I can think of is one person 
who...one couple who were declined and that was because...the guy already had one child, 
they had a donor child and that donor child...was it the playgroup or kindergarten supervisor 
I think it was, or somebody like that who had had dealings with one of the other children 
who felt that they weren’t really very well looked after.  They would arrive not completely 
dressed and there was obviously stress in the household, and I don’t think that they were...it 
was very difficult for them to find...to live, let alone to have children, let alone to have 
another one, although they badly wanted it. And, this was a long time ago, and [a nurse] was 
there then, and um she had had quite a long chat to this woman on her own and felt that it 
was really the guy who was trying to get her to have another child.  And that she couldn’t 
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really deal with another child...not coping at all well and she really didn’t...but because he 
was being rather persistent and, you know, we’re not sure of other behaviours that might 
have been going on.  And it was sort of feedback from these other people.   
 
We had to write to their kindergarten and there was somebody that we’d written to...they’d 
kept changing doctors...and we’d been in touch with some of the other doctors.  You know, 
we really had to do quite a bit of work to find out just what was going on as best we could, 
and Dr A in the end wrote and said that he felt that it would be...from the information...we 
had to ask their permission to sort of speak to the playcentre person, and you know, those 
sorts of things.  And so Dr A wrote and said that he felt that under the circumstances they 
might be best just to sort of leave it in the meantime.  And we haven’t heard from them 
again.  So that was tough.   
 
Nurse B indicated that, as well as acting as gatekeepers, the clinic staff at times took 
on a more active role in surveillance which included reference checks on individuals 
whom they were uncomfortable allowing access to donor sperm. In this case clinical 
staff determined that the welfare of the future child would potentially be 
compromised. 
 
Counsellor A maintained that although she was not officially ‘assessing’ prospective 
recipients, she nonetheless recorded any concerns she had.  She said that she would be 
concerned if people presented with poor psychiatric or physical health.  According to 
Daniels and Taylor (1993b:1477), many have suggested that the same criteria as those 
applied in the case of adoption should apply in relation to accessing AHR, including 
“physical health and emotional stability of both partners, good marriage relationship, 
acceptance by both of infertility, and a genuine fondness of children for their own 
sake”. The question arises, however, as to how one determines whether a couple has a 
good marriage relationship, or is fond of children (Daniels and Taylor, 1993b). In the 
UK, Humphrey, Humphrey and Ainsworth-Smith (1991) argue the case for 
“screening” DI recipients as opposed to “vetting”, which implies a more searching 
examination.  These authors contend that candidates for DI should be expected “to 
satisfy minimal criteria regarding their marital relationship, health and social 
adjustment” (Humphrey, Humphrey and Ainsworth-Smith, 1991:273). 
 
Counsellor A raised the issue of the potential difficulty of evaluating prospective 
recipients on one meeting because there is no way of ensuring that they were being 
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open and honest about their situation.22  She raised the prospect of ‘unsuitable’ 
recipients potentially ‘slipping’ through the system if they ‘performed’ well during 
the interview.  She said: 
 
Counsellor A:  Occasionally you get people who inadvertently fall into telling you something that...like 
I said to one couple who were really special class material.  But they were doing quite well in 
the interview too.  I said, “have you considered adoption?”  They said, “no, they wouldn't have 
us, they wouldn't have us in adoption.”  "Oh, they wouldn't have you in adoption?  Why is 
that?" "Oh, he nearly killed a bloke and he's got a prison sentence as long as your arm...they'd 
never have us."  And I said, “well our concerns are very much the same as the adoption 
agency.”  And thank God they did come up with that because they got into a worse stew later on 
in my obstetric career by kidnapping someone's baby...a young woman they had sort of seduced 
into their company, a young single woman, and they went off with her baby.  So they wouldn't 
have been very suitable…. But they might have slipped through, Katrina, if they hadn't said that. 
 
 
Dr C raised similar concerns about prospective DI recipients.  He said: 
 
Dr C:  The counselling role is really just an assessment role, a supportive role, and also for giving 
information.  If there's any concern then it comes back to the team.  The whole team really gets 
involved, but then again, it doesn't happen that often.  We have turned down some people in the 
past, and I can't remember some of the reasons why at the moment.  For example, there's a 
couple seeking assessment at the moment where it was very obvious at the first interview that it 
wasn't going to be easy because they didn't seem to have an understanding of the process.  The 
male partner had a low IQ, measured at 60 or 70 when he was a child.  I knew that from his 
notes.  [Physical problems] associated with obesity, and he is still very morbidly obese now.  
His partner, his wife is an epileptic and has a low IQ as well.  So, they are currently undergoing 
a psychosocial assessment.  That is an example where it would be difficult for us to decide 
whether there are grounds for turning them down.  You know, I mean, if any couples are going 
to be turned down, I suppose it could be them, but I don't know. 
 
Dr C constructed the role of counsellor as that of assessing, giving support and 
information, rather than actively screening or gatekeeping.23  He did not provide 
specific examples of those who were denied access to DI treatment but, like 
Counsellor A, he provided an example of a couple who were potentially not ‘suitable’ 
candidates for treatment.  He, nonetheless, indicated that he was uncertain whether 
this couple would be turned down which illustrates clinician circumspection about 
declining access to DI, or being seen to decline access, in case the decision led to 
costly litigation for the clinic for Human Rights infringements. 
 
                                                          
22 As previously discussed some authors have questioned whether a counsellor or psychologist can 
adequately assess a client’s suitability for parenthood through donor insemination in one or two 
meetings (see, for example Walker and Broderick, 1999a:42) 
23 See Chapter Seven for a more detailed discussion about the role of counselling in fertility treatment 
programmes. 
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The question arises, then, as to whether or not a more formal screening process should 
take place before couples are accepted into DI programmes.  A nurse at one of the DI 
programmes argued that perhaps, like adoption agencies, DI programmes should have 
access to more information about recipients seeking to become parents. Nurse A 
commented on the desirability of developing some sort of selection criteria for 
recipients which enabled clinics to objectively have more power to determine who has 
access to DI services.  She suggested that this was “fair” considering the extent to 
which prospective adoptive parents are screened by adoption agencies and donors are 
screened by fertility clinics. With regard to the screening of adoptive parents, in the 
New Zealand, the purpose of adoption is to provide a child who cannot or will not be 
cared for by his/her own parents with a permanent family life (New Zealand Law 
Commission, 2000:68-72).  With respect to adoption agencies’ screening of 
prospective adoptive parents, according to Coney (1999d:47), one of the central tenets 
of New Zealand family law is that the interests of the child are paramount.24   Thus, 
when placing a child for adoption, prospective adoptive parents are screened to ensure 
the welfare and the best interests of the child are met. 
 
By contrast, in the case of access to assisted reproductive technologies, fertility clinics 
offer services to ‘infertile’ persons (mostly couples) who wish to conceive and, 
barring gestational surrogacy arrangements, bear a child themselves.  In this situation, 
it is argued that because under ‘normal’ circumstances a couple can conceive, whether 
or not they meet particular criteria, those who seek medical assistance to conceive a 
child should be treated similarly.  In particular, clinics must comply with human 
rights laws and not discriminate on grounds covered by such legislation. However, 
there may be grounds to deny access on an individual basis if the welfare of the 
potential child is considered to be “at risk” (MCART, 1994:56). Questions arise, 
however, as to how such judgements are made and who has the power to determine 
them.  The Ministerial Committee (MCART, 1994:59) suggests that making such 
judgements is not easy – it is a “delicate and imprecise art” which calls for wider 
consultation and the development of guidelines. 
 
                                                          
24 Section 43 of the Guardianship Act 1968 states that “…the Court shall regard the welfare of the child 
as the first paramount consideration.  The Court shall have regard to the conduct of any parent to the 
extent only that such conduct is relevant to the welfare of the child” (Coney, 1999d:47). 
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Criteria for assessing the suitability of couples for DI have been set in the past.  For 
example, Stewart, Daniels and Boulnois (1982) report on the development of a 
psychosocial approach to artificial insemination by donor (AID) and the need for 
psychosocial assessment by a team including a social worker, a clinician and a 
psychiatrist.  The team developed criteria based on an assessment covering five areas: 
duration of the marriage, stability of the marriage, personal characteristics, social 
functioning, and understanding of, and commitment to AID.  While these criteria for 
assessment were applied in the 1980s, in the current social, political, and legislative 
context, some would be considered discriminatory, overly intrusive and 
unacceptable.25  MCART (1994:50-51) points out the enormous shift in New Zealand 
societal values over the past few decades, characterised by the development of human 
rights instruments and a widespread campaign against various types of 
discrimination.26  The Committee also alludes to the growing societal understanding 
that the notion of “family” is not limited to the traditional “nuclear family” (MCART, 
1994:50) 
 
Given the existence of human rights legislation to protect individuals from various 
forms of discrimination, and the seemingly growing acceptance of a plurality of 
family forms in the New Zealand,27 the development of any formal criteria for 
screening participants is fraught with difficulty.  In the absence of specific guidelines 
or legislation in this area, clinics are left to establish their own informal selection 
criteria (Coney, 1999d:41). These criteria are based on the values and beliefs of those 
who have the power, in that particular local context, to determine who can acceptably 
be permitted to conceive and thereby form a family by DI.  Coney suggests that this is 
an area of valid concern (1999d:46).  She cites Hamed’s contention that those who are 
                                                          
25 These included the following criteria: only married couples were to be considered for DI; lesbians 
were denied access to DI; judgements were made about how stable or otherwise a marriage appeared to 
be; the psychological and social functioning of the couple were assessed; applicants where one party 
was over 40 years old were excluded; and couples were assessed for their ‘acceptance’ of their 
infertility (Stewart, Daniels and Boulnois, 1982:855).  According to Ken Daniels, three of these five 
criteria are still applied in most clinics that have protocols. Those specifying that the recipients must be 
married no longer apply. 
26 Specific human rights legislation in New Zealand includes the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 
which instituted grounds for unlawful discrimination on the basis of race, colour, ethnic or national 
origins, sex, religion, and marital status (which was undefined).  The law was revised with the passing 
of the Human Rights Act 1993 which added the new grounds of disability, sexual orientation and 
family status.  Age had been added slightly earlier (MCART, 1994:50). 
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opposed to certain categories of persons accessing AHR services use the concern for 
the ‘rights’ and ‘interests’ of the child to mask prejudice against those who do not 
meet conventional standards of who ideally should be parents (Coney, 1999d:46).  
 
The issue of screening for access to fertility services remains controversial and 
presents an on-going challenge to policy makers and health professionals working in 
the field of assisted human reproduction.  It is the most controversial area in the 
counselling field with different disciplines, including psychology and social work, 
taking different views. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the ways that medical professionals in fertility clinics 
manage access to the scarce resource of donor sperm.  It illustrated the extent to 
which staff working in two New Zealand DI programmes engage in activities 
involving gatekeeping and surveillance in the process of determining suitability for 
parenthood with the use of DI. Analysis of interviews with recipients and health 
professionals showed that achieving conception in the clinical context involves 
negotiation between social actors taking up a variety of subject positions and 
discourses of professionalism, mothering, gender and family. People’s varying 
experiences in accessing treatment illustrated the diverse processes by which 
identities are constituted and negotiated in particular settings.  
 
While DI is not strictly a medical ‘treatment’ or therapy in the sense that it cures a 
particular ailment, i.e. infertility, it nonetheless offers couples with male factor 
infertility a way of achieving the identity of parent and forming a family.  While it is 
men’s bodies who are ‘at fault’, it is women’s bodies who are ‘treated’ and subjected 
to the medical gaze during the process of bringing about the desired changes to their 
identities.  During this process, couples, and women in particular, experience a series 
of ontological changes.  The chapter has therefore illustrated that fertility clinics are 
contexts for the construction of selves.  Would-be recipients of donor sperm are 
positioned or position themselves variously as research subjects, objectified bodies, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
27 Despite the reality of a diversity of family forms in New Zealand society, the minority of which 
conform to the ideal of the “nuclear family”, it could be argued that the latter is still considered the 
preferred family form and the norm to be aspired to.  
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people juggling work schedules so they can travel to the clinic, psychosocial objects, 
generic patients in the waiting room, people with particular ethnic identities or marital 
or socio-economic status, and so on. While clinics have traditionally treated those 
who are deemed to be ‘medically’ infertile, since the introduction of human rights 
legislation, clinics are not permitted to discriminate against categories of persons, 
including those who are deemed to be ‘socially’ infertile. While many health 
professionals had personal qualms about creating ‘fatherless’ families, they 
nonetheless had to perform their work in a socio-political environment where it was 
not possible to openly deny access to treatment to these persons.  At their discretion, 
however, clinics are legally able to deny access to treatment to individuals or couples 
they determine to be unsuitable for parenthood.   
 
While fertility clinics have no formal criteria for the exclusion of certain categories of 
persons, they nonetheless would generally exclude prospective recipients with certain 
characteristics, such as a propensity to violence, the inability to support a child 
financially, poor psychiatric or physical health or ‘coping’ strategies.  The issue of 
applying specific selection criteria to those seeking AHR services is controversial.  
While adoption agencies have the power to access criminal records and ‘vet’ potential 
adoptive parents, for couples seeking to conceive and bear a child themselves, the 
same policies do not apply.  At the same time, many who wish to access DI services 
may find their choices are constrained by a system controlled by health professionals 
who, while working within the law, ultimately have the power to determine who is 
and who is not able to conceive by donor insemination. 
 
The chapter has shown that regulatory decisions are made in clinics at the local level 
in response to local events. This had particular implications for parents who were not 
able to choose when to conceive or have the opportunity of procreating children who 
were full siblings.  In determining who has access to sperm, and under what 
conditions, health professionals in clinics appear to have significant power to define 
what it means to be a ‘family’ and who is deserving of creating a family.  This links to 
wider and on-going debates about what, in fact, constitutes a family and who should 
have the power to define it. 
   
 214
 
 
 
Chapter Seven 
Negotiating Clinical Worlds 
 
I thought for some time how would I react to having children that weren’t genetically my own. 
But I think I got through that very quickly, and the fact that we had a very proactive GP, very 
good initial treatment from the fertility clinic, and you know, it was a brilliant atmosphere. 
There was a little board behind [the nurse] with photos of children.  You could see straight 
away that you wanted to be in a position where we had children and that this was the only 
clear way that we were going to get there...at least for 50 percent of them. - Mike, father of 
two daughters conceived by donor insemination 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines how couples negotiate the shifting and changing identities of 
‘client’, ‘patient’ and ‘potential parent’ as they inhabit the clinical worlds of the 
fertility clinic.  It begins with recipients’ ‘induction’ into the DI programme, the 
information they are given by nurses, medical directors and counsellors about 
conceiving by DI and the possible implications of choosing this method of 
conception. The differentiated subject positions taken up by staff working in fertility 
clinics are explored.  The clinical worlds of DI are gendered worlds where women 
generally take on the role of carers in a nursing or counselling capacity and men of 
medical doctors and decisionmakers.  The role of counselling in the clinical context is 
considered in light of some of the ambiguities and debates that exist in connection 
with this aspect of infertility services.  
 
Couples’ experiences of inseminations and achieving conception are also a focus of 
attention. The chapter also examines couples’ experiences of pregnancy and birth 
after DI conception. While the role of the clinic officially ends with the establishment 
of the normal pregnancy trajectory, participants reported some contact between 
recipients and clinics. This raised questions about the possible need for followup, 
particularly for parents who have on-going issues in connection with conceiving and 
forming a family with the use of DI. 
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Beginning treatment1
Having accessed treatment on a DI programme, often after waiting for several 
months, prospective recipients receive information about the DI programme from 
their respective clinics.2  The nurse in one DI programme described the information 
sent out to recipients before they began treatment.  
 
Nurse B: We usually send them an information sheet.  It’s just a skeleton outline really.  It talks about 
the procedures.  It talks about how to get onto the programme.  It talks about the blood tests 
that they’re going to have to have done and why.  And again, [the clinical director] goes over 
these things in his interview, and I think probably [the counsellor] talks about them as well.  
It talks about how to do their LH testing.  It talks about… again, it’s written down that we 
think it’s a wise plan to tell the child of its origins.  The costs are written down, and phone 
numbers for contact and all those sorts of things. That’s the DI information sheet.  They’re 
also given a sheet on cycle monitoring which helps to detect when they’re likely to be 
ovulating so they can work out either from their calendar at home, or something before they 
start thinking about cycle regulation. 
   
As discussed in Chapter Six, invariably it is the woman’s body that is being ‘treated’.  
Thus, the woman needs to become knowledgeable about her ‘natural’ reproductive 
cycle3 which, in turn, becomes a ‘disciplined’ cycle through monitoring and 
surveillance. As well as practical information on diagnostic and treatment protocols, 
this clinic also indicates its philosophical position on the child’s ‘right’ to know its 
donor origins.4
 
Initially, couples seeking treatment through the two DI programmes studied for this 
research met with a clinical specialist, a counsellor and a nurse, each of whom had a 
specific role or focus within the donor programme.  As in many other hospital 
settings, a gendered division of labour was apparent. Men held the positions of power 
in the hierarchy as fertility specialists, programme directors and ultimate gatekeepers 
to treatment, and women were positioned as ‘carers’ in the roles of nurse, counsellor, 
behind-the-scenes scientist, or laboratory technician (Cussins, 1998a:83-84).  Daniels 
(2000a:11) argues that the inclusion of counsellors, psychologists or psychiatrists as a 
matter of course within fertility treatment programmes in New Zealand represents a 
paradigmatic shift “from the simplicity of the ‘medical model’ to the more complex, 
                                                          
1 I have chosen to dispense with using inverted commas here because medical procedures using 
assisted reproductive technologies are commonly referred to as treatments, even though, as discussed in 
Chapter Six, they do not conform to the usual definition of a medical treatment. 
2 Information sheets provided by fertility clinics are located in Appendix C. 
3 In addition, the woman’s cycle may be stimulated by drugs such as clomiphene. 
4 This important issue in connection with conception by donor insemination is considered in more 
detail in Chapter Nine. 
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multi-factorial, holistic, biopsychosocial approach”. According to Schwartz, “the 
biopsychosocial model proposes that medical diagnosis should always consider the 
interaction of biological, psychological and social factors in order to assess a person’s 
health and to make recommendations for treatment” (cited in Daniels 2000a:11, 
original emphasis).  Daniels argues that the inclusion of ‘counsellors’5 on the fertility 
treatment team has been fostered by a growing recognition of the social dimensions of 
assisted reproductive technologies (2000a:11). In his view, those with counselling 
skills can offer a psychosocial6 perspective in this field which other health 
professionals are not trained to offer, nor are these issues the primary focus of their 
attention in the clinical setting (Daniels, 1993, 2000a).  
 
After being accepted for treatment through a DI programme, prospective recipient 
couples generally met first with a clinical specialist to determine the best treatment 
option.  The director of one DI programme said that he sometimes sent couples to the 
counsellor to ensure they were better informed about the wider implications of 
choosing a particular treatment option before they signed treatment consent forms. He 
said: 
 
Dr A: I like to do consenting after they have had a chance to talk, particularly with [the counsellor], 
because she's actually so good and got so much information to give them. And that process 
gives them time to think, and often when they're with [the counsellor] they express a different 
view than by the time they come to me when they've thought it through, and things like that.  So 
that sometimes they come to me and I'll refer them to [the counsellor].  If they come from 
another doctor who has discussed it and they've looked at it and I believe that they've got good 
information, then I often would get them to see [the counsellor] first within the same week of 
me seeing them for consent and things like that.  So, it's not an absolute situation.  If I feel that 
it's important they get information then I'll see them first to help in their decision making.  
Because there's nothing worse than them coming along and they think they probably don't want 
donor insemination and go and see [the counsellor] and discuss it (he laughs).  So you just have 
to take that as it comes.                                                                        
 
To some extent, Dr A tailored the process of recipients’ pathway through the clinic 
according to how prepared they were for giving informed consent to submitting to 
particular diagnostic and treatment protocols and practices (Cussins, 1998a:75).  He 
recognised the usefulness of the counsellor in terms of her ability to provide 
                                                          
5 Daniels (2000a:13) states that counselling services vary a great deal in the field of AHR.  Counsellors 
in ART teams, he claims, may be drawn from a number of disciplines including social work, 
psychology, psychiatry, pastoral counselling, marital and family therapy, medicine, and nursing.   
6 The term psychosocial can be defined as “of or involving the influence of social factors, or human 
interactive behaviour” (The Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus, 1997). 
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information that helped clients make decisions about their preferred treatment option. 
Counsellor A said of her role in the the intitial stage of the treatment process: 
 
Counsellor A: It would be great to see some [recipients] earlier. …Dr A might say...but it's changing 
now with ICSI and PESA...might say to them, well we have got a donor insemination 
programme, and they might be thrown into disarray by that, and you know, just feel as though 
they need a space to talk about that, or even feel they need a space for him, or them as a couple, 
to come to terms with the fact that natural parenthood for them might be a little elusive, without 
high tech help, or donor help.  So, I might see them at that stage before they've come onto any 
programme at all.  But that's not the usual way I see them.  Usually they're about a year down 
the track from diagnosis, and they're coming for their appointment with Dr A, so they come to 
see me first, but I might only see them once. So, yes, I do do decision-making and fertility 
counselling with some, but the majority come for their one session, which is mandatory. 
 
Counsellor A indicated that three-quarters of recipients became pregnant and then 
became a ‘normal’ couple who might choose to have obstetric care elsewhere, so she 
saw them only once. She had on-going contact with recipients if they had particular 
problems and sought support during their treatment process.  This highlights the way 
the counsellor is positioned to manage the stress and emotional implications of 
infertility and fertility treatment which generally are not considered appropriate to 
discuss with physicians (Cussins, 1998a:74).  Daniels (1992:63) suggests that 
physicians have neither the time nor the expertise to address the psychosocial issues 
related to conceiving children by DI.  Moreover, Daniels, Spittal and Duff (1995) 
argue that some male doctors, and particularly psychiatrists and obstetricians and 
gynaecologists, are ‘at risk’ of becoming inappropriately sexually involved with 
female patients.  As a result, they advise doctors not to offer “caring and support” to 
emotionally distressed (female) patients, and that counselling needs should be met by 
those specifically trained in counselling (Daniels, Spittal and Duff, 1995:289). 
 
At the initial interview with the clinical specialist, a number of issues related to 
having a child by DI are discussed.  Dr A said: 
 
Dr A:  I talk about our donors and what the donors go through.  Well, it’s important they know the 
process of why we do things and also that they’re aware of the risks and the potential benefits of 
the way we go about things.  And I talk about the law and how I see that and in terms of marital 
breakup.  I will obviously talk about that if they’re that individual couple’s indications.  That’s 
why, if they’re not clear cut I would have seen them beforehand.  And then I tend to talk about 
success rates, what I would expect. 
 
That Dr A discussed with couples the legal implications of conceiving a child through 
DI, especially if marital separation was indicated for the couple, raises the question of 
how this might be ascertained.  The question also arises as to whether, and in what 
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circumstances, the policy that recipient couples should be in a ‘stable relationship’, as 
discussed in Chapter Six, is invoked.  Furthermore, it points to the doctor as moral 
arbiter.  Stephenson and Wagner (1991:46) claim that medicine is able to serve as 
moral gatekeeper because it has the capacity “to define abnormal and normal 
physiological functioning, appropriate sexual behaviour, and causal relationships 
between social factors (e.g. behaviour, morality, emotions) and disease states”.  Dr A 
also discussed with couples the likelihood of their achieving ‘success’ through the DI 
programme which, according to Cussins (1998a:75), “is wholly dependent on the 
establishment of in utero pregnancies, and the reinstatement of a ‘normal’ pregnancy 
trajectory”.  
A discussion of success rates in relation to infertility treatment can appear quite 
ambiguous and hypothetical in the context of each person’s individual experience of 
treatment.  This is because, as in the case of non-assisted conception, the likelihood of 
conception occurring varies from person to person and from cycle to cycle depending 
on a variety of ‘variables’. As discussed in Chapter Five, the element of chance also 
inevitably plays a pivotal role in ‘successful’ outcomes.  Nonetheless, understandably, 
recipients want to know their likelihood of success before embarking on treatment, 
but there are no guarantees that couples will conform to the statistical norm.  While 
the probability of achieving a pregnancy on any given cycle may be low, (and this 
remains true for each given cycle), the fact that, in statistical terms, one in three or 
one in five cycles is successful justifies three or five attempts for recipients and 
physicians alike (Cussins, 1998a:76).  Thus, projections based on statistics “licence 
doing the same thing again in the face of failure” (Cussins, 1998a:76). 
 
Literature on success rates provided by one of the DI programmes indicated that 
couples could expect “at least a 15% live birth rate for each cycle of treatment” (see 
information provided by one clinic in Appendix C).  In the same document, a table 
showing average success rates by treatment states:  “We expect approximately 30% of 
women to conceive by the end of the 3rd treatment.  In our programme from 1984 to 
1992, 63% of women had conceived by 12 cycles”.  From these statistics, it is 
difficult for individuals to determine how long it might take them to get pregnant.  
Two nurses working for one DI programme said that recipients were generally told 
that there was a 15% chance of success each cycle.  According to one of the nurses, 
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recently the clinical director had tried to temper recipients’ “unrealistically high” 
expectations, which almost inevitably led to disappointment, by telling couples that 
they had an 85% chance of not getting pregnant each cycle.  When I asked Dr A if, in 
fact, the chance of success per DI cycle was about 15%, he said: 
 
Dr A: Yeah, yeah.  It depends.  I tend to look at our figures related to what the diagnosis is.  Now, if 
the man is mildly oligospermic then our success rate for donor insemination is probably only 
60-65% overall. And of course an age factor comes into that as well.  If the man is not 
producing any sperm at all, so he's azoospermic or severely oligospermic, then the chances of 
that couple having a baby are probably about 80%, because, what it really means is, if the man 
has some sperm, or a reasonable number, then it probably means that the woman, if she was 
really fertile she would have got pregnant anyway, so she's therefore of lower fertility.  If the 
woman's not getting any sperm, not being challenged by sperm, is the way I tend to put it and 
the couples seem to like that idea (he laughs), then more likely the success rate is higher.  So I 
go through those issues.  I go through issues related to the cycle and things like that. 
 
KH: And would that success rate be over about five or six attempts?  
 
Dr A:  Yeah.  Well, most of the pregnancies occur within about six months if they're going to occur, 
although we do have pregnancies up to two years...well, you know, sort of 18 or 20 cycles. 
 
Dr A said that he did not place a limit on the number of attempts a recipient might 
have because this added to an already stressful situation.  Nevertheless, this raises the 
question of whether it benefits all couples to keep relentlessly trying to conceive. In 
her research on infertile people undergoing fertility treatment, Becker (1994:390) 
found that a long drawn-out treatment process sometimes added to respondents’ sense 
of disruption and undermined their sense of life as a continuous whole. 
 
Usually, if the male partner was azoospermic, Dr A would assume that the woman 
had ‘normal’ fertility, and she would have three unsuccessful intracervical 
inseminations (ICI) before he would investigate her fertility.7 At this time, he would 
also look at changing the treatment regime from ICI to interuterine insemination 
(IUI), to improve the likelihood of success.  This strategy illustrates the way that 
clinics manage lack of success: procedures and protocols are fine-tuned with each 
cycle to reinstate the idea that there was a specific reason why the previous cycle did 
not work, and that this can be taken care of in the next cycle (Cussins, 1998a:76). 
 
                                                          
7 This avoids potentially unnecessary and more expensive and physically invasive interventions for 
women.  The reasons for this clinical protocol are discussed in more detail later in this chapter.   
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Lack of success for some recipients was a source of stress, not only for the couples 
themselves, but for the health professionals who ‘treat’ them.  A nurse said about her 
job: 
 
Nurse B:  It is [satisfying]. It is very frustrating in other ways.  And it can be hurtful.  But you feel... I 
feel deeply for people who keep coming back and back and back and things don't seem to 
happen.  And I know there's nothing much I can do about it. …whatever it is that motivates 
them, that they're not able to sort of call a halt…quite often we'll encourage them to have a 
break for a few months or something like that, if you feel that they're getting really stressed.  
You'd think that each cycle that was unsuccessful, you'd think things get easier, well it 
doesn't, it gets worse, because each time they sort of look at those figures we give them…  
the wretched statistics, they're terrible things really, but that's all you can give them.  They 
often feel that it's very unfair that they haven't got pregnant yet, and more often than not we 
will refer them to the counsellor and if they don't contact her, we will sometimes ask her to 
contact them. We try and meet with [the counsellor], oh, about once a month or something, 
and discuss any problems that we've got and tell her about pregnancies that have been 
achieved, or babies that have been born, and those sort of things.  It is.  It's a very rewarding 
job. 
 
Nurse B attributed couples’ determination to continue treatment to their own agency, 
rather than to clinical practices. Certainly, the desire to continue treatment and 
achieve a pregnancy may relate to couple’s efforts to re-establish a sense of continuity 
in the face of the disruption of infertility (Becker, 1994:390).  Cussins argues, 
however, that clinical practices that construct the treatment process as open-ended and 
define ‘success’ in terms of the normal functioning of the woman as pregnant, also 
entice women to keep trying to conceive (Cussins, 1998a:75).  Herein lies the 
disciplinary power of the fertility clinic: it operates not through coercion but through 
its emphasis on normalisation: “by inciting desire, attaching individuals to specific 
identities, and addressing real needs” (Sawicki, 1991:85).  This explains its powerful 
allure and why couples find it difficult to ‘give up’ before having succeeded in 
conceiving and giving birth.8
 
Nurse B, who shared the job of DI programme nurse, said she attended the initial 
consultation between the clinical director and the recipients. 
 
Nurse B:  …because of the days of the week I've been working, I have been the nurse who's sat in on 
the interviews with the new couples who come through, and that has been a very interesting 
and steep learning curve.  I mean, I might have only been shown how to do an insemination.  
                                                          
8 When carrying out her research in an infertility clinic, Cussins saw only one person give up treatment 
without a recommendation from the physician, without severe financial pressure, or without being 
pregnant (1998a:76).  The woman, she discovered, had an alternative interpretation of her infertility 
based on her religious beliefs which was at least as powerful as that offered by the medical model. 
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I knew very little about infertility before that, except you pick it up as you work around the 
place, over the morning tea table more often than not.  But it was something that every time 
Dr A interviewed a couple I learned a whole heap more, and so it was good... about 
infertility and, well, really about male infertility which is what the main emphasis was, of 
course, in his interviews with first-time-through couples. 
 
 
While Nurse B had no prior knowledge of infertility, Nurse A had children conceived 
by DI, and wanted to work in this field as a way of “giving something back”.  She 
said: 
 
Nurse A: I think my own experience has been helpful in working in the programme.  I've had a lot of 
changes and the decisions with that, and things are certainly vastly different now from what 
they were when we were going through the programme.  
 
 
Peter and Alice, a recipient couple who had conceived through this DI programme, 
appreciated interaction with a nurse who had used DI.  Peter said: 
 
Peter: Actually, the nurse that helped us the first time has her own donor children, so that was 
actually quite a good... quite a helpful thing to know. So... there was a bit of empathy at 
least… you knew that the person who was helping you was probably the best person you could 
have helping you. 
 
Peter’s comments illustrate the care given by nurses on social and psychological 
dimensions, in addition to their expertise in monitoring biological processes related to 
the menstrual cycle.  Nurse A explained the role of the nurse in terms of the 
practical/biological/technical aspects of preparing recipients for the inseminations. 
 
Nurse A:  [After the initial interview] the role is then to teach [recipient women] how to test their urine 
at home, so they can learn to track their cycle.  So, education's a big part of it.  A lot of 
women haven't been aware of their fertility until they start the programme.  So, we teach 
how to understand their mucus, so when they're about to surge we send them off for blood 
tests, to make sure they're immune to rubella, this sort of thing.  And we tell them they're to 
phone us on Day 1 of their period, and we will then tell them when to start testing their 
urine.  We show them what the insemination is like, we explain to them what the process 
will be as far as the insemination is concerned. 
 
 
Nurse A’s explanation of the nurse’s role of educating recipients highlighted that it is 
women’s bodies that are being disciplined and subjected to surveillance throughout 
the clinical process. As Cussins argues, treatment has a number of paradoxical effects:  
“couple” becomes almost exclusively the female partner, and “natural cycles” give 
way to disciplined cycles, regardless of the infertility diagnosis (1998a:75). 
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The role of counselling 
This section is not intended as a comprehensive overview or analysis of the role of 
counselling in fertility clinics.  Rather, it highlights and discusses some of the 
ambiguities, contradictions and controversies that exist in relation to this particular 
service.  In New Zealand fertility clinics, while one counselling session is generally 
required in connection with most fertility treatments, the role of counselling is 
controversial. The term ‘counselling’ in the context of DI appears to refer to at least 
three separate activities: information giving and discussion, support and therapy, and 
selection or screening (Daniels, 1993). Whether or not all these functions should be 
part of the counselling role, however, is debated (Daniels, 1993). On the basis of their 
research, two Australian psychologists, Walker and Broderick (1999), claimed a 
discrepancy existed between what donors and recipients were saying and 
psychological ideology and practice in the area.  As a result, the authors questioned 
the need for what they called a “therapeutic injunction” in fertility clinics.9 The 
article, nonetheless, prompted a number of responses from social workers and 
counsellors working in the field that disputed these claims.10
 
The president of the Australian and New Zealand Infertility Counsellors Association 
(ANZICA) has argued that the primary function of counsellors in fertility treatment 
programmes is to explore with donors and recipients “the psychological, emotional, 
social, and legal implications of the medical interventions they are considering 
undertaking” (Blood, 1999:216).  Other social workers have referred to the role of the 
counsellor in addressing issues such as the “emotional impact” of infertility and the 
psychosocial issues11 related to conceiving with donated gametes (Daniels, 1992; 
Daniels, 1993; Daniels and Stjerna, 1993; Mahlstedt and Greenfeld, 1989). These 
                                                          
9 Walker and Broderick (1999a:221) suggested that the “therapeutic injunction” rests on three claims 
that are not supported by empirical evidence.  First, that it was wrong not to tell children of the method 
of conception and that doing so constituted “keeping secrets” that can lead to genealogical 
bewilderment;  second, that the model of “open adoption” should be applied to donors, recipients and 
children; and third, that the argument for a therapeutic injunction relies on evidence from research on 
psychosocial issues in assisted human reproduction that are limited and cannot be used with certainty to 
support policy, legislation and practice. 
10 For this debate, see Walker and Broderick (1999a) and articles written in response to this 
controversial article, published in the November issue of Australian Psychologist, including Rose 
(1999), Walker and Broderick (1999b), Lorbach and Lorbach (1999), Blood (1999), and Daniels 
(1999c). 
11 Daniels (1992:57) defines the term psychosocial as representing a combination of the words 
psychology and social.  The psychological dimension of the word refers to an emphasis on individual, 
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issues include secrecy and information-sharing, donor anonymity, the meanings 
attached to biological and social parenthood, social attitudes towards the use of donor 
gametes, the implications for the relationships of the parties involved this form of 
procreation, and issues related to the welfare of the child (Mahlstedt and Greenfeld, 
1989; Daniels, 1996).  
 
As stipulated by RTAC, the fertility clinic accreditation body for Australia and New 
Zealand, DI programme recipients must receive adequate information as part of the 
process of giving informed consent prior to treatment. As previously discussed, the 
counselling session is generally constructed as an opportunity to prepare clients for 
what is involved in the treatment programme and therefore is an ‘information giving’ 
session, rather than one of assessment.12 As well as providing information about the 
treatment programme, counsellors interviewed for this research addressed the 
psychosocial issues relating to infertility and fertility treatment involving the use of 
donated gametes. The counsellor working in one of the DI programmes had worked in 
the field of infertility counselling for ten years.  Part of her work involved 
interviewing recipients on the DI programme. She said she usually began the session 
by talking about infertility and the implications for the couple’s relationship.  She 
said: 
 
Counsellor A:  I usually start off by asking them how long they've been together.  When did they start 
trying for a family?  And, how soon did they go seek treatment? How soon did they feel that 
things weren't going right?  So, I sort of take them back to when they first got together, and just 
work from there forwards to get some idea of where they went to first...it's usually a GP...what 
happened there, then what happened, and then when there's a diagnosis comes in, then we find 
out that he had...and then I ask them, and how was that?  You know, how long ago was it...got 
an idea because we're working backwards, forwards and, how was that for you two?  So, we do 
talk about the infertility.  It's not a whole session on it because they've got one session before 
this DI.  The session lasts about an hour and a quarter, maybe an hour and a half.  Not much, 
not...and I mean there are other programmes that have two sessions, which would be really 
good. So, I give them handouts.  If it seems appropriate, if it brings up things for them, if it's 
still very painful for the man, I make sure that I give them some reading around that, because 
very often, they're quite isolated in their coming to terms with that, apart from their partner, and, 
isolated in as much as gender-isolated.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
internal or intrapsychic factors, while the social dimension emphasises relationships, the interpersonal 
and interaction. 
12 See Appendix C for a copy of one clinic’s brochure outlining the role of counselling.  Contrary to 
what is indicated on the brochure, and as noted in Chapter Six, counselling also includes an assessment 
function.  
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The narrative approach taken by the Counsellor A appeared to be used as a tool to 
elicit information, in a non-threatening way, about people’s reactions to infertility, 
how it affected their relationships, and the critical moments that led to their decision 
to consider conceiving with the use of DI. Counsellor A indicated that one session of 
about one and a half hours was barely adequate to cover this. 
 
A nurse working in the same DI programme said that in the past many recipients were 
resistant to having to see a counsellor as part of the treatment process. 
 
Nurse A: Some people have been resentful in the past "oh why do I need to see a counsellor?"  But we 
include this as part of our programme, and they are told it's not a screening process, but she's 
there for information giving, and I think barriers have been broken down with couples 
resisting seeing a counsellor.  And most of them say it's been very valid, and they know then 
that she is a point of contact if they wish to have contact with her in the future.  If they're 
feeling stressed with the programme, and they don't want to discuss it with us, which is fair 
enough, at least they have her that they can go to. 
 
Nurse A’s comments about the validity of counselling illustrates Cussins’ argument, 
raised earlier in this chapter, that in the context of fertility clinics it was not 
considered appropriate to discuss emotional issues or “psychological factors” with 
physicians, and that this should be confined to interchanges with nurses or 
counsellors, or the privacy of one’s home (1998a:74).  
 
Resistance to seeing a counsellor in relation to fertility treatment might also partly be 
explained by a general perception that the decision to have children is a private matter 
that should not have to be justified to anyone. Illustrating this point, a recipient said 
that when the clinic nurse had asked her at an initial interview why she wanted 
children, she had said that she did not know, and questioned whether anyone in fact 
knows why they wanted children.  This suggests that the “decision” to have children 
is not a matter of rational choice.  Birke, Himmelweit and Vines support this view, 
arguing that many political ideologies conceptualise reproduction as “a private 
concern of individuals and their families: more a matter of feeling than thinking, in 
which the state has no right to interfere” (1990:30).  In her research into what 
motivates New Zealanders to have children, Cameron (1990:55) found that many 
respondents offered biological explanations for wanting children, including that it was 
“just natural” or instinctive. 
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Counsellor B said she had encountered resistance to counselling from some 
recipients: 
 
Counsellor B: I try very much not to be in a gatekeeping role.  There are some people who immediately 
feel very defensive about having to see a counsellor, and some people are actually quite 
negative, but that would definitely be the minority.  But there have been a few situations where 
that has been some difficulty.  I think that some people felt that they were being evaluated, and 
on a particular level I guess I am evaluating them, to make sure there is nothing in terms of their 
functioning or history which might mean that DI is really not appropriate for them….  So that 
has been quite difficult, and I always make it clear that's not what I see my role as being, but 
that I'm interested in hearing about any serious concerns that they might have about going ahead 
with it and that they could discuss those with me.  So, at its most basic level, it's sort of 
information giving, clarifying how they got to this point.  
 
The role of counselling appeared not to be deeply entrenched in the ‘culture’ of this 
particular DI programme.13  The director of the DI  programme commented: 
 
Dr C: Most recipients discuss with me donor insemination as an option, and may not decide on donor 
insemination, but I would still give them an assessment of their suitability: one is that they 
understand the issues, the psychosocial issues that are involved.  From there they would… we 
do have a policy here for all recipients and donors of gametes that they have counselling.  We do 
try very hard for couples to have counselling.  I mean, there are exceptions, I mean just a year or 
two ago we had a couple who were both social workers, for example, who we didn't sort of 
counsel at the time.  Some couples are extremely widely read about the whole programme.  
They understand the issues very much; others don't, and it is through the counselling process, 
and also they have an interview assessment with [the nurse] as well, whose responsibility it is to 
discuss and give them the donor profiles and that sort of information that they need.  But I think 
that the process is pretty straightforward.  We do have a clinical guideline. It's a protocol for 
couples in the assessment and participation in the programme to ensure that we don't overlook 
some issues.  For example, after three failed cycles the guideline says that they should be 
reassessed by a clinician.14
 
Dr C maintained that the clinic had a particular protocol – a form that ensured that all 
recipients were given adequate care and assessment throughout their treatment 
process.15  Nonetheless, couples did not necessarily attend a counselling session. 
 
Several recipient couples interviewed for this research reported not having had a 
session with a counsellor before embarking on DI treatment. This was particularly the 
case for couples who had been through the programme in the late 1980s or early 
1990s. Mary and Brendan, the parents of two children conceived by DI, aged 12 and 
                                                          
13 At the time of the interview, Counsellor B had been working at this clinic for only 10 months.  In the 
past, counselling appeared not to have been offered consistently to DI recipients. 
14 While this protocol is now in place, a recipient I interviewed had nine unsuccessful cycles of DI 
treatment before her fertility was investigated.  At that time, a laparoscopy revealed that she had 
blocked fallopian tubes which were remedied with laser treatment.  She subsequently conceived on the 
next DI cycle which raises the question of why her fertility was not investigated earlier. 
15 A copy of this clinical pathways form which is designed to assist clinicians in measuring and 
improving clinical outcomes appears in Appendix C. 
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10 years, said they were initially given very little information on the social issues in 
connection with DI.  They said: 
 
Brendan:  [Clinical staff] were really just testing to see whether we were satisfied ourselves that we 
wanted to go on the programme.  It mainly hinged around that.  They didn't really talk about 
how we would feel about having the children or anything like that.  It wasn't even raised that 
I can remember.  
 
Mary: No, I think the only person that came around and said that was [a social worker carrying out 
research in this area].  He was the only one that came and talked to us about sort of feelings 
about the children.  The doctors didn't say anything about that at all.  Although at some stage 
we must have talked about that.  I think in the letters, the letters we got from the fertility 
[clinic] after we'd had the children, mentioned that most people were telling their children, 
and if we felt that we needed to talk to them about it we could contact them. 
 
Some couples receiving DI treatment through this clinic were aware of the clinic’s 
policy of ‘openness’ in relation to telling the child of his/her origins, and had 
wondered if a willingness to tell the child was critical to their being accepted for DI 
treatment. The father of triplets conceived by DI said: 
 
Allan:  Well, they did an assessment before they would accept us though.  We had to go for an 
interview with [the nurse] for half an hour or an hour.  She filled out a questionnaire and asked 
various questions.  And I remember thinking, you know, being honest with my attitude, this is 
obviously going to be going against us.  But obviously it didn't kill the idea. 
 
Allan said that he and his wife had been ‘assessed’ by a nurse, rather than a 
counsellor, in the DI programme.  At that time, he found that his resistance to 
openness did not preclude them from being accepted for DI.  Other recipients were 
mindful of the clinic’s message that it was desirable to tell the child, but maintained 
that it was not delivered directly or coercively.  Paul said: 
 
Paul:  I think it was pretty much left up to us, though I think the underlying current of conversation 
was towards openness, but there was no... you didn't feel any pressure, or...and it wasn't talked 
about in a direct sense in the way that I sort of received it but I just sort of felt that the way that 
they talked to me or us was really in a pretty open sort of a way and that's the sort of underlying 
feeling I got... and I think we did ask about it... I think that the nurse said that when she raised it 
that it seemed to be more of a concern for the parent than it ever was for the child, you know, 
breaking the news to the child seemed to be "so what?" sort of thing, whereas the parent seemed 
to be going through all these agonies of, you know, "How am I going to respond and all this?” 
sort of thing.                              
 
Many couples indicated that the clinic had provided useful information on aspects of 
negotiating relationships after having a child by DI and, in particular, about telling the 
child of his/her genetic origins.  But not all couples felt that they were prepared for 
the emotional and social consequences of having children by DI.  Andrew and Annie, 
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who had not initially seen a counsellor when they went through a DI programme, 
said: 
 
Annie: We actually were not given any counselling, and I think it should have been there right from 
the start, because it was only later when we fell into trouble going through for our second 
child, that this was sort of brought up, and the fact that Andrew wasn’t talking about it.  
Then we went to see a counsellor.  It wasn’t until that time. I think we needed to and that 
was part of our problem, for Andrew anyway… 
 
Andrew: It's a lot to do with the emotional state.  So, if you're going on the programme, you need to 
be quite relaxed about the whole thing, and what we didn't have was information about the 
after-effects, the lead on, and what happens after birth, one, two three, six years of age of the 
child.  No knowledge of that at all.  No information about it either.  It's all about the 
mechanics of the process, how you're meant to feel, but you don't feel like they say.  Life's 
never like that in the real world. 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter Eight, Andrew and Annie were secretive about their fertility 
treatment, so were isolated with no support network.  Andrew, in particular, was 
extremely stressed by his infertility, but for a long time had resisted seeing a 
counsellor to discuss his reactions to his infertility, and the DI conception of his 
daughters.  Andrew’s resistance to counselling was not atypical of men, according to 
the counsellor at one of the fertility clinics.  
 
Counsellor A:  [Men] all would find it difficult to come along, but they all say that it was okay, yeah.  
And it is okay. And I'm a story-teller, too, so, I tell them about other men's experiences.  "I met 
a couple who..." and "There was this builder who..." you know, "and he found that he told them 
on site because he was so devastated it just came out, and one of his mates said, "Well, why do 
you think we've adopted two?" You know, and it was a general topic of conversation.  So, yeah, 
I sort of normalise in that way by being anecdotal myself. It's quite liberating sometimes.  But I 
also respect privacy, because some people... it's a very intimate subject and some people find it 
hard to connect with other people on any level, let alone that deep level. 
 
Story-telling was a useful resource for addressing a delicate issue with men who were, 
at least at first, resistant to seeing a counsellor, let alone discussing their ‘feelings’ 
about their infertility.  These accounts reveal that men are ‘treated’ too on the DI 
programme, but by counsellors rather than medics, albeit usually in only one brief 
session.  The scientist working for the same DI programme indicated that many 
infertile men entering a DI programme with their partners possibly felt distressed, 
isolated and marginalised, not only because of their infertility, but because women 
tend to be the focus of treatment.  She said: 
 
Scientist:  I'm sure for a lot of these fathers it must be quite difficult.  I doubt that they easily get over 
the problem that they are infertile, and that there's something lacking in them that they 
weren't able to father a child.  And even having a child doesn't actually cure that infertility 
problem.  They may have a child but they're still infertile.  And I sort of wonder if perhaps 
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there aren't still quite a lot of [social] fathers who don't still have, you might say hang-ups, 
unhappinesses, you know, unresolved problems over this issue which no-one does anything 
to address at any stage, I don't think.  They tend to be not the focus of the treatment.  It's 
mainly the woman who gets most of the attention and time, and I guess they get a joint 
counselling session with the counsellor but one session probably doesn't get you 
tremendously far in this. 
 
 
The scientist was aware of the possible emotional difficulties encountered by infertile 
men, like Andrew, and the short-comings of a clinical system which is primarily 
concerned with ‘treating’ women so they can become pregnant.16  She also supported 
the counsellor’s contention that one session to discuss the complex emotional, social 
and psychological issues around infertility was somewhat inadequate.  Meerabeau 
(1991) hypothesises that men are marginalised in fertility treatment programmes 
because doctors, who are usually male, identify with the men whom they anticipate 
would be embarrassed to discuss their infertility, and because men play such a small 
role in reproduction and subfertility investigations generally. 
 
Like Andrew and Annie, Jennifer and Petra, a lesbian couple who conceived through 
a DI programme, commented that the primary focus of the DI programme was the 
mechanics of achieving a pregnancy, rather than the social issues pertinent to families 
with children conceived by DI.  They said: 
 
Jennifer:  I got the feeling from Dr A that he was more interested in the clinical side than the social 
side.  He sort of left it up to the social worker to do her bit, and when we got through that 
part he just explained to us the way it worked and the process, and more the mechanics of it, 
rather than the social aspects.                                                            
                                                                               
Petra: Yeah, it strikes me that he's a bit like a kid with toys isn't he?  He likes to make it work, and 
he's not really concerned about the people attached, so he prefers the people to be quite laid 
back.  I got the impression he would be quite scared if we were more abrasive or more 
sensitive than that.  But I think he was...my impression was that since we were quite laid 
back, he was calmer and, like, the forms...they haven't degenderised the forms, so they're still 
quite heterosexist.  But he made light of that and when we were happy to make light of that 
as well, I think he was relieved probably.  I think he thinks it's a bit weird, but he doesn't 
make any value judgement about it.  Do you think that's fair?  
 
Jennifer: Yes. He's a doctor at the end of the day.  He's interested in the science of it rather than the 
social issues. 
 
Petra: Yeah, and he likes to get people pregnant, basically, you know, and that's brilliant.  
 
Petra raised the important factor of patient comportment in the clinic.  Cussins 
(1998a:73) observed that all “patients” needed to behave appropriately in the clinical 
                                                          
16 The on-going emotional issues experienced by some men in relation to infertility and DI treatment 
were discussed in more detail in Chapter Four. 
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setting or they risked forfeiting their status as patients.  Cussins suggests that 
appropriate comportment both guarantees a patient’s fitness to receive treatment and 
provides the physician with a moral justification for offering his services (1998a:75). 
Jennifer and Petra were aware that the clinic was not particularly ‘geared’ to catering 
for lesbian couples, but refrained from commenting about it in the clinical context.  
They said: 
 
Jennifer:  As far as lesbian couples going through the clinic go... I don't know when the first lesbian 
couples went through the clinic, but I suspect it was quite recently, but I don't think they've 
been thinking through what the implications are and how it's actually different.  It does feel 
like... even the conversation we had about Petra using the same donor and stuff, they hadn't 
thought it through, they hadn't been presented with it before.17
 
Petra:   But then they never assumed that we would want more than one child. 
                                                                              
Jennifer: Well, they assumed right from the very first interview that we wouldn't. I remember Dr A 
saying, “Oh, now you're wanting this baby,” and I said, “We don't see it as having a baby, 
it's just we're starting a family, and we'd like four,” and he just kind of giggled, and said, 
“Oh, we'll just work on one at a time,” and didn't want to discuss it.  
  
Dr A’s reaction is consistent with a focus on the biological rather than the social 
family, but also indicates his qualms about treating those who do not conform to the 
heterosexual nuclear family model. It thus brings into sharp relief that reproductive 
technologies such as DI enhance prospects for ‘alternative’ as well as traditional 
families, and therefore potentially weaken the hold of the nuclear family as a societal 
norm (Wasserman and Wachbroit, 1992).   
As possible further evidence of the clinic’s reluctance to assist lesbian women to 
conceive, Jennifer and Petra found that the student social worker they saw in the usual 
counsellor’s absence was unprepared for the appointment with them.  They said:  
 
Petra: The Social Work student started by saying, “I’ve never actually met any lesbians 
before...worked with any lesbians before, so tell me if I’m doing it wrong.” 
 
Jennifer: It wasn’t a good start really. 
 
Petra: Well, it was just like, “okay”. 
 
Jennifer: But it was very evident that she actually hadn’t thought through the issues that were involved 
for lesbian couples. 
 
Petra: She showed us a book which was how you explain to your child that one of you is not the 
father, you know, and I mean it was just bizarre, and then she said, “Oh, I guess this book isn’t 
                                                          
17 See Chapter Six for discussion of the tension between the clinical definition of a family and Jennifer 
and Petra’s conceptualisation of themselves as one family. 
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very appropriate for you is it?”  I mean, good book in that circumstance, but you’d think you 
could screen it out when you know you’re seeing two women. 
 
Jennifer: Or you could say, “You might find some of this book useful.” I just had to wonder what kind 
of supervision she has as a Social Work student, knowing that she was coming to see a lesbian 
couple, because a lot of information that she also gave us was wrong…she said that all of the 
men on the programme were willing to have lesbian [recipients], which is not true. So she had 
to ring and apologise the next day and give us the more correct information. 
 
Petra and Jennifer had gone to the session with a prepared list of questions that they 
thought would be raised for discussion.  When this did not transpire, they raised the 
questions and supplied their prepared answers for the student social worker. In this 
situation, they were positioned as the ‘educators’ in the encounter with the social 
worker, rather than the other way round. Later in their treatment process, the couple 
had a more helpful and supportive encounter with the clinic’s regular counsellor. 
 
Insemination and conception 
Recipients’ experiences of the actual insemination process varied. For some it was 
emotionally traumatic.  This was related to a number of factors, including the failure 
to get pregnant and the need for on-going inseminations, and the meaning attached to 
being inseminated with the semen of an unknown man.  Andrew and Annie said: 
 
Andrew:  I mean, sure, you went along there and got inseminated.  That's probably easy, but Annie had 
immense problems with having someone else's semen inside her. 
                                                                              
Annie: Actually I cried most of the time when we went up there, didn't I? (she laughs)…It was quite 
awful. 
 
Andrew: And then, as a husband, the fertility people said it was the idea to go home and make mad 
passionate love when you got home to make it feel all better, and from my perspective that 
was very, very difficult. 
                                                                              
Annie: They suggested that the first time, but the second time around that it wasn't even mentioned. 
 
The suggestion that Andrew and Annie go home and make love was a practice 
employed at a time when clinics advocated secrecy and thought it easier for couples to 
accept the child, if they imagined it was in fact their ‘own’. Andrew had difficulty 
relating to his wife after the inseminations.  He said of the emotional issues for him: 
 
Andrew:  Is it a sense of rape? Is it a sense of deceiving someone? Is it a sense of having an affair?  All 
these sorts of things.  All these emotional things are on top of the process of going on the 
programme.  There's all these issues that follow on that one doesn't think about and it means 
coming to terms with that.  Annie found it very difficult because I wouldn't talk about it. 
 
Annie: At that time, and I think it was the hardest time of the whole thing for me personally, it 
would have been nice to have talked to somebody who had been through it, not a medical 
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person, or a family friend even, I mean somebody who had actually been through it.  That 
would have been actually quite good. 
 
Annie and Andrew attributed the length of time it took for Annie to conceive their 
second child (18 inseminations) to the stress they encountered throughout the 
treatment process.  The issues raised by Andrew and Annie might have been usefully 
explored in counselling sessions.  As discussed in Chapter Four, Andrew had not had 
time to come to terms with his infertility before beginning DI treatment, and this 
probably accounts for how he felt. 
 
Like Annie, Jane found the insemination process difficult to contend with 
emotionally, though her husband Steve’s response was different.  They said: 
 
Jane:   …the donor thing from the beginning sort of did create a sort of...the insemination...that 
created a bit of a block.  It did to our relationship, I'm sure it did.  Just going through it...just 
because it wasn't the norm... 
                                                                              
Steve: No.  
 
Jane: It wasn't for you, but it was for me, because the whole thing is sort of cold.  You go up there, 
and you have this insemination.  
 
Steve: I think from her...from the woman's point of view...different...different.  
 
Jane: Yeah, really emotional.  I found that really hard to grasp with, and, it was sort of cold you 
know. Even though they try to get you to, you know, to keep on with your relationship with 
your husband afterwards, but I found that really hard. 
   
Jane and Steve appeared to have been given the same message by clinic staff as 
Andrew and Annie: to “go home and make love”. To Jane, conceiving in the clinical 
context was “cold” in contrast to conceiving through sexual relations in the privacy of 
one’s own home, and in the context of a relationship but, having been inseminated, 
she found it difficult to resume ‘normal’ sexual relations with her husband.  In 
contrast, Steve was more concerned that his failed vasectomy reversal would 
‘unblock’ which could potentially disrupt the planned DI conception by making it 
difficult to determine whether he or the donor was the genetic father of the child.  He 
attributed Jane’s feelings to how women, generally, would feel in the same situation.   
 
Not all women recipients felt like Annie or Jane.  Some took a more pragmatic view, 
experiencing the inseminations as a means to an end.  Sarah said: 
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Sarah:  Tim was there at the inseminations - him and Rob [their oldest child] came up and were sitting 
next to me.  He probably didn't want to do that, but I made him get involved because I wanted 
him to be involved in the whole process, and for him to realise that it was no big deal for me.  
I mean DI's quite amazing, and it's probably actually the simplest procedure to get a family, if 
the woman's fully functioning, but it's probably the hardest morally to get your head around.  
Like, even with egg donor, women and husbands will accept having another woman's egg far 
easier than the whole idea of having another man's sperm.  And that just never concerned me, I 
just thought, OK, it was just a quick smear, in and out job, no worries. A bit of discomfort, but 
I expected that.  But for other women that I've talked to, it's been like the most horrendous 
thing they've ever done. 
 
Sarah had been sexually abused as a child, and had sought counselling in relation to 
their infertility, so it is possible she worked out how she was going to handle the 
inseminations. She raised the issue of the difficulty couples have with using donor 
sperm because of the sexual connotations involved, issues which do not seem to exist 
where egg donation is concerned.18
 
Although Sarah said that Tim perhaps would have preferred not to attend the 
inseminations, several men said that they welcomed their involvement in the 
insemination process.  Neil said: 
 
Neil: It was important to me to be involved, to go along to inseminations, even if it was just 
warming up the straw. We got the straw, and warmed it up (he laughs) [Neil shows how he 
rubbed the straw between his hands to thaw the frozen sperm]. …although the one that 
worked I didn't warm the straw up.  The nurse did that.  I really wanted to warm that straw up.  
But still, it was successful.  
 
Like Sarah and Tim, Neil and Patricia took their first child, aged nearly four years, 
with them to the inseminations when their second daughter was conceived.  Patricia 
said: 
Patricia: Well, she knew beforehand that story about a kind man giving us sperm so that we could have 
her, and we didn't sort of dwell on it, we were just going in to get some more sperm. 
 
Neil and Patricia regarded the experience of taking Tracey along to the inseminations 
as part of the process of allowing her to understand how they ‘created’ their family.19 
Whereas Neil was able to participate in the conception of his daughters by warming 
the straws, some men were also able to perform the inseminations.  Richard and 
Belinda said: 
 
                                                          
18 The issue of the different meanings attached to sperm and egg donation was discussed in Chapter s 
Four and Ten. 
19 For a discussion of the different ‘scripts’ for telling children of their DI origins and the alternative 
framings of these conception stories, see Chapter Nine. 
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Richard:  During the insemination (pause) I was able to do it, to inseminate Belinda, more so than just 
go in there and the nurse do it. So we could basically do it all ourselves… 
                                 
Belinda: So we were able to joke with some of our very close, dear friends and say, "Well, Richard 
did the deed, as such." And that, to us, was really special that Richard actually did do it.  
Because as some of our friends who do IVF say, "Well, you know, it's all in the test-tube.  
It's all up to the doctors,” where it was us that did it. 
 
 
Richard and Belinda had a sense of taking control of the conception process 
themselves rather than it being entirely controlled by medical or technological 
intervention.  This situation also illustrates the way that parenthood can be 
constructed through intentions and actions rather than through genetic substance. 
Although the inseminated semen was not his own, because of his intention to be a 
father, and through the physical act of inseminating Belinda, Richard was constructed 
as the ‘real’ father of their daughter Madison. 
 
Female lesbian partners were similarly able to derive pleasure from being involved in 
their child’s conception.  Petra recalled her involvement in the insemination process: 
 
Petra:   In fact, the last insemination was an intrauterine insemination, so I didn't do it.  
 
Jennifer: But you'd done all the other ones. 
 
Petra: Yeah.  Yeah.  I did the ones that didn't work (they laugh).  I always worried about that (she 
laughs).  
 
Jennifer:  They say that after the first three times if you haven't conceived they usually try IUI.  And 
they'd done a hysterosalpingogram, you know, where they put dye through your tubes.  
They'd done that, and they'd done a scan and everything was all right.  So they just... 
 
Petra:  It's just Dr A has these toys, he likes to up the stakes.  He doesn't like to hang around, 
so...and that was fine. 
 
 
Like Neil, who had wanted to warm the straw for the insemination that ‘worked’, 
Petra joked that she would have liked to have been able to say that she had performed 
the insemination that resulted in the conception of their daughter. Petra suggested that 
the doctors increased the odds of success by using more sophisticated ‘toys for boys’ 
which indicated a degree of ambivalence towards their use; at the same time, she 
conceded that the use of the technology produced the desired result, both for them and 
for the clinic. Dr A described his strategy to change to IUI after three unsuccessful 
attempts of ICI: 
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Dr A:  We've always had a pretty high pregnancy rate in the first two or three cycles, although recently, 
and something probably related a bit to the group of people coming through, our first two or 
three cycles have been a little bit less successful and then we've got more pregnant with 
intrauterine insemination when we go onto that.  Some programmes do IUI, intrauterine 
insemination for all of them.  Fertility Associates20 do it that way.  But until recently, our 
success rate in the first two or three cycles was as high as theirs was anyway, and because it was 
therefore cheaper and less invasive and nurses could do it very easily, and they had more time, 
then that was why I've always done intracervical.  Last year we got a slightly higher pregnancy 
rate with IUI than we did with intracervical and I'm sort of thinking, well, do we do anything 
about it?  It may be a statistical quirk and we just have to see. 
 
Dr A’s comments illustrated the clinicians’ focus on patients, more technically 
demanding types of treatment and treatment outcomes (Daniels, 1999a:9). According 
to Cussins (1998a:87), health professionals in fertility clinics are aware that the 
statistics alone predict that dry runs should occur but, in the short term, they cannot be 
sure whether local lapses are just dry runs or if they indicate that changes to 
procedures are having detrimental effects.  As a result, they have to respond to local 
failures to maintain success rates before they have the data to make this judgement.  
Dr A’s acknowledgement of the need to monitor success rates by making comparisons 
with the success rates of other clinics in the country highlights a degree of 
competitiveness between the clinics based on treatment outcomes and numbers of 
pregnancies. 
 
In contrast with the experience of conceiving in the clinical setting, Sophie and Ria 
were a lesbian couple who used self-insemination procedures to conceive their 
daughter.  Wikler and Wikler (1991) have argued that the practice of self-
insemination raises two important challenges to the medicalisation of DI.  First, they 
argue, its success raises the question of the need for a doctor’s technical skills, and 
second, the fact that it can be used by single women questions its use as a ‘therapy’ 
for couples suffering from male infertility (Wikler and Wikler, 1991:6).   
 
Certainly, Sophie and Ria chose this method of conception rather than a ‘clinical’ 
conception but, as a result, they had to do certain ‘work’ themselves, such as finding a 
donor and learning how to do the inseminations which those who go through a DI 
programme pay a clinic to do.  By organising and carrying out the inseminations 
themselves, their experience was ‘different’ but not necessarily ‘better’ than if they 
                                                          
20 Fertility Associates is a privately-owned company that operates three fertility clinics in the North 
Island of New Zealand. 
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had been through a clinic. They had learned the practicalities and technical aspects of 
doing the inseminations from a book entitled Challenging Conceptions (Saffron, 
1994). They had learned how to store sperm, what to look for in healthy sperm, how 
to transport it, how to calculate their fertile days, when to inseminate, how often to 
inseminate, and so on.  The book suggested that they inseminate several times: every 
second day around the time of ovulation.  They recalled their insemination 
experiences: 
 
Ria:   And so we gave Derek [their ‘donor’] dates.  
 
Sophie: And he came around with a jar wrapped in his undies.  
 
Ria: The first time he came around we were all just so uncomfortable and embarrassed about the 
whole situation.  
 
Sophie: We didn't know what to say, or didn't know whether to say, “sit down and have a drink.” We 
didn't know what was going to happen there either; whether he was just going to go into 
another room and do it, but neither parties would have felt that comfortable with that anyway.  
And they say it's best to leave it for twenty minutes after he's ejaculated anyway because it 
liquefies again.  It sort of goes out of its jelly state.  So, it's easier to take up with the syringe 
and inseminate.  We have been really lucky to have really supportive medical people around.  
Our doctor, we got through Derek, is also a gay man, and he's been excited for us, and really 
helpful.  He put us onto the Ettie Rout Centre21 and we got a speculum from there, so we were 
able to see where the cervix was and see where we were aiming for, which was good too. 
 
Ria, Sophie and Derek had obviously not discussed the finer points of how the 
transaction would take place.  In contrast, in fertility clinics, because the 
circumstances for the blurring between private and public are so pervasive, they have 
a “well worked-out choreography of privacy” (Cussins, 1998a:89).  In these settings, 
the transition between private and public is smoothed over by protocols whereby men 
hand over a sterile container of semen directly to someone who will deal with it 
technically. Although they used a ‘do-it-yourself’ technique for conceiving, Sophie 
and Ria welcomed support from medical professionals, who gave them information 
and access to the use of a speculum.  They also relied on the results of Derek’s regular 
medical tests to confirm that he was not infected with HIV before they began the 
inseminations. 
 
                                                          
21 The Ettie Rout Centre provides support, counselling, medical testing and educational services for 
people who have HIV, and men who have sex with men. 
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Sophie performed the inseminations. The book they consulted had recommended five 
inseminations per cycle.22  They were convinced that Ria had conceived on the fourth 
insemination of the third cycle.  They said: 
 
Ria We were using the same syringe and we were sterilising it each time, and on the month that I 
became pregnant, the fourth insemination we did, and then we were getting everything 
sterilised for the fifth insemination and the syringe broke right at that time, so we ended up 
using a teaspoon. 
                                                                              
Sophie: No, I just tipped it in in the end because the teaspoon didn't fit in the speculum, and I thought 
oh no, what are we going to do? 
                                                                              
Ria: So we're quite sure that we conceived...  
 
Sophie: We just felt that the second to last time that we tried we both really felt that it happened.  
 
Like other women recipients of donor sperm, Ria said she had found the experience of 
being inseminated quite unpleasant and stressful. 
 
Ria:  The first couple of times we were a bit tense.  The first time was definitely the hardest, and the 
second time was a little bit tense, but then friends of ours who have a child said that it's quite 
vital that you are comfortable and relaxed during the whole process, otherwise it wouldn't work.  
And I guess the first time that we tried it, I was extremely grossed out by the whole feeling.  The 
smell, and the actual sperm being in me.  I was really uncomfortable about it, and I thought, if I 
can't get over this feeling, it's not going to happen. 
 
 
Other women attributed their failure to conceive to stress factors.  Joanna, the 
separated mother of two children conceived by DI, said: 
 
Joanna: I had two inseminations, and then I lost that baby at three and a half months, and then I went 
on the programme a month after I lost that baby and fell pregnant with Todd.  But with Jessie, 
well, she took about 12, 13 goes!  And they actually put me on the list for the IVF, and I had 
surgery to see why I couldn't get pregnant and things, but they put it down to stress because 
Todd was in and out of hospital quite a lot as an infant.  So they think it was stress, and 
probably why I couldn't get pregnant. 
 
 
For some, the disappointment of not conceiving was difficult to contend with.  Tania 
said: 
 
Tania: Well, I had about four goes at it, and then they thought I had a miscarriage.  So I had to have a 
rest.  And it was really traumatic.  Like the whole deal.  We ended up in counselling because it 
wasn't working. And then at the beginning of last year I went back for one more go, and it 
didn't work, so they decided that they'd do IUI.  So, and that just worked first pop. Just 
obviously wasn't getting up far enough (she laughs). 
 
 
                                                          
22 Recipients attending one of the fertility clinics also told stories of being inseminated several times 
over a few days during one DI cycle.   
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Tania’s experience indicated that counselling services are recommended for those 
who are not coping with the stress of repeated failure to conceive. A nurse working in 
a DI programme said that she found it difficult to know how to help women to cope 
with the emotional stress many encountered in this situation.  She said: 
 
Nurse B:   I was finding it really difficult, because I hadn’t had any problems that way at all, ever (she 
laughs), and so I had no personal experience that I could share with them except the 
personal experiences that other people had expressed.  And I’ve done a few psych papers, 
and um, I did Abnormal Psych a couple of years ago, and talked about some of the 
relaxation techniques and things, so I was busy trying to use some of this very slim 
knowledge to try and help people to try and develop some sort of tools to deal with this 
jolly stress that they have. 
  
Nurse B claimed that many recipients’ expectations were high when they went onto 
the programme, so the disappointment of ‘failed’ cycles was hard to bear. Not all 
recipients, however, had difficulties conceiving.  Some succeeded in the first or 
second cycle of treatment.  Pippa and Sean said: 
 
Sean: And it worked on the first cycle.  
 
Pippa: Yes, we were very lucky with that, because my hormones were already out then, though I 
didn't know it.  They didn't say anything because I got pregnant.  But they should have said.  I 
was really cross about that.  I thought they should have said something because then we waited 
15 months before we started trying again, and now I can't get pregnant.  If I'd have known, I 
would have tried sooner, because it's only got worse with time. 
 
Pippa’s experience raises the issue of the difficulty of becoming pregnant with 
advancing maternal age.   Prue, the mother of two sons conceived by DI, claimed that 
it took longer to conceive as she grew older.  She said: 
 
Prue:   I fell pregnant the first time with Jack, so...and the second time with Luke.  And then I tried 
again for a third time and I think that took three times, so I think as time marches on, your body 
winds down.  Like, I'm 40 now.  Yeah, it definitely does make a difference.  I lost that one 
anyway.  And I didn't want to try again.  I just decided it wasn't meant to be, so...yeah. 
 
 
Prue’s husband, Henry, who had been to the clinic for the inseminations for their first 
two children, did not attend with her for their attempt to have a third child.  He said: 
 
Henry: I went for the first couple of times and then I felt as though I had accepted the process and I 
didn't need to go.  I wasn't backing off from them, I just felt, oh well, Prue's going off [for the 
inseminations]. 
 
Prue: And you never really know if he's going to be able to go or not [because of farm 
commitments].  I mean, it didn't matter.  That was with the third time though.  
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While Prue did not attach any particular significance to her husband not attending the 
inseminations for her third conception, two other recipient women commented that 
their husbands had not attended the time that they became pregnant.  Kathy, the 
divorced mother of two daughters, said: 
 
Kathy: With Melissa I had three [inseminations].  I think she was my third attempt, and the first two 
attempts I went with Joel and the last attempt I went with a girlfriend and got pregnant the last 
time.  I wonder is there some psychosomatic thing in there that you can do it without your 
husband's approval at the time? (she laughs) I don't know.  I always thought about that.  He 
wasn't there.  It was the one time that he wasn't about that I did get pregnant.  Because he had 
actually said to me, “That's the last time you're going.”  Again, he had made quite a directive 
statement at me.  He said he'd go twice and he couldn't handle it after that. Joel, I think, 
wanted to move on.  That was really where he was coming from I suspect.  He was saying, if 
this doesn't work, no more.  And there was a part of me that said, no, I'm going one more time, 
and I did and I had Melissa, so I'm glad I did. 
 
 
For Kathy, it was significant that her husband Joel had not attended the inseminations 
the time that she became pregnant with Melissa.23 Like Kathy, Carla, the separated 
mother of a daughter, said that her husband Ben was not present at the insemination 
that resulted in her pregnancy.  
 
Carla: The last time, the time that I actually got pregnant with Justine, he didn’t come.  He couldn’t 
face it anymore. He'd had enough. That was the ninth insemination. I had five different donors 
in those nine inseminations.  And, at the time I got pregnant with Justine, there were only three 
donors, so there wasn't a heck of a lot of choice.  And Justine's got beautiful big brown eyes, and 
both Ben and I are blue-eyed.  We didn't even have a choice about that. 
 
Both Kathy and Carla said that their spouses had reached a point where they did not 
want to continue with DI treatment, and thus continued treatment on their own.  
Carla’s experience illustrates a situation of a loss of control, not only in relation to her 
husband’s involvement (or lack of involvement) in the process, but also in terms of 
the number and choice of donors used during her treatment process. 
 
Pregnancy and birth 
For most couples, the pregnancy and birth became a ‘normal’ event monitored by a 
midwife or general practitioner they had chosen.  When asked what happened after 
conception, Alice said: 
 
Alice: Immediately you think you are [pregnant], you contact them and they suggest you go to the GP 
for a blood test. And then, that was confirmed and then they book you for a seven-week scan 
                                                          
23 See Chapter Three for a discussion of the implications for Kathy of Joel not giving approval for her 
to proceed with the third and final insemination. 
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just to confirm the pregnancy and measurements, and then after that, because everything was 
OK, I went back to my GP for antenatal care.  
 
Once a pregnancy was confirmed, some women resisted returning to the clinic and 
subjecting themselves to the medical ‘gaze’ of scans and monitoring devices (Lupton, 
1997b:99). Patricia said: 
 
Patricia: Well, they did encourage me to go back and have further scans and monitoring and things like 
that, just for it to become more established, but I'm independent really.  I sort of felt that there 
needed to be a certain level of trust about it.  I wanted to just trust that it would work out, that 
if it was conceived ordinarily, I probably wouldn't have known all those weeks, and that 
hovering around a monitor just didn't feel right for me, and I declined.  And then, when I was 
three months, we contacted a professional.  We went to a midwife, but we decided to do 
shared care with an obstetrician. 
 
 
In contrast with the experience of ‘normal’ pregnancies, Meredith had on-going 
contact with the clinic because she suffered recurrent miscarriages, and, encouraged 
by the clinic nurse, kept returning for treatment.  She was advised to have a few 
months’ ‘rest’ in-between attempts to conceive and carry a baby to term.  When asked 
if she was given a reason for her recurrent miscarriages, Meredith said: 
 
Meredith:  Well, no, that's the thing.  There's no reason. Everybody just says, “oh no, not again,” and 
that's it. They can't give you a reason why it didn't work. And also, I think even if they 
probably secretly know, I think they don't really want to say.  People just sort of shut up, 
don't they?  And all you want is answers and why and why?  But you don't get any 
really...so they always kept in touch and said, “oh, we’ll put you straight back on, 
whenever you’re ready”… 
 
This illustrates Cussins’ contention that fertility treatment is open-ended partly 
because success is operationalised “not in terms of the child that the couple desires, or 
in terms of the particular problem to which the infertility is attributed…but in terms of 
the normal functioning of the woman as pregnant” (1998a:75).  The lack of 
explanations for Meredith’s recurring miscarriages also indicates that the uncertainty 
surrounding establishing the cause and effect of infertility creates an epistemic 
difficulty that is actively managed within the clinic on a daily basis so that it does not 
interfere with practice (Cussins, 1998a:76).  Meredith’s perseverance at the clinic’s 
instigation also reflects the trajectory of the infertility narrative which typically begins 
with the woman as active subject relentlessly pursuing her ‘dream’ of parenthood who 
is then suddenly eclipsed by the more privileged point of view of the 
medical/scientific ‘expert’ (Franklin, 1990:211). 
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Some couples had more contact with the clinic throughout the pregnancy because they 
were having a multiple birth, one of the effects or ‘risks’ associated with fertility 
treatment involving the use of fertility drugs, such as clomiphene (Coney, 1999b:63).  
Jane, who was in her late thirties and was put on clomiphene to increase her chances 
of conceiving, was shocked to find out that she was carrying twins.  She said: 
 
Jane:  Yes, twins.  Such a shock really, and I remember [the doctor] telling me that, you know, don't be 
too worried if you don't end up with two.  Um, so, I sort of had to keep that from anybody for a 
while until I found out how many I was actually carrying.  I ended up still carrying the two of 
them.  
 
In a bid to increase the success rates, clinics have contributed to the increase in 
multiple births (Coney, 1999b:63).24  Multiple pregnancies increase health risks for 
both mothers and babies and quite often lead to miscarriage, premature birth and low 
birth weight (Coney, 1999b:63).  Jane was told by her doctor not to expect to carry 
both foetuses to term.  Ten weeks before the twins were due, she was hospitalised 
because one of the foetuses had stopped growing.  Health professionals continued to 
monitor the foetuses in hospital for another five weeks and they were born five weeks 
prematurely.  Justin weighed 6 ½ pounds at birth, but had to have a steroid injection 
to “kick-start” his breathing.  Leanne weighed one ounce under 5 pounds at birth and, 
according to Jane, had to “fight for survival”.    
 
Like Jane, Sandra was taking clomiphene to increase the likelihood of success.  She 
and her husband Allan had been told that on clomiphene she had a 10 percent chance 
of having twins if she got pregnant.  The likelihood of having triplets was not 
mentioned.  Sandra said: 
 
Sandra:  I knew at five weeks that I was pregnant.  At eight weeks I could only do one skirt up.  So I 
rang [the nurse] and I said, "I think I'd better have a scan".  And she said, "funny you should 
say that.  I just had you put on my list of things to do to ring and suggest you come in for one".  
And I said, “I can only do one skirt up,” and she said, "OK, we'll make the appointment."  The 
next day wasn't it? So we knew at nine weeks that we were having triplets. 
 
KH: How did you feel about that?  
 
                                                          
24 Multiple births are associated with treatment cycles where a woman’s ovulation is stimulated 
hormonally so she produces more than one oocyte.  They are therefore more likely to be associated 
with IVF or GIFT treatment.  Recent statistics reveal that multiple pregnancies occurred in about 20% 
of all IVF and GIFT pregnancies in Australia, compared with only 1.5% of all pregnancies (ACCESS, 
2001). The two women included in this study who had multiple births were taking the drug clomiphene 
to stimulate the maturation of more than one oocyte during DI treatment cycles. 
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Allan: I was probably wearing a jersey like this.  So I felt quite hot, and my hands started to sweat, 
and I had to take the jersey off. I was happy when he said there was one...that was 
great...there's two...that was even better...And then when he said there's three, I thought, "Uh 
oh, that's trouble", because my sister had lost twins. 
 
Sandra: [The doctor] told me that first day not to give up work, not to hand in my notice because we 
could lose all three in the same breath.  I've just heard actually in the last week that somebody 
lost them four days after finding out that she was pregnant with triplets, and I'm sure she was 
probably given the same kind of information: not to get too excited, because in the Multiple 
Birth Club there's actually quite a lot of twins that started out as triplets. 
 
 
According to Coney (1999b:63), British HFEA statistics show that the stillbirth and 
neonatal death rate for a triplet pregnancy with one or more of the babies dying is 
82.6 per 1000 births compared to 8.8 per 1000 for singleton pregnancies.  Allan 
related his anxieties about the multiple pregnancy to his sister’s experience of losing 
twins who were born prematurely.  Allan and Sandra’s triplets were born 10 weeks 
early: two girls weighed 2 pounds 13 ounces and a boy weighed 3 pounds 2 ounces.  
They were in neo-natal care for eight weeks. 
 
Some recipients with singleton pregnancies also had to face a number of physical 
obstacles before achieving the objective of parenthood.  Ella, the mother of three sons 
conceived by DI had previously given birth to a daughter who was stillborn. 
 
Ella:   I lost her at nine months.  I was ready.  The cord was around her neck and she just died.  So 
there was nothing wrong with her.  So basically she was full-term. I found out that she was dead 
and then I had to go through with the birth.  It was all quite trying really. 
 
Ella’s experience is a reminder of the complications that can arise during the course of 
a ‘normal’ pregnancy, no matter how a child is conceived.  According to Ella, the 
stress of losing this baby at full-term added to the stress of infertility, and she 
attributed the difficulties she had conceiving again through the DI programme to this. 
 
For some couples, a difficult birth was a major source of stress.  According to Carla, 
her husband Ben was “absolutely wonderful” and attentive throughout her pregnancy, 
but left her when their daughter Justine was 14 months old.  She attributed this in part 
to the stress incurred by the circumstances of the birth and the early stages of Justine’s 
life.  She said: 
 
Carla: The birth - the labour was 37 1/2 hours, very traumatic.  Ended up a real mess.  My case went 
to the inquiry at [the hospital].  It was the first one that went through the new system of 
inquiry.  Everybody was rapped over the knuckles for the way that I was managed, and the 
state that I was in, so it was a very traumatic time for him.  I sort of...you know how you are in 
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labour, you just labour on through it, 37 1/2 hours, and she ended up being born with an 
apgar25 of 2, which is terrible, and had to be resuscitated and revived.  Normally babies are 
born with 8 or 9, and she was 2.  She was almost dead.  The only thing she had was a pulse.  
She wasn't breathing, she was black, she was all floppy, and not very good at all.  And that 
was traumatic for Ben.  And then I was persistent to breastfeed because I really wanted to feel 
what it was like.  So that was really traumatic and hard on Ben because I would sit and be very 
much in pain, and things.  So it was a hard time. 
 
The physical pain, bodily traumas and matters of life and death associated with the 
births and beginnings of life of babies such as the twins, triplets and singletons 
mentioned above, tended to overshadow any other concerns about having a child 
conceived by DI.  Others, however, talked about their lingering concerns about this 
method of conception.  Simon and Clare, who had a child biologically related to both 
of them before they conceived by DI, said: 
 
Clare:  Oh it was reasonably stressful at times.  After the pregnancy was confirmed it got a bit tense, I 
suppose [she speaks tentatively]… between each other... all of the sudden it was very real, 
whereas before you were just going along to the clinic and yeah, it was sort of hazy in the 
future.  Then all of a sudden it was a reality. 
 
KH: So you felt some ambivalence about it did you Simon? 
 
Simon:  Mm.  I think that’s sure to say. 
 
KH: You weren’t sure if that was the right thing to have done? 
 
Simon: Yeah, yeah.  [The infertility diagnosis] has always been an uncertainty I guess.  I mean, how 
come I ended up like that?  So, yeah.  Certainly coming to terms with the infertility I think 
wasn’t the easiest thing really. 
 
A pregnancy following DI conception also appeared to be a source of tension for 
other couples.  Sarah said of her relationship with her husband: 
 
Sarah: Tim says I push him into everything that we've ever got (she laughs).  I pushed him into going 
onto the DI waiting list, pushed him into going for adoption and...that's on a bad day, you 
know...you're going to have bad days actually... And I would recommend any infertile couple 
or DI couple to kind of go to talk through this, because being a DI couple, you do wonder.  
Like, he hardly touched me when I was pregnant.  And I was so consciously aware of it, like, 
was it because I was carrying another man's child, or was it because we were busy with Rob 
and Phoebe?  Like we had lots going on and we didn't have an ideal pregnancy anyway.  We 
didn't have any time to enjoy it.  
 
 
Sarah indicated that Tim was ambivalent about having a child by DI.  She was 
reminded of the tensions Tim felt after Charlotte, their daughter, was born.  She said: 
 
Sarah: …a few weeks afterwards, everyone came around, "Oh, you know, this and that, and, oh she 
looks like you, or, oh gosh, what's going to happen now?" because Phoebe was only two months 
old so we were still pretty busy with her.  And he just got really snotted off one day and he said, 
                                                          
25 The Apgar Test is performed on babies to rate their state of health when they are born.  Each baby is 
given a number out of 10, 10 being the best outcome, and 1 the worst. 
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"I'm really sick of everybody asking about you and Charlotte.  What about me?"  I thought, "Oh 
shit."  I said, "What about you?  How are you feeling about all this?" "Oh, fine"(abruptly).  It 
was just a reminder.  And he was right. Even those that knew how Charlotte was conceived, 
were kind of careful not to say too much like, she looks like me, because that would offend Tim.  
But it was just all the... it was not like "Congratulations you're a father" sort of stuff. 
 
 
Sarah was aware that she and the baby were the focus of attention from others and 
that the congratulatory remarks ‘normally’ bestowed on new fathers were not 
forthcoming.  This situation raises the issue of whether, in situations when donor 
sperm is used, men’s sense of being marginalised and alienated from the processes of 
conception, pregnancy and birth could be heightened.  As previously discussed, 
research has shown that male partners could feel marginalised in fertility treatment 
because women’s bodies are the primary focus of infertility investigations and men 
often play, or are positioned to play, a passive role in the treatment process 
(Meerabeau, 1991).  
 
Other men said they experienced ambivalence when their child conceived by DI was 
born.  Andrew said: 
 
Andrew:  I was quite a cruel father at baby time because when Annie had Hayley, I buggered off and 
played a lot of golf, got very involved with the golf club and still am.  But I don’t drop the 
family now like I used to.  I didn’t with Annabel. 
 
Annie: That was a big problem at the start. 
 
Andrew:  I’d just go at the weekends, that was it.  I played representative golf.  Right into it, and 
wasn’t around.  Non-supportive.  Not my kid... 
 
Annie: Which led to me getting depression, post-natal depression I guess it was. 
 
Andrew:  ...which was pretty hard on the other spouse. 
 
 
Andrew had wanted to distance himself from a situation where he felt reminded that 
he was not the genetic father of his child.  He had also found it uncomfortable 
confronting situations when others commented that the baby looked like him which 
served as a similar reminder.26  
 
While some men were ambivalent about the birth of a child conceived by DI, some 
women said they found it difficult carrying a child who was, in a sense, as Sarah had 
also suggested, “another man’s child”.  Kathy said: 
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Kathy:  It was extremely difficult for me being pregnant too, I'd have to say.  I didn't have anyone at 
the time other than I sought my own counselling again, because I realised I was pregnant with 
someone else's child.  I mean, to me I had an unknown quantity there that I knew nothing 
about. I just... yeah, it was just that whole unknown quantity.  I thought, “well who is 
this?...there's a whole part here that I know nothing about.”  It's like having a blind pregnancy.  
I thought, “I'm half of an issue.” 
 
Like Kathy, Annie was anxious about carrying a child ‘fathered’ by a man she had 
never seen or met.  She and Andrew said: 
 
Andrew:  The only fear that we had was that it would come out Chinese, Maori or Samoan (Annie 
laughs), some nationality that wasn't where we'd come from, sort of thing. That was a pretty 
light-hearted joke, but it was driven by fear and the closer to birth time the more heightened 
the fear was from Annie's point of view. 
  
Annie: In fact the first thing that we did when we saw Hayley is, I said, “Oh good, it's not Chinese.” 
(we laugh).  And the midwife wouldn't have had a clue what we were talking about; only the 
doctor did. 
 
Andrew and Annie’s fears that the child would look ethnically different from them 
highlighted their over-riding concern with secrecy about their children’s DI origins 
and wanting to ‘pass’ as ‘normal’ parents.  It also highlights that, with the use of an 
anonymous donor, couples having babies may have more uncertainties about what 
they are ‘getting’.  
 
While heterosexual couples could attempt to ‘pass’ as the child’s biological parents, 
lesbian couples had to explain to others that they were expecting a child which 
challenged normative understandings of the family. By conceiving a child, lesbian 
women were disrupting notions that, by foregoing heterosexual relations, they were 
relinquishing the possibility of having children. The lesbian couples interviewed for 
this research said that some of their extended family members were challenged by the 
notion that they were ‘creating a family’.  When Ria and Sophie decided to inform 
Sophie’s parents that Ria was expecting ‘their’ child, they invited them out to dinner 
to tell them the good news.  They said:   
 
Sophie: We hadn’t told them that we were thinking of getting pregnant, and once we were pregnant...it 
was about two months down the track...we invited them out, and we went out to dinner and 
bought a bottle of champagne… We were a bit nervous about telling them.  And I finally told 
them, and they just went [she stares incredulously] (she laughs).  That was their initial 
reaction. 
 
Ria: Silence for about five or seven minutes. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
26 See Chapter Eleven for a discussion of physical resemblance between parents and babies, which 
becomes a particular issue in the context of DI.  
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Sophie:  And Ria hid behind the menu (she laughs).  And I went ‘blah blah blah’ and raved constantly 
for about five minutes. 
 
Ria:   It was terrible. …It would have been better to let them know that we had been trying, which 
you [Sophie, who was now planning to get pregnant] have to tell them again.  But once we 
explained to them the dynamics of where Derek will come into it, and that Sophie will apply 
for legal guardianship, and we had to explain a bit of how it was all going to...how our family 
was going to be made up really. We think Sophie’s mother went away thinking, “what are 
people going to think?” Well, we heard from Sophie’s sister that her mother was saying, “but 
what will people think?” 
 
Sophie and Ria’s narrative shows that while they wanted to celebrate and share their 
exciting news with family members, Sophie’s parents had not anticipated and were 
completely unprepared for the event.  Sophie’s mother’s supposed concerns about 
what others might think about her daughter’s situation reflects general public 
perceptions that “for socially acceptable women, biology should be destiny, whereas 
for socially unacceptable women, the demands of biology should be restricted by 
social sanctions” (Franklin,1990:208). Nonetheless, after their initial shock, Sophie’s 
parents appeared to have accepted her chosen family arrangements.  Ria said: 
 
Ria:   Yeah, it was just the initial shock, because they came four hours after Lydia was born. They 
were there with flowers and champagne, and they very much...she’s their granddaughter. 
 
Derek27 was involved to some extent in the pregnancy and birth of their child.  He had 
attended the session when they had a scan, home birth classes and was present at 
Lydia’s birth.  He said of his involvement in the birth: 
 
Derek:   I had two feelings about being present at the birth.  I would like to be, but it was also a really 
good time that Sophie could enjoy without me being there to give her a stronger bond with the 
child.  Just her and Ria could be alone to have the child.  They didn't agree with me on that.  
They wanted to have me there, but when it all started to happen quite quickly...when my 
mother was born, her mother died at the birth, and I was struggling a little bit just to see 
somebody that I love dearly going through the same scenario. So it was quite good that I was 
out because I was a little bit panicked.  I had to take time out for myself to go for a bit of a 
wander.  I was just aware that [it could go wrong] and it has happened in my family before. 
 
At the birth, Derek was negotiating multiple subject positions: as ‘father’ of the child, 
‘sperm donor’ to a lesbian couple, and grandson of a woman who had died in 
childbirth. When the birth became an emergency caesarian section, he was more 
comfortable “pacing the hallways” of the hospital, thereby adopting the position of 
                                                          
27 As discussed in Chapter Ten, Ria, Sophie and Derek consider Derek to be the ‘father’ of their 
daughter, rather than their donor.  While he is not legally the father of their child and does not live with 
them, he is the genetic and social father. 
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the nervous prospective father, at a distance from the mess and trauma of a difficult 
birth. 
 
Follow-up with the clinic 
For those who had conceived through a fertility clinic DI programme, there was no 
systematic followup from the clinic staff.  When asked if there was any on-going 
contact between the clinic and recipients of DI, the director of a DI programme said: 
 
Dr C:   No.  There's not.  There was a major contact done with the fifty couples that we 
researched…but, no, there's no contact.  
 
KH: Do couples come back with their child or send photos of their babies? 
 
Dr C:   Yeah, heaps of photos. 
 
Dr C’s comments highlighted the clinicians’ primary concerns with clinical outcomes 
and research, and also reflected the gendered division of labour.  While officially 
there was no on-going contact between this clinic and recipients after they had 
conceived through the programme, some forms of reciprocal exchange and gift-giving 
did take place, particularly between clinic nurses and mothers of children conceived 
by DI.  This illustrated that women, who were nurses, counsellors and lab technicians, 
rather than men who primarily were doctors, maintained a role as ‘carers’ after babies 
were born.  
 
Several mothers reported contact with a clinical nurse after their baby’s birth.  When 
asked if she had any follow-up with the clinic, Tania said: 
 
Tania:  No. Oh yes, [the nurse] called me about Christmas time because I was meant to go in and 
show him off.  Yeah, she did call me to see how it all went, to see if I wanted to stay on the 
programme. She asked me to bring him in so they could see him. He was called a number, 
which didn't impress me very much when she took him round to show the technician. 
 
KH: She introduced him as a number, really? (we laugh)  
 
Tania: But that's just the sort of person she was.  She's lovely.  They're very, very caring people 
actually.  But when I got pregnant I did my pregnancy test with her, and she cried, I cried.  
And I said, "What do I do now?"  And she said, go to your doctor, your GP. 
 
 
Tania depicted the clinic nurse as someone with whom she had developed a rapport, 
who was emotionally invested in her getting pregnant and having a baby, but was also 
a health professional tied to certain clinical practices. When Tania brought her baby 
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in, the nurse introduced him to the lab technician by the number attributed to him 
through clinical practices.  This illustrated how anonymity is ensured and how 
identities are constructed in particular local sites, such as workplaces.   
 
In contrast to this DI programme’s practices, the other South Island DI programme 
retained a form of contact with recipients through an annual newsletter which is 
separate from the donors’ newsletter.   A nurse said: 
 
Nurse A:  We've always sent out annual newsletters to our couples, just to update them on what's been 
happening during the year and how many babies have been born.  Now that we're under the 
[fertility clinic], the [clinic] sends out a newsletter to all its patients, and we've got a wee slot 
in there.  In that last one we mentioned that there's a support group interested in getting 
together; if people wanted to access that, they could.  I think it's important to still let couples 
know we're here, and we're still interested in what they're doing.  We also keep records of 
them on the computer and one of the questions on the computer is "do you want to be on the 
mailing list?"  Usually they do, but more recently I had a couple who said they received the 
newsletter, but they said that they felt that they'd been through the programme and they don't 
want to have any more news about what's going on, so they asked to be taken off the list.  So 
that's a personal choice.  But, we always enjoy feedback from couples, we always enjoy 
when they come back with their babies or their children, or come in with photographs.  We 
find it the most rewarding part of working in the area. 
 
 
Several recipients said they had sent photos or taken their child in to visit the nurses.  
Meredith said:  
 
Meredith:  [The nurse] used to come around. She came and brought a present for Daniel, and [another 
nurse] used to keep in touch, and then I used to take Christmas cards in every year, and last 
year, I hate to admit, was the first year I haven't.  Daniel used to take a Christmas card in to 
them. Just quickly, just to say hello and just to say thank you, I'll never forget you, and I 
still appreciate what you did (hah).  And even though I don't see them, I still do appreciate 
it. 
 
Her appreciation, it seems, was for the gift of Daniel’s life.  Other recipients spoke of 
the visits they had received from nurses in the hospital after the baby’s birth.  Ella, 
who had given birth to four babies conceived by DI, said: 
 
Ella:   I was on the same floor so they used to wander down, and they always had a whole lot of 
booties.  They always give you a pair of booties with each baby, and a card.  You get to know 
them up there because they're like family. They're nice people, and Dr A’s lovely. 
 
The gift of a pair of booties for the baby is a symbolic gesture recognising the arrival 
of the new life clinic staff had played a part in creating.  While attending the clinic 
over several years, Ella felt she had developed close relationships with the staff, to the 
extent that they had become “like family”.  
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Some mothers said that they had not received a visit from clinic staff because they 
had given birth at some distance from the clinic, but several had taken in their child to 
show clinic staff.  Clare had visited the clinic nurse after she found she was pregnant 
again, this time without the clinic’s assistance.  She said:  
 
Clare:  I took Maria in and I was chatting away, and [the nurse] said did I have any questions over the 
last 12-14 months.  And I say, um, just one.  And she said, “oh what's that?”  And I said, “well, 
can you tell me why I'm four months' pregnant?” “Oh!” [her jaw drops]. You know (she laughs), 
she was a wee bit surprised!  It was a shock to us.  It was more of a shock to [the nurse], and she 
went away and she got our file out and, she said, “what were you told?”  And I told her.  And 
she said, “oh that's not quite what I would have said”. 
 
Clare asked how she could have become pregnant when they were told by a specialist 
that they had very little chance of conceiving without donor sperm.  Having checked 
their file, the nurse informed Clare that she would have interpreted Clare’s husband’s 
results differently, giving them a better chance of conceiving together, thus 
challenging the specialist’s interpretation.  This raises the issue of the uncertainties 
surrounding determining the likelihood of pregnancy in cases where men are 
oligospermic, and the variations that can occur in the interpretation of medical test 
results. 
 
Some couples had initiated contact with the clinic themselves when they wanted to 
conceive another child. Others contacted the clinic when their child was chronically 
ill to find out if the condition could have been inherited from the donor. Kathy was 
unable to find out any information about the donor to shed light on her daughter’s 
medical problems.  She said: 
 
Kathy:   When she was born I asked for more information.  When she was sick we asked for more 
information. She had renal reflux and they wanted to know did anybody else have it. What 
else was there that we needed to know?  We had nothing. 
 
In contrast to Kathy’s situation, Joanna, the mother of Todd and Jessie, said about her 
contact with the clinic: 
 
Joanna: I actually went in because they sent me out information about the donor and I went in and 
gave them a photo, because they like a photo of the children when they're born to put up on 
their board.  And when Todd was sick, they were really good.  They actually got hold of the 
donor and his family history to see if what Todd had was through his side of the family.  They 
were quite good then, because at that stage there was nothing about great-grandparents, or 
grandparents, but now, when Jessie was born they had got all that information. 
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In Joanna’s narrative, her son Todd occupies two contradictory subject positions: as a 
symbolic representation of the ‘success’ of DI programmes and a problematic DI 
child with unexplained chronic illness.  When Todd became ill, Joanna had contacted 
the clinic which had looked into the donor’s medical history to find out if his illness 
could have been attributed to a predisposition inherited from the donor.  From what 
they could find out, this was not the case. Joanna had sent the clinic photos of her 
children because she knew that they liked to ‘advertise’ to other prospective DI 
recipients the products of their shared labours. By displaying the symbols of their 
shared achievements, the clinic strategically involves successful recipients in the 
public face of the clinic in the bid to attract future business. 
 
Conclusion 
The chapter has illustrated how recipient couples negotiate the roles of ‘client’, 
‘patient’ and ‘would-be parent’ in interaction with clinic personnel who adopt 
different subject positions and roles in the clinical setting.  Having been accepted for 
DI treatment, couples have to conform to clinical protocols and procedures in their bid 
to achieve the successful outcome of the normal pregnancy trajectory.  Women’s 
bodies are the focus of treatment, which appeared to have the effect in some cases of 
marginalising men in the treatment process.  This relates to debates in the literature 
about the biomedical focus on establishing the normal pregnancy trajectory in women 
(Cussins, 1998a) and men’s marginal role in this process (Meerabeau, 1991).  This in 
turn, raises the issue of the need to include men, addressing their specific needs, so 
they do not feel excluded from the process of conception.   It also highlights the 
gender issues associated with the different roles in reproduction. 
 
Gender issues were also apparent in the division of labour in the clinic.  Female staff 
members were positioned to provide care and support to clients in the roles of nurse 
or counsellor, and men, held positions of power as doctors and clinical directors, 
taking a more instrumental, outcome-focussed approach.  All couples attend an initial 
consultation with the clinical director, a physician who oversees each couple’s 
pathway through the clinic, changing treatment protocols if and when deemed 
necessary to achieve a successful outcome.   Clinical directors also attend to the 
required formality of gaining informed consent from couples, determining if DI is the 
‘best’ option for each couple, enlisting the help of counsellor as required.  Female 
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nurses educate women in the practical and technical aspects of the monitoring and 
surveillance of their menstrual cycles, and perform or oversee inseminations. 
 
The chapter has engaged with the debates around the role of counselling in fertility 
treatment programmes (see for example, Daniels, 1993; Walker and Broderick, 1999a, 
1999b; Daniels, 1999c), outlining its three separate functions: information giving and 
discussion, therapy and support, and assessment or screening. Counselling is 
generally constructed as information giving, but also involves elements of assessment 
and therapy.  Because the role of the counsellor is not clearcut, and recipients’ needs 
vary, some have been resistant to counselling.  If they saw a counsellor, couples 
generally attended the one recommended counselling session only. Counsellors 
working in DI programmes claimed that if they saw couples more than once, it was 
because they were experiencing stress about some aspect of treatment, at which point 
they assumed a therapeutic or support role.  The question arises whether this was 
adequate to address matters such as some men’s on-going concerns about infertility, 
and other psychosocial issues that might arise after DI conception. 
 
Several comments made by men highlighted their continued marginalisation 
throughout treatment, during pregnancy and after the birth of a child conceived by DI.  
Some clinics actively included men in the treatment process by enabling them to carry 
out the inseminations, thereby constructing themselves as ‘inseminator’ and ‘father’ 
of the potential child.  Similarly, non-biological lesbian mothers constructed 
themselves as a parent of the child through their active involvement in the conception 
process.  Partners’ reported positive experiences of involvement in the insemination 
procedures, suggests that this may be a helpful way of including prospective 
fathers/parents in the procreative process. Such involvement might also help alleviate 
some of the distressing aspects of inseminations reported by some couples.  Concerns 
and anxieties expressed by couples in this chapter raised questions about the possible 
need for follow-up of couples to address some of the psychosocial issues that emerge 
for couples after the birth of a child conceived by DI.  These issues have implications 
for the formulation of policy and practice in this area. 
 
After conceiving, couples’ pregnancies were generally constructed as ‘normal’ events 
to be monitored by maternity caregivers chosen by the couple.  Formally, the 
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relationship between the clinic and recipient couple ended after the entry into the 
normal pregnancy trajectory, but contact or follow-up occurred in ‘exceptional’ cases 
– during multiple pregnancies, after miscarriages or stillbirth, or if babies were sick.  
At one clinic, nurses visited women and their babies at the hospital after their birth, 
bearing gifts and sharing in the celebration of their mutual success.  Couples were 
also enrolled or voluntarily participated in sharing in the public face of the clinic’s DI 
programme by sending photographs of their babies to be posted on the bulletin board, 
thereby advertising the products of their mutual labours, and enticing others to follow 
suit. 
 
The negotiation of clinical worlds for DI recipients is multifaceted.  While inhabiting 
these worlds prospective parents interact with different clinic staff all of whom adopt 
different subject positions with regard to educating, evaluating and caring for 
recipients.  For recipients, the process of trying to conceive a child by DI involves 
negotiating a number of shifting and changing identities as paying client, worthy 
prospective parent, compliant patient, and active agent.  After entering into the normal 
pregnancy trajectory, couples had to negotiate the uncertainties and challenges 
surrounding carrying one or more foetuses to term and, for many, the ambivalences 
about bringing into the world a child conceived with the help of an unknown sperm 
donor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART THREE 
 
Negotiating Relationships after DI 
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Preface to Part III - Negotiating Relationships after DI 
 
 
This section of the thesis examines the implications of the birth of a child conceived 
by DI for relationships within families and between family members and others.  The 
first chapter looks at the issues of secrecy, privacy and disclosure about a DI 
conception in the context of increased criticism of secrecy about DI and arguments 
that favour information-sharing.  The chapter indicates that patterns of secrecy and 
disclosure are complex, ambivalent and embedded in particular social and relational 
contexts that shift and change over time. 
 
Parents’ attitudes and actions in relation to telling or not telling their children how 
they were conceived are the focus of Chapter Nine.  The chapter examines the socio-
political context of information-sharing about DI in New Zealand, and the dominant 
discourse of the ‘right’ of the child to know his/her genetic origins.   Most parents had 
told their children when they were quite young, but some were waiting for the ‘right 
time’ to tell.  Only one parent claimed to have no plans to tell her child about his DI 
conception. 
 
Chapter Ten explores the attitudes of parents and their kin towards donors.  Several 
parents, particularly mothers, claimed to be grateful to the donor for his ‘gift’, and 
some reciprocated by sending donors anonymous thank-you letters, and photographs 
of their children, or planned to become egg donors. Participants’ attitudes towards 
donors varied.  Some were in favour of preserving anonymity, while others claimed to 
have become more curious about the donors over time, anticipating that their children 
might wish to contact them in the future.  Women who were no longer living with the 
social fathers of their children were most likely to express an interest in meeting the 
donors and incorporating them in some way into their lives. 
 
Chapter Eleven argues that, like all families, ‘DI families’ are diverse rather than 
unitary.  The chapter examines the variety of ways that these families respond to some 
of the complex and contradictory issues and uncertainties that emerge for 
relationships within families and with others as a result of conceiving with the help of 
an unknown but potentially knowable sperm donor. 
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Chapter Eight 
Secrecy and Disclosure 
 
Secrecy is as indispensable to human beings as fire, and as greatly feared.  Both enhance and 
protect life, yet both can stifle, lay waste, spread out of all control.  Both may be used to guard 
intimacy or to invade it, to nurture or to consume.  And each can be turned against itself; 
barriers of secrecy are set up to guard against secret plots and surreptitious prying, just as fire 
is used to fight fire (Bok, 1984:18). 
 
 
Introduction 
Donor insemination, as primarily a medical ‘treatment’ for male infertility, has 
traditionally been shrouded in secrecy (Rowland, 1985; Daniels and Taylor, 1993a). 
Over the past two decades, however, the secrecy surrounding DI has been strongly 
criticised. This has been fuelled by the trend towards open adoption and the 
accompanying discourse about the ‘right’ of children to know about their birth/genetic 
origins (Rowland, 1985; Corcoran, 1988; Rockel and Ryburn, 1988; O’Donovan, 
1989; Berry, 1991; Van Keppel, 1991; Daniels and Taylor, 1993a; Blyth, 1999).   
 
Contributors to debates about secrecy and ‘openness’ (now more commonly referred 
to as ‘information-sharing’)1 include social workers, psychologists, other mental 
health professionals working in the field of infertility counselling, other social 
scientists, and increasingly parents who have conceived children by DI, individuals 
conceived by DI, and some donors (see, for example, Snowden, Mitchell and 
Snowden, 1983; Achilles, 1989, 1993a; Baran and Pannor, 1989; Daniels, 1988, 1995, 
1997; Daniels and Taylor, 1993a; Daniels and Lewis, 1996b; Schaffer and Diamond, 
1993; Landau, 1998; Blyth 1998, 1999; DCSG, 1997).  Health professionals working 
in the field of reproductive medicine have also contributed to the debate about secrecy 
and disclosure, particularly in relation to the attitudes of parents towards telling their 
children about their DI conception (Nachtigall, 1993; Leiblum and Aviv, 1997; 
                                                          
1 The shift away from the use of the binary terminology of secrecy and openness and words such as 
anonymity, confidentiality and privacy to ‘information-sharing’ or ‘exchange of information’ reflects a 
move away from controversial, value-laden language and binary logic (Daniels, 1995; Daniels and 
Lewis, 1996b).   
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Nachtigall et al, 1998; van Berkel et al, 1999). Philosophers, such as Pennings (1997, 
1999, 2000), have also made a significant contribution to this debate. 
 
Advocacy of secrecy in the context of DI is seen to revolve around forms of 
protectionism and, in some cases, medical paternalism (Rowland, 1985; Daniels, 
1995:220). Daniels and Taylor (1993a:157-158) suggest that the main reason for 
advocating secrecy, given by those involved, is to protect the child from 
psychological or emotional trauma, and from being stigmatised.  Secrecy has also 
been viewed as a means of protecting the donor from possible unwanted contact and 
disruption to his family life. Secrecy provides a means of protecting the medical 
profession from adverse public reaction to DI (Haimes, 1993b). Others have 
suggested that secrecy primarily protects the recipient couple, and particularly the 
infertile male partner, from the shame of male infertility (Daniels and Taylor, 
1993a:157). Secrecy and anonymity are viewed by some as protecting the social and 
psychological construct of the family resulting from gamete donation, especially 
enhancing the social paternal role of the male in the recipient couple (Shenfield and 
Steele, 1997; Shenfield, 1997).  Haimes (1990) draws attention to the way that DI 
policies and practices protect the ideology of ‘the family’. Shenfield (1997:372) 
argues, furthermore, that anonymity allows couples “to keep the ‘artificial’ means of 
conception of their child a secret if they so wish”, that this wish should be respected, 
and that no evidence suggests that secrecy is deleterious to the child.  
 
In contrast, those who favour information-sharing argue that secrecy is inherently 
harmful because it primarily protects the interests of those who have power to control 
the flow of information. It is particularly harmful, they argue, for those who are 
deprived of information that might be significant to them (Daniels, 1995:220). 
Advocates of information-sharing thus draw on rights discourses that compete with 
those invoked by proponents of secrecy and anonymity. In particular, they draw on 
arguments about the ‘right’ of the child to know his/her genetic origins (Daniels and 
Taylor, 1993a). As discussed in Chapter One, in the New Zealand context, the ‘best 
interests of the offspring’ of assisted reproduction, including the ‘right’ to know one’s 
genetic origins, are constructed as paramount (MCART, 1994). Openness was 
recommended by MCART on the grounds that it better protects the rights and 
responsibilities of both Maori and non-Maori, and that secrecy could not be justified 
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legally2 or culturally (1994:71-92). With respect to the latter, the concept of 
whakapapa, a notion of genealogy based on the knowledge of one’s genetic origins, is 
a significant aspect of Maori culture (MCART, 1994:2-33). Thus, in New Zealand, 
pressure is brought to bear on parents to be ‘open’ rather than secretive about 
conceiving a child by DI.  Other countries considering the implications of AHR, like 
Canada, have also implemented the same guiding principle (Daniels and Lewis, 
1996b:60).  
 
In defence of a philosophy of ‘openness’ or information-sharing (Daniels and Taylor, 
1993a:160-161), protagonists of ‘openness’ in DI also invoke arguments about the 
potential harm to families of harbouring secrets, and DI offspring ‘accidentally’ 
finding out the ‘truth’ of their genetic origins (Landau, 1998).  It is argued that this is 
also more likely to happen in contemporary western societies where access to genetic 
information is becoming more widespread.  Underlying the argument about the harm 
caused by secrecy within families, however, appears to be a general assumption that 
family and kin relationships are based on openness, trust and honesty. However, 
Haimes (1993b) points to the lack of empirical evidence that ‘ordinary’ families 
operate in this way.  They may function instead, Haimes suggests, “on knowing when 
not to say something or when not to ask about certain matters” (1993b:179).  For this 
reason, Haimes (1993b) maintains that the question of secrecy and openness in DI 
needs to be seen in the context of the full range of possible family interactions.   
 
Haimes (1993) also questions the premise she infers from Daniels and Taylor’s 
(1993a) argument that openness and truth are unproblematically “good” and secrecy 
is unproblematically “bad”. This illustrates the way that the binary concepts of 
secrecy and openness are equated with yet another simplistic and problematic 
dichotomy.   Haimes cites Bok (1984), for example, as disputing such claims.  Bok 
(1984:20) argues that all human agents seek a degree of control over secrecy and 
openness as a means of preserving autonomy, freedom and, ultimately, survival. Bok 
also identifies the dangers of secrecy, and that the experience of secrecy is conflicted 
                                                          
2MCART (1994:72) suggested that information about gamete donation was probably “health 
information” as defined by the Health Information Privacy Code 1994, and section 22B of the Health 
Act 1956, and therefore part of the “medical history” of the child conceived by DI.  More 
controversially, the committee suggested that the identity of the donor might also be considered health 
information about the child. 
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and ambivalent.  She argues that conflicts over secrecy are conflicts over the power 
that comes from controlling the flow of information (Bok, 1984:19).  Thus, she 
claims, the issue is not secrecy itself, but rather the control over secrecy and openness 
(1984:23). 
 
In view of these arguments, this chapter presents and investigates empirical evidence 
about how couples (and their kin) manage the flow of information about DI, and the 
relational contexts within which they tell or do not tell others about their child’s DI 
conception.  Rowland (1985b) has argued that talk of ‘protection’ and ‘rights’ is not 
the most useful approach to secrecy and information-sharing in the context of DI.  
Instead, she maintains that the situation for all parties concerned needs to be 
considered and, to do that, the co-operation of recipient couples is needed in research 
in this area (Rowland, 1985:395-6). The chapter thus examines the range of practices 
with respect to secrecy and disclosure adopted by the families in the study with 
children conceived by DI. The complexities, contradictions, conflicts and 
ambivalences that emerged, particularly for parents, are a focus of attention. While it 
has been suggested that there are degrees of privacy and disclosure (Daniels, 1997), I 
consider that secrecy and disclosure are more usefully conceptualised as embedded in 
particular sets of social relations.  For example, people are more likely to disclose 
private information about themselves to people they trust and with whom they share 
close ties, than to those they do not trust or from whom they are estranged.  Thus, the 
sharing or withholding of information takes place in the context of particular 
relationships that shift and change over time. The chapter traverses the sequence of 
events from diagnosis of infertility to the birth of a child conceived by DI. While 
some issues about telling the child of his/her genetic origins emerge in this chapter, 
that topic is more specifically addressed in Chapter Nine. 
 
Keeping Secrets 
The issues that emerge for couples in relation to telling or not telling others about the 
use of DI to conceive a child or children are complex and can have significant 
implications for relationships, particularly in the context of family and kin relations.  
For couples considering conceiving by DI, the discovery of infertility may be 
accompanied by a desire for secrecy, particularly in the initial stages. Several 
researchers in the field of infertility have indicated that infertile men are reluctant to 
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talk about their infertility which has led to them being under-represented in studies in 
this area (Sandelowski, Holditch-Davis, Harris, 1992; Daly, 1992; Lloyd, 1994).  
Infertility researchers point to a belief that male infertility is viewed more negatively 
and carries a greater stigma than female infertility because of associations made 
between male virility, sexuality and procreation (Rowland, 1985; Miall, 1986; Baran 
and Pannor, 1989:25). Secrecy has, therefore, been regarded as a means of protecting 
a man from the stigma of male infertility, and as a means of creating the ‘illusion’ of a 
biological connection between him and any children conceived by DI.   
 
Several men interviewed for this study indicated a desire, at least initially, to keep 
their infertility a secret to protect their self-image and to avoid the stigma attached to 
male infertility. Most were able to discuss their infertility with their partners and 
sometimes with other close family members.  However, Andrew, the father of two 
daughters conceived by DI, was so distressed about his inability to reproduce that he 
had refused to discuss it, and wanted their use of DI to remain a secret. He and his 
wife Annie said: 
 
Andrew: We did get opinions, but at the end of the day it’s become... 
 
Annie: Andrew’s choice. 
 
Andrew: My choice. 
 
Annie: Which I don’t actually agree with. 
 
Andrew:  My choice, that I chose not to talk about my condition to anyone.  None of their business.   
 
KH: But you’ve obviously had a lot of difficulties with it personally. 
 
Andrew: Yeah.  More than I anticipated. 
 
 
Andrew found it difficult to discuss his infertility even with Annie, who recalled the 
consequences for their relationship:  
 
Annie:  We weren't talking at that time.  We weren't talking about it at all.  It was just something we 
didn't do. I couldn't say anything to Andrew.  I mean, he just didn't want to talk about it, and 
that was all there was to it, which was really a hard time. We've got through that and that has 
made us stronger, but I mean, at the time, it was very difficult, especially because you couldn't 
go and tell your friends.  If I did that I was being disloyal to Andrew.  And that was quite 
hard…. Men are different.  They don't talk about these things as much. 
 
KH:  So you felt you were protecting Andrew? 
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Annie:  Yes.  Very much.  In fact I actually...I didn't lie to people, but I indicated that the problem was 
with me. 
 
Annie attended to Andrew’s ‘needs’ rather than her own. She even implied that she 
was the cause of their need to seek assistance to conceive.  Other researchers have 
found that it is not uncommon for women with infertile male partners to protect their 
partners in this way (see Snowden, Mitchell and Snowden, 1983; Sandelowski and 
Jones, 1986; Baran and Pannor, 1989:24-26). Annie indicated that telling outright lies 
would be wrong, but she nonetheless sought to avoid telling the truth because of what 
she construed as her primary obligation to abide by Andrew’s bid for secrecy. This 
illustrated an important distinction between telling lies and keeping secrets: while 
Annie was comfortable telling ‘white’ lies and half-truths, she would not have found 
it morally acceptable to actively tell a lie (Bok, 1978:57-61).3  
 
Despite her desire to be able to confide in a friend, who herself was infertile, Annie 
had managed to maintain their secret. 
 
Annie: I think my friends, well, one of them thinks that I've used somebody else's egg. She's asked a 
lot of questions, and put things together, but hasn't come up with the right answer.  I've just 
told her that it's not my place to say anything.  This is a friend that I see every day.  We're very 
close. We're very, very close, but not close enough where I'd be able to sit down and talk to 
her, because I'm so loyal to Andrew (she laughs).  
 
Annie revealed a tension between her loyalties to her husband, to herself and to her 
friends. The resolution of one tension thus created another. Annie said: 
 
Annie:   I'm not desperate to go out and tell somebody, sort of thing.  Now I've got through all that, it's 
not crucial, but yes, I think it would be nice to be able to confide in people.  Because you're 
not being totally truthful to people, and I think it shuts them out a wee bit.  And I think that 
probably good friends we know do feel that. 
 
 
Annie was particularly uncomfortable that Andrew had refused to tell his mother 
about her granddaughters’ DI conception, and regarded this as a form of deception.  
She said: 
 
Annie:  Whether I'm right or wrong, I don't know.  I feel like we've cheated your mother.  Every time I 
see her with the kids, I think “we've cheated you by not telling you this.”  But Andrew sees it 
quite differently, so we're quite different on those issues. 
 
                                                          
3 Similarly, in their study of families with children conceived by DI, Snowden, Mitchell and Snowden 
(1983:104) also found that couples generally wished to avoid telling lies about their donor conception. 
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Andrew did not think that he was deceiving his mother. He argued that she simply did 
not know about it which was different. He conceded that he suspected that his mother 
had “a bit of an idea” about it, but would respect his wishes to tell her when he felt 
ready and, at the current time, he did not feel ready. This situation raises the issue of 
the varying interpretations of the concept ‘secrecy’.  It also suggests that different 
interpretations and approaches to secrecy, in this case around DI, may be a source of 
stress for couples with differing perceptions. Bok (1984:7) highlights the distinction 
between secrecy and deception.   
 
The link between secrecy and deceit is so strong in the minds of some that they mistakenly 
assume all secrecy (especially when protected by silence) to be deceptive… To confuse secrecy 
and deception is easy, since all deception does involve keeping something secret… But while all 
deception requires secrecy, all secrecy is not meant to deceive.  Consider the many forms of 
secrecy in which there need be no aim to mislead: that which may accompany human intimacy, 
for instance, or protect voters in casting their ballot (Bok, 1984:7). 
 
 
Bok (1984) recognises the different shades of meaning attached to the word secrecy 
including whether something is sacred, intimate, private,4 unspoken, silent, 
prohibited, shameful, stealthy, or deceitful.  For this reason, Bok (1984:7) argues that 
“it would be a mistake to define secrecy in terms of one or two of these meanings, or 
to view it too narrowly by assuming from the outset an evaluative stance either for or 
against secrets in general”. 
 
Psychologists Lane and Wegner (1995:237) note that studies have shown that keeping 
secrets appears to be associated with psychological distress, and that families in which 
an important fact, such as abuse or parentage, has been kept secret over the years will 
often show dysfunctionality related directly to the secret.  At the time of the interview, 
Andrew had reached a stage where he had begun to believe that secrecy was creating 
too much stress for himself, Annie, and their marriage, and that he had resolved to 
become more ‘open’ in the future. 
 
Andrew:  I'm a very closed person, and I've learned that I've got to open up a bit, otherwise you just 
get ulcers and stuff.  Your body goes to bits (he laughs), which can kill you, I guess, if you 
do it too long.  Stress is a great thing, I live on stress, but not that much. 
 
                                                          
4 The concept of privacy, which is closely related to secrecy, is discussed in the next section of this 
chapter. 
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Andrew became more conscious of Annie’s distress relating to his refusal to address 
the emotional issues in relation to his infertility and their use of DI, 5 after Annie 
staged an exhibition of her art works, which depicted different forms of emotional 
expression.  Andrew said: 
 
Andrew:   Annie’s emotions come out in [her art].  And it wasn’t till people who came to the exhibition 
said, “You’ve got a very stressed wife.” They could see her stress, because she’d done a 
piece … and all her figures had great emotion:  stress, anger, all those things. 
 
 
Because Annie had felt unable to talk to anyone about the issues surrounding 
infertility and DI, she turned to art as an ‘outlet’ for her emotions.   
 
One of the ‘trade-offs’ of maintaining secrecy about infertility and fertility treatment 
is cutting oneself off from sources of support (Menning, 1980).  Some mothers of 
children conceived by DI expressed the emotional ‘need’ to tell close friends or 
family about their infertility and the way their children were conceived, even if their 
partner was unwilling to discuss it with anybody.  Like Annie, Jane, the mother of 
twins conceived by DI, also talked about the tension between the perceived need to 
keep DI a secret and her emotional need to tell.  She commented:   
 
Jane:   I’ve sort of had that block from the beginning that I sort of felt that I would have liked to 
probably have seen it as being the norm, rather just sort of keep it to myself, because I felt that I 
would have liked to have shared that with other people. So I do find that really difficult.  It’s 
because I sort of feel that by keeping it to yourself, you actually... it actually stops you from 
going forward in some ways. 
 
Jane’s feeling that she ought to keep her experience of DI a secret illustrates how 
notions about what constitutes a ‘normal’ family have inhibited disclosures about DI 
(Achilles, 1993a).  Jane revealed a tension between believing that conceiving a child 
by DI was not the ‘norm’, and therefore should not be shared with others, and a desire 
to tell others as part of the process of accepting it (i.e. making it ‘normal’) and 
‘moving on’ with her life. Although she believed Steve, her husband, had not 
disclosed to others, Jane said she had told some of her friends about their children’s 
DI origins. 
 
                                                          
5 For further elaboration on Andrew’s reactions to his infertility, including his suicidal feelings and loss 
of a sense of purpose in life, see Chapter Four. 
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Jane:  I don't think Steve's ever told anybody.  I have.  I have told about four or five friends, and they 
were really good about it.  I just sort of blurted it out really I suppose.  I find it really hard not to 
talk to people about it.  I find that I really do need to have, yeah, contact with people.  I sort of 
feel that you can't talk...because you actually go through a situation of having a donor, I sort of 
feel that you're different, I mean, different from other people because you don't just have the 
children naturally, so it will immediately, yeah, I sort of feel from the beginning, you're in a 
different situation. 
 
Jane was caught between two conflicting imperatives:  on one hand, the desire to keep 
her children’s DI conception a secret for fear of social retribution; on the other, she 
felt the need to tell others her ‘secret’ and found that keeping the secret was extremely 
burdensome.  Jane said that she found secrecy to be the “worst thing” about having 
children with the use of DI.  Psychologists Lane and Wegner (1995) argue that 
keeping secrets is a dangerous and difficult business because it requires hard work.  
They maintain that when it is important not to disclose the secrets, “secret-bearers 
must work strategically to make sure that their verbal and non-verbal behaviours do 
not give away the hidden information” (1995:237).  Lane and Wegner propose that 
secret-keeping sets off cognitive processes that result in obsessive pre-occupation 
with the secret.  They hypothesise that suppression of a thought makes the thought 
more accessible to consciousness and, therefore, leads to outbursts in which the secret 
is disclosed.  This hypothesis might in some way account for Jane’s tendency to 
occasionally  “blurt out” her ‘secret’. However, the focus on individual cognitive 
processes neglects the social context in which the secret is disclosed, and does not 
explain why keeping a secret can be distressing for some people and not others.  In 
Jane’s case, as in Annie’s, she was placed in the ambivalent position of wanting to 
share her important experience with friends, while knowing that Steve did not want 
her to do so. 
 
Steve appeared to be more distressed by the fact that he knew Jane had told others 
than by keeping the secret himself. He feared being socially ostracised by family 
members and friends if they found out that their children were conceived by DI.  He 
was especially concerned that they did not tell Jane’s parents because they had 
rejected Jane and Steve’s relationship in the past by refusing to attend their wedding.  
 
Steve:   I don't think that your parents... your parents at the time, because of the climatic conditions 
[their relationship with Jane's parents] and the way they did what they did to you at the 
instance with regard to the wedding and that (Jane laughs nervously).  I mean, that was bad 
enough, you getting married in a church and getting married in white, and getting married 
again and everything else like that. But to actually come up with something like this (Jane 
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laughs), it would be just like the Mayor of Hiroshima, who said, "What the hell was that?”... I 
mean to say, if they excommunicate us, or whatever, we've got an excommunication from our 
family.  
 
Jane: Cut out of the will.  
 
Steve drew on metaphors related to major social disasters to express his concerns 
about the possible repercussions of telling Jane’s parents or friends about their 
children’s donor conception.  In some part, his position appeared to reflect his 
Catholic upbringing and experience of estrangement both within his family (he was 
divorced from his first wife and is estranged from his children from that marriage), 
and fears of further rejection from Jane’s family. When I asked Steve if he thought 
there was a stigma attached to having children by DI, he said: 
 
Steve: I just feel that it can be, a thing that’s there, it’s an underlying thing, nobody really knows.  
You don’t know, it’s an unknown territory.  Whether there would be a stigmatism (sic) placed 
upon it, we have not found any among those that know about it. 
 
Jane: It surprised Steve that I just blurted it out.  “Did you really?” he’d say. “Yes!” [she said] Eh, 
dear? 
 
Steve: Yeah, it’s a sort of thing that some people may react to adversely [and think it was] the wrong 
thing to do, and you know exactly that some people around have got that opinion, and it’s out 
there in the community.   
 
 
Steve’s comments illustrate Goffman’s (1963:14) contention that there arises in those 
who are stigmatised a sense of not knowing what others “really” think about them.  
Steve’s fears of social reprisal do not appear entirely justified because Jane said that 
the friends she had told had all been supportive. She had told Steve’s sister, a former 
maternity nurse, who had been supportive and helped look after the twins when they 
first came home after their birth. Moreover, because Steve had had children 
biologically related to him in his first marriage, and his current infertility arose from a 
failed vasectomy reversal, he did not consider it an “issue” in the way that other men 
did. Steve appeared to justify his desire for secrecy on the basis that he needed to 
protect his children from the social slur of being ‘different’.  He said: 
 
Steve:  The main thing is the impact upon those two children down there [he points to the children 
playing in the room]…is the important thing that I've, or we consider, is the effect, or what's 
the effect.  I mean to say, I can be mercenary about things.  I, you know, that's why Jane says 
to me I've been too cold-hearted about the whole thing.  
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Although Steve invoked an argument about the need to protect his children from harm 
by keeping their DI origins a secret from others, he also may have been concerned 
about protecting his own interests in perpetuating the belief that the children were his 
biological offspring. Other researchers have found that when social fathers of children 
conceived by DI invoked an argument about the need to protect their children, their 
primary agenda was to protect themselves (Snowden, Mitchell and Snowden 1983). 
Andrew, for example, argued that by not telling others of his daughters’ DI origins, he 
was protecting them from being labelled ‘science kids’ or ‘test-tube babies’. Annie, 
however, challenged his motives for invoking this particular argument, and claimed 
that his underlying motive was to protect himself.  She said: 
 
Annie:  And then I've accused Andrew of using this for his own ends, to prevent him from telling 
people, haven't I?  I've accused you of actually using this idea to stop you from facing up to 
the fact that you should tell your mother.  
 
Andrew: Yes, that's probably correct, yes.  
 
Annie:   And I wonder if actually Andrew's reasoning for putting the girls first is a little bit of 
protection for himself.  
 
Andrew: Well, obviously it is.  I won't deny that.  
 
Annie: Well, you said it wasn't.  
 
Andrew: With the realisation that, one day, the fat lady sings, you know.  
 
Andrew appeared to recognise that one day he would have to tell his mother because 
he had come to the conclusion that to be ‘fair’ to his daughters, he would have to tell 
them about their DI origins.6
 
Jane’s ambivalence about telling her parents was embedded in her relationship with 
them: 
 
Jane: I think I might have told my parents, but the thing is, we actually lost ties with them about the 
time, about six months before we got married, I think.  They decided not to tell us that they 
wouldn't come to our wedding. But they actually sent back the thing to say that they're not 
coming to our wedding, because I was getting married again, and I got married in a church, and 
I got married in white, so, my father was quite against it… 
 
                                                          
6 See Chapter Nine for a discussion of Andrew’s plans to tell his children about their DI conception, 
and to then be more ‘open’ with others. 
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I was hoping, when you [the interviewer] were coming last time,7 I would sort of talk to them, 
but my father's having lots of problems with his health, and I don't want to add to the stress.  I 
was hoping to talk to them, but I would go past where we got married and there's like a still 
silence in the car, and I think well, hey, you know.  I haven't really accepted how they treated 
me... I'd like to tell them, but it's just getting worse and worse... it seems to get longer and 
longer, and it gets... every time I want to talk about it, there's sort of like... I know that Steve 
gets quite stressed about it and so do I really. 
 
But, you know, it just makes it really difficult. My brother doesn't know, and my sister does. 
Um, a few friends know, but I do find that side of it really difficult, I really find it really hard.  
Sort of like a barrier, I suppose. 
  
 
Much of Jane’s ambivalence about telling her parents seemed to be attributable to 
fears about how they might react, which were reinforced by Steve’s concerns about 
the risks of telling.  Steve’s sense of risk was significant. 
 
Steve: It’s like knowing there’s a minefield there, and you have to be able to cross it without anything 
going off.  It’s an area where you know there’s the hidden dangers, the chances are that you’ll 
have acceptance or you’ll have rejection. 
 
Steve pointed out that perhaps there is always a risk in sharing secrets.  Jane was still 
considering the costs and benefits of taking such a risk.  On one hand, she wanted to 
bridge the gap between her and her parents by telling them an intimate detail about 
her children’s genetic origins.  On the other hand, Jane thought that they had rejected 
her in the past and might do so again. She was also concerned about the possible 
repercussions for her parents. At the same time, maintaining the secret appeared to be 
increasingly burdensome for Jane, particularly because she perceived it as a barrier to 
intimacy with others.  She raised a point about the longer a secret is kept, the harder it 
is to tell and, presumably, the more work is required to keep the secret from being 
revealed. 
 
The conflicts over secrecy and disclosure experienced by Andrew and Annie and 
Steve and Jane reveal some of the dangers of secrecy.  Bok (1984) suggests that while 
some capacity for keeping secrets and choosing when to reveal them is essential, 
keeping secrets can also harm and debilitate.  She contends that shutting out criticism 
or feedback from others may lead to people becoming “mired down in stereotyped, 
unexamined, often erroneous beliefs and ways of thinking”, or may “lower resistance 
                                                          
7 Our initial interview was to take place during Jane’s parents’ visit.  Although she had planned to use 
the impending interview as an opportunity to tell her parents about the twins’ DI conception, she had 
been unable to do so.  The interview was subsequently rescheduled for after her parents’ departure. 
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to the irrational and the pathological” (Bok, 1984:25).  As Bok suggests, because 
secrecy can impair judgement and choice, and become obsessive, it can negatively 
affect others, even when this is not intended. 
 
“It’s not a secret. It’s just something they don’t know” 
For many parents of children conceived through DI, the issue is not so much to do 
with secrecy as it is about privacy and confidentiality.  Writers often distinguish 
between secrecy and privacy (see Warren and Laslett, 1977; Tefft, 1980; Bok, 1984). 
Some have defined secrecy as involving obligatory concealment, and privacy as 
involving voluntary concealment (Tefft, 1980:13).  Warren and Laslett (1977:44) 
claim that privacy and secrecy can be differentiated by the moral dimension of the 
behaviours to which they refer. They argue that secrecy implies the concealment of 
something that is illegitimate, or negatively valued.  Thus, according to Tefft 
(1980:14), stigmatised persons keep secrets to protect themselves from economic, 
legal or social punishments.  In comparison, privacy can be seen as something that 
protects behaviour that is generally regarded as legitimate, morally neutral or valued 
(such as consensual marital relations) (Warren and Laslett, 1977:44).  
 
Writing about the sociological significance of the secret, Simmel (1950:331) contends 
that secrets are “the sociological expression of moral badness”. Simmel (1950:334-
335) also suggests that secrecy has a dual role in that “social conditions of strong 
personal differentiation permit and require secrecy in a high degree; and, conversely, 
the secret embodies and intensifies such differentiation”. In her review of the 
literature on family secrets, Brown-Smith (1998:25) argues that this definition tends 
to emphasise the negativity of secrecy.  Her more neutral definition, in relation to 
family secrets, is that “a family secret is any information that directly affects or 
concerns one but is either withheld or differentially shared between or among family 
members” (Brown-Smith, 1998:23). 
 
Different meanings have also been applied to the concept of privacy.  Margulis 
(1977:10) suggests that privacy represents the control of transactions between persons 
with the aim of enhancing autonomy and/or minimising vulnerability.  Laufer and 
Wolfe (1977) argue that privacy relates to the preservation of personal dignity through 
the management of information and interaction.  They also suggest that privacy 
 266
relates to the life cycle: at various developmental stages in life (e.g. becoming an adult 
or a parent) patterns of privacy change.  Thus, privacy is often conceived of as a 
dynamic, relational concept involving the management of self-other boundaries 
(Derlega and Chaikin, 1977; Foddy and Finighan, 1980).  Similarly, Bok (1984:11) 
defines privacy as limiting physical access to one’s ‘personal space’ or to information 
about personal matters.  According to Bok (1984), secrecy and privacy overlap, 
particularly in the private lives of individuals where secrecy guards against unwanted 
access by others to information central to personal identity.  Given the private and 
personal aspects of reproduction and its association, particularly for men, with 
sexuality and virility, it is clear that secrecy and privacy may overlap considerably.  
As exemplified in the cases of Annie and Andrew and Steve and Jane, this overlap 
might become a source of conflict between partners.  For example, one might 
consider secrecy unnecessary and inappropriate among close family and friends and 
might associate the withholding of information in this context with negative 
constructs of lying, deceit and dishonesty, rather than the more positive meanings 
associated with privacy and confidentiality.   
 
That decisions about secrecy and disclosure are related to the meanings people attach 
to ‘secrecy’ is illustrated by a recent study on the disclosure decision amongst parents 
of children conceived by DI (Nachtigall et al, 1998).8  This study revealed that 
disclosers used the term ‘secrecy’ in a negative psychologic sense and made reference 
to the harm to family relationships incurred by keeping “family secrets” (Nachtigall et 
al, 1998:1166).  In contrast, non-disclosers derived their stance from the principle of 
confidentiality and discourses about the right to privacy and freedom from unwanted 
intrusion. Illustrating the latter stance, and also the way in which secrecy and privacy 
overlap (Bok, 1984), Paul and Fiona considered that their decision to have a child by 
DI was personal, and they did not initially tell any family or friends about it.  When 
asked why, they said: 
 
Fiona:  I didn't really want to talk about it, because, I mean, at that time I don't think it was sort of 
known a lot about it.  You know, it was sort of new and that.  Whereas IVF was more… that 
                                                          
8 This study, carried out in the United States by Nachtigall et al (1998), explores patterns of disclosure 
and non-disclosure among couples with children conceived by DI, particularly in relation to informing 
their child of their DI conception.  When asked if they had told, or planned to tell, their children about 
their DI conception, 54% of the sample were categorised as ‘nondisclosers’, 30% as ‘disclosers’ and 
16% as ‘undecided’.   
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was always on the radio, and those kind of things and in the magazines there's a lot about 
that...but not about donor. 
 
Paul: Did you ever think that if you said anything you might finish up having to defend what you'd 
done?                                                    
                                                                              
Fiona: Yeah, in some ways, yeah. 
 
KH: Do you think people might judge you in some way?  
 
Fiona: I don't think our real friends...like Trudy and Neville would, would they?  
 
Paul: Well, I don't...you know, my attitude is more...it's not an issue, so once you start saying these 
things you run the risk of um, this is a big issue sort of thing, and you're almost inviting 
comment, or you know, this question of having to get into a philosophical argument, when 
you don't want to get involved in it.  It's just, why do I have to defend myself over this, sort of 
thing, of what's happening? 
 
Fiona:  And it was between Paul and I that made the decision… 
 
On some level, Paul and Fiona felt that DI was not socially acceptable. As a result, 
they felt most comfortable keeping their decision to have a child by DI to themselves.  
They may also have felt less of an emotional need to disclose to others because they 
already had one son who was biologically related to both of them, but had been 
unable to conceive a second child (and “complete” their family) because of Paul’s 
lower sperm count.  Paul also believed strongly that his daughter, Elise should be the 
first to know about her DI conception, chiefly because of his experience as a young 
man of finding out that his ‘uncle’ was, in fact, his cousin.  He recalled: 
 
Paul: Mum said to me out of the blue one day…I'm not sure how old I was, but probably, maybe sort 
of early teens…said my uncle wasn't really my uncle, but was my aunty's son born out of 
wedlock.  And here's this person I'd been, you know, was my mother's brother…I thought was 
always my mother's brother, was not really.  It was almost...it was a cousin to me and ah, while 
it never affected me much, it just seems such a surprise…I said, “Why did I have to know this 
way?” sort of thing.                                                
 
He was told when he was 21, at a party away from home, by someone who had nothing to do 
with the family or something.  And from then on he was um...it really screwed him up. And that 
sort of played on my mind, and so for me there was that issue.  And the other issue for me was 
that Elise had to be the first one to know. 
 
 
Paul thought that the ‘accidental’ revelation by an outsider to his uncle/cousin had 
ruined this man’s life, and he therefore wished to avoid his daughter having the same 
experience.9  Thus, unlike Steve, who was primarily concerned about others’ 
                                                          
9 Curran (1997:26) reports a similar situation in which an Irish immigrant to the United States 
discovered from his birth certificate, when attempting to take out US citizenship, that his ‘aunt’ was in 
fact his ‘mother’.  As a result, he embarked on a career of alcoholism that finally killed him.  
According to old family letters, it was the family lie that destroyed him, not the illegitimacy – his loss 
of trust in his family coincided with his alcoholism.   
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reactions to his conceiving a child by DI, for Paul, protecting his child from harm was 
a paramount concern.  Paul wanted his daughter to be told at a time that he 
determined, and their power to control the flow of information would be potentially 
undermined by telling others.10  
 
The reasons other parents gave for non-disclosure were often similarly complex, and 
related to experience of family relationships, geographical proximity to significant 
others, and a variety of contingencies.  Mike and Caroline also chose not to disclose 
to others while they were having DI treatment.  Caroline said: 
 
Caroline:  [I decided] I would play it by ear.  It wasn't as if I wanted to keep it a great big secret, but 
then I didn't feel the need to go out and rush and tell everyone.  It was our personal business, 
and still to this day, there's a lot of our very good friends who don't know...it was something 
that I thought I would deal with in the future. I didn't make a decision either way, right there 
and then.  I didn't think to myself, “I'm never going to tell this child.”  It was something that 
I thought I would play it as to how I felt about the situation, because it was still new. 
 
 
Caroline’s comments illustrate Bok’s contention that secrecy about one’s plans is 
necessary “not only to protect their formulation but also to develop them, perhaps to 
change them, at times to execute them, even to give them up” (1984:23).  Like other 
couples who are attempting to conceive, at the early stages of DI treatment, Caroline 
did not know how their plans would unfold: whether she would get pregnant, the 
outcome of the pregnancy and so on, so it was important to keep their plans to 
themselves.  
 
Mike contended that they did not have the time to tell anyone because, just as they 
started DI treatment, they moved to a new city where they knew no one.  The couple 
said that the private and personal nature of infertility and fertility treatment did not 
make good dinner-party conversation, nor was it something one raised over the phone 
talking with geographically-distant kin.  Caroline’s sister, Mandy, was the first person 
they told about their daughter’s DI conception.  Caroline recalled the occasion: 
 
Caroline: I had brought Toni down when she was about eight weeks old from the North Island, down 
to meet the family basically and my sister was going through a rough patch at the time. Life's 
                                                          
10 To control the flow of information to others about their DI conception, Paul first told their daughter 
Elise of her DI origins when she was five years old.  He and Fiona then informed their older son of her 
origins and then their parents.  They were unsure if other family members knew, or whom Elise might 
have told. Their strategy worked for them, in that Elise’s DI origins has not become an “issue”. 
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pretty tough, gee...she'd had one child and her second baby had just been born and her 
husband had lost his job.  And I said, “Oh well, look, you know, you've got a nice healthy 
baby, and da da da,” and then I just sort of... it was the right time to tell her, so I told her.  
And she was just amazed.  She couldn't believe that we could have gone through that and not 
told anyone.  And she said, “Why didn't you tell us?”  And I said, “Well I don't know.”  It 
wasn't that we were... we certainly weren't ashamed of it or anything like that. 
 
 
Caroline did not disclose to her mother until after their second daughter, Lucy, was 
born, three and a half years after beginning treatment. Initially, she attributed not 
telling her mother to the physical distance between them, but later, she acknowledged 
that other factors in her relationship with her mother might account for her delayed 
disclosure. By the time she told her mother, Caroline decided she could tell because 
she no longer cared what her mother thought.  
 
Caroline:  I think I might know now why I left it so late.  Because I remember my mother making a 
comment once about somebody who'd had... it might have been donor insemination or 
surrogacy...and sort of scoffing at it.  Because here was she who'd had seven babies, plomp, 
plomp plomp, just like that, you know, and obviously thought… Not that I ever thought for 
one minute that they'd disown the children.  I never thought that.  But it was just I knew all 
the questions that were going to be asked, and I just couldn't be bothered I suppose when 
Toni was a new born baby, going through all those questions... the whys, the what ifs and all 
the rest. Whereas, when I told my sister, I knew that she wasn't going to ask silly questions. I 
suppose I didn't trust my mother enough to think that she would ask the right questions. 
 
As in Jane’s case, the issue of ‘trust’ was related to how Caroline’s mother might 
react, rather than whom she might tell.  In neither case was trust about keeping the 
secret. Although she did not expect her mother to reject the children, Caroline did not 
trust her not to question her decision to have DI or to judge her in some way. 
 
Caroline:  My mother had seven children so easily and here was us who had to have help with one and 
as it was she ended up being a caesarean (she laughs).  I didn't feel like a failure, but I often 
thought my Mum would have thought, “What's wrong with these girls nowadays?  Can't they 
just have babies normally?” (she laughs). 
 
 
Caroline was concerned that others might perceive their conception and birth as not 
‘normal’ and it threatened her competence as a woman.  Although she had not trusted 
her mother enough to tell her initially, the question arises why she did not tell her 
sister, with whom she was “close”. 
 
Caroline:  My sister was surprised.  Probably more from the fact that we had gone through the whole 
pregnancy and had Toni before we had actually even told her.  I think she thought she 
probably deserved to know before then, and she probably did because we’re quite close.  At 
the time it was really personal just to us, and we just wanted to get through it, I suppose.  
Comes back to the thought of having frozen sperm.  Okay, you can achieve a pregnancy but 
can you hold it?  So you wanted to make sure, and then you wanted to make sure that the 
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baby was going to be fine, and that all fingers and toes would be there, and that sort of thing.  
And once that initial worry is over, then it was easier. 
 
 
Although Caroline had eventually found the “right time” to disclose to close family 
members, Mike had not found the “right time” to tell his family members.  He said: 
 
Mike:    I have not made a decision not to tell my sisters.  I have not found a time suitable to do it.  
I'm certainly not going to talk about it when we're all together.  I'm wary as to which one I'd 
tell first, because of the way that we'd be...  
 
Caroline:  Construed.  
 
Mike: So, if and as and when they show some interest or we get closer and we have more time 
together, then they will be told.  I'm not concerned about that.  The longer it goes I guess, the 
possibility is that it'll be harder to do, and I might question the need to tell, but it's not a 
secret, it's just something they don't know. 
 
Mike’s recognition that the longer he kept the information a secret from his family 
members, the less likely he would ever tell, highlights the issue of the difficulty of 
shifting from a position of non-disclosure to one of disclosure when the information 
has been withheld for a long time.  Because disclosure about personal matters often 
takes place in the context of intimate relationships, withholding information may raise 
a question about the level of trust or intimacy that exists between people.  
 
Illustrating the point made above, Mary said that she had not told a close friend about 
her children’s DI origins.  The friend had commented that her children did not 
resemble her and her husband and now she felt it was too late to do so.  
 
Mary:   I've never told this other friend of mine Barbara, even though we're very close.  And I sort of 
don't feel as if I should tell her now.  
 
Brendan:  They have asked... “Jason's not like you”…They have asked, well not asked, but sort of 
queried, commented that, you know...  
 
Mary: Jason's not like us...and I think I've left it too late.  I just feel that if I tell her now, she'll be 
upset that I've never told her before, and yet I never really told her because I didn't tell 
another friend because her husband was a real gossip and I just couldn't tell her because I 
was scared that he'd go around and gossip and tell the whole world, you know. So, it is a bit 
hard sometimes. 
 
 
Mary’s experience reveals how decisions about secrecy and disclosure are made not 
just on the level of one-to-one relations, but in the context of the web of social 
relations in which people are embedded.  The essential element here is trust and, in 
particular, trust in people who are some distance removed. 
 271
 
Several couples commented that they would tell about their child’s means of 
conception only if they believed a person “needed to know”.  This decision was often 
made in relation to whether anything could be ‘gained’ in terms of support or 
approval for the decision to have a child by DI.  In these situations, couples would opt 
for non-disclosure if they believed that a person’s values, morals or worldview would 
preclude them from accepting it or being supportive. Caroline and Mike used this 
premise to justify not telling the priest who baptised their daughters about their donor 
conception.  Caroline said: 
 
Caroline:  When we got them baptised, I felt that perhaps I should have told the priest, but then I 
couldn't.  
 
Mike: Well you put them on the spot because their policy is “Thou shalt not...” They're not 
supposed to do it.  
 
Caroline:  I did feel a little odd about that.  Well, I...  
 
Mike: Our priest, the one who married us...  
 
Caroline:  He'd have been all right.  And Father Matthew, he would have been fine. 
 
Mike: One of the military padres, he's no problem.  And he also knew my sisters, but I wouldn't 
take the chance on a person who I don't know that well.  So, why expose them to something 
when there is no advantage that can be gained? 
 
Caroline:  Well, I suppose that's what I thought in the end.  He probably doesn't need to know, and I 
suppose I thought well, you know, if there is a God up there, he would understand why we 
did it, and the reasons for it, and hey, I'll bring these children up to be good children. 
 
Mike and Caroline’s decision had more to do with the type of relationship they had 
with the particular priest rather than because of his position.  If they knew the priest 
well, and trusted him to understand their position, they might well have chosen to tell 
him. By telling him they risked being told the church’s ‘official line’ that condemns 
DI as immoral (Lauritzen, 1993:90-91).  
 
Kathy, mother of a daughter conceived by DI, chose not to disclose her daughter’s 
origins to her English grandmother, for reasons similar to Caroline and Mike’s.  She 
said: 
 
Kathy:  I'd heard her views over the years on other members of the family that had had children out of 
wedlock. And she was quite a strict upper class old English lady, and when you get the 
aristocratic type, they've got very fixed views, and she wouldn't have approved of my doing it 
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by choice, I would think.  Yeah, and that mattered.  Not so much that it mattered as such, but I 
thought, well what would be gained from telling her?  There would be no support or goodwill 
gained on behalf of Melissa.  There would be no support for me gained by telling her this.  If 
anything it would... nowadays I would probably look at what would be gained by saying 
something. 
 
Like Kathy, Alice and Peter, who had told most of their close family members about 
their daughter’s donor origins, decided not to tell certain of their relatives whom they 
regarded as holding “bigoted” views. They said: 
 
Alice:  Auntie Joyce is very strong-minded and quite bigoted at times, about all sorts of things, and it's 
just...  
 
Peter: And it would be a mistake to tell her. Not so much, I mean we've never really been...we've never 
wanted to keep the information from people, except we've come to realise that kind of the 
ultimate test is whether or not it could ultimately be hurtful to Erica in some way.  So, we'd 
really only tell people who're likely to treat the information in the appropriate way. 
 
Like Paul, when deciding whom to tell and not to tell, Peter revealed that protecting 
their child was the paramount consideration.  This, in turn, supports the contention 
that a reason often given for keeping DI a secret is to protect the child from possible 
harm (Daniels and Taylor, 1993:157).11 Kathy’s and Peter and Alice’s experiences 
also illustrate that non-disclosure is a tool for managing identity. 
 
Privacy as a means of impression management 
Non-disclosure is significantly about managing self-other boundaries and about 
managing self-identity which, as previously stated, connect to the concept of privacy  
(Foddy and Finighan, 1980).  These authors contend that: 
 
Privacy is the possession by an individual of control over information that would interfere with 
the acceptance of his [sic] claims for an identity within a specified role relationship (Foddy and 
Finighan, 1980:6). 
 
Foddy and Finighan argue that privacy is a dynamic process which “does not seem to 
be important in situations when people feel completely at ease with their relationships 
with others and where the others’ standards are the same as their own” (1980:9-10).  
However, in situations where standards clearly or potentially differ, the individual 
attempts to manage his/her identity, or the definition of self that he/she seeks to 
                                                          
11 It should be noted, however, that in these cases the parents do not intend keeping the secret from the 
child him/herself.  Thus, they are not seeking to protect the child from knowledge of their DI origins, 
rather to protect them from other people’s possible reactions to this information. 
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project or publicly claim (Foddy and Finighan, 1980:3).  This relates to Goffman’s 
work on stigma and the management of a “spoiled identity” (1963).  Foddy and 
Finighan (1980) acknowledge the significance of Goffman’s work in the area of 
privacy and impression management.  They also cite Weinstein and Deutschberger’s 
argument that individuals give off ‘impressions’ aimed at influencing the other’s 
perception of the situation and the individual’s identity (1980:3).  In this way, the 
individual seeks to control the alternatives the other will have when identifying him. 
 
Several couples talked about non-disclosure as a way of managing their public ‘face’ 
in two particular semi-public contexts: the antenatal group, and the workplace. The 
former social context was more often raised by women, and the second by men.  
Alice, the mother of a daughter conceived by DI, had not wanted to disclose to the 
antenatal group about her infertility problems or about her daughter’s DI conception. 
She said: 
 
Alice: [I feel ‘different’] in one context and that's when we meet with our antenatal classes that we 
went through with Erica when she was born.  Almost all of those women…there are only two of 
us who are not onto the second child already…have had the second child or are about to.  …We 
never disclosed to that group about Erica being different and she very much, you know, I do feel 
the difference a bit there. I haven't been able to be open about our fertility problems, because I 
didn't want to have to disclose the history of it to them so far. 
 
Alice did not feel comfortable disclosing within a group situation where she might be 
considered ‘different’.12 Alice and Peter compared their struggle to achieve a 
pregnancy and the birth of a child with the apparent ease with which others in the 
group appeared to have had children. 
 
Peter:   It was a bit hard anyway, because half of them are rabbits (he laughs). 
 
Alice: Breeding like rabbits  (we all laugh). 
  
Peter: That's shocking [he says ironically]… they were young and kind of fertile couples weren't 
they?  Whereas we're not (he laughs). 
  
Alice: Every meeting there'd sort of...  
 
Peter: There'd be another one.  
 
Alice: ... be comments about who's pregnant now, and da da da, you know.  It's been quite a big sort 
of issue.  They've stopped asking me which is quite good (she laughs).  I probably will tell 
                                                          
12 Self-perception of being ‘different’ and the perception of others of difference are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter Eleven. 
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them that we have fertility problems.  But I don't know if I'll tell them about the DI.  I'm not 
sure about that.  We don't have that kind of closeness of relationship. 
 
 
Peter’s unflattering remark about others in the antenatal group “breeding like rabbits” 
reveals the ambivalence ‘infertile’ people often feel about those who appear to 
reproduce with ease. Alice and Peter’s age and their inability to conceive so 
effortlessly set them apart from others in the antenatal group making it more difficult 
for them to disclose about their infertility problems and DI conception. Non-
disclosure in this context was also related to the fact they did not feel they were 
among sympathetic others who shared the stigma of male infertility (Goffman, 
1963:20). 
 
Further illustrating that non-disclosure is a form of stigma management, Sandra said 
that she would not tell others in the Multiple Birth Club that her triplets were 
conceived by DI. She said: 
 
Sandra:  One of the multiple birth mums knows that I was at the infertility clinic, but she doesn't think 
that our kids are natural kids because we had to go through the infertility clinic, whereas her 
children were naturally conceived, so therefore they're definitely her children.  And therefore 
in that kind of a situation I feel there is no point at all in saying the rest of it. I guess that we do 
prejudge people's attitudes and that may be wrong, but generally, if I felt that there was going 
to be bad vibes about the person being told, I wouldn't tell them. If I felt that somebody was 
going to be very uncomfortable with me telling them, then I wouldn't tell them, but it's not 
because I want to hide something, it's only because I think that they would not respond well to 
it. 
 
 
Sandra’s reasons for non-disclosure link to Shenfield’s contention that anonymous 
sperm donation protects privacy because it enables recipient couples to keep the 
“artificial” means of conception of their child a secret if they so wish (1997:372).  It 
also highlights that thinking about children’s means of conception in these binary 
terms contributes to the perpetuation of differentiation (Simmel, 1950:334), prejudice, 
and public ignorance about the many forms of assisted conception. 
 
Several fathers of children conceived by DI commented that it was difficult to raise 
the subjects of infertility or DI in their respective workplaces.  Neil commented: 
 
Neil:  I mentioned to my boss that I was going over to Adelaide and what it was for - FSA (a 
conference of the Fertility Society of Australia).  He was a bit uncomfortable with the subject I 
thought, which was interesting. 
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Because his boss seemed uncomfortable when Neil raised the issue of infertility, he 
would be unlikely to disclose to him that he had children through DI.  Similarly, 
others had found that alluding to difficulties having children was a conversation 
“stopper”.  Diane said: 
 
Diane:  [People] almost get embarrassed don't they when people mention things like that. It's like 
when people say to you, "Well, when are you going to have some more children?" and I say to 
them, "Oh, I've had a couple of miscarriages," and they immediately shut up (she laughs).  
That's people you don't know very well.  "When are you going to have children?" (she laughs). 
 
While Diane suggested that topics such as infertility might be met with silence, some 
men commented that they would not disclose to others at work about their infertility 
or having children conceived by DI because they might become the butt of jokes.  
This highlights the difference between people’s reactions to female infertility and 
male infertility.  Peter opted for non-disclosure as a way of protecting his reputation, 
illustrating Foddy and Finighan’s contention that a certain level of ignorance is often 
necessary in certain social situations because information about identity in one 
situation can interfere with the maintenance of an identity in another situation 
(1980:9). 
 
Peter:  There were people at my work, who I would have liked to have told, but I didn't think would 
be… would consider the information sort of… or use it appropriately. Just always be a little bit 
concerned that they'd think less of me, or… 
 
Alice: The sort of people who joke about… sort of… make jokes about manliness, and you know…                                        
 
Peter: You know just workplace humour really, you know… pretty innocent, but just didn't really 
want to be kind of... the butt of jokes.  So, not that I think they would have done it 
deliberately.  It would have been pretty innocent because they had reasonable regard for me, 
but even so, you know, I just didn't feel comfortable telling them. 
 
 
Peter’s concerns that work colleagues might think ‘less’ of him if he told them about 
his infertility illustrate the way that notions of male fertility, virility and sexuality are 
so strongly intertwined in our culture (Rowland, 1985; Miall, 1986; Baran and 
Pannor, 1989:25).  In this circumstance, non-disclosure operates as a form of self-
protection in terms of avoiding disruption or damage to a workplace identity. 
 
Peter’s mother-in-law, Janine, also aware about the stigma of male infertility, had 
made the decision not to tell her husband.  She said: 
 
 276
Janine:  I have never discussed this with my husband, because he's Alice's step-father.  And he has real 
macho feelings about things.  And I just feel that if he knew, that he would think less of Peter.  
And I don't want to...so I just never...he knows...I think he thinks that it's an IVF baby... that 
she's IVF, but he doesn't know that it's donor sperm. 
 
Janine’s decision raises the issue of the relative social acceptability of IVF and the 
possible inacceptability of having to use donor sperm, because of the stigma attached 
to male infertility, and the negative connotations of DI which have kept it a public 
secret for so long.  Like Sandra’s experience in the Multiple Birth Club, it also 
illustrates the way in which secrecy, which is most likely to be deployed in 
circumstances of social differentiation, also serves to intensify such differentiation by 
limiting public knowledge and potential acceptance of it (Simmel, 1950:334-335).   
 
Other participants in this research commented that, if they disclosed to others about 
their experience of assisted conception, they intimated that it was IVF rather than DI.  
Joanne, grandmother of Richard and Belinda’s daughter Madison, said: 
  
Joanne:  I do actually find I don't actually say to people that it's a donor.  I actually say it's an IVF 
[baby] and people sort of know this word, and whether it's through ignorance of not knowing 
what it is, but they just leave it at that.  And Belinda actually said to me when I was selling 
[cosmetics], a few people had sort of said, oh they'd had a few problems, and Belinda said, 
"Just say to them it's IVF Mum, and then they think they know, or they don't wish to ask any 
more questions."  And it just seems to work like that.  It's just one of those subjects, you tell 
them something and so they leave it.  
 
This scenario indicated that while IVF and ‘test-tube’ babies were publicly visible and 
positively associated with the ‘miracles’ of modern medicine, DI was less well known 
and negatively associated with male infertility, and the use of sperm from an unknown 
third party. Joanne’s comments revealed that there is a fine line between arguing on 
the basis of what is known and understood, and protecting against the potential stigma 
of male infertility.  
 
Some couples spoke of the difficulty of controlling who knew about their fertility 
treatment.  Diane and Chris travelled a long distance for fertility treatment, which 
involved taking time off work, so it was difficult to keep it a secret.  However, they 
had some control about what people knew. They said: 
 
Diane:   Like my work mates don't know, for example.  Your [Chris’s] work mates don't know do 
they? 
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Chris:   No.   They know we go to Auckland, but they just think we're going for IVF.  It's quite a 
convenient little...yeah...because you can't hide it, because there's so much emotional stuff that 
goes with it.  You're always away...so...yeah…. 
 
KH: Would you not tell people at work because it feels uncomfortable, or because you just don't 
have those sort of relationships? 
 
Chris:   No.  I mean it's not...yeah...it's just not their business.  I mean it's not a secret.  
 
KH:   It's not appropriate? 
 
Chris:   Yeah.  It's not for open broadcast.  It's just the way it is. 
 
The couple did not frame their non-disclosure at work as a form of secrecy; it simply 
was not their colleagues’ business. Like other parents mentioned in this chapter who 
did not share information that they thought was not other people’s ‘business’, non-
disclosure was used as a tool to protect their privacy. 
 
Like Chris, several couples said that they did not wish to “broadcast” information 
about their child’s origins.  For parents like Sean and Pippa, this was a way of 
protecting their vulnerable child from the possibility of social stigma. 
 
Sean:   We don't want to tell the whole world. 
 
Pippa: No, not yet anyway.  As Elspeth grows up, probably more people will find out about it, 
because it's something that she might mention, directly or indirectly.  And that's something 
that we'll deal with. 
 
KH: But at the moment its close family and friends?  
 
Pippa: Yes.  People that matter in our lives.  Not just anyone.  We don't want her feeling different.  I 
think that's quite important because I think people treat you differently if they know you're 
different.  And I don't want her known as the donor baby.  I want her known as Sean's baby, 
our baby.  
 
Pippa emphasised that she wanted her daughter’s identity firmly established as their 
daughter – not as a child who might be labelled as a “donor baby” and therefore seen 
as not entirely theirs.  After all, the term “donor baby” implies that a baby was “given 
by someone else”.  At the same time, Pippa acknowledged that more people might 
know about it in the future if their daughter chose to tell others.  This suggested that 
having told their daughter they had a sense that they would lose some control over the 
flow of information about her conception, but that would be less of a concern when 
their daughter was older, with a more established social persona. 
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Secrecy as an adaptive process 
Some couples claimed to have changed their views on secrecy and disclosure over 
time, illustrating that secrecy is part of an adaptive process. Many couples had begun 
by wanting to keep their experience of DI and their child’s donor origins a secret but, 
once their children were born and because of other contingencies and circumstances 
in their lives, they had become more ‘open’ about it, both with their child and with 
others.  This implied that secrets have a particular ‘life’; they may be concealed for a 
period of time and later revealed for a variety of reasons. 
 
Initially, when embarking on DI treatment, Sean and Pippa had thought about keeping 
the whole experience a secret to avoid the contingent difficulties of opening Pandora’s 
box (Bok, 1984). They said: 
 
Pippa: [Keeping it a secret] did cross my mind, I have to admit.  It probably crossed Sean's mind.  
 
Sean: Yes, it did.  
 
Pippa:   Initially, just 'let's not tell anyone, and nobody will ever know'. 
 
Sean: But you can't get away with it.  
 
Pippa: I think it would fester, and you might inadvertently say something, or she says something, or 
something could go wrong.  And you could ruin your relationships.  
 
Sean:   Yes.  It's too big a risk. 
 
Assessing secrecy as “too big a risk” draws on public narratives about adopted 
children or young adults inadvertently finding out that one or more of their parents 
was not, in fact, their biological parent, and the frequently negative consequences for 
them and their families that ensue (Curran, 1997). This relates to Paul’s experience 
discussed earlier in this chapter, which also indicated that stories about the serious 
psychological repercussions for adopted people and their families of sudden 
revelation about parentage play a significant part in decisions many couples make 
about disclosure.  The idea that personal relationships are put at risk by keeping 
secrets contrasts with the stance of those, like Steve, who chose to keep DI a secret 
because they believed that revelation entailed too many risks. Secrecy is, therefore, a 
form of risk management.  The difficulties confronted by people like Andrew and 
Annie and Steve and Jane when trying to keep their secret, however, highlights that it 
is difficult to maintain secrets within intimate circles because of the temptation of 
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revelation (Simmel, 1950). Simmel argues, moreover, that secrets should not be 
necessary in that context because this type of social formation usually levels its 
members (1950:335). 
 
Like Pippa and Sean, Allan and Sandra had initially thought that they would be 
secretive about having DI. 
 
Allan: And at that stage I think I wanted to be secretive about it.  I don't know that Sandra was. 
 
Sandra:  Well, I was happy to go along with whatever you wanted. 
 
Allan:   And I don't think the clinic was very happy with that attitude. 
 
Sandra: And they gave us a book and things to read on it as well.  So, yeah, they were keen for us to 
be quite open, but at that point we weren't ready for that, were we? 
 
Allan: We had a difficulty also...or I had a difficulty, in that my ex-wife was still alive, and not 
always saying complimentary things [about] me to Jacqui and Tom, our older children. So, I 
thought, well, rather than make other ammunition there, I'd prefer that she didn't know, but of 
course that would mean that Jacqui and Tom didn't know. And then I think I also, to be 
honest, had a hang-up about, you know, thinking that I could pretend that they were mine and 
that sort of thing, from a genetic point of view. Initially, and probably until they were born.  
And then we talked about it more.  As time went on we made the decision to be open about it.  
 
This scenario illustrates that secrecy and disclosure are embedded in particular sets of 
relations which shift and change over time. Allan and Sandra’s situation illustrates 
that secrecy is used as an adaptive strategy.  Sandra supported Allan’s initial desire 
for secrecy. As time went on, however, it became apparent to Allan that keeping the 
information a secret meant that he was not being open and honest with his grown 
children. By the time the triplets were two and half years old, Allan decided to tell his 
older children about their DI conception.  By this time, his former wife had moved 
overseas, so Allan felt that there was “less damage to be wrought”. He and Sandra 
also thought that Jacqui and Tom had already developed a bond with the triplets and 
that hearing about their ‘different’ means of conception would not alter that.  Allan 
also felt that he had an obligation to tell his older children: it was their business, too, 
because from being one of two children in a family, each was now one of five, which 
would have implications for their inheritance.  
 
Some parents raised the issue of the difficulty of telling some people and not others.  
Peter said that when considering telling one person, he had had to consider their entire 
 280
social network because to tell someone, but ask them to keep the secret, might be an 
imposition.  This raised the issue of the burden on the secret-holder. 
 
Peter:  And it becomes…it's not just...you can't just decide not to tell one person.  Often it's groups of 
people, and it's quite difficult to tell one person and expect them to…um…and it's not really fair 
to tell them because then they've got to kind of keep a secret. And, it's actually easier, and 
probably fairer on people if you're a bit more even-handed than that.  
 
Selective telling within close social circles also raises the spectre of the information 
being ‘leaked’ unintentionally or otherwise to those who have not been chosen to be 
privy to the information, a prospect that could create another set of problems. 
 
Kathy and Joel’s experience illustrated the difficulties of telling some people and not 
others. They had initially only told people at the Infertility Society about their 
daughter’s DI conception.  But, as a young baby, Melissa was suddenly taken ill and 
needed a transfusion of compatible blood that neither she nor Joel could provide. 
Kathy recalled their situation: 
 
Kathy:  We decided really to say nothing at all.  We were comfortable with what we were doing.  The 
thing that occurred to me at the time was that some of the people in the Infertility Society 
knew.  We had told them.  But to me, if you're telling some people you've got to tell 
everybody because it's such a small world. As I say, there we were stuck in a hospital and they 
were seeking information off us and the pair of us were like stunned mullets looking at one 
another thinking, get my mother out of the room.  They must have wondered what an earth 
was happening in this hospital, because Joel and I both looked at each other at the time and 
thought, well, what are we going to do with this?  We made a decision at that point, we 
discussed it and we were out in Australia and we wrote a letter and photocopied it and sent it 
to everybody.  
 
 
Kathy’s and Joel’s precipitous decision to disclose to “everybody” was in response to 
a particular event, their daughter’s sudden illness, and Kathy’s belief that if you tell 
someone, you have to tell everyone because, having told someone, you no longer have 
any control over the flow of information. Implicit in this is the assumption that 
information flows freely through social networks, and so it might as well come from 
the primary source.  This raises issues of identity and control (White, 1992).  When 
their daughter’s life was in danger, Kathy and Joel’s identities as parents became 
threatened.  They lost agency and had no choice but to disclose information about 
their daughter’s DI conception to the doctors. Thus, through seeking to control their 
identities as parents and securing their daughter’s life, they lost control of the flow of 
information about her conception. Kathy’s later comment that now she would only 
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tell others if something would be gained by doing so, raised the question of whether 
she later regretted their decision to tell everyone they knew. This regret may be linked 
to the subsequent loss of power as a result of losing control over the flow of 
information (Bok,1984:19) and, perhaps, to their changed identity.  It also highlights 
Bok’s (1984:20) contention that control over secrecy provides a safety valve for 
individuals in the midst of communal life.  She asserts: 
 
To restrain some secrets and to allow others freer play; to keep some hidden and to let others be 
known; to offer knowledge to some but not to all comers; to give and receive confidences and to 
guess at far more: these efforts at control permeate all human contact.  Those who lose control 
over these relations cannot flourish in either the personal or the shared world (Bok, 1984:20). 
 
Other parents who, like Kathy, had at one time made a ‘blanket’ decision to tell 
“everybody” about their child’s donor conception, also said they later changed their 
position and would now be more discreet, only telling those who “needed to know”.  
Neil and Patricia had decided to be “relatively open” about having fertility treatment. 
When their first daughter was born, they thanked the fertility clinic in the birth notice 
in the newspaper.  They maintained that it was the first time that the fertility clinic 
had been acknowledged in this public space.  Since then, as part of an Infertility 
Awareness Week, they had agreed to publish their story in a national magazine, using 
their own names in the article, thus effectively telling “the whole country” about their 
DI conception.  According to Patricia, this degree of ‘openness’ was prompted not 
only by the political motivation to raise the profile of infertility nationally, but also a 
number of other factors. 
 
Patricia: My motivation to do that was two situations really: one where my father was perhaps 
discussing it amongst family as though it was some skeleton in the closet sort of thing, and the 
reaction of the relatives really.  And I just sort of felt, you know, it's not a dirty secret, sort of 
thing.  And the other, was that at the time, it was sort of...I heard that I was being discussed at 
Playcentre and I just felt that one way to stop all of that is to shout it from the rooftops if you 
like, that it's no big deal then...that it's nothing...everybody knows about it, you know. 
 
Patricia took the view that if their DI conceptions were common knowledge, they 
would not be the subject of “gossip”, illustrating the contention that gossip increases 
whenever information is both scarce and desirable (Bok, 1984:91). Patricia’s concerns 
reflect the normative point of view which often stresses the more negative evaluation 
of gossip (Bok 1984:90). Bok claims that this view neglects to take into account that 
everyone has a special interest in personal information about others, and the need to 
inquire and to learn from others’ experiences (Bok, 1984:90).  While Bok concedes 
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that some gossip can be harmful, before proceeding to examine what makes gossip 
more or less morally problematic, she prefers to define it as “informal personal 
communication about other people who are absent or treated as absent” (Bok, 
1984:91). 
 
Patricia and Neil’s decision to tell their story in a national magazine also illustrates 
Goffman’s contention that there are many ways of managing stigmata (cited in 
Manning, 1992:98-99).  Goffman maintains that concealment is the simplest solution, 
but this is often a tacit acknowledgement that the stigma in question is as discrediting 
as is generally assumed.  A second way of managing a stigma is by using a “cover” 
which is a way of passing in the community by acting in an expected way (i.e. passing 
as the biological parents of one’s child) (Manning, 1992:98).  A third, quite different 
strategy for managing a stigma is disclosure which is achieved by either flaunting a 
symbol of the stigma, or the stigma itself.  According to Manning (1992:99), Goffman 
noted that this transforms the stigmatised person from someone with difficult 
information to manage into someone with difficult situations to get through.  In this 
view, the difference is between a person who is discreditable and one who is 
discredited.   
 
Patricia’s concerns about being the subject of whispered gossip were echoed by 
parents living in small rural townships (such as Annie and Andrew and Helen and 
Patrick) who chose what Goffman would have considered the simplest solution to 
manage or hide a stigma and to avoid being the subject of gossip: concealment 
(Manning, 1992:98). Since disclosing about their experience of DI in the women’s 
magazine, Patricia reflected that she too had adopted a more ‘secretive’ stance in 
other contexts such as in her parenting group.  This suggests that secrecy and 
‘openness’ are not mutually exclusive, and that different spaces open up or close 
down opportunities for certain conversations to take place or not take place (Plummer, 
1995).  Disclosing through a magazine article or through a newspaper birth notice are 
different social and relational contexts from disclosing face-to-face in a parenting 
group, and might elicit different responses. Since publishing their story using their 
own names, Neil and Patricia had since featured in a similar magazine story, but this 
time anonymously. 
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Neil: The following year we had some contact from a journalist, ah, who wanted to use that story and 
initially we said "Yes, that's OK.  You can use our real names.”  And then we phoned back and 
said, “Well no. Make up some names.  We didn't really need to be in the public spotlight in that 
way all the time. And it wouldn't have diminished the story in any way.  
 
Neil and Patricia’s desire to tell their story anonymously in the second magazine 
article revealed that they were both ‘open’ and secretive.  It also illustrated that when 
disclosing, there is always a need to preserve some degree of privacy to maintain 
control over one’s identity and private life (Bok, 1984:12). 
 
Disclosure as a means of soliciting and giving support 
Some parents of children conceived by DI said that they told others about their 
infertility problems and DI treatment as a means of gaining support from family 
members and close friends.  Diane and Chris said that they told their parents and 
siblings in the early stages about having DI and informed them of the various stages 
of their treatment as they proceeded.  Diane said: 
 
Diane:   All the years that we were involved with it, they sort of were informed right through, so it was 
just a natural progression, the various steps, so they were sort of behind us all the way through. 
And the same with our friends, all our close friends know about it as well, and they were the 
same.  They knew what was going on through the various stages.                                                                
 
Diane claimed that conceiving a child by DI was a positive experience for them. One 
reason for participating in this research, they said, was to help others who might be 
contemplating having a child by DI.  Joe and Ella claimed that by sharing information 
about their DI treatment, they had helped others who had contacted them as ‘experts’ 
on fertility treatment.  Similarly, Carla talked about being able to help others by being 
‘open’. 
 
Carla:  I did a course at Polytech, and I said to one of the guys there, “Do you have children?” and he 
said, “No”.  And, I could tell by the way he said no, being a person who's been infertile, that 
there was a problem there.  And I just started talking to him and chatting, and said that my 
daughter was a donor insemination daughter, and it turned out that they were going through the 
same thing.  He talked about it from his perspective and it was almost like a relief to him that 
there was somebody that he could talk to.  So, that's been great.  And you do find that there are 
other people who have been infertile, or who don't have children, [for whom] it's great to find a 
soul person. 
 
 
Carla and Ben had initially been secretive about their attempts to conceive by DI, but 
found that they gained more support and sympathy from others by telling them about 
it.  Carla said: 
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Carla:  When we were having the donor insemination to start off with, we didn't tell anybody, but 
people were wondering why we were stressed or tired, and sometimes... I remember at a party 
somebody saying to Ben and I, because we'd been married for seven years and still didn't have a 
child, that we were the most selfish people that they knew.  And here we had been trying for two 
years at that stage to have a child, and it just cuts you off, and you think, “Oh!”  And we didn't 
want to tell people that we were struggling away to try and have this child.      
                                                         
 
Carla and Ben’s experience suggests that when people do not have children, others 
assume that they have actively chosen to be childless, and somehow are shirking an 
expected adult responsibility.  This contrasts with Cameron’s (1997) finding that 
involuntarily childless people in New Zealand sometimes reported that others 
assumed that they could not have children.  According to Cameron (1997:63), studies 
have shown that it is a moot point whether those who choose not to have children are 
‘selfish’.  It could be argued, she says, that having children is the most selfish act, 
because no child asks to be born, and having a child is totally for the self. Supporting 
this view, a mother who had given birth after many years of infertility, recently told 
me that she viewed having her child as a form of self-indulgence, in contrast to her 
former involvement in community work.  
 
Some parents commented that they had told others about their child’s DI conception 
so that they might become protectors or advocates for them and their children.  Henry, 
who was familiar with the practice of artificial insemination in livestock farming, 
said: 
 
Henry: Once or twice I was talking to mates and they've said something about Jack or Luke seeing 
them run around and actually I'll say they're AI donors.  And they go, “Oh, are they?” I'm glad 
I do tell them because it's something I used to worry about.  And I feel as though by including 
them in my world, that they'll be protectors for Jack and Luke too. 
 
Similarly, Petra and Jennifer said they believed that it was best to be open and “up 
front” about their lesbian parenting.  By adopting this strategy they avoided situations 
where they would not be made welcome or supported.  They said about their views on 
secrecy: 
 
Jennifer: There's no-one who I would keep it a secret from, because I felt like keeping it a secret.  I 
think it's best to be up front, say it like it is, everyone knows where they stand.  It's a much 
easier way of dealing with it.  
 
Petra:   Because, then, what power have they got?  I mean there are a few psychos out there who 
might really, really hate you, but we're safer if we've got lots of people who know, who will 
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defend us.  Like your [Jennifer’s] stepfather, he's a case in point, I mean he's a bit of a redneck 
really, but he would defend us to the death, because we're his.  
 
Jennifer: My stepfather was the most homophobic person that I'd ever known until I came out to him.  
And now he professes undying love and support for us.  Now, that's a story of conversion.  
 
Petra: And he'd do it anywhere...he won't...yeah.  I would feel completely confident that the people 
who we know and trust will not be bad-mouthing us elsewhere.  
 
Patrick had not disclosed to others about his sons’ conception until the issue emerged 
spontaneously in a ‘therapeutic’ context.  Patrick was undergoing medical 
rehabilitation after suffering head injuries in a car accident.  He said: 
 
Patrick:  The only people I've told was in therapy. Therapy is part of my rehabilitation after one of my 
accidents.  Part of my rehabilitation was to do with communicating.  We were having one 
session and I just started crying, and my therapist asked me why and I said, “I'm just so 
happy.”  I was just feeling emotional in that session, and I said that my wife was pregnant, and 
he said, “What's so special about this?” I said, “It's not just that my wife is pregnant, it's the 
fact that I, myself, can't have kids.”  I don't know why I said this to him.  But I've been going 
to my speech therapist for a long time. 
 
This episode reveals the contingent nature of disclosure.  It also illustrates how 
therapy “works”.  In his every-day life, Patrick had not talked about his infertility, but 
amongst the ‘friends’ he had made in his ‘rehab team’, he felt freer to express his 
emotions.   
 
Disclosure was used by some parents as a means of sharing the burden of infertility. 
Joe, father of three sons conceived by DI, said that he had told many people about his 
infertility and his sons’ DI conception. Joe and Ella said: 
 
Joe: Yeah.  It wasn't any great secret. 
 
Ella: Everyone knew...well, most people knew.  
 
Joe: Hit the handle bars once too often (he laughs).  … I'd be totally comfortable telling 
anybody...anybody who wants to listen.  It's probably part of my therapy. 
 
KH: So, would you, for example have told people at work? 
 
Joe: Yeah.  Oh, totally.  
 
Ella: Would you? 
 
Joe: Oh yeah.  Friends.  Even friends, you know, I play in a band and I'm sure they all know...well, 
the ones who I talk to, you know.  I won't say they all know, but I don't bother talking to some 
of them.  Not because I don't want to, it's just that I don't get around to talking to them. 
 
Joe had told several friends and even work colleagues about his problems with 
infertility and found it therapeutic.  He also used humour, seemingly as a way of 
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coping with his infertility. Ella, however, was not entirely comfortable with the fact 
that he had told so many people, though it appeared that she had never strongly 
asserted this view.  
 
As well as telling friends and acquaintances face-to-face, Joe had also made a public 
announcement about his two youngest children’s donor conception in the newspaper 
birth notices because, he said, by that time “we had got used to the idea of people 
knowing that I fire blanks”.  He said: 
  
 Joe: Well, in the birth notices we put, with thanks to... originally it was AID [artificial 
insemination by donor], and everybody got confused with the more common meaning for AID 
[AIDS]. 
 
 Ella: You put, "Thank you to the AIDs" and it sounded like we had AIDS or something (we laugh). 
 
Joe: People looked at me for a while and said, "Are you all right?" (he laughs). 
 
Joe appeared to flaunt the stigma of male infertility, possibly suggesting that, like Neil 
and Patricia, he had chosen this particular method of stigma management (Manning, 
1992:99). Although Joe and Ella said that they planned to tell their children how they 
were conceived, they had not yet done so. As a result, Ella was concerned that others 
who knew might tease their children, or that they might hear about their donor 
conception from others first. 
 
Ella: The only thing that worries me about telling lots of people is that like, say, I tell the 
neighbours down the road and then their children tease our children saying, “Your dad's not 
really your dad.”  That's the only thing that really worries me, because you know what 
children are like, and until our children understand, I'm really a bit scared of that. I can just 
imagine the Jones’s down the road… they've got two older boys and I can just imagine Paula 
and them talking and the children hearing them and then...  
 
Joe: Yeah.  But it's probably not something that they discuss.  
 
Ella: No, but you could understand how it could accidentally happen.  
 
Joe: Ah, yeah, personally...the chances are pretty remote though.  
 
Ella: Mm. Apart from that, it doesn't really worry me. 
 
Joe’s denial about the likelihood of others telling their sons about their conception 
before they did is contested by the existence of public narratives about people who 
were adopted being psychologically harmed by hearing from others about their birth 
parentage.  Knowledge of such stories no doubt contributed to Ella’s unease about the 
number of people to whom Joe had disclosed. Joe’s openness contrasts with Andrew’s 
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desire for secrecy, discussed at the beginning of the chapter, but also illustrates that 
these are different strategies used in the management of stigma.   
 
While couples like Joe and Ella and Andrew and Annie illustrated incongruence in the 
desire to tell others or not about their experiences of infertility and DI, Nachtigall et 
al’s (1998:1166) study found that there was no association between disclosure status 
and gender.  However, in this study, more women than men claimed that they had 
more of a “need” to talk to others about their infertility-related problems than did their 
partners.  Sean, who had not discussed with others his infertility or their use of DI, but 
knew that his wife had told others, raised the issue of difficulties arising for him 
because he did not know who among their friends knew, and who did not know, about 
their daughter’s DI conception.  He said to Pippa: 
 
Sean: The only thing that I've found hard, is that you've told some people I think, and I was never 
entirely sure who.  
 
Pippa: I think probably because...I find it hard...I needed to talk more than Sean, because Sean's not a 
talkative type.  But then apparently that's a male thing. 
 
Sean: There's nothing to talk about as far as I can see.  It's a small plumbing problem. 
 
Pippa:   But there are issues that I needed to talk about and Sean didn't.  
 
Sean: I mean, I don't mind you talking to people.  I still, to this day, don't know who knows.  So I 
don't know how to speak to people.  
 
Pippa:    Well, everybody that you know knows.  
 
Sean: Sorry?  
 
Pippa: Zita knows but Pierre doesn't.  
 
Sean: Yeah.  But that's really hard.  I mean, what do I say to Pierre? 
                                                                              
Pippa:    Nothing.  Just don't say anything. 
 
Sean:     Yeah.  But things come up, like, “they look like you”, or... 
 
Pippa: Well, you can tell Pierre!  You can tell Pierre if you want to tell Pierre.  And I only told Zita, 
because Zita actually guessed.  I don't know how. 
 
 
This exchange between Sean and Pippa indicated the tensions that can emerge 
between couples around secrecy and disclosure, even if they have generally agreed 
about disclosing to others.  It also illustrated a lack of congruence in their “need” or 
desire to tell others about issues surrounding infertility and having a child by DI. This 
situation also indicated a lack of communication between the couple about what 
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information had been shared and with whom. Pippa gave conflicting responses to 
Sean’s questions and appeared irritated by the situation, which had become an “issue” 
when she would rather it had not.   Pippa’s remark about only telling because her 
friend had guessed highlights the relationship between disclosure and contingency: 
she disclosed to her friend because her friend had guessed that they had had fertility 
treatment.  To deny it in that situation might have felt like lying rather than not 
disclosing. The difficulty was that this event had further consequences, including for 
Sean, who remained unclear about whom she had told. 
 
Conclusion 
As a medical treatment for male infertility, DI has traditionally been shrouded in 
secrecy.  DI has been regarded as morally suspect, and negatively associated with the 
stigma of male infertility, illegitimacy and adultery.  Secrecy has reportedly served to 
protect the interests of the parties involved in DI conception (donors, recipients and 
their children, as well as health professionals engaging in DI practices) from social 
stigma and retribution. In recent years, however, the secrecy surrounding DI and the 
lack of information available, particularly to individuals conceived in this manner, 
have been subjected to a strong critique.  This has been fuelled by research evidence 
that adopted persons were psychologically disadvantaged by secrecy, and benefited 
from receiving information about their birth parents.  The trend towards open 
adoption and the growing strength of ‘rights’ discourses have thus informed debate 
about the right of the child conceived by DI to know about his/her genetic origins.   
 
Use of the terms ‘secrecy’ and ‘openness’ have also been critiqued on the basis that 
these terms set up a binary opposition, are value-laden, and simplistic in that they 
represent absolute positions that do not accurately reflect social practices.  As a result, 
the term ‘information-sharing’ is more commonly used to frame patterns of disclosure 
and non-disclosure about donor conception.  Debates about information-sharing 
centre on the conflicting ‘rights’ and ‘needs’ of all the parties involved.  Drawing on 
the work of a number of theorists on secrecy and privacy, two separate but related 
concepts, this chapter has illustrated that conflicts over secrecy are not so much about 
the secret itself, but the power to control the flow of information.  
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The chapter illustrated that secrecy and disclosure are embedded in sets of social 
relations. Power struggles over controlling the flow of information about DI were 
more apparent among couples who reported differing definitions of secrecy, and 
different ‘needs’ with respect to sharing or not sharing the information about their 
children’s DI conception with others.  Some men used secrecy as a means of 
protecting their self-image or to avoid the stigma attached to male infertility and the 
use of donor gametes.  Men’s desire for concealment of information, even from close 
family members and friends, caused conflict in some couples’ relationships.  Women 
generally perceived themselves as more ‘relational’ than their male partners and 
considered that they had a ‘need’ to share this information with significant others.  
Some women experienced conflict between the desire to protect their husbands and 
families from social stigma, and the desire to be honest and share information about a 
significant event in their lives.  The difficulties that emerged for some couples, as a 
result of the conflicts over secrecy, illustrated the dangers of secrecy: it can be a 
barrier to intimacy and personal development, become obsessive, impair judgement 
and negatively affect others (Bok, 1984).  
 
Issues of secrecy and disclosure revolved around issues of trust, intimacy and honesty.  
Parents who were inclined to keep the information a secret tended not to trust others, 
expected that they would react negatively or use the information in a way that would 
harm them or their child, or would not keep the secret.  Secrecy was thus a way of 
protecting relationships and maintaining the status quo. Non-disclosure, however, was 
also used as part of an adaptive process.  Some couples kept the information from 
others while they evaluated their situation and established social relationships with 
their children.  From this more secure position, they felt more willing to disclose.  
This illustrated that, for some, the perceived risks of telling became less significant 
over time, the perceived ‘need’ of others to know intensified, and revelation was 
perceived as less of a risk.  This indicates that patterns of secrecy and disclosure are 
variable, change over time and contingent on a multitude of factors relating to the 
nature of people’s familial relationships.  
 
For many couples, non-disclosure was more a matter of privacy and confidentiality 
than secrecy.  Maintaining privacy enabled them to share the information only with 
those whom they trusted to treat the information in an appropriate way and to be 
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supportive of their actions.  Decisions about disclosure or non-disclosure were thus 
made in the context of the web of social relations in which couples were embedded.  
While many couples revealed information about their infertility and their child’s DI 
conception to close relatives and friends, many were uncomfortable telling others in 
semi-public arenas, such as at antenatal groups, or in the workplace.  This illustrated 
that the secret was about a personal or private matter.  It also illustrated Simmel’s 
(1950) contention that secrecy occurs in social conditions of strong differentiation and 
that the secret embodies and intensifies such differentiation.  Non-disclosure in these 
contexts revealed how privacy works as a means of impression management.  It also 
illustrated that privacy protects self-identity and that knowledge about one aspect of 
life can disrupt identity in another setting, such as the workplace. 
 
Patterns of disclosure and non-disclosure were dynamic and contingent processes, 
embedded in particular social and relational contexts.  Giving the impression that they 
were having IVF treatment, rather than DI, was used by some couples as a tool of 
impression management.  This illustrated that IVF was regarded as more positively 
associated with biological parenthood and the miracles of modern medicine, 
compared with DI with its more negative associations with male infertility and the use 
of donor sperm.  This demonstrated how families manage stigma and that some 
stigmas, such as male infertility, are more easily concealed than others 
(Goffman,1963:63). Other couples publicly announced their use of DI, at a particular 
time, illustrating that couples use different forms of stigma management (Manning, 
1992:99).  Disclosures to ‘everyone’ were generally preceded by situations that 
threatened people’s agency or self-identity. Relinquishing control of the flow of 
information about DI, however, subsequently increased vulnerability and reinforced 
the desire to regain some control over the flow of information about their private 
lives.  
 
The complexity that emerges when analysing patterns of disclosure and non-
disclosure about DI raises issues for policy and practice in this area.  Clinics may 
advise ‘openness’, but the complexity of people’s familial relationships, and changes 
that occur over time should be acknowledged.  Appropriate strategies for managing 
disclosure and non-disclosure that take into account their individual family 
circumstances might usefully be discussed with recipients.  Gender disparities are 
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apparent in relation to disclosure and non-disclosure. These differences and ways of 
managing such differences might be discussed in counselling sessions with recipient 
couples prior to treatment, or in follow-up sessions.  While not fully explored in this 
study, couples’ disparate attitudes towards and practices related to secrecy and 
disclosure indicates a topic for future research in this area. 
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Chapter Nine 
Telling Conception Stories 
 
My mother did not tell me of my origins until I was 37 years old (in 1983), a few days after 
the death of my younger DI brother. My dad died the prior year.  The details of the revelation 
are not important.  My reactions are.  Within the space of a few minutes, I was confused, 
angry, relieved, hurt and embarrassed and yet full of sympathy for my parents.  In the first 
place, I had long suspected that my dad was not my genetic father.  At five years of age I had 
asked my mother if I were adopted but she said, “No, you’re my child.” - A. William Cordray 
(1997:35), Let the Offspring Speak. 
 
Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter Eight, perhaps the most complex and controversial issue in 
AHR, when donor gametes are used, is whether or not the child should be told of 
his/her donor origins. The secrecy that has traditionally surrounded DI practices has 
created significant blocks to the flow of information between parties involved in 
donor conceptions and, ultimately, to children born of such arrangements.  As 
outlined in Chapter Eight, secrecy and anonymity have ostensibly been deployed as a 
means of protecting the interests of the parties involved in a DI conception: donors, 
recipients, offspring and the clinicians (Haimes, 1993c; Daniels and Taylor, 1993a). 
Thus, the practices of secrecy and disclosure in relation to the child conceived by DI 
need to be considered in the context of the complex web of interests that historically 
have supported the maintenance of secrecy and anonymity. 
 
The medical profession has had long-standing vested interests in maintaining secrecy 
about DI. Traditionally, medical students were used as sperm donors and the 
profession has sought to protect the medical institution from public scrutiny and 
criticism about the morality of creating families using the gametes of third parties 
(Haimes, 1993c; Daniels, 1998:79).  Amongst medical practitioners, donor anonymity 
has also been regarded as a means of ensuring a supply of donor sperm: the 
assumption being that men would no longer wish to donate semen if their identity 
were to become known (Daniels & Taylor, 1993a:158).  Donor anonymity has also 
been strictly guarded because of concerns about legal liability in relation to the child, 
and amidst fears of possible future intrusion into a donor’s own family by DI 
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offspring. At the same time, anonymity has also been regarded as a means of 
preventing unwanted intrusion from donors into recipient families.  These concerns 
support Haimes’ (1992:136, 141) contention that the elaborate devices used to 
preserve anonymity in DI indicate the significance attached to genetic ties in Western 
society and how this is linked to ideas about family and, hence, to ideas about 
intimacy, social responsibility and social relations more generally. 
 
Many couples with children conceived by DI have been advised by fertility specialists 
that nobody need know about their donor conception, and research has shown that 
many parents have chosen to follow this advice (Snowden, Mitchell and Snowden, 
1983).  These authors stated that many couples interviewed for their research 
suggested that because the mother went through what appeared to be a ‘normal’ 
pregnancy, nobody, including the child, needed to know of the ‘special’ 
circumstances of conception (Snowden, Mitchell and Snowden, 1983:101). Research 
has also shown that some parents of children conceived by DI have opted for non-
disclosure in a bid to protect their children from the stigma of being ‘different’, that 
is, not conceived ‘naturally’ (Achilles, 1986:82).  Many also opt for secrecy and 
anonymity to protect the child from finding out that their father is not their ‘real’ 
father, and from the confusion that might result from having two ‘fathers’ (Snowden, 
Mitchell and Snowden, 1983; Blyth, Crawshaw and Speirs, 1998:70). 
 
This reasoning nonetheless raises the question of whose interests are in fact being 
protected, and also raises the morally problematic spectre of paternalistic lies (Bok, 
1978: 212-213).  While pointing out the problems of paternalistic lying, Bok 
nonetheless acknowledges that the consequences of telling children certain ‘truths’, 
such as their biological origins, are not uniform.  She asserts that “most, if told the 
truth, might well agree that they prefer to know; but some would grieve and wish that 
they had never been told” (Bok, 1978:217). Paternalism, however, has been criticised 
by protagonists of information-sharing in DI (Daniels and Lewis, 1996). A number of 
adults conceived by DI have spoken out against the secrecy, lies and deceit 
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surrounding their conception that they claim has negatively affected their lives 
(Cordray, 1995, 1997; Whipp, 1998; Turner, 1999).1  
 
Arguments in favour of protecting children from the knowledge of their DI origins is 
contested by anthropological research which suggests that children can maintain 
knowledge about their ‘birth’ parentage while experiencing parentage within a kinship 
system which is not restricted to biological ties (Carsten, 1998:1).2 Non-disclosure to 
people born by DI has therefore become increasingly subjected to criticism, 
particularly by social workers, psychologists, counsellors, and also by doctors, on the 
basis that it deceives human beings about a fundamental aspect of their identity: their 
genetic origins (Baran and Pannor, 1989; Daniels and Taylor, 1993a; Landau, 1998). 
 
Arguments in favour of disclosure to the child conceived by DI, and a movement 
away from complete donor anonymity in some countries, have arisen partly in 
connection with changes in attitudes towards adoption (Cohen, 1996:89). According 
to Cohen (1996:89), although DI and adoption have significant differences, both 
involve the rearing of a child who is not genetically linked to at least one parent, and 
as a result, frequent linkages between the two have been made.  Haimes (1988) 
reviews the linkages between adoption and donor conception but claims that while 
adoption might be a useful precedent, this is more because of the questions it poses 
than for the provision of solutions for direct application. Arguments made in the 
adoption literature about the child’s ‘right’ to know about his/her biological and 
family origins, and the importance of knowing these to the construction of one’s 
identity, are invoked in arguments about the right of the child conceived by DI to 
knowledge of his/her genetic origins (Cohen, 1996).  Proponents of information-
sharing also invoke arguments about the psychological harm caused by deception and 
secrecy within families (Baran and Pannor, 1989; Daniels and Taylor, 1993a; Landau, 
1998).  Thus, some argue that secrecy, anonymity and deception in DI are not only 
psychologically and socially harmful, but also ethically unacceptable (Landau, 1998).  
                                                          
1 A variety of other accounts by individuals who have learned about their DI origins also appear in 
Donor Conception Support Group (1997); Blyth, Crawshaw and Speirs (1998); and Franz and Allen 
(2001). 
2 Carsten (1998) argues that what defines the identity of a child is highly variable cross-culturally.  
Amongst Malays and in other south-east Asian cultures, for example, the acquisition of identity is 
rather fluid and is not simply determined by birth or parentage.  While blood is highly significant in 
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This position is reflected in laws governing AHR relatively recently instituted in some 
countries.   
 
Sweden, in 1985, was the first country to give donor offspring the legal right to access 
information about their donor when they reached ‘maturity’ (Blyth, 1998). Other 
jurisdictions to follow the Swedish example were Austria, in 1992, and Victoria, 
Australia in 1995 (Australian Government, State of Victoria, 1997).  According to 
Blyth, the latter “provides the most comprehensive legislative framework regulating 
access to genetic origins following donor-assisted conception” (1998:73).  Most 
recently, Switzerland has instituted laws on medically assisted reproduction, which 
ensure that people conceived by DI have access to identifying information about 
donors (Switzerland, 1998).  In many other jurisdictions, including Spain, Denmark 
and France, donor anonymity is protected by law.  In countries where no legislation is 
currently in place (such as Canada, The Netherlands, Italy) non-identifying 
information about the donor may be accessed, but identifying information is only 
available in ‘extraordinary’ circumstances (Blyth, 1998). Thus, overall, international 
reviews of regulations relating to AHR reveal a lack of consensus in several legal and 
ethical areas, including access by individuals conceived by DI to information about 
the gamete donor, the kind of information available, and the keeping of donor 
registers (Daniels and Lewis, 1996b; Blyth, 1998). 
 
Information-sharing in the New Zealand context 
New Zealand has come to be regarded as a “leader” in information-sharing about DI, 
particularly in connection with telling the child conceived with donor gametes of its 
origins (Daniels & Lewis, 1996b; Watkins, 1999).  This position has been assessed as 
a positive development by advocates of information-sharing (MCART, 1994:69), but 
has also been described as a dangerous experiment by one British medical specialist 
(Daniels & Lewis, 1996b:57) who presumably opposed information-sharing.  This 
possibly relates to arguments that support the natural-social divide and the idea that 
anyone attempting to cross these boundaries is ‘dangerous’, because they cannot 
easily be categorised (Haimes, 1988:55-56).  Given the history of the dominance of 
discourses about the need for anonymity and secrecy in DI, a stance favouring 
                                                                                                                                                                      
these cultures in relation to ideas about kinship, blood is not just genetically determined, but can be 
formed in part by food. 
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information-sharing could certainly be regarded by some as venturing into risky and 
uncharted waters.   
 
In view of the socio-political context in which DI is practised, this chapter examines 
the policies of two New Zealand fertility clinics in relation to their philosophy of 
‘openness’ and advocating the need to share information about DI conception with the 
child.  It also reviews the perspectives and practices of parents of children conceived 
by DI in relation to telling them about their DI origins.  This chapter draws on 
Rumball and Adair’s (1999) New Zealand study of parents’ patterns of disclosure to 
their children conceived by DI.  These authors’ quantitative study, which includes 
responses from 181 parents of children conceived by DI, illustrates how those who 
disclose often begin by telling children when they are young, later re-telling the story, 
thereby framing it according to the child’s level of understanding (Rumball and Adair, 
1999).  Similarly, my research illustrates that telling the story of a child’s conception 
is not a single event, but an on-going and evolving conversation (Hajal and 
Rosenberg, 1991).  Like Rumball and Adair’s study, the current study investigates 
whether couples have told their child how they were conceived, how and when they 
have told these conception stories and, if not, if they plan to do so in the future.  It 
differs from Rumball and Adair’s study, however, in that it highlights the 
complexities that emerge for parents in relation to determining if, when and how to 
tell. 
 
Advocating disclosure in the clinical context 
In New Zealand, fertility clinics have moved towards a policy of information-sharing 
between the parties to a DI conception (Daniels, 1995).  As a result, and as discussed 
in Chapter Five, most clinics recruit only donors who are willing to be identified in 
the future to any DI offspring.  This has occurred in the absence of any formal policy 
or legislation which reveals the extent to which education and changing professional 
attitudes about secrecy have significantly changed in recent years. Staff, and 
particularly counsellors, at New Zealand clinics advocate that parents tell their child 
about his/her means of conception (Rumball and Adair, 1999:1397). When asked 
about their reasons for this advice, the clinical director of a New Zealand fertility 
clinic said: 
 
 297
Dr A: To a degree it was sort of the dogma3 of the time.  I think there are enough examples in the 
literature of situations where secrecy just doesn't work.  And that applies not only to donor 
insemination but adoption and those sorts of issues.  And that's the standard thing that people 
say, that secrets are wrong.  Now, I certainly believe that it is the child's right to know, ah, I 
think there are children who don't know. I don't have any strong proof of that, but I'm pretty 
sure there must be. Again, it's what people say they feel they have to say.  But I know the 
families in which the child does know and the way they function seems to be a much more... a 
much better way.  
 
 
While Dr A believed that families who were ‘open’ functioned better than those who 
were not, he also recognised that disclosure might not always be the best option.  He 
elaborated:   
 
Dr A:  I suppose, to a degree, there may be situations where that dogma may be wrong.  I can't really 
think of anything, but nothing in our world is black and white.  So the philosophy of the clinic is 
that it's the child’s right to know.  All of our donors that we have are in agreement that they may 
be contacted in the future.  We tell everybody that.  We can't guarantee that because there's no 
obligation for the donor to change their mind... not to change their mind.  Well, I mean, we talk 
about it and they agree in that sort of way. 
 
 
Closely linked to discourses about the child’s ‘right’ to know their genetic origins are 
arguments about the need to protect the ‘best interests’ of the child.  These were 
guiding principles for the Ministerial Committee on Assisted Reproduction in its 
consideration of the use of AHR in New Zealand (MCART, 1994:32). While 
arguments about the need to consider the ‘best interests of the child’ are often invoked 
in discussions about the ethics of assisted human reproduction, it is easy, nonetheless, 
to overlook the potential child in a clinical context. After all, the child does not yet 
exist and both the fertility specialists and the potential parents are primarily concerned 
with attending to the immediate problem: infertility and the couple’s desire to have a 
child.  When asked about this ethical dilemma for fertility clinic staff, a scientist 
working in a New Zealand DI programme had this to say: 
 
Scientist:  It takes a conscious effort to remember the child, and I'm sure it's not forgotten.  I'm sure the 
nurses are quite conscious of this.  In fact, with the discussion they always have with the 
parents about the need for openness and how it is really more desirable, that at an 
appropriate stage they do tell the child the truth about its origins, and the dangers of having 
these secrecy things in families, which perhaps are apt to come out at moments of stress 
rather than under controlled circumstances.  And so to me that's probably the central ethical 
issue, this kind of balancing act of the interests of all parties involved. 
 
                                                          
3 The term dogma refers to a principle or tenet laid down by a particular authority which, in this case, 
relates to the literature on adoption and the harm caused by keeping secrets in families, and the 
importance for a child’s identity to know their biological origins. 
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In the current New Zealand context, attending to the interests of all parties, including 
the child, means advising potential parents to be open and honest with their child 
about their donor conception.4  While the situation varies between clinics, recipients 
are generally given non-identifying information about their donor(s) which indicates 
the donor’s position on being identified at a later date.    
 
Not all New Zealand clinics have a formal policy that donors be identifiable.  A staff 
member in charge of recruiting donors at one clinic said: 
 
Lab Technican B:  We are one of the few clinics probably where it isn’t mandatory at this stage.  It’s 
not mandatory but [donors] are certainly encouraged to think about it very carefully.  I can 
honestly tell you that I don’t have one donor at present who is not prepared to be identified.  
They sometimes say, “Well what do other people do?”  And I say, “It’s your decision, but most 
people do, but it’s up to you.”  And some of them specify an age at which they’d be willing to 
meet the child, and some of them say they leave that to either the parents or just when the child 
is ready to do it.  Yes, so they’re happy.  And so what I tell them is that the child or the people 
will make contact with the clinic and we will approach the donor, and then they can regulate, or 
control the situation.  So they don’t feel that things are out of their control. 
 
Although all donors at this clinic had indicated that they were prepared to be 
identified, the implication was that they would want to have some measure of control 
over when and how any DI offspring would be able to make contact with them. This 
highlights the issue raised by Dr A that clinics cannot guarantee that a child will be 
able to contact their donor in the future because donors are not legally bound to keep 
their word that they will be available to meet their DI offspring in the future. Like 
couples who might agree, in the clinical context in which ‘openness’ is advised, to 
disclose to their child, donors might also agree to be identified.  Later, however, 
because of their life circumstances, they may change their mind. Uncertainty therefore 
surrounds the prospect of donors being identifiable and available to meet any DI 
offspring who may seek contact in the future.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Five, fertility clinic staff participating in this research advised 
couples in DI programmes on aspects of secrecy and disclosure to family and friends 
and the benefits of informing the child of its genetic origins.  A clinical director said: 
 
                                                          
4 See Appendix C for information sent to recipients that states the clinic’s philosophy on the 
advisability of telling the child. 
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Dr C: It’s openness all around really.  It’s openness with families and friends.  Some people have very 
difficult relationships, and it causes all sort of difficulties when a child comes into the world and 
the grandparents don’t know.  I mean there are people like that still I think.  So, we do advise on 
that.  And I think it’s interesting whether a couple accept that and agree to it [disclosure], then 
don’t.  So it would be interesting to know whether they do. 
 
Dr C’s comments highlight the lack of control5 clinical staff have over whether or not 
parents disclose to others about the method of their child’s conception.  Fertility clinic 
staff can espouse a particular perspective and attempt to provide tools to help parents 
disclose to the child and others, but ultimately recipients are individual agents who 
make their own decisions regarding secrecy or disclosure in the context of their own 
relationships.  It also raises the issue of trust between clinicians and their clients: the 
possibility that recipients might agree to disclosure in the clinical setting, but in 
practice maintain secrecy. 
 
In terms of addressing the issue of telling the child with prospective DI parents, a 
fertility clinic counsellor, who had been employed by the clinic for ten years, said:  
 
Counsellor A:  I ask what they think, without entrapment really, without trying to trick them into 
anything.  And then I state quite clearly that as they’re going through the programme we have a 
very overt philosophy of the child’s interests.  And I also tell them we are not...we cannot alter 
what you intend to do, because if you knew that you could only get on the programme by saying 
we’ll tell the children, then you could tell me, we’ll tell the children, and I’d say, “right you’re 
on”.  And so I make it really clear to them that it is a process.  Some people work it out really 
quickly before they...you know...as soon as they think of DI, they sort of have got this idea of 
the right way to do it, whichever way they go, that they’ll sort of work it out.  But it is a process.  
You can go into it and think, “Oh it would be impossible to do that”... to tell the child... but 
then, there’s the pregnancy and then there’s the actual child, and it’s a process of working out 
what’s best for the child.   And I usually bring up, you know, in your relationship what things 
are really important?  And, they usually say “honesty” or “trust” or something like that.  And I 
say, well, I guess that’s how we look at it here, that the relationship with the child ideally should 
be based on trust and honesty.   
 
The decision to tell the child of its origins was therefore constructed as part of a 
particular ‘journey’ which might begin with the desire to be secretive, but then evolve 
to one where the focus is more the interests of the child.  Counsellor A described the 
process: 
 
Counsellor A: To start off with, it’s the male infertility.  It’s protecting, and sometimes the woman 
colludes with that.  Protecting that privacy, protecting that self-esteem, protecting that public 
image.  And she often will collude with this, thinking that that is the focus, which it is at that 
time, but then the focus shifts to the children, and what’s best for the children.  What it is for 
                                                          
5 The focus on control here links to discussion in Chapter Eight about privacy and the control of 
information flow. 
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you fades into the background with what is best for the children.  I often say that to them.  I say 
to them, I can absolutely guarantee you, you know, looking at the two of you and seeing your 
relationship that you’ll be doing everything in the best interests of your kids.  Wherever you’re 
standing now, they’ll be the focus once they’re here. 
 
The counsellor also assessed the extent to which couples appeared to be receptive to 
the idea of disclosure more generally and, if they appeared somewhat resistant to it, 
she warned them of the potentially harmful consequences of harbouring secrets 
within families. If she thought recipients were “a bit closed” she would tell a 
cautionary tale about a person who had gone through a DI programme some years 
previously.  Following the advice given at the time not to disclose, he had later 
suffered a “breakdown” as a result of “living with the lie”. Non-disclosure was thus 
constructed as a risky and potentially destructive course to follow. 
 
In contrast, the counsellor at another clinic was more circumspect about advocating 
disclosure, preferring instead to discuss with clients both the “pros and cons”.  She 
said: 
 
Counsellor B:   I have had a number of people whose parents’ attitude has been “if it’s not meant to be, 
it’s not meant to be.”  That can have a significant bearing on whether they would tell the 
parents.  But they may want to tell the child but not tell other family members.  That’s a very 
difficult one.  I spend quite a lot of time trying to get people to make the best decision for 
themselves.  And those things can change over time as well.  Some people have been surprised, 
pleasantly so, by other people’s reactions.  It’s easy to imagine a bad reaction. 
 
Counsellor B’s reluctance to advocate a particular stance for or against disclosure 
highlighted the complexities surrounding the issues of secrecy and disclosure for 
parents of children conceived by DI as they negotiate relationships with their children 
and significant others.  While she attempted to help couples decide what was best for 
them, she also discussed the issue of the rights of the potential human being.   
 
To tell or not to tell? 
For some couples in this study the decision to tell others, including their children 
about their donor conception was fraught with conflict and ambivalence. Although 
most couples had told, or said that they intended to tell, their children of their origins 
some were unsure whether to tell, while others planned to tell, but did not know the 
‘best’ way, or the ‘right’ time to tell their child. Similarly, Rumball and Adair (1999) 
report that couples who had given their children information about their donor 
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conception, chose to tell when ‘it just seemed right’, or when they believed their 
children could understand their stories.6  
 
Parents of children conceived by DI varied in their approaches and the degree of 
uncertainty that they experienced in relation to making the decision about whether or 
not, when and how to tell their child(ren). When Andrew and Annie entered a DI 
programme, they did not see a counsellor.  They had a “chat” with a medical 
specialist who advised them that it was better to tell the child of its origins than not to. 
At the time, Andrew accepted this as the best strategy but over time had become 
increasingly anxious about the prospect of telling his daughters, now aged nearly six 
years and two and a half years, about their DI origins.  He said: 
 
Andrew: That was a long time away, so I was quite relaxed about telling the child at that stage.  I'm 
not now.  It was easy at the time, but as time went on, it became more difficult, and I guess 
what has become more difficult is my realisation that I have to tell my kids. 
 
 I went and saw my doctor six months ago or eight months ago, to talk about the issue... I was 
getting stressed, stressed to hell about the whole issue, so I went along and saw him.  And he 
basically said, well, it's my choice.  He said that my personality was strong enough and my 
ability to communicate was strong enough to just do it naturally... that I had all those 
abilities.  See, my own self-confidence disappeared when I couldn't have children, and it's 
taken a long time to get that back again.  I'm not a very confident person now.   
 
Andrew raised the issue of the lack of well-established and acceptable scripts for 
telling his children how they were conceived (Daniels and Thorn, 2001).  While he 
did not believe that he had the tools or the self-confidence to tell his daughters about 
their DI conception, Andrew believed he had a moral imperative to tell them the truth. 
From what he had learned from talking to doctors, he decided that he had to tell his 
eldest daughter when she was seven which gave him a year and a half’s grace. Thus, 
he constructed the event of ‘telling’ the children as a major obstacle that had to be 
overcome at a fixed point in his life.  Given the stress and anxiety caused by the 
prospect of telling the children, I asked Andrew and Annie why they thought it was 
important for their children to know about their origins.  They replied: 
 
Andrew:   Well it would be a terrible lie if one day I told them [a lie], and one day I died, and they'd 
look at my records.  I mean, I keep things, okay. They'll look at my records and they'll look 
at my death certificate and they'll say, “Gee, Dad couldn't have kids, and he died of a related 
                                                          
6 Rumball and Adair (1999) report that, of the 181 parents who responded to their survey, 30% had 
given their children (who were all 8 years old or younger) information about their DI origins.  Seventy-
seven percent of those who had not told intended to do so in the future, and 17% planned not to 
disclose. 
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complaint,” testicular cancer, for example, which I'm at risk to, “Golly gosh.  Hang on a 
minute.  That means he's not my Dad.”  
 
Annie:   Oh, I just think it's about them, isn't it?  
 
Andrew:  I don't think that's fair.  
 
Annie:  It's not natural not to tell them.  It didn't ever enter our minds not to tell them really. 
 
Andrew:   I don't think there was ever an issue of secrecy to them.  
 
Annie:   You've got to be honest with them.  I mean, they're our children.  If you can't be honest with 
your children, well you've got a big problem I think.  
 
While Andrew imagined a scenario of being ‘found out’ if he lied to his children, 
Annie invoked a discourse of honesty and truth as a ‘natural’ phenomenon between 
parents and children.  She drew on public narratives about the “huge” problems 
arising for adopted children who found out later in life the circumstances of their birth 
and the need to avoid a similar scenario for her children.  Annie had already attempted 
to introduce the topic to her eldest daughter when she accompanied her to the hospital 
when she had their second daughter.  She said: 
 
Annie:  [Hayley] gets around with babies up her jersey, when she goes to the hospital.  She knows 
that... I've told Hayley that we were having trouble having children and needed to go to the 
hospital to get some help, and I've sort of explained we're not just like a normal couple.  So 
she knows that...that we had to go to hospital, and I thought that would be a good lead up, 
yeah, and I'm waiting for her to ask questions. 
 
At such a young age, it is difficult to determine what Hayley understood from her 
visits to the hospital, or what sort of questions might later emerge. While he struggled 
with the notion of how to introduce the topic of DI to his children, Andrew 
nonetheless predicted that, having told them, he would then become more ‘open’. He 
said: 
 
Andrew:   …you'll find that once my children know, then I'm probably going to be quite open about it 
with them, and if they so choose, other people that they so direct to.  So I'm going to be at 
both ends of the scale, I predict, in the future: being very secretive and very open. Annie will 
frown over there, but I'm on record saying this. 
 
Andrew appeared to indicate that the act of disclosure was more problematic than the 
secret itself.  Placing himself simultaneously at two ends of the secrecy-openness 
continuum, Andrew illustrated the way in which secrecy and disclosure are embedded 
in particular sets of social relations. Although he gave assurances that he would 
become more ‘open’ having disclosed to his children, given his past and current 
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position of maintaining secrecy, Annie appeared skeptical about his ability to position 
himself differently in the future. 
 
According to a nurse working in a DI programme, concerns about when and how to 
tell are common among parents of children conceived by DI.  As previously 
mentioned, one of the major barriers to disclosure is the perceived lack of availability 
of knowledge about an appropriate script for telling.  One of the major sources of such 
scripts are the children’s books written to help parents frame the story of their DI 
conception from an early age, ‘My Story’ (Cooke, 1991) and ‘How I Began’ (New 
South Wales Infertility Social Workers Group, 1988). Andrew and Annie were 
unaware of these children’s books.  A nurse referred to the usefulness of these stories 
as tools for telling children. 
 
Nurse A:  In a support group, it’s usually been the more, most asked question - “How do you do it?  
How do you start?”  And we usually suggest to them to have the book available, and use it 
really as a bedtime story or just a reading...story to read to them while they’re young.  So 
they can absorb what they want at the time and slowly it filters through.  I think nothing 
could be perhaps more devastating to be sat down and told as perhaps a teenager.  I think 
there are enough issues going on in a teenager’s head without being told then that you’re a 
donor child.  So we do impress upon them the importance of telling them while they’re 
young.  So that they can slowly absorb what they want when they’re ready. 
 
Nurse A’s experience of conceiving children through DI and telling them how they 
were conceived was valuable when advising other parents about how and when to tell 
their children.  She said: 
 
Nurse A:  I think my own experience has been helpful when couples asked about telling the children, 
and I related my experience of how we told them, and what the response was, so that they 
don’t think it’s a frightening experience... that they’re going to be totally rejected.  I think 
that’s what parents feel, particularly that there’s going to be rejection.  So I think that my 
own personal experience has been useful to them. 
 
 
The suggestion is that parents are not only unsure how to tell, but anticipate a negative 
reaction from their children, just as some feared negative reactions from telling others. 
Steve and Jane claimed not to have discussed the issue of telling their twins who were 
four and a half years old.  Their ambivalence and differing views about telling their 
children were apparent.  In Chapter Eight, Jane’s conflict about telling her parents 
about their twins’ donor conception was discussed. She was also conflicted about 
telling their children how they were conceived. She explained: 
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Jane:   I sort of don't really like to have to tell the children…that their father's not actually their genetic 
father, because I sort of feel that I'd hate him to get hurt.  But he could possibly say that he's not 
hurt, but to me I sort of feel that that side of it, I think, is quite difficult…. It's sort of a stigma 
thing too isn't it?  It's just like adoption, but I think with adoption less, yeah, with adoption it's a 
bit different, because people are... I don't know how to describe it really, sorry. 
 
 
Jane highlighted the contention discussed in Chapter Eight that secrecy is used as a 
means of protecting the infertile male.  Her comments that DI was less socially 
acceptable than adoption relates to Haimes’ (1988:48) argument that the perceived 
asymmetry in the relationship between the parents of children conceived using 
donated gametes might mean that these families are regarded as even more unusual 
than families with adopted children.7 Jane claimed that when they began DI treatment 
Steve was against disclosing to the child. She intimated that she had persuaded him to 
give clinic staff the impression that he agreed to it because the clinic had made it clear 
to them that this was preferable to “living with a lie”.  Steve obviously had concerns 
about telling the children about their DI origins and commented that he thought that it 
had the potential to tear families apart.  He invoked an argument against telling the 
child on the basis of his personal experience of this claiming that his adopted niece 
had “rejected” his sister, her adoptive mother, in favour of her birth mother. 
 
Nonetheless, Steve insisted that the twins would eventually be told, which suggested 
that parents feel the pressure to tell, or say they will tell, even when they have 
personal misgivings about it. When asked what he thought was a suitable age to tell 
the children, he replied:  
 
Steve:  I...looking probably to about 10 years of age, something probably around about that, a bit older;  
when they're starting to get more comprehension of what's happening around them in the world 
because their education, on-going education sort of thing.  But at the moment they want to know 
a lot of questions about everything.  They drive you batty.  I mean to say, the fish up and died 
the other night, and they just didn't want to accept the fact... Why did it die? 
 
Steve’s concerns about when to tell support Rumball and Adair’s finding that most 
parents who had not yet disclosed gave their child’s age and inability to understand as 
their main reasons for choosing to wait (1999:1392). Contradicting her previous 
position about not wanting to tell the children, Jane then said she thought that the 
children should be told at a much younger age. 
 
                                                          
7 The problem of asymmetry in families with children conceived by DI is discussed in Chapter Eleven. 
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Jane: But I just sort of feel that 10 is, personally, myself, and you're probably different...as normal, 
we're like chalk and cheese.  But, um, I sort of feel that 10 is too old.  Yeah.  
 
Steve:   Too old?  Why?  
 
Jane: Because I think that children are a lot more intelligent... you know I believe in telling them...  
 
Steve: But there's a difference between intelligence and comprehension though, dear.  
 
Jane: ...about four.  I'd like to know the ideal age actually.  There must be something...in the 
contract (she laughs).  
 
 
Jane was nonetheless unsure whether the twins were too young to be told or not.  She 
said: 
 
Jane: Justin and Leanne have actually sort of said to me a few times, you know they often say, “Who's 
your mum and who's your daddy?”, and “Who's my daddy?”, and I go, “Oh, all right” as if I'm 
telling a lie.  Where did I come from, type thing, and that's when I feel, “Wouldn't it be good to 
be able to sort of pop it out?”… because they keep on asking the same questions all the time.  
It's comes, not every day, but they do often do that to me.  So, I think that could be quite an 
opportunity to tell them, and then I think, “Well is it too early?” 
 
 
Jane worried that if she told them, they might talk about their DI conception in a 
playgroup before they understood it themselves.  Her concern about giving children 
information appropriate to their age and stage of life illustrates a point made by a 
fertility clinic counsellor8 who said:  
 
Counsellor A: I think children should have information related to their age of development, and you 
should be building up their story for them, so that in fact the penny drops for them.  Around 11 
or 12 they'll say, "Does that mean you're not my biological father?" or however bright they are, 
"Does that mean that it wasn't your sperm?"  And you say, "Well Dan, you figured that out.  
Couldn't have done better myself."  You don't encourage precociousness in children.  That can 
be taken advantage of by others. 
 
If Jane was aware of what constituted information appropriate to her children’s age 
then she might be better equipped to answer their questions about how they came to 
be born without giving them the ‘whole story’ which, according to the counsellor, 
could be quite counter-productive.  McWhinnie (1996) provides a resource for 
matching age-related child development issues, and suitable scripts for answering the 
types of questions raised by children at these times.  Clearly, however, this knowledge 
is not within the grasp of all parents with children conceived by DI. The lack of 
knowledge about what constitutes appropriate age-specific information might lead 
                                                          
8 Rumball and Adair (1999:1393) also cite Dudley and Neave’s recommendation that information 
shared by parents with children should begin at the children’s level of understanding. Stories will need 
to be repeated and modified as the child grows up. 
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parents to think that they should wait until the child can cognitively grasp the concept 
of biological relatedness before they tell them about the circumstances of their 
conception.  But this, in turn, begs the question of how parents are to know when their 
children are cognitively competent. 
 
Tools for telling the child 
One of the challenges faced by clinical personnel advocating disclosure to the child is 
the provision of adequate information to recipient couples in donor programmes.  
Many programmes provide reading resources to help couples decide how and when to 
disclose, but little is known about the implications of disclosure for children 
conceived by DI, or the ‘best’ way for parents to proceed.  A nurse working in a 
donor programme said that she provided couples with information collected to help 
them think about the issues involved in having a child by DI and how to tell the child 
of his/her origins. 
 
Nurse A: In the past, when we were doing the appointments, we had a book list that we always sent 
out to couples, and it suggested that they had some reading background on the issues so that 
they are more prepared as to what’s involved. I also keep articles from magazines on hand 
that they can have photocopies of when the couples are being interviewed and their feelings 
on what it’s been like to tell the children.  And it usually crops up again when they have 
children and the children are growing up.  They probably think about it initially when 
they’re going on the programme, but they want to get onto the programme and then I think it 
lies dormant for a while, and then suddenly there’s the child and it becomes real and as it 
starts growing up the issue rises again.  And we always tell them we have the book “How I 
Began” on sale available for them, which helps tell the child of its origins. 
 
The clinical director of a fertility clinic commented on the difficulty of knowing how 
to advise recipient couples about how to tell their children how they were conceived.  
He said: 
 
Dr A: I have always struggled on actually what to tell people to do, because I mean I don't know how I 
would do it in that situation. But I suppose the best advice that I've found is to tell the child 
before it understands, because then it just becomes part of what they do.  And I say that we have 
these books.  [The counsellor] is pretty knowledgeable about those issues, and so, I don't know 
the answer to that.  
 
While Dr A did not claim expertise in this area, he drew on adoption discourses that 
suggest that children should be ‘told’ when they were young, so they have the sense 
of always having known about their donor origins. The fertility clinic’s counsellor 
advised couples to provide their children with information about the circumstances of 
their birth that was relevant to their age and stage of life.  She said that she followed a 
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particular developmental model based on Piaget’s age-related developmental 
concepts.  This related to research that shows that children only absorb information 
relevant to their level of understanding (Rumball and Adair, 1999:1397). The 
counsellor said: 
 
Counsellor A:  I've got this developmental model of telling children.  And it starts right at the first 
questions about who am I, where did I come from, or how was the kitten born, or whatever.  It's 
the facts of life, which is all tied up with identity and who I am and that comes from maybe 
looking at photographs and seeing the two of them fancy free, then the bump, and you say 
"That's you in Mummy's tummy" and then there's the picture at the birth, and Daddy cutting the 
cord, whatever.  And the first questions the children ask are, you know, how did I get out of 
Mummy's tummy?  So you give them that story, and that's about four they start asking that.  It's 
related to the cat having kittens, or someone else having a baby, or the second baby arriving.  
You know, how is that, four or five - how do babies get out of Mummy's tummy? 
 
You give them that age-related story, pushing very hard, etc. And the next question is how did I 
get into Mummy's tummy?  So they process the first bit, go away, sort of Piaget's developmental 
concepts, process that, next question is, and who knows what they'll be then, sixish? Five or 
sixish, depends how bright the kids are, how fast they process things. And, how did I get into 
Mummy's tummy?  You give them the normal story, that's what I tell them.  Daddies have the 
sperm, mummies have the egg, sperm and egg has to join together, and mummies and daddies 
are built so they can fit together really closely, sperm meets the eggs, and that's the beginning of 
a baby.  That was the beginning of you, and then you add a rider in there, and that's how it 
happens, but sometimes it's not that simple for all mummies and daddies, but sometimes the 
doctors can help.   
 
So, they'll take that in. They're getting a normal view of themselves, not a view that there was 
anything odd about their conception or themselves, so they get a normal view and then they'll 
ask questions, because you'll repeat it again, because a friend will have a baby, or I mean, it's the 
story of their life, so they will ask, and they'll say, "Did you have any help?" And you'll say, 
“yeah, we were trying for three years to have you, and we weren't getting anywhere, and then 
the doctor sent us to the special fertility centre,” and you still don't give them... you always give 
them a little bit less than they're asking for, so they can process that, and then they can come 
back – “What sort of help did you have to have?”  “Well, we were trying and trying and went to 
the doctor and found that Mummy could have babies, but Daddy had something or other.  Then 
we went through a lot of operations to see if we could put it right, or they said that there was a 
special programme that we could go on.”  
 
So, you gradually build up this picture for the child that that was the way that they were 
conceived.  That they needed extra help, the parents, for that conception.  Whether this is the 
right way to tell people to tell their children or not, I don't know, but it seems logical to me.  
And having had an adopted child, who we told she was adopted right from the beginning, and 
had no idea of what that word meant, but at 8 or 9 the penny dropped that she had two mothers, 
and there seemed to be that insight, that light going on.  And I've spoken to other people who 
say that around 8 or 9 they seem to have that facility to be able to puzzle things out, but you 
need to build them up.  And I think you're disadvantaging children by giving them information 
that they don't understand, because they can say at school something that gets a reaction from 
other people that can be quite demeaning for the children. 
 
In theory, because the information about donor conception is gradually understood 
over time, it becomes less of an ‘issue’ or a potential problem for the child to find out 
that an assumed biological link to the father does not exist.  This follows reasoning 
from the experience of adoption which Counsellor A also has first-hand experience 
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of, as an adoptive mother.  Research in the field of adoption has indicated that 
children who are told about their adopted status when they are young adjust well to 
being adopted and, while ‘naturally’ curious about their birth parents, are less likely to 
want to trace them because they regard their adoptive parents as their ‘real’ parents 
(Haimes, 1988:50).9 The counsellor acknowledged that it was difficult to know 
whether this is in fact the ‘right’ way to tell the child, but to her it seemed logical and 
sensible and was relevant to her experience of telling her own adopted child of her 
birth origins.  As a result, she was comfortable relaying this model to couples who 
sought guidance on what, how and when to tell the child about their origins. 
 
The counsellor at another clinic also believed in this model of telling, but questioned 
whether she had the right to advocate this approach to telling the child of its origins.  
 
Counsellor B:  I’d say that of the people I’ve seen, it would be approximately two-thirds who would be 
in favour of telling the child, but sometimes there’s disagreement on that, not necessarily 
whether to tell or not to tell, but when.  One person might think it would be better to tell when 
they’re teenagers, and the other might think it would be better to tell them when they’re young. 
 
KH:   Do you have any thoughts on that? 
 
Counsellor B:  Well I do have thoughts on that, and actually that’s probably the thing about this that 
I find hardest really.  I’ve got a background in developmental psychology, and know how 
children learn about their background.  So, I do believe that it would be better to tell them 
earlier on, tell them in small manageable chunks, and to have it as something that could just be 
taken on board as part of your own story about yourself, where you came from, so it’s not like a 
huge secret, or you’re told one thing before you get to fifteen and you’re told something else 
later.  But I appreciate that’s not necessarily the way other people feel, and it’s not my place to 
tell them that that might be the way to go about it.  And at the moment I don’t feel like we have 
enough research to be able to say, clearly, that this is what has been found to be best way to 
approach it. 
 
Counsellor B therefore appeared to question that the ‘overwhelming evidence’ from 
adoption necessarily supported what should be recommended in the practice of DI 
(Haimes, 1988:51). 
  
The process of disclosure 
Almost all the couples participating in this research said that they had told their child 
of its DI origins or that they planned to.  The high percentage of ‘disclosers’10 is 
significantly different from other studies of couples with children conceived by DI, 
                                                          
9 See Chapter Ten for a more detailed discussion about the reasons why adopted people might wish to 
make contact with their birth parents. 
10 Equally, some parents who said they intend to disclose or intend to do so by a certain age, might not. 
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which found that most parents did not intend to inform their child of its origins (see, 
for example, Snowden, Mitchell and Snowden, 1983; Daniels, 1988; Leiblum and 
Aviv, 1997; Nachtigall et al, 1998; van Berkel et al, 199911). The apparent acceptance 
of ‘openness’ towards children conceived by DI in New Zealand is consistent with the 
findings of two recent New Zealand studies.  One revealed that 82% of couples 
having DI treatment intended to tell their children of their donor conception (Purdie, 
et al, 1992).  The other found that 84% of respondents had disclosed or planned to do 
so (Rumball and Adair, 1999).  It is interesting to compare this high level of 
disclosure or intent to disclose in New Zealand, with results of a Swedish study of 
disclosure patterns by parents of children conceived by DI (Gottlieb, Lalos and 
Lindblad, 2000; Lindblad, Gottlieb and Lalos, 2000).  As previously discussed, 
Sweden was the first country in the world, in 1985, to introduce legislation that 
enabled DI offspring to identify their genetic fathers upon reaching maturity.  In their 
study, however, Gottlieb, Lalos and Lindblad (2000) found that only 52% of parents 
had told or intended to tell their children of their DI origins (11% and 41%, 
respectively).  The authors therefore concluded that compliance with the intentions of 
Swedish legislation were low, even though the number of parents willing to inform 
their children was high from an international perspective, and that legislation alone is 
not sufficient to change personal attitudes in a population (Gottlieb, Lalos and 
Lindblad, 2000:2055).   These authors also argue that in light of the Swedish 
legislation, health professionals should promote disclosure, and provide adequate 
counselling and support to assist parents in making the decision to disclose (Lindblad, 
Gottlieb and Lalos, 2000:201). 
 
The high number of disclosers in the current study undoubtedly reflects to some 
(unknown) extent the context in which participants were recruited for the research: 
through New Zealand fertility clinics, and the New Zealand Infertility Society, which 
advocate sharing this information with the child.  Because disclosure to the child has 
become a dominant discourse in DI treatment, it is also possible that those who agreed 
                                                          
11 This last study compares attitudes of couples with children conceived by DI in studies conducted in 
1980 and in 1996.  Results showed that nearly 80% of respondents in each of the two years did not plan 
to tell the child of its origins.  However, in 1996 significantly more couples said they would inform 
their child of its origins (in 1980, many had said they were uncertain). The numbers, however, remain 
small.  In 1996, significantly more couples opted to be open with others about their use of DI and 
sought more non-identifying information about their donors than they had in 1980.  Thus, the authors 
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to participate in the research were more likely to be ‘open’ than those who declined to 
participate.  As discussed in Chapter Two, this exploratory study cannot generalise to 
the population of families with children conceived by DI.  Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that the discourses that couples draw on to help them make sense of 
their lives and guide their actions are constituted by common and shared social 
understandings.  As a result, it can be expected that people who embark on similar 
experiences (e.g. conceiving children by DI) at a particular time and place will draw 
on a set of discourses that are generally available to all of them to interpret their lives.  
This argument is supported by Williams and Popay (1994:122) who maintain that lay 
knowledge is both personal and social knowledge in the sense that shared knowledge 
informs the private understanding of an experience. 
 
As a counsellor pointed out, decisions about secrecy and disclosure are part of a 
process that involves shifts and changes over time.  Some couples who had originally 
decided not to tell, later changed their minds. Stephanie, the mother of three children 
conceived by DI, Liam, aged 12 years, Marcus, aged 9 and Louise, aged 7, had this to 
say: 
 
Stephanie:  We just went through all the traditional paths of everybody else that we weren't going to 
tell a soul. But it's just so unrealistic. Well, it's like all of those things, it's a grieving 
process.  And then, as you go through the grieving process, and then you decide, yes, this 
is what you're going to do, and you're going to do it under these circumstances... and then 
you go on a bit further and you think, well, that's not very practical, and it's just an 
evolution. And I look at Liam now, and I think he is a person in his own right.  He has 
rational thought, and all of those things, and he has an absolute right to know. 
 
Stephanie raised an important point about the connection between the grieving 
process and the desire for secrecy and that having moved through a grieving process 
they then focussed more on the child, as a rational individual agent who had a ‘right’ 
to know how they came into being. Stephanie said that she first introduced her eldest 
son to the knowledge that he was conceived by DI when, after a television programme 
on adoption, he asked if his parents were his birth parents.  She said: 
 
Stephanie:   Liam asked us, were we his birth parents.  And again it was a television programme 
about adoption.  
 
KH:   So then you explained to him? 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
of the study identify a trend towards greater openness which, they argue, reflects public opinion (van 
Berkel et al, 1999). 
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Stephanie:   Yes.  It was just an ideal opportunity. 
 
KH: How old was he?  
 
Stephanie:   Four, yes, just four. You see, it's the time they ask the questions.  Not necessarily that, 
but they're asking where babies come from and those sorts of things.  And actually, I've 
asked the children do they remember being told, and none of them do.  They all say, "Oh 
we've just always known," which is good, because it meant I achieved my objective. 
 
While Stephanie wanted her children to grow up knowing about their DI conception, 
so that the knowledge did not emerge as a sudden revelation, some couples waited 
until their children were older before informing them.  Mary and Brendan, parents of 
Jason, aged 12 years, and Clare, aged 10 years, told their children when they were 10 
and 8 years old, respectively. Brendan claimed that they were always going to tell the 
children and that he had no difficulty with it. Mary, however, said she had found the 
prospect more difficult.  She obtained a copy of a children’s book on donor 
conception which they used as a tool for telling their children.  At the time, Brendan 
and Mary invited the children to ask them questions, but said that none had yet been 
forthcoming.12  Mary recalled: 
 
Mary:  It was a terrible issue for us, for me.  I found it really hard to tell them.  I just worried about it 
for months and months. But once they were getting older I thought well this is something that's 
there... they've got a right... you know... it's a selfish reason not to tell them. As much as you 
feel that you're, you know, giving away something when you tell them, it's your selfish reasons.  
You're not thinking about their feelings, and their right to know these sort of things.  Because 
it's their body, and how would you feel if you were in the same situation?  I think if I was in the 
same situation I would want to know.  And I think that that was basically it.  I thought, well 
they're old enough and they really have that right to know.  They're people, they're not babies 
any more, that you... when you first have this you think, well this is a baby, and you're quite... 
it's yours, but once it starts to grow, it does have its own feelings. 
 
Like Stephanie, Mary illustrated the way in which views on secrecy and disclosure 
can change over time.  As a fertility clinic counsellor said, the interests of the child 
appear to take on a different meaning as he/she grows older and his/her individuality 
becomes more apparent.  Mary appeared to think that as her children grew from 
babyhood she had less of a claim to ‘ownership’ of them and so non-disclosure 
appeared selfish.  This indicated that non-disclosure is a tool to protect the parents 
rather than the child.  It is also a question of ownership of the information: it is not 
just for the parents to own. 
 
                                                          
12 When Brendan’s nephew also had a son conceived by DI, Jason, however, commented that he hoped 
he would be able to have children in the future.  Mary said she replied that he should be “fine” because 
he did not have the same medical condition as the other men in the family. 
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Other couples chose to tell their children about their origins right from birth.  Some 
said they felt more comfortable with this because it was a way of practising telling the 
child before he/she could understand anything about it. By having always told the 
child about his/her DI origins, parents such as Diane and Chris hoped that it would 
never become an issue for their child.  They said: 
 
Diane:   When he was a very little baby, right from when he was born we used to tell him a story, 
"Once upon a time there was a mummy and a daddy and they wanted to have a baby and they 
were very sad...and they went to see a doctor...and blah, blah, blah.  And just lately I've been 
introducing the fact, you know, “Once upon a time...” and adding in the fact that a special man 
at the clinic helped us, and as time goes on and he gets more understanding, because he's not 
really that interested in it at the moment... [Chris laughs] but if it's in there I hope it will 
gradually just become something that he's always known, you know, it's never been an issue.  
 
Chris:  We really find it hard to believe that he's even going to think about it or worry about it, or 
think it's an issue.  It just becomes another part of life. 
 
Rumball and Adair (1999:1395) report that participants in their study told similar 
stories to their children.  Other parents of DI children began introducing the topic 
when they first began reading books to their children. Caroline and Mike introduced 
the children’s book about DI conception, ‘My Story’ (Cooke, 1991), to their 
daughters when they were about 12 months old and had read the story to them many 
times since. They were not sure how much their daughters, Toni, now 8 years old, and 
Lucy, 5 years old, understood about the story.  When asked if they had asked any 
questions about it, Caroline said: 
 
Caroline:  Oh, they have asked odd questions.  I can't remember anything specific, but Toni said 
tonight that she... I was reading it to Lucy... I thought, well I'll just see what she comes up 
with, and she turned around and said, “Oh, that was a lovely story” basically, “but I don't 
understand it.”  And I thought well that's okay, you'll learn to understand it and I said to 
Toni, “Do you understand it?” and she said, “Yes, I understand it.”  Now, whether that was 
just a big girl talking I don't know, but I think she... she knows that she wasn't conceived 
normally, as such. 
 
When asked why they thought it was important for their children to know their 
genetic origins, Mike said: 
 
Mike:   We don't want any secrets.  They deserve better than to be not told something as critical to 
their makeup.  Personally, they may or may not think it a big deal.  We've undertaken to be a 
good set of parents and to have a good stable family environment for those critical years.   
And where they come from was just another one of those things that happened because we had 
no choice.  And if we didn't do it we wouldn't have children.  That's it... that' s the whole... I 
mean, I've told the girls ever since we first held them and have been reading to them so they're 
never going to look me in the face and say, “You never told me.”  I've been telling them very 
frequently.  They may not have understood it, but they could never say they were not told. 
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Mike’s comments illustrated that disclosure could also be perceived as a means of 
protecting the parents: from possible future accusations that they had not told their 
children the truth.  In their study of parents’ disclosure to their children, Rumball and 
Adair (1999:1396) found that 20% of parents had talked to their children about their 
DI conception from birth. Some couples with more than one child conceived by DI 
took their older child with them to the fertility clinic when having treatment to 
conceive the second child, and used the opportunity to tell the older child that this was 
how they had their babies and formed a family.  This raised a question about the 
‘best’ way of framing the child’s DI conception.  Daniels and Thorn (2001) argue that 
a ‘family-building’ approach might be more useful than a child-conception approach.  
They suggest that parents telling the child a story about how they were conceived 
might somehow have the effect of setting them ‘apart’. An alternative approach, they 
suggest, would be to tell the story of how ‘our family’ was created which places the 
emphasis on ‘us’ as a family rather than ‘you’ as a child (Daniels and Thorn, 2001).  
The question arises, however, whether this is really more than semantics because it 
still indicates ‘difference’. 
 
Helen and Patrick, who had two sons, Thomas, aged 4 years, and Connor, 9 months, 
said that they had already started telling the boys about their DI conception.  Helen 
said: 
 
Helen:   We do tell them.  I've got a book and it's a wee book about how the doctor can help you, but 
then I took Thomas with me [to the clinic] when we were having Connor. I told him that 
Mummy and Daddy want to have a baby and have to come to the clinic to be able to and that a 
man [a donor] was going to help us.  I didn't tell him everything.  So he knew right at the start 
that [the nurse] was going to help us, and I told him that this was how we had him.  So, he was 
happy with that, and he was really intrigued by it all. Nothing's probably been said about it 
since we had Connor, nine months ago, but the book's always in the bottom drawer, and we 
read it to them from time to time.  And we sort of think, if it's in the children's subconscious 
that when it comes time to actually really talk to them about it in detail, they'll be able to cope 
with that.  It won't be such a shock.  
 
Helen raised the issue that telling the child is part of an on-going conversation that 
involves telling and re-telling when opportunities arose (Rumball and Adair, 
1999:1397). The question arises whether parents tell their children that DI is an 
unusual form of conception.  Otherwise children might think that all babies are 
conceived this way which poses a different issue.  The question also arises whether 
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older children conceived by DI help tell the story to younger children and whether this 
helps ‘normalise’ the idea of DI conception. 
 
Some couples chose to develop their own scripts for telling. Sarah wrote individual 
stories for each of her children as a way of introducing them at a young age to the 
topic of how they came to be in their family. She said: 
 
Sarah:  The point of the stories was that the children would initiate how much information they wanted 
to have.  And Charlotte's doesn't say she's donor, and it just says a special doctor helped, you 
know.  But, yeah, we've been filling in gaps as Rob gets older and Rob now has good contact 
with his birth family, and we talk about his birth mother.  We don't talk about the grandparents 
as being birth grandparents, and he knows that Grant, we try not to use the word birth father 
because we think it could be giving him too much... it's not necessary.  You know, Grant was 
Jo’s partner back then and Aunty Judy has got her story to tell when that day comes, and all 
Charlotte knows is that another nice man helped... a doctor. 
 
 
Sarah expected her children to ask more questions about the circumstances of their 
births as they grew older and wanted more information. It is possible that she did not 
give birth-father information to the children because the birth fathers did not have 
social relationships with the children. Therefore, it was difficult to explain who they 
were.  As an added complication, Phoebe’s birth mother claimed not to know who the 
birth father was.   
 
Other parents were concerned that they had given their child too much information 
too young.  Joanna said that her son Todd, aged 7 years, appeared to be confused 
about what she had told him about his DI origins.  She said:  
 
Joanna:  [The book’s] always been in the bookcase.  But I've always said, from when they were only 
little, that they're special and I tried to explain last year to Todd, because Todd wanted to 
know why [he was special] but then he got confused.  He asked, “Why isn't Dad my real Dad 
and why have I got another Dad?”  He just got totally confused.  So I thought, I'll wait till he's 
11 or 12 and sort of really sit down and talk to him about it.  I always say he's special and 
things.  
 
Joanna had always told her children that they were ‘special’, a discourse used by 
adoptive parents and also parents of children conceived by DI to make them feel that 
they were specially chosen or wanted, rather than ‘different’.13  However, when she 
attempted to explain to Todd why he was special he became confused because, at 7 
                                                          
13 The construction of the child conceived by DI as ‘special’ is discussed in Chapter Eleven. 
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years old, he was too young to understand the difference between biological and 
social ties. Solomon et al (1996) contend that children below the age of 7 years are 
unable to fully understand the concepts of biological inheritance.  According to 
Piaget’s theory of cognitive development, once the child reaches the concrete 
operational stage (7-12 years) he or she is more capable of logical thought processes 
and more reasoning (1955). 
 
Like other parents, Jennifer and Petra had already started telling their 9-month old 
daughter, Olivia, about her origins.  They said: 
 
Jennifer: We've already introduced it.  Like, when we read her stories at night and stuff like that, we'll 
tell her the story, you know, as a kind of “Once upon a time...”. That's our story at the 
moment. I think the kind of stories that I tell her as she gets older will develop at the 
appropriate age, so it's not, when she's five or six, to suddenly sit her down and say “This is 
what the story is.”  It's something that's actually developed and evolved right from the start, so 
there's no great surprises…. It's like sex. I see it as being very, very similar.  
 
Petra:   That's right.  Sex is not a secret from her, it's just a bit bizarre to tell her the facts of life now 
since she can't talk.  
 
Jennifer and Petra therefore envisaged that Olivia’s knowledge of her DI origins 
would emerge as part of her normal development, just as people learn about the facts 
of life and human sexuality as part of the process of growing up.  The children’s 
books designed to help (heterosexual) parents tell the DI child of his/her origins are 
not suitable for lesbian parents.  Like Sarah, Jennifer had decided to write Olivia’s 
story herself.  She said: 
 
Jennifer: One of the things that I will do for Olivia, is that I want to write her a life story book, so that 
she has her nice little book, with her story in it, and how she came into the world.  It's 
basically a, you know, what's that book they have at the clinic?  
 
KH: ‘My Story’? 
 
Jennifer: ‘My Story’, basically a ‘My Story’ but more appropriate with photos and whatever.  So, that's 
what I wanted to do for her.  And also so other people will know how to explain it to Olivia, 
like I'm really happy for people who are close to us to read it to Olivia as well, so that they 
know how to tell the story, and take the lead from us. 
 
For Jennifer and Petra, part of educating others about lesbian parenting involved 
being ‘upfront’ both about being lesbians and about parenting in the context of a 
lesbian relationship. At the same time, the couples suggested that as their children got 
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older they would take a cue from them as to when to be ‘upfront’ and when to be 
more ‘closeted’. Olivia’s non-biological mother, said: 
 
Petra:  And once Olivia's older, I mean, that's why we have to be up front.  I can never deny being 
Olivia's parent, you know.  Once she's six, seven, eight, I must take a cue from her.  If she wants 
me to be closeted, I can be closeted.  If she wants me to speak up for her, I have got to be 
prepared to speak up for her.  
 
Similarly, Ria and Sophie, parents of Lydia, aged 7 ½ months, said: 
 
Ria:   I think what beliefs we have now are our own personal beliefs, but it's all really going to 
change when it starts to affect Lydia, when she starts to go to school.  If she wants to have her 
friends over and she's slightly embarrassed, I think that I would probably do her the courtesy 
of not blurting out anything to her friends, because I just know how cruel kids can be, and so 
if she goes through a stage of being embarrassed about it, then I'll just have to let her be 
embarrassed about it, and not be so out front.  
 
Sophie: But it's amazing, there's been a situation last week at the pre-school when there were two girls 
playing mothers and fathers, and one of them was saying, “Oh, who's going to be the 
mummy?” And they were fighting over being mummy, and Jessica says, “well, I'll tell you 
what, why don't we both be the mummy?” and Tara said, “But you can only have one mum 
and one dad,” and Jessica turned around and said, “Lydia's got two mummies!” So it all comes 
from being around it really.  And, as I say, I think that once Lydia's older, it may not be so 
much out of the norm.  There's probably going to be two or three other kids at school with two 
mums.  
 
Sophie appeared optimistic that with more children being born to lesbian parents 
having more than one mother may become ‘normalised’. 
 
When donors are not identifiable 
The issues pertaining to disclosure about DI need to be considered in the context of 
DI practices (Haimes, 1988).  As discussed in Chapter Five, what emerges is a picture 
of health professionals advocating disclosure to the child in a context where 
anonymity, at least initially, remains a primary organising principle for the two South 
Island DI programmes included in this study.  While most couples had had children at 
a time when donors had agreed to be identified in the future, as discussed in Chapter 
Five, this could not be guaranteed.  Some, however, had had children at a time when 
complete donor anonymity prevailed and very little information was provided about 
the donor. Children conceived by DI at that time are very unlikely to be able to 
identify their genetic father should they wish to in the future.  When Stephanie and 
John conceived their eldest son, Liam, they were given scant information about their 
donor:  his hair colour, eye colour and general level of education.  For Liam’s sake, 
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they tried to find out more by contacting the doctor who had performed the 
insemination, who had later moved overseas. Stephanie said: 
 
Stephanie:  He can't...the fact that he'll never know the full information saddens me, but fortunately 
he's able to cope with that...and we've said, well we've tried.  We showed him the letter to 
prove we tried [to get more information].  We weren't actually seeking the identity.  But, 
[the doctor] couldn't provide any more information.  He said he couldn't remember.  What 
a wimpy excuse, but never mind.  But then we had to say to Liam, “That was the deal we 
accepted, and we had a choice - accept the deal or not have you.  Which would you rather 
we did?”  “Oh well”... no contest really is it?  It might raise its head again if the other two 
choose to meet the donor. 
 
 
That Liam will not be able to find out more about his biological father was somewhat 
troubling to Stephanie and John, but their choices were constrained by the system as it 
operated at that time.   
 
When Kathy and her husband Joel sought to conceive by DI, the health professionals 
at the clinic they attended advised them to keep it a secret.  Kathy, however, had no 
intention of keeping the knowledge of her donor conception from her daughter 
Melissa.  Like Stephanie and John, Kathy had tried to find out more information about 
their donor, but was unsuccessful.  Kathy was adamant that her daughter had the right 
to know more about her genetic father and wrote to the clinic after Melissa, at four 
years old, started drawing pictures of the donor.   She hoped that Melissa would be 
able to find out more about the donor if she wanted to, but the clinic said they could 
not assist because the donor had not agreed to provide any more information.  Kathy 
said: 
 
Kathy:  My concern all along has been in the interests of these children. What right do we have 
to...there is the contract of law that they enter into of anonymity with the donor, but where 
does the right of this child pop up?  There's a whole bundle of stuff in there. 
 
According to Kathy, Melissa, who was 10 years old, had asked questions about the 
donor.  For example, she wondered whether he liked peppermints, like she did, 
because other members of her family did not.  She also wondered where her thick 
blonde hair came from because her parents and her younger sister, Nicole, aged 8 
years, all had very fine hair.  Kathy said that Melissa had recently begun to ask 
questions about the meaning of ‘blood ties’ and human relatedness.  She said: 
 
Kathy:   She did ask was the donor related to her and I had said, “Yes, by a technicality” and she said,  
“You should just give it to me straight,” and I said, “Well, yes, by blood, yes.”  And I said, 
“How do you feel about that?” and she said “well I don't want him to be.” At that point she 
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then asked was she related to her dad.  I said, “Well, you're related to your Dad by social 
circumstances, and he's your Dad and always will be.”  And she asked if she changed bloods 
with Daddy and he changed it with her, would that make her related by blood, because I guess 
that solid connection, the blood connection is a close tie.   
 
I don't know whether it's got anything to do with Nicole, that's her sister.  Earlier in the year, 
probably in February, we were talking about blood and relatives and Nicole had very 
unwittingly let her know... we were talking about relations by blood and Grandma being 
related.  It was nothing to do with the donor issue.  And Melissa said, “Am I related by 
blood?”  And Nicole had swung around in the room and said “No, you never will be.”  And 
she said, “Shut up Nicole, shut up.  I didn't even need to hear that and I don't want to hear it.” 
She had gone out of the room and she was mortified, absolutely devastated. 
 
Kathy’s claim that Melissa and the donor were related “by blood” illustrates that 
genetic ties are regarded as synonymous with ‘blood ties’ in Euro-American notions 
of kinship. This is illustrated by Cameron’s (1990:34) New Zealand study which 
found that for many parents an important reason for having children was to continue 
family bloodlines, which assumes the sharing of blood between parents and their 
children and ensures the continuity of the family. This framing of kinship, however, 
sets up a rigid dichotomy between the biological and the social.  As Carsten (1998:2) 
has pointed out, cross-cultural studies have shown that while blood is significant to 
ideas about kinship, in many south-eastern Asian cultures blood is not just genetically 
determined, but can be formed by the sharing of other substances, such as food.  In 
these cultures, blood is a marker of shared identity between kin, but is derived from 
both ‘biological’ and ‘environmental’ factors. Moreover, as previously discussed in 
this chapter and in Chapter Three, in the context of assisted conception using donated 
gametes, ideas about what constitutes blood ties are undergoing significant changes 
(Carsten, 1998). 
 
Kathy, who said that she had always talked ‘straight’ to her children, had only 
recently decided that she needed to modify the information she gave them, 
recognising that they were still young children.  She said that she had first told 
Melissa about her donor conception when, at three years old, she had asked how she 
was made.  Kathy recalled: 
 
Kathy:  At the time, she was three, and I was driving the car.  And Joel was in the car at the time and 
she said, “So how was I made?” and I said, “You were made from an egg from me and a 
sperm from a donor.”  I explained that a donor was another man who had given sperm because 
papa didn't have enough sperm at the time.  “How was Nicole made?”  That was a sinking 
rock for me.  I said that Nicole was made from a sperm from papa and an egg from me, and 
she said, “Oh” and she's always been aware of that unequitable thing in there…very much so. 
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Kathy’s comments raise a number of issues. The situation she describes suggests that 
families who have children who are full biological children and children conceived by 
DI might have different issues to confront when telling because of the possible 
perception of an asymmetry existing between them. In the light of previous discussion 
in this chapter about the need to provide children with information appropriate to their 
level of understanding, it could be argued that telling a 3-year old child about sperm 
and eggs and donors is inappropriate.  However, in Kathy’s estimation, this was less 
“in-depth and personal” than talking about the particular contexts of the two 
conceptions. It raises the issue that for Kathy genetic ties were significant, and 
therefore, she also assumed that they would also be significant for her daughter.14   
 
Melissa, who was present at times during the interview with her mother, denied being 
concerned that she was conceived by DI and her sister was not.  However, she said 
she had recently worked out for herself that Nicole was her half-sister and she 
wondered why her mother had not told her this before. Kathy replied that she did not 
want Melissa and Nicole to feel that they were anything less than ‘whole’ sisters so 
she avoided using the term ‘half-sisters’.  As far as the donor was concerned, Melissa 
was curious about “little things” about him, but said she thought little about him.15 
Melissa seemed more concerned about her social relationship with her father.  Her 
parents had separated when she was 4 years old and her father had recently remarried.  
Kathy claimed that Melissa was reluctant to go to her father’s house since he had 
remarried.  Her father now referred to his partner’s 16 year-old daughter as his “other 
daughter”.  Kathy wondered whether Melissa felt her relationship with her father was 
threatened because of the lack of a biological connection with him.  Melissa, on the 
other hand, argued: 
 
Melissa:  It’s just that he’s changed.  He spends time with [his wife].  He spends time with her and he 
used to be able to take us places and buy us clothes and things, but now he buys [his wife] 
something first but if he doesn’t have enough money he won’t do anything for us.  He’s just 
changed. 
 
                                                          
14 Kathy’s daughters, Melissa and Nicole, were present at times during the interview.  On some 
occasions Kathy called Melissa in from the adjoining room to ask her questions relating to her thoughts 
about the donor and her relationships with her sister and father.  Melissa was not present when her 
mother described how she told her about her DI origins.  However, Kathy then called her in to ask her 
whether knowing that she and her sister had different biological fathers affected the way she thought 
about her sister.  Melissa replied that it did not change the way she thought about her sister. 
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It appeared that Melissa’s problems with her father were more related to her parents’ 
separation, divorce and her father’s subsequent remarriage and reconstituted family, 
than to her donor conception and the lack of a genetic tie to her father.  
 
Waiting for the ‘right time’ to tell 
Whereas many couples had told their children when they were young about their 
donor origins, some couples were waiting for the ‘right time’ to tell. This supports 
Rumball and Adair’s contention that parents chose to tell when ‘it just seemed right’ 
(1999:1392). Generally, they were not sure when that time might be.  Most of those 
who had not yet told their children had sons rather than daughters.  Tania and Mark, 
who had a 9-month old son, Levi, said that they expected they would eventually tell 
their son about his origins.  However, Tania claimed that they had received little 
advice from the clinical staff on how to tell.  She said:  
 
Tania:  They sort of said that it was important that the child knew, and to perhaps bring it up like an 
adopted child.  But I thought there might be a support group or something like that for later on, 
but I don't think there is.  They never said anything, but they just stressed that it was important 
that we did tell. There was one support group started up by a couple but they were having 
problems themselves, but I honestly received no information about how you might tell the 
child… I mean we'll sorta certainly tell him, but I've never really thought about what the 
consequences would be (she laughs).  Since he was born I've said to him, “you're a special wee 
baby,” but you don't think about... I don't think... because he's only a baby and he's too young 
to understand, and he'll probably be ten years old before he'll really understand what we mean.  
 
The prospect of telling Levi about his origins appeared to be a distant abstraction for 
Tania.  She did not feel well-equipped to know how to tell the child and had given it 
little thought.  The couple did not see a counsellor when they entered the DI 
programme and Tania was unaware of the children’s books that tell the story of DI.  
 
Some couples said that their children had not, to date, asked them anything about the 
“facts of life” which might have provided an entree to the topic of their donor 
conception.  Henry and Prue had not yet told their sons Jack, aged 8 years, and Luke 
aged 6 years, of their origins.  They thought that the boys were too young to tell, and 
were not sure how they would approach the topic. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
15 Other perceptions of donors raised by some children in the context of interviews with their parents 
are discussed in Chapter Eleven. 
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Prue: Right now I think they play silly wee games and say silly things and I think it's not a good 
time to tell them anything like that.  I don't know when it will be a good time.  It'll have to be 
perhaps in the next few years.  
 
Henry: When they go on their first overseas trip (he laughs).  Actually I've been thinking about that, 
and I really don't know how to start.  We're probably waiting for the right time, and when is it 
and I suppose that's a common thing for all donor families.  When do you sit down with the 
little fella and tell him?  I think the sooner the better in a lot of ways, but then it's... I don't 
want to tell them when they're out of shorts and into long pants.  I think that's too late.  It's 
within the next year or two I think.  Nine, ten years old is a good time for that.  
 
Prue: Somewhere around there.  
 
Henry:  The thing is, once you tell them, there'd be a hundred questions. 
                                                                              
Prue:   Oh yes, you see (she sighs).  That's... I'm not really looking forward to telling them.  
 
Prue and Henry appeared to be putting off something they would rather not have to 
contend with.  Their quandary raises the issue of the difficulty for many parents of 
children conceived by DI, who do not build the story into their children’s lives from 
birth, of making decisions about when and how to tell their children about their DI 
origins. 
 
Like Henry and Prue, Joe and Ella had not decided when to tell their three sons about 
their donor conception.  Ella had read a book recommended to them, The Gift of a 
Child (Snowden and Snowden, 1984), which included information about telling 
children about donor conception and she said she was planning to buy a children’s 
book about it from the clinic.  When asked if they thought their children should know 
about the circumstances of their birth, they said: 
 
Joe: I think so, yeah.  It's going to come out eventually; better it come from our mouths than 
somebody else's.  
 
Ella: I must go buy that book.  I keep saying that.  Life's so busy.              
 
KH: Do you imagine it might be hard to tell them?  How do you think you might introduce the 
topic?  
 
Ella: Well, I find that, if they don't know the facts of life, how do you explain it? 
 
KH:   Have they asked anything? 
 
Ella: Not really.  
 
Joe: No. 
 
Ella:   It said in that book to say that they were special and keep emphasising that they are special 
children, but it never said why they're special really. Because they're all wanted, that's the 
main thing. 
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Joe: That's the other thing.  It wasn't by mistake that they arrived.  
 
KH: So you think you might tell them through the book?  
 
Ella: The thing is, at what age to tell them.  
 
Joe: It's one of those things you haven't thought too much about.  We will tell them eventually, I 
suppose by the time they're 10 or 11 and they know the facts of life…that they'll be told. 
 
 
Joe appeared somewhat resistant to telling his sons about their origins which stood in 
direct contrast to his openness with others about his infertility and his children’s DI 
conception. The information about their donor origins was perceived as something 
that would eventually be shared with them. Ella was clearly uncomfortable by a 
suggestion that she had read in connection with telling the child about its origins 
which was to tell the child that he/she was ‘special’.16 She resisted the notion that 
they were ‘special’ like adopted children who also could be constructed as ‘unwanted’ 
by the birth parents (Iwanek, 1997:15-16). 
 
The notion of waiting for the ‘right time’ to tell the child of his/her DI origins and 
having no particular plans to tell illustrates that ‘telling’ is by no means 
straightforward, even as a concept, “let alone as a feature of interaction within actual 
families” (Haimes and Timms, 1985:82).  It also raises the question whether the 
parents will eventually tell their children and under what circumstances. Both Henry 
and Prue and Joe and Ella claimed that they would tell their children, and both 
implied that the age of about 10 or 11 years old might be a good time because by then 
they might understand the facts of life.  This notion runs counter to advice given by a 
counsellor that children should be told before they understand.  In light of prior 
discussion in this chapter, the question also arises as to whether the longer they leave 
it, the more difficult it may become to tell them and the greater the risk of others 
telling their sons before the ‘right time’ emerged.   
 
Meredith, the mother of Daniel, aged 7 years, said that she had no plans to tell him 
about his DI origins. 
 
Meredith: I'm not worried.  If he finds out, it's the right time.  And if he doesn't...  
 
                                                          
16 This conceptualisation of the child conceived by DI as ‘special’ is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Eleven. 
 323
KH:   So, you don't plan to tell him?  
 
Meredith: I'm not going to make an issue of it.  I don't think so.  
 
KH: Would that be partly for Karl’s [her husband’s] sake as well? 
 
Meredith:   Um, yes, and also because, going back to the fact that he's an only child.  And, you know, 
that's a bit different now too, because so many children have brothers and sisters to play 
with.  And, you know, I don't want him to feel that he's different (hah) from other families.  
So...when he's older, he'll probably cope with it.  He's a very, um, takes things to heart.  
Very sensitive.  If somebody calls him a name at school, it doesn't upset him, but when I 
go in to see him at night, he'll bring it up and say, “Why did he say that to me?  Why did 
he?” You know? He's not upset about it, but he doesn't let something go, and get on with 
the next thing.  
 
 
Meredith had no wish to be proactive in telling Daniel but on some level was prepared 
to leave it to ‘fate’ as to whether he found out or not.  She was aware that her son had 
a classmate who knew the circumstances of her own DI conception and she had 
wondered if he might somehow find out through her. 
 
Conclusion 
The decision whether or not to tell a child conceived by DI of his/her origins is 
embedded in a complex web of interests and policies that surround the practice.  
Traditionally, DI has been kept a secret by the medical profession which has sought to 
maintain donor anonymity primarily to protect donors, recipients and their children 
from harm.  The use of donor anonymity and secrecy can be seen to shift from an 
initial focus on protecting the donor to protecting the social father, to protecting the 
child from knowing about his/her ‘different’ origins, to the need for disclosure to 
protect the child from lies and deceit.  
 
Research on adoption that has documented the need to know one’s genealogical 
background for the development of mature independence and a sense of identity, and 
the trend towards open adoption, have led to a belief that denying individuals 
conceived by DI access to knowledge about donor origins has increasingly become 
regarded as ethically unacceptable. International studies of the attitudes of recipient 
couples, however, reveal that the vast majority of parents still prefer not to tell their 
children that they were conceived by DI.  Nevertheless, with some countries opting to 
legislate in favour of individuals having access to identifying information about 
donors, and growing public opinion in favour of ‘openness’, more couples appear to 
be in favour of telling their child about his/her donor conception.  This is evident in 
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recent New Zealand research which indicates that over 80% of parents have told or 
plan to tell their children about their DI origins.   
 
Most of the recipient couples participating in this study said that they had told, or 
planned to tell, their child of his/her origins.  This reflects the current philosophy of 
New Zealand fertility clinics, which has been shaped by the ideology of the child’s 
‘right’ to know their genetic origins.  This dominant discourse has been informed, not 
only by moves towards open adoption in New Zealand, but also reflects Maori beliefs 
about the significance of whakapapa, or knowing one’s genetic heritage, which is an 
important consideration within New Zealand’s bicultural context.  In contrast to 
quantitative studies carried out by fertility clinics assessing recipient couples’ 
attitudes to telling the child, this exploratory, qualitative study shows the complexities 
involved in the decision to tell or not to tell the child conceived by DI. Decisions 
about secrecy and disclosure are embedded in sets of social relations and professional 
practices, and therefore involve taking account of the interests of all significant parties 
concerned. 
 
Couples responded differently to the issues emerging from the pressure to tell. Many 
couples were knowledgeable about theories of child development and chose to tell the 
story of their child’s origins in incremental steps so the knowledge about their 
biological connection to an unknown donor, rather than to their social father, did not 
emerge as a shocking revelation.  Many of these parents had used children’s books on 
DI as a valuable tool for introducing the topic to their children; and others had written 
personalised stories of how their children were born. Other parents were unsure how, 
or when, to tell their child, or were waiting for the ‘right’ time to present itself. Most 
of those who were still waiting for the appropriate time to tell were parents of boys 
which raises the question of whether couples find it more difficult to tell boys than 
girls.  Reluctance to tell boys may relate to claims that girls are more interested in 
where babies come from and therefore ask more questions about it.  Equally, it may 
relate to concerns about the possible implications of the social father’s male infertility 
for their sons who may consequently identify with or possibly reject their social 
fathers as inadequate. Certainly, several parents of boys claimed not to have given the 
matter of telling much thought, claimed ignorance about how to tell, or felt ill-
equipped to answer the difficult questions that they envisaged would emerge as a 
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result of telling.  Future research in this area might usefully explore possible 
differences in telling boys and girls about their donor conceptions. 
 
For all the parents in this study, decisions about telling emerged as part of a process, 
or a ‘journey’.  Some decided to tell their child about their origins as soon as they 
were born.  These were generally parents who went through a DI programme that 
actively encourages parents to tell children before they understand the concepts.  This 
suggests that clinical practices have a bearing on whether, when and how information 
sharing with DI offspring begins.  For others, the decision to disclose to the child 
emerged as the child grew older and in contrast to an original decision to keep it a 
secret.  Many felt prompted to answer their child’s initial questions about their 
origins; some parents said they were waiting for questions from their children about 
how they came into the world.  Others sought to avoid the topic of donor conception 
until they thought it would be comprehensible to the child.  Nonetheless, most said 
that they believed that they should not wait until the child was a teenager before 
telling him/her the truth.  
 
Having told the children born after DI of their origins, the question still remains 
whether, like in adoption, many individuals would be interested in finding out more 
about their genetic father, or even contacting him.  If, in fact, many do wish to make 
contact with the donor, the question also arises as to how many donors will in fact be 
available or willing to be identified many years after the act of donation.  As one 
health professional interviewed for this research said, having donors who are 
potentially identifiable only, creates too much uncertainty to foster a desire to be 
‘open’.  In her view, having a known donor is preferable to an anonymous donor 
because from the outset, “all the cards are laid on the table”.  But whether donors are 
known or not known, they still embody a third party in the procreative process which 
is something individuals conceived by DI will respond to in their own particular way.  
As Bok (1978:217) has pointed out, such responses will not be at all uniform.  Most 
might be glad to know the truth about their biological origins, some would be 
indifferent, others might seek to meet and know their genetic father, and others might 
wish that the story of their conception could have been otherwise told. 
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Chapter Ten 
Constructing and Locating Donors 
 
We're probably increasingly curious [about the donor], aren't we?  Compared to that initial stage 
[when] it was sort of helpful to have a certain distance between… you know, almost to think of 
him not a human being in a sense.  Alice, mother of a daughter conceived by DI. 
 
Introduction 
Donor gametes make conception possible, but also construct a complex relationship 
between parents and the unknown, but potentially knowable, donors. This chapter 
explores how parents and kin of children conceived by donor insemination 
conceptualise donors. It examines attitudes, feelings and perceptions about donors, 
and whether or not recipients and their kin were curious to know more about donors, 
or even to meet them. Since donors are potentially identifiable in the future, the 
attitudes of parents and their kin towards their children possibly contacting donors are 
also a focus of attention. 
  
Analysis of the interview material indicates that perceptions of donors varied among 
participants.  This related to a number of factors including the perceived significance 
of biological and social ties, the perceived needs of the child, fear of the possible 
implications of children’s contact with donors, and whether or not donors had 
indicated a willingness to be identified.  Responses of parents and other family 
members to having an unknown stranger involved in the conception of their child 
were complex, ambivalent, and sometimes contradictory. For example, while many 
parents drew on the discourse of the child’s ‘right’ to information about the donor, 
they professed to have little interest in the donor themselves and were more 
comfortable with the idea that donors remained anonymous. The challenges 
articulated by parents were in part an outcome of uncertainty about whether or not 
people conceived by DI will want information about donors or seek to contact them. 
 
When explaining their perceptions and attitudes towards donors, couples and their 
family members drew on discourses of ‘altruism’, ‘reciprocity’ and ‘gift-giving’. 
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Related to this discourse of giving was a discourse of gratitude.  Drawing on the work 
of Simmel (1950), this chapter examines whether or not parents felt grateful to the 
donor and the reciprocal actions engendered by gratitude. Couples presented a broad 
spectrum of notions in their construction of the gifting act and these sometimes 
correlated with their reaction to the identifiability of donors.  Some recipients had 
contacted donors anonymously via the clinics, sending letters or photographs of their 
children to express their thanks for their ‘gift’. Discourses of ‘science’ and ‘risk’, and 
the relative importance of genetic and social ties, were also used frequently in talk 
about donors.  A discourse of rights was also evident in recipients’ and family 
members’ talk about donors; in particular, the ‘right’ of the child to know his/her 
origins and potentially to meet the donor and, for some, the ‘right’ of the donor to 
identify his DI offspring.  While many acknowledged the ‘rights’ of the child or the 
donor, many were also concerned about contact between them.  These concerns were 
most significant among those who perceived such a meeting as a potential threat to 
social fathers (see Chapter Nine). 
 
This chapter first examines professional discourses about the potential to identify 
donors, and fertility clinics’ facilitation of anonymous exchanges between recipients 
and donors.  The chapter then explores differences among parents in their attitudes 
towards donors.  It identifies differences between those wishing to preserve 
anonymity and those wanting more information about donors, or tentatively open to 
contact. Finally, it examines the talk of those who would welcome the opportunity for 
contact with donors.  Because of the complexity that emerges in participants’ talk, a 
number of themes emerge that run across each category of this continuum.  For 
example, women generally expressed more interest in donors and levels of interest in 
donors were related to the presence, or lack of the presence of, a social father and to 
marital status.  Many parents and their kin were concerned about the risks of 
identifying genetic fathers.   
 
The potential to identify donors: the intermediary’s view 
As discussed in Chapter Five, the deliberate recruitment of anonymous sperm donors 
who are prepared to be identified to DI offspring in the future began in the late 1980s 
or early 1990s in New Zealand fertility clinics.  Thus, the children born to potentially 
identifiable donors are still too young to seek contact.  When asked if there had been 
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any instances of children conceived by DI meeting donors, one fertility clinic nurse 
said: 
Nurse A:  Not through our clinic, no, because the children are still quite young.  The oldest are 10, I 
guess.  So no, and then prior to that we didn't know who the donors were.  So, no we haven't.  
It's an unknown quantity.  It will be interesting to research in future years.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Five, there is no centralised register of donors, recipients and 
their children in New Zealand, though pending legislation is expected to centralise 
and formalise the system.1 Currently, individual clinics maintain their own records 
which should, in the future, enable individuals conceived by DI to identify their 
genetic father.  Nurse A described the record-keeping procedures of one South Island 
DI programme: 
 
Nurse A:  All the donors are coded, and when a child is born we then send a copy of the donor profile 
to the recipient couple, so then the couple pass this information on to the child or children.  
So those children know who the donor is, or have a non-identifying profile of the donor.  
Because we don't know what's going to happen in the future, and there may be a central 
register which these donor children may access, and this is always discussed with potential 
donors, to make sure they're comfortable with that idea.  So, if in the future, perhaps, a child 
was 18 or 20 and wanted to have information about the donor, or more information, they 
could come to the clinic.  We would then contact the donor to see how he felt.  
 
Nurse A indicated that the clinic staff would feel “very uncomfortable taking on a 
donor who didn’t want contact”, but she did not anticipate that all people conceived 
through DI will want to identify the donor.  Donors are able to stipulate just how open 
they are to having contact with DI offspring and some are more willing to be 
contacted than others.  A system is therefore in place to potentially allow individuals 
conceived by DI to make contact with their genetic fathers, preferably when they are 
young adults, but possibly sooner.  However, because the children conceived through 
the current system are still quite young, the system has not been tested.  The question 
thus arises as to how many people conceived by DI will be interested in identifying 
their genetic fathers in the future.  This is the subject of some speculation and, 
because it is unknown, many health professionals and parents draw on the example of 
adopted people seeking their birth parents as a guide to the possible interest in contact 
with donors.2  When asked if he anticipated that many children would want to meet 
their genetic fathers, the director of a DI programme said: 
                                                          
1 See Chapter Five for a discussion about the voluntary DI Family Register piloted by Fertility 
Associates, Wellington, New Zealand. 
2 For comparisons between adoption and DI, see Brandon and Warner (1977), Coffey (1987), Haimes 
(1988) and Midford (1993). According to Haimes, adoption might provide a useful precedent for DI, 
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Dr A: Well I don't know.  I mean, nobody's really got any experience with that.  One of the interesting 
things I always remember is that in Scotland, for many years, the child has had the right to know 
about their birth parents - adopted children.  Very few are very interested in the male side of it.  
So, I mean it may be a curiosity thing and things like that. But I'm not sure it's quite as an 
emotional event for a lot of children, as there may be related to their mother who gave them up.  
If they know that this man made a present to help him or her exist, then that's different to “my 
mother couldn't look after me and had to give me up.”                                                                          
 
Dr A cited research evidence that pointed to the fact that, although adopted children in 
Scotland have had the information to enable them to search for their birth parents, 
very few had pursued this option.3  He also implied that people are more interested in 
contacting their birth mothers than birth fathers, whose physical and emotional 
connection to them was perceived as more tenuous. The supposed lack of interest in 
identifying birth fathers, however, might be because it is more difficult to identify 
birth fathers, many of whom are not named on the child’s birth certificate (Iwanek, 
1998:29). 
 
In the case of adoption, a decision was made by the birth mother (possibly in 
conjunction with the birth father) not to raise the child.  In contrast, gamete donors 
choose to give a body product, not ‘a child’; thus, it is argued, the connection between 
a donor and his DI offspring is even more tenuous. As a result, according to this 
argument, people conceived by DI are less likely to want to seek to identify the 
unknown donor, who is their genetic parent but not their ‘father’, especially because 
no social ties ever existed between the donor and the mother.  This argument seems 
flawed, however, because many of the social ties that have resulted in the birth of a 
child subsequently placed for adoption have been little more than fleeting sexual 
encounters. In contrast, the planned and purposive act of donating semen to a DI 
programme indicates a social and moral interest in contributing to the birth of a child. 
Thus, it could be argued that the connection between the donor and the child is less 
tenuous because the conception occurred as a result of the donor’s specified intent.  
Evidence from adoption research indicates that the circumstances of conception do 
                                                                                                                                                                      
but more in the way that it poses questions to be answered than as a source of solutions for direct 
application (1988:46). 
3 Humphrey and Humphrey (1986) cite research by Triseliotis (1973) which revealed that, over the 
previous decade, only 1.5 per 1000 adoptees over the age of 17 had made contact with the Registrar in 
Edinburgh to trace their birth parents.  However, as the authors point out, the birth certificate 
information available to adoptees in Scotland was minimal and the task of actually finding the birth 
parents potentially formidable (Humphrey and Humphrey, 1986:134). 
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not necessarily have a bearing on adopted people’s interest in knowing more about 
their genetic parents (Iwanek, 1997, 1998). Similarly, genetic ties alone may have 
some significance for some individuals conceived by DI, leading them to seek more 
information about their genetic fathers, even if they do not seek direct contact. 
 
Counsellor A argued that while she thought people conceived by DI should have the 
option to be able to contact the donor, few would feel the emotional need to pursue 
this option. 
 
Counsellor A:  When I talk about choice of donors, I usually say, “I wouldn't touch anyone who 
doesn't have the box with future contact ticked.” And now we don't have anyone who doesn't 
tick that box for future contact.  So, I say, “That might sound a bit alarming to you now, but 
when you're looking at the rights of your child, when you're telling them the story about their 
origins, you can take it on yourself and say, well, we made sure they've kept the records for you 
and we've made sure that you can make contact in the future if you want it.”  My hunch is, and I 
usually say this too, is that the children won't have a driving desire.  They're not looking for 
daddies, you know, they've got their father. I do a little bit of a blurb on the differences between 
adoption and DI.  Some people are looking for identity, looking for the beginning of their story.  
The beginning of this child's story starts when [the parents] met.  
 
Counsellor A’s argument begs the question why adopted children often seek their 
birth mother or birth father when they already have a mother and a father. Counsellor 
A conceded that certain ‘gaps’ might be perceived to exist for the person conceived 
by DI, but that his/her motivation for seeking the donor would be different from those 
of adopted people.  She said: 
 
Counsellor A:  Well, when you look at adopted kids who want to find their parents, it's for totally 
different reasons.  They're looking for identity. They're looking to fill in the gaps in their story.  
Donor children might look for gifts, they might look for medical history, they might look 
for...they could be a concert pianist and you two could be tone deaf...and they might be curious 
about that.  It would be curiosity.  Not looking for, you know, that essence, and that identity, so 
much, that adopted children look for.  
 
KH: So you don't think that identity is very closely related to genetics? 
                                                                              
Counsellor A:  Yes it is, but I think that having that social father there, that person that they've related 
to as their father.  They've got a really close relationship from before birth, from conception.  
That gap has been filled to a considerable extent by that social father, not like adopted children 
so much, who came into the family maybe at three weeks, six weeks, whatever. 
 
Counsellor A considered that the ‘pieces’ of knowledge individuals conceived by DI 
might be looking for were less substantial or emotionally significant than the more 
fundamental aspects of identity, related to the formation and severing of relationships, 
which adopted children typically seek. The assumption here is that the person 
conceived by DI will see the relationship with their social father beginning before 
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their birth and therefore not seek to fill ‘gaps’ in their emotional history. According to 
Triseliotis (2000:93), adopted people tracing their birth parents are generally looking 
for information about their genetic and genealogical heritage, explanations as to why 
they were placed for adoption, the physical appearance of members of the birth 
family, and the possibility for developing a new relationship (in addition to, not as a 
replacement for, the adoptive family). It is certainly possible to imagine that, apart 
from the explanations about why they were placed for adoption, people conceived by 
DI could potentially be interested in the same information that adopted people seek.  
The counsellor articulated the view of children’s relationship to their fathers that is the 
dominant discourse at the clinic.  The future adults conceived by DI are projected to 
have the emotional responses that are consistent with that discourse. 
 
A scientist working in a DI programme reiterated Counsellor A’s expectation that 
people conceived by DI would be less likely to want to seek their genetic fathers than 
those who were adopted.  The scientist had this to say: 
 
Scientist:  It's an interesting question really.  There may not be.  Because they've got a biological 
mother who's their mother in every sense.  They've got a complete family around them.  
They're never given up for adoption the way adopted children were.  They were created in 
that family for that family, so there are some fairly big differences to the adopted children 
who have been keen to chase their birth mothers.  But I gather not so many chase their birth 
fathers anyway.  Though, by the same token, you do hear quite a few stories, often from the 
States about DI children who can't trace their origins and are very bitter about it.  I certainly 
personally know one woman who was conceived by DI, she and her sister both were, and 
she's in her 30s now, and all she knows about her father is that he was a Scandinavian, and 
she'd love to know more, but there's no way she ever will, so that's sort of a permanent gap 
in her background. 
 
The scientist acknowledged that some people conceived by DI were now speaking out 
about the bitterness they felt about this void created by a system based on secrecy.4  
What is unclear is whether they are bitter because they were deceived or because they 
cannot know anything about their genetic background.  Research has shown that for 
some adoptees and DI offspring seeking the truth about their origins was the 
overriding concern, rather than attempting to meet biological relatives (Humphrey and 
Humphrey, 1986; Blyth, Crawshaw and Speirs, 1998). Participants in Turner and 
Coyle’s (2000) study of the experiences of 18 donor offspring indicated that they were 
                                                          
4 For examples of accounts by adults who were conceived by DI of the difficulties that have arisen for 
them in connection with the lack of knowledge about their paternal biological origins, see the Donor 
Conception Support Group publication, Let the Offspring Speak (1997) and Blyth, Crawshaw and 
Speirs (1998). 
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negatively affected by the secrecy that had surrounded their donor conception, and 
were shocked when they discovered how they were conceived. Many reported that 
they needed to know their genetic origins and wished to search for their donors.  
Moreover, while these DI offspring did not experience being ‘abandoned’ as babies 
by their birth parents, many reported a sense of abandonment of responsibility by their 
genetic fathers and the medical profession (Turner and Coyle, 2000:2050). 
 
The director of another DI programme was convinced that very few individuals 
conceived by DI would want to contact their genetic fathers. He explained his 
position: 
 
Dr C:   Well, first of all I would say, “What would I think?” And if I was brought up in a family and I 
know my mother's my mother and my father's my father.  He's my old man, and I'm his 
mate...okay, my biological roots…I don't think I would want to know who my biological father 
is.  I don't think so.  But I mean, I may have a different view of that.  I think it's different from 
the adoption process...  So that's why I would suggest... I would be prepared to [bet on it] in a 
few years time. My bet would be less than 20% and I'm prepared to put $100 on the table. 
 
 
While Dr C was prepared to bet that less that one in five people conceived by DI 
would seek identifying information about the genetic father, uncertainty surrounds 
how much information DI offspring will want about donors, and how much interest 
they will have in them. Research carried out in New Zealand in the late 1980s 
indicated that donors were more likely to anticipate that DI offspring who knew how 
they were conceived would seek information about them than were recipients 
(Daniels, 1988:381).  Daniels notes, however, that a large percentage of both donors 
(51%) and recipients (63%) thought that DI offspring ‘possibly’ would want 
information about the donor.  Daniels’ research, which was carried out before the 
passing of the Adult Adoption Information Act 1985,5 showed that the majority of 
donors (59%) and recipients (47%) did not believe that people conceived by DI 
should be able to trace their origins.  Twenty-four percent of donors and 44% of 
recipients were unsure, and 16% of donors and 9% of recipients thought it should be 
possible (Daniels, 1988:381). 
 
If adoption statistics are any indicator, then it is possible that many people conceived 
by DI will seek identifying information about donors.  According to Iwanek 
                                                          
5 The Act gives access to adopted people and birth parents about one another, while providing 
safeguards for those who want privacy (Rockel and Ryburn, 1988:59-60). 
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(1998:28), since the passing of the Adult Adoption Information Act 1985, 
“approximately 65 per cent of people adopted by strangers in New Zealand, or their 
birth parents, have obtained identifying information about each other”.   Furthermore, 
she argues that research indicates that 95 per cent of these people have gone on to 
make personal contact, suggesting that most people sought contact if it was possible 
(Iwanek, 1998:28). 
 
Given that donors recruited by New Zealand donor programmes are only potentially 
identifiable, the question also arises as to how interested donors might be in their DI  
offspring.  As indicated in Chapter Five, fertility clinic staff have found that many 
donors are interested in the outcome of their donations. Recent research on donors has 
also shown that many are interested in knowing the outcome of their donations, 
including knowing about numbers of pregnancies and births and, in some cases, 
wanting to receive photographs of DI offspring (Daniels, 1998b:90).  
 
Several parents of children conceived by DI said they wanted to express their thanks 
by writing anonymously to donors and sending them photographs of their children 
through the clinic, which acted as intermediary. Dr A said:  
 
Dr A:  We certainly have allowed parents to communicate messages of thanks to the donor through the 
third party.  We've had women who've wanted to give a present to the donor, and we've passed it 
on.  And I think that's nice, I mean I think it's [appropriate]. 
 
 
Dr A’s views reinforce the construction of semen donation as a ‘gift’ that could elicit 
gratitude from recipients and the desire to thank the donor. To preserve anonymity, 
such transactions were carefully monitored by staff at the clinic.  A nurse said: 
 
Nurse B:  After the child is born we have had people who have bought gifts for the donor, who have 
sent or brought in photographs, and those have been passed on, usually through [the 
scientist] who oversees it all.  And she will ring the donor and say, “This is here, or that's 
there.”  And some of them are quite chuffed and some of them... I don't know... I’ve only 
heard about the chuffed ones, but I've got a feeling that there might be one or two who 
perhaps weren't quite so keen, especially those who were around a good while ago.   
  
 
Nurse B implied that donors who had been recruited at a time when recipients were 
given very little information about them, and who did not agree to be identified at any 
time in the future, were less likely to welcome any acknowledgement from recipients. 
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While there have been no reported incidents of donors and recipients with children 
conceived through DI meeting through the South Island fertility clinics included in 
this study, anecdotal evidence suggests that some donors and recipients have 
identified themselves to one another. 
 
Nurse B:   I know of one situation of a couple in Nelson I think it is, who sent a photograph of their 
donor child which was passed on to the donor, and the donor wrote back and they are now in 
direct contact. And this is sort of Christmas, so it's not a case of knocking on the door at the 
moment, it's a case of Christmas time and photographs. 
 
While it is very much the exception, some meetings between donors and recipient 
families have been reported in the New Zealand media (Williamson, 1995).6  A recent 
newspaper article told the story of the parents of a donor, who had died as the result of 
an accident, who gained access to their genetic grandchildren through the North Island 
clinic where their son had donated sperm (Dekker, 2000).  Nevertheless, the 
arrangement of such meetings has been approached with extreme caution and, 
according to Williamson (1995:80), fertility clinics are wary of the “maze of spinoff 
issues” involved in ‘open’ DI.  Thus, despite moves towards information-sharing 
between the parties to a DI conception in New Zealand, when the transaction begins 
with the anonymous donation of gametes, in general, maintaining anonymity remains 
a priority. 
 
While the clinics will now only accept donors who agree to possible contact in the 
future, they suggest to parents that it is unlikely that children conceived using DI will 
want such contact.  They also strive to preserve the anonymity of donors and parents. 
 
Preserving anonymity 
Many recipients interviewed for this research were in favour of maintaining 
anonymity between the parties to the DI conception. They employed a variety of 
strategies for maintaining anonymity.  Sandra, the mother of triplets said: 
 
Sandra:  We saw [the clinic nurse] a few times, and she asked us if they could let the donor know that 
he had donated eggs [sic] for triplets.  And we agreed to that as long they waited six months 
because I didn't want him to be able to go to the newspaper and look back over the last few 
issues and find out who it was.  We wanted to remain anonymous to him, I guess, yeah. 
 
 
                                                          
6 These reported meetings have occurred through North Island, rather than South Island, fertility clinics 
in New Zealand. 
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Their donor had not agreed to be identifiable at the time of donating, which was 
acceptable to Sandra and her husband Allan, who rationalised maintaining anonymity 
on the basis that their triplets would be more interested in being triplets than in “the 
business about their conception”.  
 
Other parents employed distancing strategies that denied the donor any ‘ownership’ of 
their child. Tania, mother of a 9-month old son, had this to say about the donor: 
 
Tania: I don't even think about him.  Just, when I got pregnant.  I just never looked at Levi as being 
somebody else's.  I never ever thought about it.  And the only reason I've got a copy of [the 
donor’s] profile was because when I went in and took Levi in, she said to me "Oh, I'll give you 
one."  I didn't ask for it, because it didn't really occur to me to take it. 
 
KH: What about if you might want to know in the future?  It might give you a better idea of his 
genetic inheritance on one side.  
 
Tania: Yes.  I don't know, because as I say I don't look at him as being anyone else's but Mark's, 
which is probably not right, but...  
 
Tania was quite ambivalent about receiving the donor profile which provided tangible 
evidence of the existence of their sperm donor. Thinking that the child was her 
husband’s illustrated that metaphor, as a cultural resource, is a mediator of disruption 
that enables people to recreate a sense of continuity and to reconnect themselves to 
the social and cultural ‘order’ after the disruption of infertility (Becker, 1994). 
 
Although many parents were aware that their donor was potentially identifiable, and 
conceded that their child had the ‘right’ to make contact with the donor in the future, 
for many, this was a distant and almost unimaginable concept, and not a welcome 
prospect. Thus, some parents said they preferred not to think about the possibility of 
their children wanting to make contact with donors in the future.  When asked how 
they would feel if their sons, currently aged between 3 ½ and 8 years, wanted to meet 
the donors, Joe and Ella said: 
 
Joe:   I think... I haven't really thought about it too much to be honest. It's not really something I 
particularly want to think about.  I suppose, personally, I'll cross that bridge when we get 
there.  
 
Ella: It's a long way away for us.  
 
Joe: It is.  It's got to be at least 10 years for the first one.  
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Ella: So, we don't really want to get...I mean, we're quite happy the way it is, but we're not going to 
stop them from contacting them.  
 
Joe: No, if they want to, they're going to.  And I suppose we're comfortable with that really.  It's 
just something we have to accept.  
 
                                                                              
Joe and Ella appeared to want to guard the boundaries of their nuclear family, and 
hoped that their children would not be interested in contacting their genetic fathers.  
 
For some couples, the strong desire to maintain strict anonymity appeared to relate to 
on-going concerns about the donor possibly interfering in their child’s upbringing.  
Clare and Simon, parents of a daughter, Maria, aged 9 years, who was conceived by 
DI, and two daughters aged 14 years and 7 years, who were related to them both 
genetically, were very concerned that the donor remain unknown to them.  When 
asked if they were curious about the donor, Clare replied: 
 
Clare: No.  Definitely not.  No.  I mean, I'm grateful that he became a donor, but as far as I'm 
concerned, he was there for a purpose and that purpose was served.  How we bring her up is up 
to us. 
 
Clare implied that the donor might interfere if he was identified. She said of the 
possibility of her daughter wishing to make contact with the donor in the future: 
 
Clare: Well, I think once she gets to that age, it's probably up to her.  It is a reasonable concern to me 
that she will want to.  At this point in time, I think she identifies so completely with Simon [her 
father], that it doesn't cross her mind, but when she gets to be of age, that's a bridge that we'll 
cross.                                                                  
 
The likelihood of his daughter wanting to make contact with the donor in the future 
appeared remote to Simon. Clare’s concerns in relation to the donor could be partly 
accounted for by their ambivalence about having had DI in the first place.  Prior to 
having DI, they had had a daughter without medical assistance, but then experienced 
secondary infertility. A specialist had told them that they were unlikely to conceive 
again, unassisted, because of Simon’s very low sperm count, so they opted for DI. Not 
long after Maria’s birth, Clare conceived again without assistance which caused them 
to question the doctor’s recommendation that they have DI. 
 
Talk about donors illustrated the lack of adequate language to label donors and how to 
think and talk about them. When Steve and Jane were asked if they would like to meet 
their donor, they replied: 
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Steve:  Well, no not really.  I don't feel any need to rush out and go meet the man himself in 
particular.  I don't know if there's been any approach, with people doing that in the past and 
there's been any problems with it…. I think that the information that's been given to us is 
sufficient as such that we do know that there are things about the donor. But to answer your 
question, no, I'm in no great rush to go out and see the person, but as you say, if it is through 
the children, and the children say well, “Where is my dad?” and if they do say after a period of 
time say,  “Look hey, can we meet our dad?” well that's certainly something we've got to...  
 
Jane: Not “dad”.  It’s not actually really their father. 
 
Steve: No, but in terms of the knowledge of the expression. 
 
Jane: Genetic...it is... 
 
Steve: Well, that’s right, generic [sic] or whatever you like to call it, yeah. 
 
While reticent about making contact with the donor himself, Steve acknowledged the 
need to respond to his children’s potential desire or ‘right’ to know about the donor, 
whom he referred to as their ‘dad’. Jane countered that he was not their ‘dad’ but their 
genetic parent, but Steve did not seem familiar with this terminology.7  In keeping 
with Steve’s framing of the donor as the children’s ‘dad’, when asked if they felt 
grateful to the donor, Steve and Jane said: 
 
Jane: I do, but I don't...  
 
Steve: No.  
 
Jane: ... not to the extent that I want to go and write to him and say thank you very much.  No.  I'm 
not that sort of person, I don't reckon. …I don't think that Steve would want me to either, but, 
um, I don't know if that's sort of callous, or what, but I just…                         
 
Steve’s denial of gratitude might be explained by Simmel’s argument that “gratitude 
easily has a taste of bondage” (1950:393) which lies in the knowledge that the gift can 
never be returned. According to Simmel, “[g]ratitude is peculiarly irredeemable.  It 
maintains its claim even after an equal or greater gift has been made” (1950:394).  
Steve might therefore wish to reject such a bond of obligation, just as some people 
refuse presents to avoid feeling they have to reciprocate (Simmel, 1950:393). Later, 
when Steve had left the room with the twins, Jane commented more freely on her 
views about sperm donors.  She said: 
                                                          
7 Unlike Latin which has separate words for biological father (genitor) and ‘social’ or rearing father 
(pater), English has only the word ‘father’, which is generally understood as encompassing both 
biological/genetic and social fatherhood.  Snowden, Mitchell and Snowden (1983) raise the issue of the 
need for an appropriate vocabulary to describe the roles of the persons involved in the assisted 
procreation of a child.  They suggest “genetic father” as an appropriate term for the person who 
“provides and delivers the sperm for either internal or external fertilisation” (1983:35). 
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Jane:  They're a very special person, because I don't even really know how I'd feel if Steve wanted to... 
if Steve was able to, if he wanted to do that, because I think it takes a very special person, and it 
takes a very special partner to let the husband do that as well.  Yes, we are very grateful for that, 
because it must be the unknown thing for that family as well, and you sort of wonder, well, how 
are they?  I don't really think about it, because I suppose we don't dwell on that topic, probably 
because, in some ways, Steve has different emotional feelings to me, so I don't talk about things 
that I'm more emotional about than he is, because of the difference in our outlook on life.    
 
Jane was appreciative of people who donated sperm, and of their families, and had 
thought about the possible effects on them of having contributed genetic material to 
another unknown family.  Her gratitude was therefore collective and safe, rather than 
focused on an individual donor.  Jane’s expression of gratitude for the existence of 
people who are prepared to donate their gametes to others illustrates Simmel’s 
contention that “we do not thank somebody only for what he does: the feeling with 
which we often react to the mere existence of a person, must itself be designated as 
gratitude” (Simmel, 1950:389).  Her comment that she and Steve did not talk about 
the donor links to discussion in previous chapters where wives subjugated their views 
to their husbands’ emotions. 
 
Most extended family members professed to have been told very little about the 
donor.  Marion, the maternal grandmother of Diane and Chris’s son, Scott, said that if 
she had been told anything about him, she had forgotten.  She also claimed to have 
little curiosity about, and no desire to meet, the donor. When asked if the donor was 
ever discussed in relation to her grandson, Marion said: 
 
Marion: No, not really.  There might have been something very vague but certainly nothing that I 
recall, put it that way.  But not, um, it's not because he's in hiding or anything, put it that way.  
 
KH: But do you yourselves have any curiosity about the donor, or is he not in the picture at all? 
 
Marion: No, he's not in the picture.  Scott’s colouring sort of ties in a bit with his mum's.  I have at 
times wondered whether or not his colouring is coming from… oh, he tans a bit more, you 
know, from his… the donor, but, um, no, not a lot, because I just sort of see him… he's very 
much like his mum, I feel, to look at. But he's certainly starting to get a lot of Chris’s 
mannerisms, and therefore, once again, it's a non-issue. 
  
While Marion claimed that the donor was not a part of their lives, she nonetheless 
professed a vague curiosity about physical resemblance between Scott and the donor.8 
Her desire to recognise Chris as Scott’s father is reflected in her relegation of the 
                                                          
8 The topic of physical resemblance and differences in families is discussed in Chapter Eleven. 
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donor’s contribution to the status of a “non-issue”. Similarly, an uncle of three DI 
nephews, suggested that the donor’s contribution was “a chemical thing”, while 
another uncle of a niece conceived by DI thought of it as a “gift from one family to 
another”, which avoided focusing on the donor as a specific individual. 
 
Other family members reflected on the difficulty of articulating and thinking about the 
connections between donors, recipients and their DI offspring and the implications for 
families of contact with donors. This indicated that not only parents, but also their kin 
have these concerns.  Matthew and Julia, paternal uncle and aunt of Joe and Ella’s 
three sons, appeared protective of Joe in his role as the boys’ social father.  In relation 
to the possibility that they wanted to contact their genetic fathers in the future, they 
said: 
 
Julia:   I don't think the problem's with the child.  I think it's with the father, like Joe, that's actually 
brought the child up all their [lives]... it'd be like letting go of [their status as father]... It just 
depends on the person doesn't it?  How secure the father is, and that was just my view that 
the mother is still the mother and she's the biological mother, and she can share with the 
biological father.  And then the father, who's brought the child up all their life, if not out of 
the picture, doesn't fit in to the history of the child.  
 
Matthew:  The biological loop. 
 
Julia and Matthew imagined that if one attended to the significance of biological ties 
the social father would be placed in a vulnerable position especially in relation to the 
mother who shared a biological link to the child with the donor. In contrast, if social 
parenting is privileged over biological connections then the donor becomes irrelevant, 
and the social father shares the social parenting role with the mother. 
 
Offering another view, Frances, another aunt of Joe and Ella’s three sons, who was 
adopted, contended that knowing some basic facts about their genetic fathers would 
be sufficient. 
 
Frances: I think it's good if the children have got all the physical facts about their father.   That’s all the 
information that I’ve had, because I didn't meet my birth father because he died when he was 
50, but I've got photos of him.  And just to know the physical characteristics, you know, that 
to me is probably just as good.  Just to see what they look like and a few statistics about him, 
and their hobbies and likes and dislikes and things like that. 
 
KH: Yes, and that can be enough?  
 
Frances: Yeah, it can actually. 
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Being satisfied with knowing only the basic “facts” about her birth father might relate 
to the fact that Frances knew she could never meet him. According to Humphrey and 
Humphrey (1986:134), research on adoptees who search for their birth parents has 
shown that those with a more satisfactory home life and positive self-image are more 
likely to be content with background information only.  This casts doubt, they argue, 
on claims that ignorance about one’s forebears leads to personal insecurity.  This 
research finding raises a number of issues.  For example, it suggests that children’s 
desire to know and need to meet a genetic parent is then interpreted as ‘insecurity’ and 
this, in turn, may reflect critically on the parents.  
 
Other researchers have argued, to the contrary, that adopted people who request 
information about their birth families in fact feel secure in their adoptive families 
(Kirk cited in Iwanek,1997:17).  Haimes and Timms (1985:75-76) are critical of what 
they describe as the psycho-pathological model that links the desire of adoptees to 
search for their birth parents with concepts such as ‘identity crisis’ or ‘deep 
psychological need’.  In their study of adoptees applying for information about their 
birth parents, they found applicants were “normal, well-adjusted adults” who were 
assessed by counsellors as “naturally curious” rather than driven by a psycho-
pathological condition  (Haimes and Timms, 1985:76).  Thus, they argue that 
adoption can be better understood in terms of a person’s social identity, rather than 
ego identity.  
 
Some parents were not interested in identifying donors, but recognised the child’s 
potential interest in them. Andrew and Annie drew on the discourse of the ‘right’ or 
‘need’ of the child to know their genetic origins.  They were strongly motivated to 
keep records of the donors for their children’s information, and had compiled a folder 
of documents relating to their experience of DI.  Andrew and Annie had this to say 
about the donor profile: 
 
Annie: It was sufficient really.  I mean it wasn't of interest.  It is of more interest for the child.  
 
Andrew: We can't expect to have photos, okay.  What was written for Hayley was more than 
satisfactory.  You can't identify the person, and I don't want the person identified to me 
through the donating process, because you'd see him in a crowd at some stage in the future.  
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New Zealand ain't that big.  I don't walk around looking at everyone trying to work out 
whether they look like my daughters or not. 
 
KH: No, so you're not really curious about the donor?  
 
Andrew: No, not right now, no. This is the first time we've pulled [the donor profiles] out, and we've 
actually just put them in a folder so it's better... 
 
Other parents acknowledged that their child(ren) might wish to make contact with 
donors in future years, but were ill at ease with the prospect.  Richard and Belinda 
said that this was the most difficult aspect of having DI, and they initially had 
concerns about the donor’s rights in relation to the child.  They said: 
 
Richard:  I was actually very surprised at the information that was available [on the donor profile].  
And thought it was very good. Um, I don't think about it as far as wanting to meet him goes, 
or probably even Madison wanting to meet him, but that's her decision in the end.  But, um, 
I'm…to my knowledge he's been told that an offspring has been produced. 
                                                                              
Belinda: I would like to write…what we can do through the clinic is write an anonymous letter, not 
identifying our names or anything…and we can actually write and thank the donor, and that's 
what I'd like to do.  I want to thank this person, because it's given us a wee kiddie and great 
fun now.  It's all fun and games in our house now.  And, um, I'm like Richard, I'm not so 
keen to meet this person although, if Madison wishes to when she's a teenager, that's fine by 
me.  I'll support her, but I just want to be open with Madison about it and let her know that 
we're her Mummy and Daddy, but the seed came from this particular man and it's up to her if 
she wants to find out. 
 
While Richard and Belinda were grateful to their donor, their use of language in 
relation to him, such as “this man”, “this person”, and their daughter as “an 
offspring”, firmly positioned the donor as an outsider to their family, who existed only 
as the unknown provider of genetic material (“seed”)9 so that they could have their 
‘own’ child.  In this way they marginalised and depersonalised the donor. 
 
Richard and Belinda nonetheless stressed the importance of the donor’s altruistic 
motivation to help an infertile couple, like themselves, have a ‘priceless’ child.10    
 
Belinda: One thing that was really important to us was why he actually became a donor.  And, this 
particular one that we have got now, his reason was his wife had infertility problems and they 
only actually conceived one child. And I thought, as a couple, that's a pretty nice thing to do, 
just go off and help others.  
                                                                              
                                                          
9 McWhinnie (1996:12) provides a script offered by one mother of a child conceived by DI who also 
referred to sperm as ‘seeds’ when answering her young child’s question about where she came from. 
10 Zelizer (1985) argues that the 20th century has witnessed a profound cultural transformation in 
children’s economic and sentimental value.  In the earlier part of the century, children, who were once 
valued for their useful wage-earning capacities, became economically useless but emotionally 
priceless.  Zelizer argues that, despite the financial costs of raising children in contemporary families, 
voluntary childbearing is an indicator of children’s persistent emotional value to parents (1985:222). 
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Richard: He was loving enough really to say, “Well hey, I'm able to help somebody out,” and that's 
what Belinda said before, the reason for some of these donors donating is actually very 
genuine, and not just a matter of saying, “Hey, I'm getting paid a hundred bucks for this,” 
because they don't get paid for it at all. 
 
Although they could not reciprocate to the donor, this couple actively supported a 
form of gift exchange by encouraging men they knew to become sperm donors and by 
Belinda approaching the clinic to become an anonymous egg donor.  Belinda said: 
 
Belinda: I want to help somebody else out, because to me, going through a pregnancy…oh it was great 
fun for us and having Richard there to actually watch Madison being born.  I don't know who 
was more excited, him or me. Because he just kept saying, “God, look at all this!” (she 
laughs).  It was just fascinating for Richard.  Although I didn't get to see a great deal… he was 
seeing heaps and yeah, he was just so grateful for his little girl at the end of it all.  I'd just like 
to help some other couple have that joy that we had.  It was just so neat. 
 
Belinda’s desire to write to the donor and to donate eggs illustrates Simmel’s 
contention that although gratitude may remain something purely internal, it 
nonetheless may lead to reciprocal actions (Simmel, 1950:388). Simmel (1950:387) 
argues that the sociological importance of gratitude “can hardly be overestimated” and 
that gratitude is the “moral memory of mankind” (1950:388).  Gratitude, he maintains, 
plays an important role in the cohesion of society, because it establishes a bond of 
interaction and reciprocity between persons without it being guaranteed by external 
coercion.  However, gratitude does not mean that direct connection is seen as 
appropriate.  Although Belinda wanted to help another couple, as an egg donor she 
also wished to remain anonymous. 
 
Hesitant contact 
While many parents said they were not interested in contact with donors, some 
maintained that their views on donors had changed over time, and they had become 
more accepting of the possibility of their children contacting donors in the future.  
Acknowledging the ‘right’ of their child to identify their donor, many of these parents 
drew on discourses of adoption and the possible risks and benefits to children of 
identifying their biological relatives. Initially, Henry, father of Jack, aged 8 years and 
Luke, aged 6 years, had been concerned that his sons might reject him in favour of 
their ‘natural’ fathers.  He recalled: 
 
Henry:   It sort of bothered me.   One of my concerns was that Jack or Luke, now they're people, get to 
their teens and become angst-ridden and go off and find their birth or natural fathers, and/or 
family, and there could be a swing of allegiances or whatever.  It could be something to run to.  
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I've seen it happen in the foster situation, where the kids haven't come from a very good 
environment, and it takes them a while to work that out.  Except we actually get given a 
certain amount of information about the donors, and they seem like good plain folk, and I'm 
quite comfortable about that now, but if the boys go off and find their parent or extended 
family... there shouldn't be any emotional hooks. 
 
Henry explained his initial fears by drawing on discourses about children in other 
circumstances who did not live with their biological parents. This might be explained 
by Haimes and Timms’ (1985:80) claim that because adoptees are not rooted in 
‘natural’ relationships, there can be no certainty about with whom they might align 
themselves: to ‘natural’ or adoptive families or to no one at all. Henry appeared not to 
distinguish between fostering (where there could be two other ‘birth parents’) and DI 
(where the mother is the genetic/biological parent). His use of adoption terminology 
to describe the donors again raises the issue of the lack of appropriate language and 
frames of reference for conceptualising gamete donors and how they are positioned in 
relation to recipients and their children. 
 
Henry’s initial concerns about the possible threat presented by the existence of the 
donors, who might embody an attractive alternative father to himself (because the 
primacy of the biological tie is assumed), were allayed by two factors.  First, his 
depiction of the donors as “good plain folk” suggested that they were “nothing 
special” and therefore unlikely to be preferred by his sons and, second, his friendship 
with a sperm donor.  His friend Donald had become a donor after learning about the 
plight of Henry and Prue, and another couple who had children conceived by DI.  
Henry said: 
 
Henry: I thought Donald was a help in his own way.  He's quite eccentric, our mate Donald, but he 
gave us the other view.  Now that's not supposed to happen, but he gave me the perspective 
from the man coming from the other side, and he told me all his hopes and fears and all those 
things, and why he did it.  He's given me the whole thing.  So it's not some spotty-faced 
university student getting his ten dollars by going in. That was a joke.  It's a grown man 
making an altruistic decision, and okay, he's just a donor to some other families, but he gave 
me that view, and that was good… 
 
 There's a running joke about these massive little girls, because Donald's quite a heavy-built 
bloke with glasses, and we were having these jokes about these poor mothers around [an 
‘exclusive’ suburb] shouldered with a daughter with glasses fluffing around in tutus at ballet 
lessons (he laughs).  I keep saying to him, “I hope they don't grow up looking like you, you 
know (he laughs), if they're girls.”  
 
Having talked to Donald, Henry appeared to have developed some sort of 
understanding and acceptance of sperm donors and their role in the procreative 
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process.  This raised the issue that anonymous donors are mysterious, not understood 
and therefore possibly to be feared. Henry anticipated that donors would be readily 
accessible to donor offspring in the future. 
 
Henry: I don't think you'd have many donors who disappear.  It's not like they're college boys like in 
the States, where they might just disappear. In New Zealand, donors belong to an altruistic 
network and the people will tend to run fairly tidy lives, I suppose.  They won't just disappear.  
These are people who are part of society and there'll always be contacts with them surely. I 
think they're all men [as distinct from students]... the people we saw on file were mature 
people and they've gone through this process and they've thought it through and having talked 
to Donald, I feel as though they'll always be approachable through the system. 
   
Henry appeared to have developed his views about the ‘typical’ donor from talking 
with his sperm-donor friend. His assumption that donors who provide sperm for 
‘altruistic’ reasons are more likely to be identifiable in the future than those who 
‘donated’ for pecuniary reasons relates to arguments against introducing the market 
economy into areas involving the sustenance or creation of life (i.e. blood, human 
organs and human gametes).11  
 
Some parents who had received little information about their donor said that, although 
this had been of no great consequence at the time, in retrospect, they wished they had 
been told more.  When Mary and Brendan had their son Jason, aged 12 years, they 
were not told anything about the donor. They received some written information about 
the donor when they had their second child, Natalie, aged 10 years. Brendan appeared 
more interested in the donors than Mary and said he would like to know “their side of 
the story”.  Mary was more circumspect and said about their two donors: 
 
Mary:  I didn't really think about them too much, because of the fact that I just thought about them 
being a person that wanted to help us out, and that was it, you know.  I didn't put a face to what 
they'd look like. I just thought, well, this is a person that wants to help us, and they must be nice 
(she laughs briefly)… They've virtually forgotten what they've done really, I think.  I don't 
know.  Perhaps donors think somewhere there might be a child of mine walking around but I 
don't think that they really go into it thinking about that.  They go into it because they want to 
help somebody and they don't really think too much about it. 
 
 
Mary’s perceptions of donors stemmed from the dominant discourses about DI and 
the role of donors at the time she conceived. Daniels (1998:78) cites comments from 
authors from the 1980s that suggests that donor semen should be regarded as ‘material 
                                                          
11 For a discussion on the construction of semen donation as a ‘gift’, and the arguments related to the 
gifting and selling of human gametes, see Chapter Five. 
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from an anonymous testis’ and the donor as a ‘non-person’. Mary’s perception of 
donors might also relate to the lack of information they had received about their 
donors.  She claimed that Natalie’s donor had written “maybe” on the donor profile in 
relation to possible contact with DI offspring.  Brendan, however, appeared not to 
know this which suggested that this was not a topic of conversation between them. 
With respect to their daughter having contact with the donor, Mary favoured caution, 
whereas Brendan adopted a more laissez-faire position. 
 
Mary: I think it would be more like her right if she wanted to.  
 
Brendan: Yeah.  I don't think that it would worry me.  I mean... yeah. 
                                                                              
Mary: It could complicate her life, you know.  It could make it worse, or she might get something 
out of it.  I don't know.  It's very hard to say, because it's a bit like adoption.  Some people...  
 
Brendan: It's an individual thing, I think.  You've got to leave it to them. 
 
Mary: …yeah...they really want to meet their birth mother, or they want to meet...sometimes it can 
benefit them, but in other times it can make their life more complicated and actually make 
them feel worse.  So it's very much an individual thing, I think.  It's a bit like, um, with 
Natalie, I know that there was another couple that had a half-sister to her and they did want... 
they asked me if I would be interested for Natalie to meet her.  And the same sort of thing, I 
thought well this could complicate things, and do I really want this?  
 
Mary conceptualised contact as a risky path. Her concerns relate to adoption 
discourses that frame the tracing of birth parents by adoptees as ‘dangerous’ or 
potentially ‘vindictive’ acts, and adoptees as not capable of coping with information 
that would enable them to straddle the biological-social divide (Haimes and Timms, 
1985:80). As a result, Mary was not prepared to help facilitate a meeting between her 
daughter and the daughter of another couple who shared the same donor.12  If Mary 
had agreed to allow her daughter to meet her ‘half-sibling’, it would perhaps have 
indicated the importance of ‘blood’ ties and genetic connection, rather than social 
parenthood and family location. As discussed in Chapter Five, Mary’s reluctance to 
facilitate a meeting might also have related to the lack of a ‘script’ about how to frame 
the relationships. Brendan claimed not to know that another family, who had used the 
same donor, had sought contact with their daughter which implied that Mary had 
made the decision not to have contact. 
 
                                                          
12 For a discussion about the facilitation of contact between families who have conceived children using 
the same donor, see Chapter Five. 
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Some parents had given considerable thought to the possible significance to their 
children of identifying their genetic fathers.  Stephanie, mother of three children 
conceived by DI, said that she and her husband had received minimal information 
about the donor when they conceived their oldest son, Liam, aged 12 years, and were 
unable to find out more.  She said of Liam’s response to this: 
 
Stephanie:  Liam said, “look if I walk down [the street] naked with a chook on my head, it's not going 
to change anything, so why be stressed about it?”  And so, that is his attitude at the 
moment.  But, inevitably he'll feel some twinges if Marcus and Louise choose to meet their 
donor.  But it's interesting, I doubt that it will be so important to Marcus.  Liam's a details 
man, everything's got to be in its right place, whereas Marcus is a dreamer…. 
 
I've done some reading about relinquishment, and that was another theory postulated that 
donor children didn't want to know or hadn't had the tendency to want to know so much 
because they had no sense of relinquishment.  They'd never actually been handed over.  I 
mean, relinquishing genes, or sperm or gametes is not quite the same as relinquishing them 
specifically. But I think...it wouldn't surprise me if the kids were just 'interested'. And if I 
wanted to meet the donor and say, “Thank you, you've brought great joy to our lives,” 
that's the only other reason, just “Oh, I wonder what he's like.”  And that's all. 
                                                                              
 
Stephanie anticipated that her children might be interested in their genetic fathers to 
some (unknown) extent but had read that unlike adopted children who were 
‘relinquished’ after birth, children conceived by DI were less likely to be interested in 
their genetic parent.13  Her expectation that they might just be ‘interested’ suggested 
that, like adopted people, individuals conceived by DI might also have a ‘natural’ 
curiosity to see what their genetic fathers were like (Haimes and Timms, 1985:76). 
 
Other parents speculated as to whether the donor might be interested in contacting 
their DI offspring.  Diane, mother of Scott, aged 3 years, said: 
 
Diane:  I think if he wanted to, he should be able to, because they are still his biological children.  I 
don't know whether he would.  He's been a donor there for a little while and he has a couple of 
children through the clinic, so I don't know whether he would, from what I've picked up about 
him through the clinic.  
 
Diane and her husband, Chris, were also uncertain whether their son would want to 
meet the donor.  
 
                                                          
13 Although distinctions are often made between adoption and DI on the basis that in DI, unlike 
adoption, the child was not relinquished, Midford (1993:6) argues that relinquishment can be compared 
to the donation of human gametes in important ways.  For example, donors relinquish the potential of a 
 347
Diane: If Scott wanted to, I certainly wouldn't feel threatened, or, um, really that he's going to be 
looking for his ‘real’ father, like with the adoption issues.  I've got no feelings like that at all.  
If he wants to see him, it's fine…. I know there's a strong thing with children that they do want 
to find their roots and whatever, so, but, as I say, he will be able to. 
 
Chris: But then again, by the time he's a teenager... it could happen...but I mean that's just a sign of 
the cycle that we're going through.  We've become very liberal and all this airy-fairy type 
stuff, and you know, finding your roots and all this.  I mean it's a buzz-word of today that'll 
probably be gone by the time he's a teenager.  Who knows, but, you know...  
 
Diane: He could still have an interest in his other parent.  
 
Chris: Yeah.  But I don't think there's a big difference between that and adoption. 
 
Diane: There are a few little similarities.  
 
Chris: And I mean, if he wants to, that's fine.  That's his call really.  And I mean that's just... you 
know we went through it with the egg donor.14  I mean, these things, you can sit around and 
hop onto a spiral, and talk about the ifs and buts and whens, and really it's just about managing 
it when it arises. 
 
 
Chris asserted that discourses such as the need to ‘find one’s roots’ were socially 
constructed and not an outcome of intrinsic human needs. Triseliotis (2000:93) 
maintains that the search for roots was one of the main characteristics of the 1970s, 
1980s and 1990s, made respectable by minorities wanting to assert ethnic identities 
and adopted people wanting to establish more complete selves.  Nevertheless, Diane 
conceptualised their donor as her son’s “other parent” and, because of the genetic 
connection between them, envisaged the possibility of either the donor, or her son, 
being interested in meeting. 
 
Diane claimed that if she thought about the donor at all, it was usually in connection 
with her gratitude to him. 
 
Diane:  I can honestly say that the only time I think about his biological origins is to thank whoever 
that he's here, you know, and to be really grateful to the donor that we had him.  That's the 
only reason I think about it, and I do that frequently, you know.  
 
Diane and Chris’s experience with having an anonymous sperm donor contrasted with 
their experience as recipients of donated oocytes.  In a bid to have a sibling for Scott, 
they were embarking on a treatment cycle that involved both egg and sperm donation. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
human life from their genetic heritage and give up their rights and responsibilities as parents of the 
child.  
14 Diane and Chris were about to embark on an IVF cycle, which would involve the use of donated 
eggs and sperm, because Diane was ‘premenopausal’ and was considered unlikely to conceive using 
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Diane and Chris had met the egg donor through a North Island egg donor programme 
which facilitated meetings between egg donors and recipients.  They said: 
 
Diane: We haven't of course met the sperm donor.  I've actually met the egg donor and I felt a lot 
better after having actually met her.  Not better, not that I had any reservations, but I was 
really happy to meet her.  It was a really nice thing to do.  And we'll keep in contact with her 
through the clinic.  
 
KH: There do seem to be differences there in that often egg donors do meet up with recipients, 
whereas...  
 
Diane:    It's what a woman wants to do. 
 
Chris:    They're females (he laughs).  
 
Diane: Yeah.  Yeah.  That's true.  It was quite interesting when it came to choosing, like the sperm 
donor... the information that they give you is very brief and to the point, whereas the egg 
donors were very... a lot more expansive, weren't they?  They were completely different. 
 
 
Diane and Chris thus raised issues about the gendered features of responses of donors 
and the different processes involved in donating sperm and donating eggs.   
 
Haimes (1993a) examines the ways in which gender is deployed to construct 
meanings about semen and oocyte donation.  According to her analysis, semen 
donation was associated with negative connotations of adultery, masturbation and 
illegitimacy.  Moreover, semen donors were regarded as strangers with questionable 
motivations and semen donation was regarded as unregulated and undesirable, and its 
very simplicity (and the potential for sexual pleasure) a danger.  In contrast, the risky, 
physically invasive and uncomfortable or even painful act of egg donation was seen as 
reassuring.  The clinical and familial context of egg donation provided a sense of 
regulation and control and the egg donor was seen as less of a threat because her 
claim to genetic parenthood was offset by the claim of the carrying mother to 
biological motherhood.15 Haimes’ examination of the Warnock Committee Report 
(1984) revealed donor anonymity was regarded as necessary to avoid unwanted 
                                                                                                                                                                      
her own ova.  They had therefore discussed with the egg donor the possibility of the potential child 
wanting to meet her in the future. 
15 In New Zealand, Section 9 (a) of the Status of Children Amendment Act 1987, states that where a 
woman becomes pregnant as a result of a donor ovum or donor embryo implantation procedure, the 
woman shall, for all purposes be the mother of any child of the pregnancy. 
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intrusion from donors in recipient families. In contrast, egg donors were expected to 
be part of the family and to be donating for altruistic reasons.16
 
While ambivalent about contact with donors, some parents indicated that they would 
actively support their children in meeting donors in the future. Patrick, who identified 
as Maori, and Helen, a pakeha, had a Maori donor whose sperm had been sourced 
from a North Island clinic. They said about their donor: 
 
Helen:  Oh, it had to be a Maori donor.  And it had to be someone who could be approached.  It wasn't 
to be a hidden thing.  When your children ask you questions, you've got to be able to be honest 
with them.  That was important to us.  
 
KH: How do you feel about him being up in the North Island?  
 
Helen: We're glad about that, I am, I'm glad about that.  He can stay there as far as I'm concerned.  I 
don't know what you [Patrick] think, but I think he can stay as far away as possible, and that 
gives me at least 15 more years to prepare myself for the day that I'll have to help my children, 
if they decide, okay, we want to see this guy, we want to have a look at him.  Because I'd 
definitely support them if they wanted to do that.  I wouldn't see it as a slap back to us.  I'd see 
it as a positive thing. 
 
Patrick:  This is what we discussed the first time round, before we even went ahead with it.  We didn’t 
want to know him, but we would help the children. Since then, nothing has changed.  It’s still 
the same. 
 
When asked if they thought their sons would be interested in meeting the donor, they 
said: 
 
Patrick: I’m sure they will be.  It’s part of human nature to have that curiosity. 
 
Helen:   Yeah.  And if you look at the Maori side of things, whakapapa is very important, very 
important.  Patrick can talk about his family going back, but he wished he knew more.  We 
have also thought that if they find out more about the donor's background, they could find that 
Patrick and the donor may even come from the same tribe, or be related.  
 
Patrick thought that ‘essentially’ human beings were curious about their genetic 
origins which reflects Euro-American kinship ideology about the importance of 
‘blood ties’, but also the significance attached to genealogy in Maori culture.  
                                                          
16 A study of issues in non-anonymous oocyte donation indicated that although 94% of donors reported 
altruism as their primary motivation to donate, interviews revealed a more complex picture (Bartlett, 
1991).  Egg donation was regarded by some as “making up” for having had a previous abortion.  
Moreover, half the egg donors reported feeling “flattered” by being asked to donate genetic material to 
an infertile couple (Bartlett, 1991).  This raises the issue of the possible coercion of egg donors.  
According to one study, rather than being overt, coercion was more likely to occur through the 
widespread societal objectification of women and their bodies and their characterisation as selfless, 
caring, self-sacrificing and altruistic (deLacey, 1995b).  Arguments about coercion, however, tend to 
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According to Helen, they had speculated about a biological or tribal connection 
existing between the donor and their family which would make it even more 
appropriate that their sons should meet the donor. Helen, however, was also somewhat 
ambivalent about the prospect of such a meeting.  She said: 
 
Helen:  In saying that, with the donor, I really hope, and it worries me a little, that over the next 10-15 
years he doesn't do anything stupid, you know.  I don't want my kids to meet up with him and 
come home and say, “Hey, I saw him on Crimewatch,” you know, or something like that.  And 
it does worry me.  It worries me that meeting him and his family could be a terrible culture 
shock.  We don't have hangis and all the neighbours around, and have sleepovers for a week, 
do we?  We don't talk about that.  
 
KH: Do you do any traditional Maori things? 
 
Patrick: No. 
 
Helen: We don’t. 
 
KH: You live a pakeha kind of life? 
 
Helen: Very, very.  But they know who they are, and like we’re trying to give them some of their 
culture [they have Maori words labelling objects around the house].  We’re not going to deny 
them that, but we don’t see the need to show them that there’s that, what’s that movie, ‘Once 
were Warriors’17 side, it could be there.  But we don’t want them to see that. 
 
Helen’s ambivalence about having a Maori donor arose out of her ambivalence about 
Maori culture.  While Helen wanted a donor of the same ethnic background as her 
husband, and recognised the importance of certain cultural understandings, such as 
whakapapa,18 she also feared that her children’s genetic father might break the law.19  
She was also concerned about a possible cultural gap between her children and their 
genetic father because of their lack of familiarity with some aspects of Maori culture. 
 
While ambivalent about being able to identify their donor in the future, Helen was 
nonetheless very grateful for his ‘gift’. When she was pregnant with Thomas, Helen 
and Patrick often referred to the donor by a special name (which they said they could 
no longer recall, but had to do with him being a generous person).  Helen said:  
                                                                                                                                                                      
disregard the agency of gamete donors who, whether they are male or female, may choose to become 
donors for a variety of complex reasons. 
17 Once Were Warriors (Duff, 1994) is a controversial New Zealand film that depicts domestic violence 
within an urban Maori family. 
18 According to the Ministry of Justice (2001), “[w]hakapapa is central to Maori society.  Whakapapa 
defines both the individual and kin groups, and governs relationships between them.  Whakapapa 
confirms an individual’s membership within the kin groups that constitute Maori society and provides 
the means for learning about the history of their tipuna (ancestors)”. 
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Helen:    But it is a gift.  It is the gift of life.  It's a special gift when someone gives a part of themselves, 
whether it be their heart, or their eyes or whatever… Anybody who can give somebody life 
like that must be a special person. 
 
As a means of expressing her gratitude to the donor, like Belinda, Helen had wanted 
to reciprocate by anonymously donating eggs to an infertile couple.  She said: 
 
Helen:  I have offered to donate eggs anonymously, but they said no, people have to bring their own 
egg donor.  But I just thought it would be much easier for a woman if she didn't have to see 
that face, if she didn't have to go to the shop and bump into that woman (she laughs). 
 
Helen appeared to be projecting her own desires for the donor to remain anonymous 
(at least while her children were young) onto how a woman who received donated 
eggs might feel. In her study of egg donors, however, DeLacey (1995b) is critical of 
anonymous egg donation on the basis that it is recipient-centred and positions donors 
as a potential threat to the nuclear family.  In her view, egg donors appear to benefit 
more from known donation practices where information exchange is unhindered.  
This, in turn, reflects research that indicates that birth mothers benefit from open 
adoption arrangements (Berry, 1991). 
 
Incorporating donors 
Several parents envisaged the possibility of incorporating donors into their lives at 
some time in the future if this was perceived to be beneficial to their children. Neil 
and Patricia had this to say about their donor: 
 
Neil: Well, I would be quite happy to meet him.  I wouldn't... the only thing, I wouldn't be interested 
necessarily to meet him other than through my daughters' interest in meeting him.  
                                                                              
Patricia: I've felt the same.  I was about to say that, for any other reason I wouldn't have met him, so I 
don't really want to meet him for any reason really, apart from the fact that [the children] 
might be wanting to meet the donor and want me to meet him, and from that aspect I would. 
 
These parents had initiated contact with the donor anonymously through the fertility 
clinic, to thank him for his ‘gift’, but also as a strategy for ensuring that he would be 
identifiable at a later date if their children wished to make contact. Neil had a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
19 Helen’s concerns relate to Maori being over-represented among offenders in New Zealand. 
According to New Zealand statistics, the incidence of offending and incarceration is higher among 
Maori than pakeha/European or other ethnic groups (Statistics New Zealand, 1996:34; Lash, 1998:24). 
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particular interest in this because he was adopted and, as a result of having children by 
DI, had recently sought contact with his birth parents.20 He said: 
 
Neil:   We actually wrote a letter to the donor.  So we got more information, and it was really great to 
get an encouraging and positive letter.  Our letter was to say that we wanted to check out his 
preparedness to have contact at some time in the future, should Tracey wish that when she was 
older. 
 
KH: And what sort of response did you get from him?  
 
Neil: Very positive.  He was happy to.  
 
Neil had also written to the donor after the birth of their second daughter, though he 
had not yet passed the letter on through the clinic.  His reasons for writing were: 
 
Neil:   Well, just to let him know of our thanks again for his gift, and to let him know that we were 
thinking about how he'd helped... Well, just to give him basically a bit of an update on what 
sorts of interests Tracey had, and how she was growing up, and just to reiterate that one day if 
the children wanted to make contact... just make sure that was still...[a possibility]. 
 
Neil and Patricia said that they planned to provide occasional ‘updates’ on their 
daughters’ lives to the donor, as a way of facilitating their eventual meeting, should 
their daughters initiate it.  Parents’ actions to ensure that their children conceived by 
DI have access to knowledge about their genetic heritage from the donor highlights 
their belief that such information might be significant for them.  It also brings into 
stark relief the uncertainty surrounding the possibility of future contact between 
people conceived by DI and donors in a system where, at the point of donating their 
gametes, donors agree to be identifiable at a later date, but cannot be held 
accountable. 
 
Other parents said they hoped that their donor would be available to meet their child if 
they had particular problems associated with having been conceived by DI. Pippa, 
mother of Elspeth, aged 19 months, said about the donor: 
 
Pippa: And he says he's identifiable, so hopefully if she needs to... they said she can contact him at 18.  
He hasn't got any children of his own. He's in a de facto relationship.  So, she can meet him at 
18, and hopefully if she has problems earlier, he would be prepared to meet her sooner.  
 
KH: Identity problems?  
 
Pippa: Yes.  If Elspeth was having problems, I'd like to meet him first with Sean [her father], and his 
partner, and then maybe we'd all meet later… I think we can make contact if there's a problem.  
                                                          
20 See Chapter Three for a discussion of the meanings Neil attached to biological and social ties. 
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I think if Elspeth was having real issues with it, because I know somebody else from the donor 
programme whose son is about nine and finding it very difficult, which is unusual, because most 
boys don't seem to apparently, it's more the girls.  And they were contacting the donor, so he 
could meet him. 
 
 
Like Neil and Patricia, Pippa had contacted the donor anonymously through the clinic.  
 
Pippa: I sent a letter to the donor with a photo of Elspeth.  Apparently he was delighted.  Yeah, they 
were really, really pleased.  I chose a photo of her that he wouldn't recognise now, because I 
don't want her recognised on the street.  So, now, I've sent him one of quite a few months ago, 
so he wouldn't recognise her from that.  
 
 
By sending photos of her baby that were several months old, Pippa engaged in 
nuanced communication:  she wanted to show the donor the child, but not in a way 
that she could be identified by him.  This contrasted with her expectation that Elspeth 
might wish or ‘need’ to meet him in the future, and illustrates the ambivalence of a 
number of parents about their relationship to donors of sperm.  A number sought 
contact, but also valued anonymity until these children were old enough to state their 
own desires about possible face-to-face contact. 
 
Elspeth’s paternal grandmother was fearful of her granddaughter possibly meeting the 
donor in the future.  She said: 
 
Joan:  I'm scared of it.  I don't really like it, for my sake, but for her sake it's right that she should, 
because I think it's very important to know about your grandparents and your great-
grandparents.  So, she should.  It wouldn't be fair that she didn't.  But when I think that, then I 
think that maybe Sean will get his nose pushed out.  So I fear for him…. But I hope Elspeth will 
be proud of [the donor] and love him and be glad that that person is her father, because I think 
it's important to people if they can be proud of their parents, don't you?21  
 
Joan illustrated the tension between different sets of rights.  She juggled a variety of 
contradictory discursive frames in relation to the parties involved in the donor 
conception arrangement.  She thought that the donor, as her granddaughter’s genetic 
parent, should be acknowledged, and that in all fairness the child had the ‘right’ to 
know, not only her biological origins, but the donor himself, whom she hoped her 
granddaughter would love and be proud of, as one should one’s parents.  At the same 
time, she feared that her son, as the social father, would become an ‘outsider’ if his 
daughter formed a relationship with her genetic father.  For his sake and her own sake, 
                                                          
21 As discussed in Chapter Three, Joan said that she could not feel proud of her granddaughter because 
she was not biologically tied to her and therefore had nothing to do with who she was.  Pride in one’s 
offspring was therefore, for her, the outcome of biological rather than social ties. 
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she therefore did not like to contemplate a meeting between Elspeth and the donor, 
whom she referred to as Elspeth’s “father”.  Joan commented later that she hoped 
such a meeting would happen after her death, so it would not affect her. 
 
Ria and Sophie, a lesbian couple who chose a known donor, stressed the importance 
of children being able to identify their biological parents. Ria said: 
 
Ria:    I think it's important for the child, because I myself was adopted and I've met my birth mother 
and she said that she wouldn't help me find my birth father and wouldn't go into it.  
 
KH: Did you find that quite disturbing or unhelpful?  
 
Ria: Um, just unhelpful really.  
 
KH: Do you want to know who he is? 
 
Ria: No, I don't really have a great interest. 
 
Sophie: I think the health history would be interesting more than anything. 
                                                                              
KH: Not for your sense of who you are? 
 
Ria: No.  Well...  
 
KH: Wouldn't you be curious to know his family background? 
 
Ria: Yeah, yeah.  I mean, I do occasionally get curious, but after having gone through the difficult 
line of trying to find my birth mother, and I guess having expectations and it not working out 
to be what I expected, I don't want to go through that again.  So, yeah, I guess there is that 
curiousness of what he looks like and whatever.  It's really important for me that my child can 
have the choice to know where he or she came from. 
 
Ria’s inability to locate her birth father supports Iwanek’s (1998:29) contention that 
because birth fathers are often not named on the birth certificates of adopted people, 
they are dependent on birth mothers for information.  This might not be forthcoming 
if the birth mother still felt hurt or betrayed, or simply had put it in the past. Ria 
appeared to have some curiosity about her birth father, particularly in terms of 
knowing what he looked like, but her inability to locate him did not appear to be 
detrimental to her sense of identity.  Triseliotis (2000:93) suggests that many adopted 
people tracing their birth parents are interested in the physical appearance of members 
of their birth family which, he claims, relates to the issue of physical identity.22
 
Ria’s partner, Sophie, suggested that knowing the birth father’s medical history was 
perhaps of more interest than knowing him as a person. This relates to O’Donovan’s 
                                                          
22 For a discussion of the significance of family resemblance see Chapter Eleven. 
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(1989) argument that the emphasis in the adoption literature on the psychological 
need to ‘search for origins’ overlooks the practical reasons, such as medical and 
genetic history.  Some extended family members of children also suggested that 
knowing the health and medical history of the donor was perhaps the most relevant 
type of information to be shared with DI offspring.  In these cases, the connection 
between the donor and the DI offspring is justified medically rather than socially.   
 
Some parents of children conceived with the help of an anonymous sperm donor, 
thought that it might be helpful for the child’s sense of self to possibly meet him. 
Peter and Alice said that their perceptions of the donor had changed since they 
initially selected him from a donor profile, which illustrates that donors’ identities 
shift over time.  Alice said: 
 
Alice: We're probably increasingly curious, aren't we?  Compared to that initial stage - it was sort of 
helpful to have a certain distance between…you know, almost to think of him not a human 
being in a sense, more the donated kind of…   
                                            
Peter and Alice had chosen a donor who had indicated on his profile that he was 
willing to meet any DI offspring “sooner rather than later”.  They said: 
 
Alice: We've thought about actually at some point maybe meeting him, earlier rather than later, so 
that we could get a photo, and we can talk about him to her, and then at some stage, when 
she's older, if she wants to make more contact, then she could do that… so that it's not a secret 
and it's there and so the curiosity I think will be… then it'll be up to her what she does with it.  
 
Peter:   Yeah.  The timing is pretty important because it would be really good if we could sort of 
normalise the information by just having a relationship with his family… even if it's just the 
occasional sort of acquaintance level... because we have heard of other donor children who've 
found it more upsetting to find… to realise that they're different, than it is to kind of know 
about it... and sort of having an occasion when you're gonna have to meet people because they 
have some importance to their lives.  
 
                                                                              
Peter indicated that meeting the donor would obviate the potential ‘need’ for Erica to 
later ‘search for her genetic origins’.  Alice and Peter wondered if they might be the 
first couple to initiate contact with the donor through the clinic they had attended.  
However, they also acknowledged that it was difficult to know if this was the right 
course of action.  In many ways, they said, it was easier to be complacent, to forget 
about it and just get on with their life. 
 
The maternal grandmother of Peter and Alice’s daughter explained her views on the 
possibility of Erica meeting her genetic father: 
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Janine: The thing is, as long as she knows that Peter is not her biological father, as she grows up, she'll 
probably have a natural curiosity to meet the man or to, you know, I would think, I mean, that 
seems to me to be quite normal.  And I'm sure that with the guidance of Alice and Peter that it 
won't become an issue.  I think she might meet him, but I don't think it'll affect her love for 
Peter…. And there was no relationship between Alice and the man, or anything like that... so... 
but I still think that she might want to actually see him, as you say, out of curiosity, to see 
what he's like. 
 
Janine drew on an adoption discourse about the ‘natural curiosity’ to meet one’s 
biological parents (Haimes and Timms, 1985:76).  She did not envisage that this 
would interfere with Erica’s love for her father, Peter, especially because there had 
been no relationship between her mother and the donor.  This has to be articulated 
because ‘usually’ the connection of the sperm and the egg involves ‘a connection’ 
between people.  What is usual, needs to be articulated and distinguished from what 
happens in DI. 
 
In contrast to Janine’s views about Erica possibly meeting the donor, Peter’s father, 
Jim, drew on an old adoption discourse about the ‘dangers’ of crossing the boundaries 
between the biological and the social (Haimes and Timms, 1985:80; Haimes, 
1988:55). He said: 
 
Jim: I think I said to Peter, “Don't you think that's adding sort of another risk dimension to the whole 
thing?”  Peter and I can always have an argument on something, so I think it was stopped fairly 
quickly (he laughs). He's got a mind of his own.  No, I wouldn't interfere.  That's their business 
really, and, ah…  My own impression is I don't know whether it would do a lot of good, but ah... 
it's up to them…. I can accept [children conceived by DI] being told, but I don’t think that it’s 
altogether necessary for them to meet another man who’s the biological father.  As I say, it’s 
adding another risk factor to the whole thing, which… there may not be any risk, but it’s all 
confidential in the early stages, why not leave it like that?  There are safeguards there. 
 
In connection with the prospect of his granddaughter meeting the donor, Jim 
repeatedly used the language of ‘risk’. Jim’s concerns about the choices that his son 
might make in relation to meeting the donor relate to arguments which posit that, in 
late modernity, agents have become less constrained by institutional structures 
(Petersen, 1997).  In these conditions, individuals must become the masters of their 
own fate, bearing the consequences of their own decisions as they participate in the 
individualisation of risk (Beck, 1992, 1999). Alice and Peter thus construct 
themselves as individual autonomous and risk-bearing actors as they embark on 
contact with the sperm donor. 
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Jim’s acceptance that his granddaughter should know about her origins, but not 
actually meet her genetic father, raises one of the thorny issues and paradoxes that 
exist in the way that DI is organised.  Haimes raises the issue of the difficulty of 
‘telling’ within adoptive families when the prescription to be ‘open’ comes from 
sources that promote institutional secrecy (1988:55).  Similarly, in the case of DI, 
clinics advocate that children should be told of their origins, while their institutional 
structures revolve around anonymity, albeit with the expectation that donors are 
potentially identifiable at some later date.  Difficulties thus arise for parents who tell, 
but are then asked by the child for information about the donor which they cannot 
provide.23
 
Some mothers had sought to make contact with the donor, while their husbands 
argued for the need to respect donors’ privacy. One couple who had DI through a 
North Island clinic had written to thank the donor, and identified themselves. Sarah 
said: 
 
Sarah: When [Charlotte] was six months old we wrote to him via the clinic to say thank you very much 
and that we were absolutely thrilled.  We gave him all her details - date of birth, and name and 
ours.  He knows where we are. … And we just said that if he would ever like a photo of her, or 
to meet with her or us, that we would welcome it, and that if he didn't that we would respect his 
privacy.  Actually we wrote the letter to him and his wife, because he was married with two 
children, and I guess she would have been a part... because their information was on the whole 
profile, we just assumed that she was part of the whole decision.   
 
We didn't hear back, but I was worried that the clinic hadn't passed it on.  And, so they checked 
for us, and he had received it, and he was really thrilled to receive it and know that we were 
happy.  And thanks very much, and we'd leave it at that.  But another day could come and this 
person could knock on the door, and he'll be there, and I'll know who he'll be. 
 
KH:  And that wouldn't bother you? 
 
Sarah: Not at all, I look forward to it.  
 
 
The lack of a direct response from the donor illustrated how gamete donation is 
primarily constructed as an anonymous transaction to enable an infertile couple to 
have a child, and thereby create their ‘own’ family. It also highlights the way in which 
anonymous gamete donation is set up to preserve the privacy of the nuclear family, 
                                                          
23 In December 1997, the Christchurch Infertility Society received an anonymous letter from a mother 
of two children conceived by DI, who described her frustrations about ‘telling’ in the context of not 
being able to answer her daughter’s questions about the donor.  Her 9-year-old daughter had asked the 
donor’s name, wanted to know whether the donor’s father could be a replacement for her dead 
grandfather, had asked for a photograph of the donor, and so on.  This mother urged that DI become 
organised along the lines of open adoption. 
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and reinforce the notion that crossing those boundaries might have negative 
consequences for the families involved. Concerns about donors ‘intruding’ into 
recipient families relate to arguments espoused by proponents of anonymity between 
the parties to a donor conception.   Such arguments posit that anonymity enables the 
recipient couple to construct their own parental status without feeling indebted to a 
known donor, and that it also protects the child from what is construed as a potentially 
harmful multiple parent situation (Raoul-Duval et al, 1992). 
 
Through open adoption, Sarah and Tim had on-going contact with their adopted 
children’s birth mothers, and their foster daughter’s biological parents are their 
friends. Sarah, however, appeared reluctant to tell her adopted children about their 
birth fathers.  She claimed that it was easier to talk about the relationship with birth 
mothers by describing to her children how they grew in their birth mother’s ‘tummy’.  
In contrast, her children’s birth fathers were distant, marginalised figures with whom 
they had had almost no contact.  Rob’s birth father had not seen him since he was two 
years old, and was no longer in a relationship with his birth mother.  Sarah’s sister, 
Phoebe’s birth mother, claimed not to know who her birth father was, so he could not 
be identified. By not introducing her children to the concepts of birth fathers and 
donors, Sarah appeared, at least in part, to be protecting Tim and his relationship with 
their children.  Thus, her decision to identify themselves to the donor appeared 
somewhat contradictory. 
 
While Sarah appeared open to the donor arriving on their doorstep, Tim was less 
enthusiastic about the prospect of such a meeting.  He said of the donor: 
 
Tim:   I would respect his privacy.  If he ever requested to meet his donor daughter... I think he's the 
parent of a few... he's been successful a few times.  Yeah, but it's not like I'd really like to meet 
this guy.  I mean, what he's done is really great, and he's had his own family, and maybe he... I 
don't know... for whatever reason he's done it, you know, which is great.  Like, Charlotte is just 
a real little cracker.  She's beautiful... a beautiful child.  
 
While Tim indicated that the donor had the ‘right’ to contact his biological offspring, 
it appeared that the letter identifying them to the donor and saying that they would 
welcome contact, was initiated by Sarah, rather than Tim.24 As well as writing to the 
                                                          
24 Tim did not stay for the entire interview.  While forthcoming, he nonetheless appeared ambivalent 
about being interviewed.  Perhaps partly because some of his views were at odds with Sarah’s, he 
asked me to ask him questions, excused himself and went outside to attend to the children. 
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donor to express her gratitude, Sarah also had a strong desire to donate her eggs to 
another infertile couple.  She said: 
 
Sarah:   I've always said I'm going to donate eggs as well, to give something back to the programme.  
Tim's actually really not all that keen on it. And he says, “Well why do you want to do it?” and 
I say, “Well, you know, it's something I thought I would do when we had Charlotte,” you 
know, and he says, “Well, you don't have to do the eggs, you're doing enough. Are you doing 
it for egotistical reasons? Do you want to say you've got another child out there or 
something?” I said, “Well, no, it might be a weeny part in it, but I really get so much joy out of 
Charlotte, and, you know, but maybe it's just, they're so rare, even more rare than sperm 
donors.  He reckons now that we've got the kids, I probably wouldn't be able to disassociate 
myself from that curiousness all the time.  And I said, “Well I've seen what's happened with 
Rob and with Phoebe,” and I said, “I think I could just give for the sake of just giving.  Just to 
give another couple an opportunity to be parents.”  And he says, “It all sounds really good 
Sarah, but you know you're a highly emotional sort of person and are you trying to kid 
yourself?”  And I said, “I don't think so.”  I mean, not to say I wouldn't ever have those 
curiosities, like an adoptive parent does. 
  
Sarah’s claim that Tim questioned her motives, which she acknowledged involved 
some self-interest as well as an altruistic motive, suggests that Tim, like some female 
partners of sperm donors, might have had a sense of ‘ownership’ of her eggs. He also 
appeared to equate donating eggs with having a child. His discomfort might also 
indicate that it served as a reminder that she could become a biological parent and he 
could not.25  
 
Sarah’s claim that she did not expect to feel overwhelming attached to a child 
conceived using her donated oocytes is supported by the findings of qualitative 
research on egg donors in Australia which explores the experience of egg donation 
from the donor’s perspective (see deLacey, 1995a, 1995b).  DeLacey argues that some 
studies of egg donors showed that oocyte donors anticipate a sense of ‘connectedness’ 
with a child born of their donation.  According to deLacey, fear of this connection 
leading to a feeling of ‘ownership’ has led to the development of exclusively 
anonymous egg donation programmes in some countries (see Raoul-Duval et al, 
1992).  DeLacey argues, however, that due to the limitation of the quantitative 
methods employed in this research, the nature of this connection and its implications 
have not been defined.  In her study, carried out in 1994, deLacey (1995a) found that 
oocyte donors defined feelings of ‘connectedness’ as genetic affiliation, natural 
interest and curiosity about the children, not as a sense of ‘ownership’ or ‘maternal 
attachment’. 
                                                          
25 For a discussion about the motivations for becoming a donor, see Chapter Five. 
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Caroline, another mother of two daughters conceived by DI, had written to the donor 
through the fertility clinic as a way of ensuring that her daughters would be able to 
gain access to him in the future.  She and her husband Mike said: 
 
Caroline:  I wrote this letter about three years ago…Basically, I said I really want you to get in touch 
with this donor, because...and I had a letter to give to the donor and I said these are our 
reasons for it.  The way I look at it, when my girls get older it'll be like a little piece missing 
out of a puzzle, and I want it so they can complete it.  They may never want anything to do 
with this man, but I don't want it to be seen that I never did my bit to help them do that, 
because I think them both being females they are more likely to want to trace it than I think 
males would, and I think it's just a female thing. It's a very maternal type thing.  So, it was 
probably more my driving force than yours, I think. 
                                                                              
Mike: I was quite supportive.  I thought it was a very good idea.  I wasn't against it.   But Caroline 
would definitely have been more bothered about doing it. 
 
Caroline:  Originally, [the clinic nurse] had got back to me on it and said, “we don't know where he is 
at the moment” and I said, “you're really going to have to find out where he is, because if 
you don't, I'm going to have to take some other measure to try and find out where he is.” I 
now feel the real need that I need to know... I don't need to know who he is, but I need to 
know that if my girls want to get in touch with him, they can do so.  So after really stressing 
the point to her, about two days later she said, “Oh, we have actually found him now”.  So, 
they had found him and they had given him my letter, and he has apparently left his 
solicitor's name and this solicitor will always know where he is, hopefully.  So that if we 
need to then obviously my girls will get in touch with the [clinic].   
 
Caroline saw her motivation to make contact with the donor in essentialist terms 
which was reinforced by her husband. Iwanek (1998:28) argues that it is a myth that 
more adopted females trace their birth parents than adopted males do. She contends 
that adoption orders made in Wellington, New Zealand, courts between 1965 and 
1975 were 44 percent for males and 56 per cent for females, and applicants for 
information under the Adult Adoption Information Act represented the same gender 
ratio.  Caroline’s reference to the donor as “this donor” and “this man” simultaneously 
highlights the gulf between the unknown donor and the anonymous recipient, and also 
constructs the donor as provider of a (missing) piece of the puzzle that constitutes her 
daughters’ lives and genetic makeup.  
 
The question arises whether just as birth mothers are the key gatekeepers to birth 
fathers when children are adopted, so some birth mothers like Caroline may assume a 
special responsibility for access to the genetic father of her children.  Caroline and 
Mike’s donor had donated at a time when donors were not asked to indicate whether 
or not they were willing to be contacted by recipient families. This was initially of 
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little concern because their overwhelming priority was to have a baby, but as her 
daughters had grown, Caroline had become more concerned that they could make 
contact with the donor, and she, herself, had become more interested in him.  In 
relation to the possibility of meeting the donor, she and Mike had this to say: 
 
Caroline:  Yeah, I would love to meet this person [the donor].   I probably wouldn't do it, I think, until 
the girls got older. 
                                                                              
Mike:  I would not want to meet the person unless the children wanted to meet him.  I'm quite 
happy to meet him, but I think... from what I gather he's ten years plus older than us, so he's 
an older person.  He's remarried. He's possibly got new children.  I wouldn't want to put him 
in any form of spot without... because we accepted the rules as they were, and we're thinking 
of the interests of the children, so if and when they meet, then I'm quite happy to meet him.  
I'd like to meet before, but I don't think it's fair to him to do that. 
 
 
Mike raised the issue of the donor’s right to privacy. He raised a set of issues related 
to timing for the donor, whose circumstances also change over time. Mandy, 
Caroline’s sister, expressed a concern that the donor be protected from unwanted 
approaches.  She commented on Caroline’s attempt to ensure that the donor was 
available to meet her children in the future: 
 
Mandy: I think the way Caroline's doing it, they're going through a lawyer, and I actually think that's 
probably a good way, because then you've got a third party in there, who [can mediate].  It's 
hard, because, yes I think Toni and Lucy have a right to know who their father is, but then, 
like this friend of ours [whose husband was a donor before he married] who's now got four 
children, you don't want them to impinge on their life that they've now got.  
 
KH: So donors have their rights as well?  
 
Mandy: Yes.  And I think, especially in those early days, it sounds like they didn't sign a form saying 
that they would be available and it was probably a mistake by the donor insemination 
[programme], because they should have... So, I can see why now they would not want to, 
because they probably thought they could be anonymous, and they were doing something that 
would never come back to haunt them in later life, and now it is. 
 
These comments illustrated the ethical dilemmas that might arise for donors who 
donated at a time when they did not agree to be identified, and were later asked by the 
fertility clinic if they were prepared to be identified.  Mandy had been alerted to this 
by a friend, whose husband had donated anonymously before he married, who felt 
strongly that any donor offspring should not be entitled to meet her husband and 
“intrude” into her family life.  At the same time, Mandy empathised with her sister’s 
desire to meet the donor.  She said: 
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Mandy: Yeah, I suppose for her she's probably interested because she'd like to see where her child gets 
different aspects from. It's funny, because I know things that my kids do, and I think... “You're 
just like your father,” and then you wonder, like Caroline might jokingly say that, but they'll 
never know, and that would be interesting to know different little characteristics.  
 
Mandy raised the possibility of mothers of children being interested in meeting the 
donor in the same way that individuals conceived by DI, or adopted people for that 
matter, might wish to find out where certain of their characteristics or looks 
originated.26 Considering the intimacy involved in carrying a child to term, and the 
unusual circumstances of having virtually no knowledge of the genetic father, let 
alone a visual image of him, it is perhaps not surprising that some women might have 
an interest in meeting the person who contributed to the procreation of their child. 
 
As a result of the expression of interest in donors by some mothers, some health 
professionals speculated whether the desire for contact between some recipient 
families and donors would be prompted by mothers, rather than the children 
themselves. Dr A had this to say about children possibly wanting contact with donors: 
 
Dr A: I would assume that there would be a significant group that would want to.  And it may not be 
the children that want to do it.  There seems to be a moderate amount of pressure from the 
mothers, if you know what I mean.  Maybe those mothers are wanting to protect and think for 
their child, but it may be something else.  I don't know. 
 
Dr A speculated whether some mothers’ interest in knowing more about the donor 
was prompted by personal interests.  This raises the question of whether women who 
have borne a child conceived by DI might be interested in men who shared with them 
the status of biological/genetic parent.  
 
Other health professionals spoke of the need to protect both donors and children, 
especially in situations where parents had separated.  A nurse at one of the clinics 
indicated that when couples separated there was a danger that the mother might try to 
turn the donor into a father figure for her child. 
 
Kathy, the mother of Melissa, aged 10 years, had been given no information about 
Melissa’s donor.  Although she accepted the lack of information about the donor at 
the time of the insemination, she said later she began to feel that it was important that 
                                                          
26 The significance of physical resemblance in families is discussed in more detail in Chapter Eleven. 
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her daughter had access to information about the donor, and wrote to the clinic.  She 
said: 
 
Kathy:  We did write.  I have since contacted them again and asked for further information, which they 
were not forthcoming with at all. They said they didn't have anything else on file and it wasn't 
their policy to obtain any further information for anybody.  At some point I did push the boat 
out because in those days they tended to shred the information on the donors.  They didn't 
keep them.  I tried to do it the nicest way I could and I thought, “How will I guarantee that 
these records are actually going to be kept?” … If the clinician drops dead, well, the 
information goes.  I didn't want that to happen.  At that point I realised I had quite a big 
responsibility.  I'd brought this child into the world and I had to ensure she had some kind of 
ability to have those records if she needed them. … As far as I'm concerned there's two cross 
records [the donor’s and Kathy’s] and we really need to hold that information... we've 
produced a child out of it.  And I would have stood the ground in my own right at the time.  
But really my interest is… I don’t have a need to know, but I knew somewhere down the line 
she'd be the type of kid that would ask a hundred questions and she does just that. 
 
 
Kathy was thwarted in her desire to receive more information about Melissa’s genetic 
father because the clinic was unable to furnish any further information about a donor 
who had not agreed to it.  The director of a fertility clinic said that two recipient 
couples had contacted them to ask for more information about donors.  
 
Dr C: One couple we feel very embarrassed about but, because the letter we received requesting more 
information I passed on to our nurse and I think I then went on leave, and when I came back she 
had lost the letter, and she couldn’t remember the name of the person.  And so we’re hoping that 
they would write again, but nobody’s written. 
 
There's another couple where we sought more information from the donor and they refused.  
And I agreed to contact the donor again in a year or two... but we actually got two ethical 
specialists to look at the case and they said that we didn't have the right to pursue the donor for 
more information.  It's actually got quite messy I'm afraid.  The couple separated... 
 
Although Kathy claimed that she sought the information about the donor purely on 
her daughter’s behalf, her actions coincided with her separation from her husband.  At 
the time of the interview, she indicated that she was quite interested in meeting the 
donor.  
 
Kathy: Now I would, and that is probably based on looking at Melissa.  I look at her sometimes and 
think, “Who are you like, you pretty baby?”  Yeah, I would look at her sometimes and I think 
there's a lot of talent, there's a lot of unknown quantity in there.  And I think somebody's given 
me such a great gift, really, and yeah there's so much about a whole side of her that I just don't 
know anything about.  I mean, I look at Nicole and I know her father and I know all those 
things in that whole family, and it's like, there.  It's not a biggie for me, but it's there.  I often 
look... I mean Melissa's extremely artistic.  She's my artist.  And she's been a finalist (she 
points to Melissa’s painting hanging on the wall).  
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Kathy focused on Melissa’s giftedness, her good looks, her artistic talent, and her 
curiosity about everything.  And she wanted to be able to establish whether these 
attributes were those of the donor or other members of his family, about whom she 
knew almost nothing.  Kathy’s interest in meeting the donor might also be attributed 
to the significance she attached to kinship based on biological ties.27
 
Joanna, a separated mother of two children conceived by DI, hoped that the donors, 
whom she referred to as her children’s “fathers”, would be available to meet them.  
She said: 
 
Joanna: It's quite good, Todd's father doesn't mind meeting the children when they're a bit older, past 
their teen years, through a third party, whereas Jessie’s father doesn't mind meeting the 
children any time at all.  I'd quite like Todd's donor [to be available sooner], because I mean, 
teenagers, they're a bit funny at that time of life. 
 
 
Joanna’s concerns that the donor be available to meet Todd possibly relate to the 
allegedly poor relationship between Todd and his social father.  According to Joanna, 
Todd had recently said that if anything happened to her, he did not want to live with 
his father.  Joanna’s estrangement from her husband might have contributed to the 
donors appearing more significant. She described them as follows: 
 
Joanna: I know that one's married with two children, that's Todd's.  And he's 9 stone and only about 
5'9", a real weed.  He's an accountant and he's got bursary and all his schooling and that.  And 
he enjoys cricket and the piano.  It's funny because Todd enjoys cricket and the piano.  Just 
things that come out.  Todd is an A-grade student at school and maths is one of his best things, 
so it's funny how things come out. 
                                                                              
 [The other donor is] an older man.  He's in his 50s and he's single and has had no children.  
And he's an historic writer with an American background.  He was born here, but his parents 
are American.  He's 5'9" too, but he's a more solid build, and he's got an eye problem, which 
was funny, because Jessie was born with a turned in eye, but she's got it all checked out.  He 
had surgery on his eye, because he had an eye problem, but Jessie is all right.  So... and he 
likes collecting cars and horse riding, and I thought, oh dear, he's just like my father... with all 
those car bodies and that lying around.  But she should have been a boy, she's a real boy.  She 
really is.  She was a prem[ature] baby and she's a real fighter (she laughs).  Always will be I 
think.  Determined. 
 
Joanna spoke in more depth than other parents about their sperm donors and offered 
the most detailed comparison of the donors and her children.  
 
                                                          
27 See Chapter Three for a discussion of the primacy given to biological ties in Euro-American kinship 
ideology. 
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Carla was explicitly interested in meeting the donor because of the loss of strong ties 
to her husband and to other family members. She said of the donor: 
 
Carla: Well, he did an amazing thing in giving life to Justine, and I mean, I don't want to deny him 
that, if you know what I mean.  I'm not going to give him visiting rights or anything, but that is a 
pretty special thing to do and he did actually partake in making Justine.  And I don't have a 
problem with the fact that he is the father.  Probably more because Ben [her ex-husband] and I 
aren't together, too, in that Ben hasn't been a real father in the home either.  So, there were some 
amazing things going through my head when Ben left.  Well, who is the Dad here?  Is it the one 
that made her or the one that's just gone off and left her or, does she have a Dad? But I've 
resolved a lot of those things.  
 
To some extent Carla recognised the donor as her daughter’s “father” because of the 
gap left by Ben, Justine’s absent social father.  She also refers to him as “the one that 
made her” which implied some purposive action on the part of the donor.  Although 
Carla said that Justine now had a good relationship with her father, she felt some 
bitterness about his having left her ‘holding the baby’, and did not believe that he 
adequately filled the role of father to their child.  She expected that Justine would 
want to make contact with the donor: 
 
Carla:  I have the expectation that she will; whether she does or not is up to her, and I don't want to 
impose that upon her.  I'll try really hard to leave it open.  It's up to her and if she has no desire 
then that's fine. But, I personally have a desire.  
 
KH: Would you like to meet him?  
 
Carla: I would, just to say thank you.  That would be the overwhelming thing, just to say thank you.  
 
KH: When you say that you have a desire, do you mean you think it might be good for her to meet 
him?  
 
Carla: Having been raised by a stepmother and lost contact with my own real family, I think that 
family is important.  Like, I'm lost: I don't belong to my step-family; my Dad's family, a lot of 
them have died, and I wasn't raised with them either, and I'm like a lost wee soul in the world, 
and I think that family's really important and I would like Justine to have some link with 
family.  There's very little for her, because my Mum's a step-mother, so she hasn't got a real 
grandmother there.  Ben's side of the family consider that they're not her real relatives, so 
we've got problems there.  And my Dad adores her because she’s his grandchild, but I mean, 
he's not going to live forever and there's not a lot.  I have a step-brother and a real brother, but 
he's fairly removed and not that interested in children.  So, family's not going to be huge for 
her, and so if she can find identity… And for me, not having known a lot of things about my 
mother because she died, and the family didn't want to talk about her, then I hope that things 
are more open for Justine, and if she does want to know those things, that it's there for her. 
 
Carla’s desire to have contact with the donor appeared to be related to her perception 
of the paucity of ‘real’ relatives, or ‘real’ family, in her life, and in Justine’s life.  
Thus, she made a strong distinction between biological and social ties: she categorised 
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the former as unproblematically positive and meaningful and the latter as negative, 
insignificant and uncaring.  
 
Conclusion 
Talk about donors illustrates the uncertainty that surrounds the meaning of sperm 
donation. It highlights a range of issues relating to donors, people conceived by DI 
and their families, and the sets of competing ‘rights’ and claims parties to a DI 
conception have to one another. Questions arise about whether or not people 
conceived by DI will be interested in identifying or meeting donors.  Clinical staff 
working in two New Zealand DI programmes did not anticipate that many people 
conceived using DI would be interested in identifying donors. In support of their 
views, they drew on the experience of adoption. For example, they anticipated that the 
lack of a social relationship between mothers and donors, that the child was not 
‘relinquished’ by his/her parents, or that adopted people appeared to be more 
interested in locating birthmothers than birthfathers, indicated that it was unlikely that 
large numbers of people conceived by DI would be interested in identifying donors. 
These views, however, are speculative, and if comparisons are to be made between 
adoption and DI, it should be noted that adopted people seek their birthparents or 
information about their biological origins for a variety of reasons that could 
conceivably apply to people conceived by DI. 
 
This chapter has shown that the level of interest in donors by recipients and their kin 
varies considerably, from total lack of interest, to a desire to meet the sperm donors.  
This has implications for the implementation of policy relating to information-sharing 
in this area. Many parents of children conceived by DI wished to remain anonymous 
to donors. While most of these parents thought it the child’s ‘right’ to know about 
their DI origins, and even to identify or contact the donor, they neither expected nor 
hoped that their child(ren) would want to identify the donor.  While most parents 
expressed their gratitude to the donor for his altruistic ‘gift’, many perceived his role 
as one of providing genetic material to enable them to have their ‘own’ child. For 
many of these couples and their kin, immediate family relationships were of primary 
importance and they did not wish to attend to the possible significance of genetic ties. 
They sought to maintain their ‘right’ to privacy and to freedom from the possibility of 
donors ‘intruding’ into their family lives.  Thus, they appeared to wish to maintain the 
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integrity of the nuclear family. Those who were more likely to prefer the preservation 
of anonymity employed a variety of strategies for maintaining anonymity, which 
denied the donor any ‘ownership’ in or access to their child, and reinforced the social 
father’s position as the only father of the child. 
 
Parents and their kin presented a broad range of notions in their construction of sperm 
donation as a gifting act, which sometimes correlated with the way they 
conceptualised and reacted to the identifiability of donors.  This illustrated Simmel’s 
(1950) arguments about the significance of gratitude in social life and that it may or 
may not engender reciprocal acts.  Those who were less inclined to feel grateful to 
donors for their ‘gift’ were also less likely to welcome any contact with them in the 
future. Gratitude to the donor, however did not always mean that a direct connection 
with him was seen as appropriate.  While some parents’ gratitude did not engender 
any reciprocal acts, others wrote to the donor anonymously through the clinic, and 
some sent photographs of their child.  Writing to thank donors was also used by some 
couples as a means of ensuring that the donor would be available to be contacted in 
the future if the child initiated it. Some women planned to donate their eggs to another 
infertile couple as a means of reciprocating and expressing their gratitude for the ‘gift 
of a child’. 
 
Talk about donors also illustrated the lack of adequate vocabulary to enable people to 
think and talk about them (see Snowden, Mitchell and Snowden, 1983).  Because 
language constructs meaning, this indicates that it is important to establish a 
nomenclature that adequately describes the donor’s role in the procreation of a child.  
Donors were variously labelled by parents as “dad”, “biological father” “this man” or 
“this person”, the latter of which positioned him as an outsider to their family, and 
thus depersonalised and marginalised the donor. Other parents used language related 
to adoption or fostering discourses, referring to donors as “birth fathers” or “natural 
fathers”. Some extended family members said they knew very little about the donors, 
and some conceptualised their contribution to the conception of the child as a “non-
issue”, “a chemical thing” or a “gift from one family to another”.  Thus, they drew on 
discourses of gifting and science that tended to distance and depersonalise donors.  
Others, however, referred to the donor as the child’s “father” and expected that the 
child conceived by DI would want to meet him in the future. This raises the question 
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whether the terms ‘father’ or ‘dad’ should be used in relation to the semen donor who 
has no social relationship with the child.  Equally, with the increasing use of third 
party gametes in assisted conception, the question arises whether it may become more 
widely understood and accepted that people can have more than one father or mother. 
 
Conceptualisations of, and interest in, donors appeared to change over time.  This 
highlighted that some of the views expressed by parents and their kin might change in 
the future, depending on a variety of contingencies.  Some parents maintained that, 
while they had not been interested in the donor at the time of conceiving by DI, over 
time they had become more curious and wished they knew more about the donor.  
Some of these parents expressed concerns that identifying donors might complicate 
their own, or their children’s lives. They nonetheless conceded that their children 
would have a ‘right’ to do so.  This illustrated the extent to which some parents and 
their kin drew on discourses and public narratives related to adoption or fostering, and 
the possible risks involved in the ‘search for origins’ to frame their fears and 
expectations. 
 
Several parents anticipated that their children would want to identify the donors in the 
future, and some had actively sought to contact donors to ensure that this would be 
possible.  Others raised the question of whether donors might be interested in 
identifying their DI offspring. Parents who were the most ‘open’ to meeting or 
incorporating the donor in some way were predominantly people who had experience 
of a father or husband gap in their lives or split biological/social rearing. Others who 
expected their child might wish to identify the donor had chosen a Maori donor and 
recognised the importance of whakapapa. The views and experiences of these parents 
highlight the need to acknowledge that many families in contemporary New Zealand 
society are negotiating complex kin relations in the context of forming families.  This, 
in turn, indicates a need in New Zealand to establish a regulatory system and a 
register of donors that at least ensures that DI offspring have access to information 
about donors, and perhaps provides access to identifying information to all parties to a 
DI conception. 
 
The chapter raises issues about competing ‘rights’, such as the right to privacy, raising 
questions about the formulation of policies around information-sharing in the context 
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of DI conceptions.  For example, some mothers expressed an interest in identifying 
and possibly meeting their donors, and were perceived to have their own interests in 
identifying donors. For some health professionals, this interest highlighted the need to 
protect donors and their families, and children conceived by DI. Issues also emerged 
relating to timing for donors whose family circumstances may change over time.  This 
study has shown that women who were no longer living with the social/legal father of 
their child, and had tenuous ties with other family members, were most likely to 
express the desire that the donor should be available to meet their child.  Some also 
hoped that the donor might be available to fulfill a father-like role in their child’s life.  
Expectations such as these should be acknowledged in clinical practice, though they 
appear unrealistic considering that donors legally have no rights or responsibilities in 
relation to their DI offspring.  
 
This chapter has illustrated a variety of responses to issues relating to donors, children 
conceived using DI and their families. It has also illustrated the existence of 
competing ‘rights’ of donors, social fathers, mothers, and people conceived by DI to 
access to information and identification of the parties involved in a DI conception.  
While everyone recognises the right of children to know something about their 
genetic fathers, parents and their families vary in their attitudes to contact with 
donors. Some parents accept the possibility of such contact, but would rather avoid it.  
Others positively embrace this possibility and want to ensure that their children can 
make this contact in the future.  This highlights the diversity among DI families, and 
the complexities that need to be taken into consideration in the formulation of policies 
and practices particularly in the context of information-sharing in DI. 
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Chapter Eleven 
 
Conceptualising Families: Difference, Sameness 
And the Use of Donor Insemination 
 
 
It is time to lay to rest the ghost of The Family so that we may begin to build a safe world for 
living families.  The family is dead.  Long live our families! (Stacey, 1996:51) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
‘The family’, as a unitary concept, has been problematised by sociologists and social 
scientists who argue that a diversity of family forms is evident in society (Pryor and 
Rodgers, 2001; Smart and Neale, 1999; Silva and Smart, 1999; Morgan, 1996; Stacey, 
1996; Coontz, 1992, 1999; Gittens, 1993; Macklin, 1991; Gubrium and Holstein, 
1990). These authors argue that what is commonly understood as ‘the family’, as one 
dominant family form, simply does not exist in contemporary western societies.  As 
discussed in Chapter Three, a renewed focus on ‘the family’ has moved away from a 
structuralist view of ‘the family’ as an institution.  Instead, major theorists, such as 
Giddens and Beck, avoid using the terminology of ‘the family’, focusing instead on 
intimacy, child-parent relationships, or what Morgan (1996) refers to as ‘family 
practices’, or engaging in actions that constitute categories of people as families. 
 
Drawing on these contemporary understandings of family diversity, this chapter 
argues against a ‘DI families’ frame that defines families with children conceived by 
DI as a unitary category.  Rather, the chapter focuses on parents, children and 
extended family members who have to respond to a set of issues relating to the 
genetic contribution of donors.  Other families respond to such challenges as multiple 
births, the knowledge that a child was conceived outside the marriage, or to the 
diagnosis that a child has cancer.  These things highlight common assumptions, and 
bring discourses about family, love, and parenting into stark relief.  Analysis of the 
interview material indicates that people in families with children conceived by DI 
respond differently to the complex issues and challenges they face, illustrating the 
diversity that exists between families that are generally defined as belonging to the 
same category. 
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Sociologists and social scientists have drawn attention to the effects of the use of 
reproductive technologies on the meaning of ‘family’ and related concepts such as 
‘motherhood’, ‘fatherhood’ and ‘parenthood’, particularly when third party gametes 
are used (Almond, 1995; Macklin, 1991; Edwards, 1991; Eichler, 1989).  Much of the 
concern about the implications for families of conceiving a child by DI is shaped by 
assumptions about biology and social relationships, particularly the view that ties 
between parents and their children ‘naturally’ have a biological/genetic basis 
(Haimes, 1990).  As Stanworth has pointed out: 
 
In the dominant culture of Western societies, the importance of blood ties is a powerful 
cultural theme.  The family is often imagined as a biological unit, in which social relationships 
grow straightforwardly out of genetic ones, such that commitment to ‘the family’ and to 
‘blood ties’ becomes inseparable in many people’s minds; the overlapping responsibilities of 
mothers, fathers and children are filtered through a biological lens (1987:20). 
 
This pervasive and important cultural theme may have particular implications for 
couples who conceive children using donated gametes. Stacey (1996:49) has pointed 
out that while the modern family system, incorporating a male breadwinner, married 
to a homemaker, and their biological offspring, might be defunct, its “ghost” lingers 
in the form of the ideology of the family which pervades general understandings of 
what is meant by ‘family’.   
 
Gubrium and Holstein (1990:133) have argued that family ideology acts as a form of 
normative control: the use of the discourse of “The Family” promotes a sense of what 
ought to be as much as it suggests what actually exists.  These authors contend that, as 
a means of social control, family usage simultaneously creates and controls the social 
order it purports to describe: family imagery may recommend particular social 
relations and arrangements as ‘normal’ or ‘expected’ while proscribing others 
(Gubrium and Holstein, 1990:132). Adoptive families, and those including children 
conceived using DI, disrupt assumptions about the ‘naturalness’ of families.  They 
highlight the differences among families (Humphrey and Humphrey, 1988). In 
everyday discourse, ‘other’ families are qualified, such as adoptive families, foster 
families, step-families and DI families.  According to one adoption researcher, 
acknowledgement as opposed to denial of difference has led to more open and 
creative relationships between children and their adoptive parents (Kirk cited in 
Iwanek, 1997:17; Haimes and Timms, 1985:83).  Acknowledgement of difference, 
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however, can also reinforce the dichotomous relationship between the biological and 
the social which, as discussed in Chapter Three, has been challenged and disrupted by 
many theorists (Carsten, 2000). 
 
Rather than contending that families conceived by DI constitute a particular ‘family’ 
type, this chapter illustrates diversity of experience and difference among these 
families.  Gittens (1993) has argued that having children creates new power 
relationships between mother and child, father and child, mother and father, and 
siblings.  In the context of conceiving a child by DI, these power relationships are 
intersected by the knowledge (at least for the parents themselves) that the father is not 
genetically tied to the child, while the mother is both biologically/genetically and 
socially connected to the child. Questions arise about how various members of a 
family respond to and use this knowledge in their day-to-day familial relationships, 
and how this affects their understandings of ‘family’ and related concepts. 
Importantly, parents who are using DI to conceive their children are doing this in the 
context of general ‘troubling’ of what we understand by families and a world in 
which children are generally less likely to live with their genetic/biological fathers.1
 
The chapter begins by examining the ways in which parents and family members of 
children conceived by DI conceptualise their family, and whether or not they think of 
their family as being ‘different’ from other families.  The ways in which children 
conceived by DI are conceptualised as ‘different’ or ‘special’ are also explored.  The 
issue of physical resemblance and the importance attached to this in the context of 
family formation is a focus of attention.  Another focus of this chapter is the 
implications for parents’ relationships and the problem of ‘asymmetry’ in connection 
with the missing genetic link between the father and the child conceived by DI.  The 
concluding section of the chapter is a discussion about the meanings attached to the 
missing genetic link and the ambiguities and uncertainties that emerge as a result, 
                                                          
1 New Zealand census data show that families consisting of two parents with children declined from 
53.2 percent in 1986 to 44.9 percent in 1996 (Statistics New Zealand, 1998:15-17).  Over the same 
period, the proportion of one-parent families rose from 14.3 percent to 17.7 percent. Twenty-eight 
percent of all families with children were one-parent families, and 83.1 percent of sole parents in 1996 
were women.   Data from the Christchurch Health and Development Study indicate that over the period 
of childhood (0-16 years) 36% of the cohort of children included in the study had spent some period of 
time in a single-parent family with the majority (79%) entering single-parent families as a result of 
parental separation and divorce (Fergusson, 1998:158). 
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particularly in connection with the relationship between social fathers and their 
children conceived DI. 
 
Families with children conceived by DI:  more of the same, and ‘different’ 
The secrecy and anonymity that has traditionally surrounded DI has been attributed to 
the desire of couples with children conceived by DI, and health professionals who 
assist in these arrangements, for these families to be seen as ‘normal’ or ‘ordinary’ 
families (Haimes, 1990; Snowden and Snowden, 1998).  In their study of couples who 
had conceived by DI, Snowden and Snowden (1998:46-47) found that many couples 
wished to appear like a ‘normal’ family to avoid what they perceived as the stigma 
attached to the ‘unnaturalness’ of DI conception, as well as the presence of male 
infertility.  Additionally, the vast majority of couples kept their DI conceptions a 
secret because of concerns about the implications for family relationships. For 
example, many parents assumed that grandparents would expect their grandchildren 
to be biologically related to both the parents, and would be concerned about an 
imbalance created by the grandchildren being related on the maternal but not the 
paternal side of the family.   
 
Secrecy, therefore, is seen as a means of enabling families with children conceived by 
DI to deny that they are ‘different’ (Snowden and Snowden, 1998:46).  The concept 
of ‘differentness’, however, is complex and ambiguous: the question arises as to who 
or what these families are different from. Stacey (1996) promotes the celebration of 
family diversity, rather than the identification of families that differ from an 
overgeneralised ideological norm. However, given that family diversity exists 
alongside the powerful images of conventional heterosexual nuclear families, 
questions arise about whether people who have used DI compare themselves to other 
‘types’ of family, or to some established ‘norm’ of what a ‘family’ ought to be.  
Questions also arise about the meaning of ‘different’, and whether being ‘different’ is 
regarded as neutral, as positive and valued, or as negative and pejorative.  
 
Most couples participating in this research considered their family to be a ‘regular’ or 
‘normal’ family.  Joe and Ella, the parents of three sons conceived by DI, said:  
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Ella: Because, as far as anyone else was concerned, they were conceived by us, and they were... we 
made them...basically Joe put the sperm in where it was needed.  We made them.  
 
Joe: More of a triangle than a two thing...it's a three thing.  
 
Ella: With the help of someone else we've made these children.  
 
KH: Your own children.  They feel very much your own?  
 
Joe: Mm.  But again, I've got nothing... it's not as if I've had children which are genetically mine, 
and I can stand back and compare the two. I've got nothing to compare with, so to me that's 
the benchmark.  That's normal.  
 
To Ella and Joe, theirs was a “normal” family for several reasons.  Their perception 
that others would see them as having conceived the children themselves, however, 
neglects the fact that many people know that their children were conceived by DI, 
because, Joe, in particular, had told many people.2  This suggests that secrecy and 
denial of ‘difference’ do not necessarily go hand in hand. Because they had no other 
experience of having children other than by DI, it was ‘normal’ for them.  Later in the 
interview, Ella said they might have felt ‘different’ at one time, but over time they 
believed the fact of having conceived by DI had receded into the background as they 
lived their day-to-day lives like any other family. 
 
Ella hinted that they had had certain issues to deal with that other families did not.  
Some extended family members indicated that, while they had thought that the 
problem of infertility was resolved by having a child, it appeared that some problems 
related to infertility were on-going.  Jeremy and Christine, the brother and sister-in-
law of Richard and Belinda had this to say: 
 
Jeremy: I think that from what it looks to us, it is still a fact of life, they are still an infertile couple, 
though an infertile couple with a baby. 
 
Christine: Yeah.  I think they were very excited that the baby came and it seemed all of a sudden that 
they didn't need the Infertility Society any more and the people associated with it, and I 
could understand that…. But I also felt like, once she was born then there were things like, 
you know, “Who does she look like?” When Thomas [their son] was born everybody was 
talking, “Oh, he looks like this and he looks like that,” and I knew that they would strike 
that.  And, even if they had their baby and that solved their problem, it seemed to me that it 
would bring a whole new set of problems with it that perhaps they did need the support of 
people that really understood.  I mean, we can try and understand, but we can't really 
understand what they've been through. 
 
Hammer Burns’ (1990:183) study of perceptions of parenting after infertility shows 
that most couples reported that infertility had caused conflict in their marriage, and 
 375
that conflict in the marriage during infertility may be unresolved and subsequently 
carried over into their parenting practices. 
 
Some parents of children conceived by DI acknowledged that they had different 
issues to deal with as a result of conceiving a child in this way, but denied that their 
family was ‘different’.  Kathy said: 
 
Kathy: Well, in today's world there are a lot of different families and there are a lot of different inter-
related families and ours… no, I don't see us as different.  I've got different issues to deal with. 
And it's a matter of making the most positive way into it. No, I wouldn't say different at all. 
  
 
Neil, too, said he did not think of his family as ‘different’. 
 
Neil:  I've become aware of the many different ways of forming families… whether it's via adoption or 
ART, or other means.  I don't see one lot as being normal and one lot as being special or 
different. 
 
In contrast, Sarah, the mother of four children from a variety of ‘origins’, thought of 
her family as special in some way, but not ‘different’.  She said:   
 
Sarah:  I don't see us being as different, um, unique, but I've never wanted to be like anybody else.  
When I was a teenager I wanted to wear glasses and braces because it was embarrassing to do 
so and I was going to do it and not be embarrassed.  I mean, I guess both Tim and I have got... 
kind of got a rebel streak in us.  So we don't see ourselves as ‘different’.  We called ourselves 
either extraordinary, or special. …It's a toughie though.  I mean, because Tim and I were 
probably different before we had kids (she laughs).  So, we're not different now. 
 
 
Sarah juggled with a variety of discursive frames connected with the meaning of 
being ‘different’.  She preferred to see their family as “unique” or “special” rather 
than the more pejorative ‘different’.3 She claimed that she and Tim liked to be 
‘different’ from the crowd in the sense of not being ordinary. Having said this, Sarah 
intimated that they were ‘different’ before they had children, which suggested that 
unlike other forms of differentiation, being childless was a form of being ‘different’ 
that Sarah did not value. 
 
Other parents claimed that if they thought about their family as ‘different’ from other 
families, it was along a variety of dimensions other than the origins of their child. 
When asked if she saw her family as ‘different’, Meredith, the mother of a son 
conceived by DI, replied: 
                                                                                                                                                                      
2 See Chapter Eight for a discussion of Joe and Ella’s views on secrecy and disclosure. 
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Meredith:  No, as I said, that is a closed book.  I don't see any difference.  The only difference is that 
there's only one.  Not having any brothers and sisters, because there's no way I'd go through 
all that again. 
 
 
Perhaps partly because of the difficulties she had encountered having a child, 
Meredith and her husband chose to put their son’s DI conception ‘behind’ them, and 
had no plan to tell their son about it. While it has been argued that secrecy serves to 
deny the DI (Snowden and Snowden, 1998:46), rather than denying the DI itself, 
Meredith appeared to want to avoid confronting the issues that emerge for parents of 
children conceived by DI, at a time when there is pressure to tell. 
 
The importance attached to having more than one child was raised by Paul, a father of 
a daughter conceived by DI, and an older son conceived without assistance. 
 
Paul: I think that [having another child] was quite important because up until that time it was, well for 
me anyway, I sort of, we had a family but it was...having two children seemed to make us more 
of a family, from my point of view anyway.  It just seemed to be more complete. 
 
For Paul, having a second child, no matter how she was conceived, assisted in a 
normalising rather than a differentiating process. 
 
While they thought of their one-child family as ‘small’, Alice and Peter raised the 
issue of differentiation along a number of dimensions. 
 
Alice: I guess when I compare it, I just think that we've got a small family (Peter laughs), because it 
looks like we're not going to end up having any more, and it feels like a small very close 
unit….  
 
Peter:  In terms of whether we are or are not a different sort of family.  We probably are in lots of 
ways…because we're not married.  We've never been, and we've been together… 
 
Alice and Peter (in unison):  17 years.                                                               
 
Peter: ...or something.  And we've been through all of this.  We've never sort of had the need to 
marry, but um, as well as that, Erica's a very special child to us because of the process and, 
you know, her sort of innocence in the whole thing. They don't have any say in it. So, I think 
we are a bit different.  We don't… it's nothing you think about very often, but I think you 
value what you've got more. 
 
Peter located their ‘differentness’ in their marital status and the process by which they 
brought a child into the world. He appeared to perceive these points of difference as 
positive and valued.   
                                                                                                                                                                      
3 Conceptualising the child conceived by DI as ‘special’ or ‘different’ is discussed later in this chapter. 
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Like Peter, Andrew and Annie considered that they appreciated their children more 
than many other parents. This assertion was made in the context of denying that their 
family was ‘different’. 
 
Annie: I think we're a healthy family and have a lot going for us as a family, as the four of us.  
 
Andrew: I appreciate my children more I think than perhaps other people do who just have it because it 
happens.  I think I appreciate my children a lot more, even though I haven't had a lot to do 
with them. 
                                                                             
Annie:  Well I have, and I hear other parents moaning about things about their children, and I get very 
intolerant because they're so lucky to have their own children. And they don't know.  I might 
have been the same.  I might have been the same had I not been through what I have.  
 
Andrew and Annie appeared not to wish to associate themselves with the pejorative 
connotations of the word ‘different’. Although he said he had not spent a lot of time 
with them, Andrew valued his children after his experience of infertility and 
conceiving through DI.4   
 
Some parents argued that perceptions of being “different” were embedded in 
particular social contexts.  While she initially denied perceiving her family as 
‘different’, Alice suggested that: 
 
Alice:   I do [feel ‘different’], actually, in one context, and that's when we meet with our antenatal 
classes that we went through with Erica when she was born. Almost all of those women (there 
are only two of us who are not onto the second child already) have had the second child or are 
about to, and I do think about it there.  We never disclosed to that group about Erica being 
different, and you know I do feel the difference a bit there. 
 
 
Pippa, another mother with a daughter conceived by DI, said she felt somehow 
‘different’ from others in her antenatal group with whom she had not disclosed about 
her DI conception.  While her husband Sean denied that they, as a family, were 
‘different’, Pippa remarked: 
 
Pippa: I think it's more an issue with me than Sean, because I'm at the antenatal groups and I can 
remember one at the very beginning, and they were saying something about how important 
that the genetic link is for fathers to bond to their babies.  And I find that quite hard. 
                                                                              
KH: Did you disagree with them?  
 
Pippa: I just didn't say anything.  I might have said, “I don't know if it's true, because adopted 
children get loved just as much.”  But, yes, they were onto this genetic thing, and every now 
                                                          
4 See Chapter Four for an account of Andrew’s response to his infertility. 
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and again it's like, how much they look like each other, you know, how important genetics is, 
and genetics or the environment. 
 
Alice’s and Pippa’s experiences raise the issue of whether the concept of being 
‘different’ is more likely to be attributed to a person or a situation which is unfamiliar, 
or not well understood.  Illustrating this point, a family member of one couple with a 
child conceived by DI said that she did not think of her brother-in-law’s family as 
“different”, because she knew them all so well. Related to this idea, Haimes (1998:55) 
argues that people conceived by DI are construed as ‘different’ because it is assumed 
that there are very few of them, which suggests that these conceptions are rare and 
therefore ‘special’.  
 
Some mothers perceived their families as ‘different’. They were more likely to 
compare their family to the norm of the ‘traditional’ family, comprising a mother, a 
father and their biological offspring.  Jane spoke about her sense of difference from 
others. 
 
Jane:  I sort of feel that you can't talk...because you actually go through a situation of having a donor, I 
sort of feel that you're different, I mean, different from other people, because you don't just have 
the children naturally, so it will immediately, yeah, I sort of feel from the beginning you're in a 
different situation.  
 
KH: So you see your family as different?  
 
Jane: Yeah, different to other families, yeah. 
 
Jane claimed to think of her family as “different” because the children were not 
conceived ‘naturally’ and that, as a result, she ought to keep their origins a secret.5
 
Acknowledging ‘difference’ was seen by some parents as being ‘honest’ or accepting 
‘reality’, but again this was in the context of comparing themselves with the 
traditional nuclear family.  Carla had this to say: 
 
Carla:  We are different, and I think if you denied that and tried to pretend that you weren't, that maybe 
you wouldn't be seeing things.  How do I explain that?  I think it's really important that it's open 
and honest and that if anybody that was close to me did have a question or a problem that I'd 
like them to be able to talk about it.  And people have asked me all sorts of things through the 
time, about how I felt about it, or whatever, and that's fine.  I don't mind.  I'd rather that things 
were open.  And open for Justine's sake, in a way, too.  I don't want anybody at a family reunion 
dropping a bombshell on her saying, “did you realise that you were this or that?”  So, yes,  I do 
                                                          
5 For a more detailed discussion of Jane’s conflicting views on secrecy and disclosure see Chapter 
Eight. 
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see us as slightly different.  And I know that even as a single parent family, Mum doesn't think 
that Justine and I are a family.  She says that we don't class as a family and that's been hard at 
times too.  She doesn't think that just one mother and a child is a family… [In another way] 
we’re a little different as well…there is this third person that’s been part of this family. 
 
Lesbian families have to confront ‘differentness’ in ways that heterosexual couples do 
not because it is obvious that someone outside the lesbian couple’s relationship must 
be the father of the child. Lesbian parents, however, respond to this particular issue 
differently illustrating that, just as there is no standard ‘DI family’, no standard ‘DI 
lesbian family’ exists (Haimes and Weiner, 2000:485). When asked how they would 
respond to questions from their daughter, Lydia, about being ‘different’ from other 
families, being raised by two lesbian mothers, Ria and Sophie observed:  
 
Ria: I guess it's not something that I think about a lot.  But I know that's something that is going to 
come upon us in the near future, so I do think about it occasionally, and I'd like to be 
informative to her about life in general before that happens, hopefully.  To explain to her that 
there's just so much difference in the world.  
 
Sophie: I think one of the reasons why we wanted to have our second child so close, is so that they will 
be close in age and able to be support for each other.  But I really think that once they're at 
school age, or the age when children do realise differences, I think that it's not going to be so 
much out of the norm, because there are so many lesbian couples having...or gay parents, 
around these days.  It seems to be happening more and more.  
 
KH: Do you know of male couples bringing up children?  
 
Sophie: I don't know of any, but I've heard gay men say that they would like to.  I think that will be the 
next thing that does happen. 
 
                    
When asked how he would expect to respond to possible questions from Lydia in the 
future about her family arrangements, Derek, Lydia’s genetic father, had this to say: 
 
Derek:  I'd just have to be downright honest and explain to her that I'm attracted to men, and that her 
biological mother was attracted to Sophie, and that we all wanted to have children, but really 
push the point that she's very, very lucky because she actually has three parents.  And may 
even have four, if I have a partner.  I'll be able to address it if it happens, but I also believe 
from reading the research, that usually doesn't happen, as long as the family unit is working.  
That she will accept it.  She knows who her father is, but her father doesn't live with her.  And 
at school I think there's a lot more solo parenting, or divorced parents that are living with a 
new partner. 
 
Derek thought that Lydia would accept the way their family was formed as long as the 
relationships worked well. Furthermore, he thought their family arrangements would 
be regarded as ‘acceptable’ because Lydia would have contact with other children 
who did not live with their fathers. 
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Like many of the heterosexual couples, Petra and Jennifer said they did not perceive 
themselves or their family as ‘different’. 
 
Jennifer: I always get surprised when people mark us out as being different.  But that's sort of a bit 
like being in a lesbian relationship.  I just consider it to be normal, you know, it's normal.  
It's certainly normal for me.  And then suddenly when someone says, but...blah, blah, blah, 
blah, it really hits me and I think, oh that's right, it's not totally accepted by some people.  
And it feels the same with Olivia.  Like, Olivia is our normal family, and then suddenly... 
                                                                              
Petra: We go to church, and it's not a gay church, although it's quite gay-friendly.  And they accept 
us, they have learned quite easily to accept us as a normal family.  So, they're really excited, 
because they've got a baby, and young couples with babies is what churches like in fact.  
That we happen to be both women is not a big deal. …So we are normalised in enough 
places that we think we're completely normal.  But just occasionally someone will say to me, 
“I get asked a lot of questions about your baby, or who your baby's father is.”  And I think, 
“oh shit, people are talking about us,” and that's a real jolt.  So that's a bit of a shock, but not 
as much as I thought.  I thought we'd walk out with the mark of Cain, and in fact, like, we've 
just booked Olivia into [a centre] for child care and they've been really cool, haven't they?  
And I mean, her child carer is a very ordinary heterosexual woman with three sons, and...  
 
Jennifer:  I said to her, you know, “Is this going to be an issue for you?” because I thought it was better 
to deal with this up front, “and if it is, forget it, it's a non-starter.” And she said, “No, no.  It 
would be boring if we were all the same,” was her response, which I thought was a really 
nice response.  But it's...I deal with things that you're actually much better to be totally up 
front about that... 
 
This discussion illustrates the contrast between self-perception and others’ perception 
of ‘difference’, and highlights its political, contextual, dynamic and relational 
dimensions. 
 
Physical resemblance 
For many couples, issues around difference and sameness emerged particularly in 
relation to physical resemblance between parents and their children.  Families exist in 
time as well as space.  The birth of a baby symbolises not only the continuity of life 
and the family, but also the passing on of physical characteristics that are often 
associated with a particular family. As a result, when babies are born, people tend to 
look for the ways in which the child resembles the parents or any other close family 
member.  Physical resemblances thus appear to locate the baby as part of a family/kin 
group. As indicated in Chapter Three, Barnard points to the existence of three, rather 
than two, levels of analysis of kinship and relatedness: true genetic relationships 
based on the facts of reproduction; socially constructed ‘biological’ knowledge (a 
middle ground between the biological and the social, which is culturally specific); and 
social relationships (1994:788).  Barnard (1994:786) argues that expressions such as 
“She has her mother’s eyes” relate to culturally specific definitions of ‘biology’ which 
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may or may not have a basis in a true genetic relationship. Thus, physical resemblance 
belongs to the middle level of analysis with respect to kinship. As an illustration of 
the middle analytical level, Barnard suggests that in some cultures, for example, 
children are supposed to resemble their mothers’ husbands because of the close 
physical relationship between husband and wife, and not because of the implantation 
of semen (1994:789). Barnard (1994:786) argues that even in Western societies, 
where social kinship is axiomatically bound to a ‘biological’ foundation, ‘biological’ 
kinship is as much a metaphor for social relations as a statement of genetic fact. 
   
As discussed in Chapter Three, Strathern has argued that biological connections 
between individuals formed through the act of procreation are the cornerstone of 
Euro-American thinking about kinship and relatedness (1993:13). For participants in 
this research, the ‘fact’ that the genetic father of the child was an anonymous sperm 
donor led to concerns about what baby might look like, and that differences from the 
parents would have to be explained. Even though parents argued that in ‘normal’ 
circumstances a child may resemble one and not the other parent, for some fathers, 
comments from others that the baby did not look like them were a source of distress.  
The parents of a daughter conceived by DI commented: 
 
Alice:  I think it was difficult early on because she’s such a spitting image of me when I was younger 
that the comments that used to come about that were difficult for you. 
 
Peter:  Yeah, they used to repeatedly, kind of, reinforce my relationship in the whole deal. 
 
Alice:  And even people who knew, I mean like family, would still comment on the relationship, which 
was kind of reasonable that they did, but made you feel left out, didn’t it? 
 
Peter:  It used to actually annoy me [chuckles] something wicked.  But you don’t hear it very much any 
more. 
 
Peter’s response highlighted that in Euro-American kinship ideology, the child 
represents the symbolic fusion or unity of the couple and that, if not reconceptualised 
(e.g. by using physical resemblance as a metaphor for social relations) can become a 
symbol of disunity (Ragone, 2000:70).  That fewer remarks about physical 
resemblance, or the lack thereof, were forthcoming as the child grew older perhaps 
indicated that, over time, she came to be seen as belonging to both her parents 
because of the social relationships that had developed. Alice and Peter had had to 
field remarks made by his great aunt, whom they had not told about their daughter 
Erica’s DI origins.  She had commented on how tall Erica was (in contrast to her 
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parents), that she could not “see any of Peter in her”, and “what was the milkman 
like?”  Remarks such as these illustrate how people construct links between parents 
and their progeny by tracing a relationship on the body.  They also bring into stark 
relief assumptions about family, relatedness and biological connections between 
parents and children, and that paternity (an invisible link to the child) is always 
potentially unknown (Gittens, 1993:66). 
 
Several parents observed that it was commonplace for people to comment on 
likenesses between fathers and their children who were conceived by DI, even though, 
in reality, no biological/genetic tie existed between them.  This further illustrates that 
people register relationships on the body, and supports Barnard’s argument that 
‘biological’ kinship as expressed in terms of physical relatedness is as much a 
metaphor for social relations as a statement of relevant biological fact (1994:786). In 
many cases, family members and friends were unaware of the child’s donor 
conception, and therefore probably assumed the existence of a genetic connection 
between both parents and the child.  Andrew, however, was all too aware of the lack 
of a genetic connection to his children, and became irritated when people commented 
on the resemblance between him and his eldest daughter. 
 
Andrew: I found it very hard sitting there bouncing the baby and, “Doesn’t she look like you?  No 
hair!” and all that sort of rubbish [laughter].  Give it a rest!  Then you’ve got the other effect 
with Annie hanging around there as well, and knowing darn well [that the child is not 
genetically related to Andrew], and you’ve got these dopey people saying, “Doesn’t she look 
like Daddy?”… and the fact of the matter was, she was very much like Annie, no-one else 
but Annie. …So that insemination was dominated by Annie, which to me has been quite 
comforting.  If the kid had come out with strong tendencies to the other person, that 
wouldn’t have been as comfortable, and that’s turned out with the second one who has a 
tendency to be, not like... 
 
Annie: We don’t know who she’s like! (they laugh). 
 
Andrew: No idea at all.  It ain’t like me. 
 
 
Like Andrew, several parents with children conceived by DI commented about the 
‘strong’ indication of the mother’s genes in the child. This might be explained by the 
desire to emphasise the primacy of the mother’s biological/genetic claim to the child 
over the donor’s. Snowden, Mitchell and Snowden (1983:141-142) also found that 
some parents minimised the role of the sperm donor in the creation of their child, 
contrasting the “brief role of the genitor” with the mother’s role of carrying the baby 
 383
to term. Highlighting the physical resemblance between the mother and child might 
also serve as a means of reinforcing distance and emotional boundaries between 
parents and donors (Ragone, 2000:71). As another distancing strategy, Andrew 
referred to the donor as “the other person”, rather than the donor or ‘donor father’.  
While he took comfort in the strong physical resemblance between his wife and their 
oldest daughter, he said their second daughter, conceived with sperm from a different 
donor, did not look like either of them. The possibility that their second daughter 
resembled the donor thus emerged, but neither Andrew nor Annie suggested this.  The 
lack of resemblance between their daughters was a source of discomfort for Andrew 
and Annie because people in the community frequently remarked how different the 
girls looked from one another.  This illustrates the way that physical difference creates 
more ‘distance’ between people, setting them apart rather than conferring on them a 
sense of belonging together (Ragone, 2000). 
 
While looking alike can confer a sense of relatedness, many parents suggested that 
often children within families could look quite different from each other, even ‘full’ 
siblings. Differences were not always explained in terms of genetic inheritance, but as 
something common to families more generally. Ella noted that their middle child, 
Hamish, stood out as ‘different’ from his brothers primarily because of his social 
location in the family, and not because he had a different genetic father.  Hamish was 
conceived using a different donor from his older and younger brothers, who shared 
the same genetic father.  Ella conceded that Hamish was more heavily built than his 
brothers, had a different personality, and also did not get on with his brothers as well 
as they got on with each other.  She attributed the latter to the small age gaps between 
Hamish and his brothers, and his being the middle child.  Thus, for Ella and Joe, 
social positioning was seen as more significant than genetic inheritance when 
accounting for difference.   
 
Similarly, Simon and Clare argued that their middle daughter, Maria, their only child 
conceived by DI, was different from the others, who were their genetic offspring.  Her 
‘differentness’ was not attributed to her DI origins. Instead, in their view, all families 
have a child who stands out as different from their siblings. Clare’s mother, Annette, 
invoked the same argument, telling the story of their son who stood out as somewhat 
“different”. 
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Annette:  When I was complaining about our fourth child to our doctor, he said, “In a family you’re 
always going to get one who stands out as completely different.”  He had four daughters, and 
he said, “I sometimes wonder where our Catherine came from.” So, I don’t see Maria as 
different.  She is different, but I don’t think that is the donor or anything else.  I just see it as 
the way she is. 
 
Some parents highlighted the complexity of genetics and the inability to determine 
where certain looks or traits originated.  Pippa and Sean said about their young 
daughter:  
 
Pippa: I don’t think she looked like anyone.  I still don’t think she looks like anyone.  She’s got olive 
skin, but he’s [the donor] got a bit of Italian in him. 
 
Sean: But so has your Dad. 
 
Pippa: Yes, Dad’s got olive skin.  He’s Lebanese.  So it could be a combination, or not.  You just don’t 
know. 
 
The argument that a child conceived by DI did not resemble anyone but him/herself 
was also invoked by some parents to emphasise the child’s individuality and, in the 
process, minimise the role of any genetic contribution to his/her makeup. When asked 
if she saw her son as resembling anyone in particular, Meredith had this to say:  
 
Meredith: I never think about it.  He’s Daniel to me.  And I don’t think about what he looks like, 
what he does, what he…or anything. 
 
KH:   So, you don’t make any kind of comparisons? 
 
Meredith: Never think about it.  But, I mean, when he was born, I know a lot of people said, “Oh, 
he doesn’t look like Karl. ”  And that used to hurt Karl I think, you know.  But, you see, 
as children get older you never ever think… so, no, we just get on with our life. 
 
Meredith’s desire to “get on with life” indicated a desire to give primacy to social 
rather than biological/genetic ties.  Inevitably, a child is born with a particular genetic 
makeup, but what really was most significant, in her view, was the social relationships 
that are formed as the child grows up within the family context.   
 
Neil, who himself was adopted, said he could not relate to people who commented on 
family likenesses because both he and his sister were adopted, and looked entirely 
different.  When he had children conceived by DI, however, he traced his birth 
parents for the first time, and then met his half-brother, which was first time he 
encountered family resemblance. He recalled meeting one of his half-brothers for the 
first time: 
 385
 
Neil:   It was quite fascinating to meet one of my half-brothers who had a strong physical resemblance 
to myself, ah…prior to that, physical resemblances weren’t something that I was interested in.  
In fact, I got slightly peeved whenever people focussed on photos and physical resemblances 
and so on.  To me it wasn’t something that was important.  But it was quite amazing to see a 
little bit of a mirror image. 
 
Neil appeared to define physical resemblance as similar facial characteristics, or 
perhaps body shape and stature.  Some participants acknowledged that whilst the 
child conceived by DI might not look like his/her father, by adopting his mannerisms 
or interests the child comes to resemble his/her father.  This reflected Snowden, 
Mitchell and Snowden’s findings that once children conceived by DI were old enough 
to exhibit their father’s mannerisms and characteristics, they become like their social 
father’s progeny (1983:141). Diane commented that although her son, Scott, did not 
look like his social father, in many ways he was very like him. Diane’s mother, 
Marion, corroborated this perception: 
 
KH: In some families, people talk about inherited looks or character traits.  What sort of talk is 
there around Scott? 
 
Marion: Well, it’s a bit of a laugh, you know, because often you see Chris’s traits coming out in him.  
And sometimes you forget and just say, “Oh, he’s like his father” or whatever, you see, 
because he’s got a lot of Chris’s mannerisms.  He obviously is picking up things.  He’s got 
Chris’s interests, as in fishing, etc., and right from babyhood.  So that, you know, when you 
say that, you just would not be able to pick out the fact that he’s not Scott’s biological father.  
That’s absolutely honest. 
 
Diane’s brother, Philip, also thought Scott was very like his father, to the extent that 
he continually forgot his nephew’s DI origins.  However, unlike Philip’s mother, who 
said that Chris liked being told that Scott was like him, Philip said he felt he had to be 
careful not to offend Chris by saying something like “He’s so like you Chris”.  This 
illustrates a tension between the perceived need to construct likeness on the basis of 
the ‘facts’ of reproduction and an acknowledgement that physical relatedness can be 
as much a metaphor for social relations as a statement of biological fact (Barnard, 
1994:786-7).  
 
Other family members, who knew about the child’s donor conception, said they felt 
they had to be wary of making comments about likenesses between the parents and 
the child.  Frances, an aunt of Joe and Ella’s three sons, said about visiting them 
shortly after a son’s birth: 
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Frances:   We were petrified that we were going to say something in front of Joe. When we went up to 
see the baby, we sort of thought, right we’d just better be careful what we say here, because 
normally when you see a baby, you say, “Oh, doesn’t he look like his father, or doesn’t he 
look like his mother?”   So that’s what we were really, really worried about (she laughs). 
 
Like Philip, Frances perceived the need to acknowledge physical relatedness on the 
basis of the biological ‘facts’ as she knew them. In contrast, comments that the child 
resembled both the mother and father appeared to be used by some kin as a strategy to 
give primacy to the social father over the donor. Like Marion, who perceived 
likenesses between Scott and his father Chris, Joanne, the maternal grandmother of 
Madison, commented that her granddaughter had her daughter Belinda’s “little round 
face” and her son-in-law Richard’s ears.  She said she could see “a bit of both” of the 
parents in her grandchild.  She explained this by drawing an analogy between her 
niece’s experience of adopting a child who was “the spitting image” of her adoptive 
mother.  This in turn draws on public narratives about some people being “lucky 
enough to adopt a dead ringer”.  In this way, physical resemblance between parents 
and children can be attributed to random phenomena, rather than strictly to heredity.  
Other family members, however, who were relatives of Madison’s father, could not 
see a likeness between father and daughter, and resisted colluding with other family 
members who insisted on there being a resemblance.  Christine, Richard’s sister-in-
law, commented: 
 
Christine:  Richard and Belinda told us about the donor and the physical attributes that he had and those 
sorts of things and it seemed… he sounded very like Richard and I thought that that was 
really good.  I was really hoping that she would be very like Belinda, but I have to be honest 
and say that I don’t particularly find her that way…which surprises me.  But seeing 
Belinda’s father, I actually find Madison quite like him… I’ve told them that, because 
Belinda has put me on the spot and said, “Who do you think she looks like Christine?” 
because a lot of people say that she looks like Richard, and I completely disagree with it. 
 
 
The differences in these family members’ perceptions might be explained partially by 
what others in the study said, that people see different things in others (or see what 
they want to see). It could be argued that, as mothers-in-law of infertile men, Marion 
and Joanne actively construct physical resemblance between their sons-in-law and 
their children conceived by DI to confer on them the status of father and to lessen the 
possibility of an asymmetry existing between their daughters and their husbands.  In 
Christine’s case, the refusal to construct physical resemblance between her brother-in-
law and his daughter might be explained by her belief that the ‘biological’ and the 
‘physical’ can be taken as essentially synonymous and applied to the facts of 
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reproduction (Barnard, 1984:787).  At the same time, it might reflect the feelings of 
ambivalence that appeared to exist between these two couples which stemmed from 
the fact that Jeremy, Richard's twin brother, was fertile while Richard was not.  
 
Commenting on physical resemblance is a way of expressing social acceptance of the 
child as the offspring of the two parents.  This can even be extended to lesbian 
parenthood, a generally unfamiliar form of parenting, where it is not possible for both 
parents to be genetically related to the child.  Petra and Jennifer had this to say: 
 
Jennifer: One of the most interesting ways we find we’re really going to be accepted is like, my dear 
grandmother who said, “Oh she looks a little bit like you Jennifer and a little like you Petra.”  
And then she goes, “Oh, that can’t be can it!” And that’s a sign of incredible acceptance, I 
think, when people look at Olivia and actually… 
 
Petra:  …see me.  And people do, I mean at work people have said, “Oh she’ll probably have curly 
hair because you’ve got curly hair.”  One woman said that to me and then a day later came 
up and said, “Oh, look, I’m so sorry. You probably thought that was so offensive.”  I just 
thought it was lovely, but I mean, you know, they just haven’t got the hang of it. 
 
This scenario reveals that identifying physical similarity legitimates the parent/child 
relation.  It creates social connection through the discourse of physical connection.   
 
Resemblance between children and parents or their kin is not static or constant, and 
some parents mentioned that likenesses shifted and changed over time.  Making 
comparisons is more feasible for those with a known donor, who are therefore 
familiar with the physical characteristics of both parents.  Sophie and Ria said: 
 
Ria:   Well, she looks like herself at the moment. 
 
Sophie:  A mixture of both of you.  She’s got Derek’s eyes.  She’s got amazing blue eyes [she goes to 
get a photo of their daughter Lydia]. 
 
Ria:   Oh yeah.  I’ve asked him before if he gets as many compliments about his eyes as she does 
about hers, because they’re definitely the Taylor’s [Derek’s family] eyes…When she first 
came out, our midwife said she definitely looks like Derek, and then she did look like Derek in 
the early days, and then she sort of changed to look like me, and then she goes back to looking 
like him. 
 
Some families with anonymous donors commented that their child must resemble the 
donor in some way because he/she had characteristics that were foreign to the 
maternal family.  Kathy noted about her daughter Melissa: 
 
Kathy:   And when she was born, I remember thinking, ‘goodness me’.  She was quite an olive 
[skinned] little girl, and she’s got dark brown eyes.  And I’m not an olive person.  My father is 
a blond man with blue eyes. 
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According to Kathy, Melissa had asked her where her thick blond hair came from 
because both her parents and her sister had fine hair.  Thus, she had noted how she did 
not resemble other family members. 
 
Some paternal grandparents expressed regret that they could not see a physical 
resemblance between the child conceived by DI and their sons who were the ‘social’ 
fathers. The views of these grandparents contrast with those of maternal grandmothers 
who actively construct physical resemblance between their sons-in-law and their 
grandchildren.  Jim, Erica’s grandfather, made the following observation: 
 
Jim:  She’s a dead ringer of Alice.  And that’s good, that’s good.  But you don’t see any of Peter in her, 
and that’s natural, and I think that’s a little sad. 
 
When first visiting her donor grandchild in hospital, Joan was acutely aware that her 
granddaughter was not genetically related to her side of the family. 
 
Joan:  When I first saw her at the hospital and her other grandparents were there and they were saying, 
“Oh, I can see a likeness to someone or other”, then I felt envious.  It was definitely with envy.  
I did feel envious…and I suppose they can see a likeness in the family, which I never will in my 
family. 
 
For Joan, the lack of physical resemblance between her and her granddaughter, based 
on the lack of a genetic connection, appeared to create a distance between her and her 
granddaughter.  The lack possibly symbolised a diminishing of the contribution to the 
child’s character than Joan felt she could make.  This highlighted the importance of 
resemblance in the bonding process.  Illustrating this point, in gestational surrogacy, 
racial difference between the surrogate and the commissioning parents is sometimes 
viewed as a positive factor because the lack of physical resemblance is seen to 
facilitate the process of separation between surrogate and child (Ragone, 2000:66). 
 
The tracing of a relationship on the body was also symbolic of continuing the life of a 
loved one. Derek, the father of Sophie and Ria’s child, had been particularly close to 
his late mother, and welcomed the opportunity to reproduce elements of his mother by 
‘fathering’ a child. He said: 
 
Derek:   And I want to see her genes go on.  My brother, you know, he’s not going to have children, 
and my step-brother… my father had another wife before my mother.  So, my mother’s genes 
weren’t going to be carried on.  And it’s interesting, you know, I see little facial movements 
that I attribute to my mother when I look at Lydia. 
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Seeing resemblances between family members may in part be related to the gender of 
the child.  For example, Caroline, the mother of two daughters, Toni and Lucy, said 
that she was pleased that she had daughters rather than sons because, in her view, it 
was more possible to see a resemblance between mothers and daughters and fathers 
and sons.  By implication, this meant that by having daughters, she was less likely to 
have to make connections between the donor and her children. 
 
Caroline:  I suppose in one way I was quite pleased that we had girls, because I think that if I had had 
boys I would be looking at the boy thinking, “Oh, you must look like your biological father.” 
Whereas I can look at the girls and I can see myself in them, whereas I couldn’t see 
myself…oh you might be able to see it in a boy, but I think that the male traits come out a lot 
more.  So, in a way, I suppose I’m really pleased we had girls. 
 
Caroline acknowledged that before her daughter was born, she thought a lot more 
about what she might look like, but later she had thought little about the donor, except 
in some situations.  She recalled: 
 
Caroline: But once Toni started developing her own little personality the thought just never entered my 
mind what the donor was like, except when she was screaming in the middle of the night, 
and I used to think, ‘What is this donor like?  Is he a maniac? [she laughs] 
 
Caroline appeared to attribute her daughter’s ‘different’ (and in this case unpleasant) 
behaviour to her ‘other’ origins (i.e. to the donor).  This is similar to a situation, 
discussed later in this chapter, where a parent might address the co-parent referring to 
a misbehaving child as “your child”. Toni’s aunt, Mandy, agreed that her nieces 
looked very much like their mother, but she also wondered where their very curly hair 
originated. 
 
Mandy:  They do look like Caroline, yeah.  Funny, because, as I said, people would say, “Doesn’t that 
look like Mike?” [the father] and  I used to go [she makes a face indicating doubt or 
uncertainty].  But they do look like Caroline when you see baby photos.  But they’ve both got 
this curly, curly hair, so that’s the only thing I wonder about…mind you Mike’s got curlyish 
hair…But they don’t really look like Mike.  They don’t have the freckles and the ginger tinge 
like Mike.  And I remember Caroline laughing, saying “At least we won’t have ginger-haired 
kids!” (she laughs) or something like that, because Mike does have a red tinge to him.  And 
they’re really tight curls, like very…Caroline had curly hair as a baby, but not like they have.   
 
 
While Mandy pointed to a possible ‘benefit’ of having DI: avoiding having children 
with ‘ginger’ hair, Pippa remarked that their daughter might have inherited better 
looks from the donor than she would have from her father, Sean.  She said: 
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Pippa:   [The donor] must be reasonably good looking, because Elspeth’s quite cute.  I think she’ll be 
better looking with him that with Sean’s family (we laugh).  I think we’ve got a cuter child 
(she laughs). 
 
KH  [to Sean]: How does that make you feel? 
 
Sean:   Mm.  You haven’t told me this before dear. 
 
Pippa:  Because they’ve got quite angular features, you know, very pointy features, particularly Sean’s 
mother.  So, I think Elspeth’s probably lucked in [sic] actually (she laughs). 
 
This is reminiscent of the ways in which DI could be used for eugenic purposes, or to 
ensure that the child had socially-valued physical and/or intellectual attributes.  For 
example, one sperm bank in the United States was set up for those who wanted sperm 
from Nobel Prize winners.  Recently, a website was set up to sell the oocytes of 
models, for those who would pay the price to have (hopefully) a beautiful child. This 
idea is embedded in the Enterprise Culture where "the child is literally - and in many 
cases, of course, joyfully - the embodiment of the act of choice" (Strathern, 
1992b:34). 
 
 
The child conceived by DI as ‘special’ 
Like adopted children whose parents often tell them that they are ‘special’ and 
purposefully ‘chosen’ (Snowden and Snowden, 1984:111), many children conceived 
by DI are perceived as ‘special’ by their parents and family members.  For example, 
they can be considered ‘special’ because they were born after the considerable 
‘heartache’ associated with infertility, and effort on the part of the parents (Snowden 
and Snowden, 1984:76-77).  In light of the characterisation of children conceived by 
DI as ‘special’, a maternal grandmother said:  
 
Joanne: But it's the old story isn't it?  What you haven't got, or can't have, when you do have it, it's 
more special.  You know, it's like that with everything isn't it?  If you are suddenly able to 
have something that you thought you couldn't have, it's got to be better.  
 
Joanne drew on a public discourse about how people always value more what they 
can not easily achieve, or what they have been able to achieve after ‘beating 
considerable odds’.  As previously discussed in this chapter, some parents are 
particularly appreciative of becoming parents after experiencing periods of infertility, 
and the time and effort involved in the DI process. This appreciation possibly partly 
explains research findings that suggest that the quality of parenting in families who 
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have children through assisted conception is higher than the quality of parenting in 
families who conceive without assistance (Golombok et al, 1993). 
 
When asked if they thought of the twins as ‘special’, Jane and Steve said:  
 
Steve: Um, at this age and stage I do.  
 
Jane: I do.  I think because I'm really so protective of them.  It's because of how they came about, 
and it would be very difficult to replace them. 
                                                                              
Steve:    …That's right, we're blessed with what we've got - two lovely children.  There was always 
those risks and everything of things going wrong, you know, an unknown quantity.  
 
Steve implied that his current perception of the twins as ‘special’ could change over 
time.  This possibly related to the fact that he was estranged from the children of his 
first marriage. That Jane saw the twins as ‘special’ was connected to a perception that 
at her advanced maternal age, they would be difficult to replace. 
 
Several parents told their children they were ‘special’ as a way of mitigating any 
possible negative consequences if they were perceived as ‘different’ because of their 
DI conception. Haimes (1998:55) has suggested that the perception that children 
conceived by DI are ‘different’ is a characterisation as ‘other’.  This, she claims, 
derives its cultural significance from “the awareness that in most Euro-American 
societies, it is not a trivial point to be conceived using the gametes of someone other 
than the adults raising you as your parents” (Haimes, 1998:55).  Diane and Chris had 
told their son Scott, who was conceived by DI, that he was ‘special’. 
 
Diane:  [It’s important] to give him life skills to be able to cope with it, like the self-esteem thing and 
all the rest of it, so that they don't feel that they're different, or... if they do feel different that 
it's in a special way rather than a negative way.  
 
Chris: Like he quite often, when he's been naughty, he'll tell you he's special (he laughs).  
 
Diane: That's something we've always... right from a little baby eh... and the grandparents are the 
same.  They've got lots of other grandchildren but I'm sure that he's probably the favourite, 
even though they wouldn't say it.  They're just so attached to him aren't they? 
 
 
The concept of Scott being ‘special’ was shared by extended family members and 
reinforced in their conversations.  So, Scott was deliberately constructed as special.  
His maternal grandmother raised the issue of Scott’s ‘specialness’ in the context of 
 392
encountering his paternal grandparents, with whom they had not talked directly about 
Scott’s DI conception. 
 
Marion: I remember meeting them when we were on holiday at one stage and we had Scott with us, 
and um, they actually said to us, you know, as he skipped out of our car to see them, “He's a 
very special little boy. ” And I think that's what we all think. 
 
Scott’s paternal grandparents’ alleged characterisation of Scott as ‘very special’ 
appeared to be both a way of acknowledging the ‘different’ means by which Scott 
came into the family, and communicating to the maternal grandparents their total 
acceptance and appreciation of him.  When asked to explain what constituted this 
sense of his being ‘special’, Marion said: 
 
Marion: He's our second grandchild, and our first one of course is very, very special to us.  But, 
because of the hard work to get Scott, and Scott is a very, very appealing little fellow, very 
normal…can be naughty and all the rest as well. He's very special to us, and we've had a 
tremendous amount of input into him, as Diane probably has told you.  You know, we look 
after him a lot, of choice, rather than…you know.  She works two days a week, but we ask if 
we can see him far more than the two days a week. He’s probably very special because of the 
fact we've seen a lot of him, because we've been involved in the whole programme, in that 
Diane will come and keep us fully informed, but our…we've now got about five 
[grandchildren]…but I've got to admit, number one and Scott, though you try not to make a 
difference, are very very special. 
 
Some parents and family members suggested that their child conceived by DI was 
‘special’ in some way, but this was not necessarily related to how they were 
conceived.  Sandra and Allan said that their children were set apart from others more 
by the fact that they were triplets, rather than by the nature of their conception.  
Sandra said:  
 
Sandra: That's probably been more of a focus since they have been born, you know, they still get 
people saying "the triplets", which we're not particularly fussed on, but we'll never get away 
from it completely. So, that's where their focus is… if they're going to have a focus on 
something, then it's quite possible that it would go more that way than the other really.  
 
Similarly, as discussed in Chapter Three, for Joe and Ella, Joe’s father’s response to 
William, their eldest son, was shaped by his status as the first grandson who ‘carried 
on the family name’, even though he was not related to his grandfather ‘by blood’.  
They suggested that the grandfather perceived the birth of a first grandson, no matter 
his genetic ties, as ‘special’ in that it constituted a symbol of his family’s continuity.  
When asked if they thought of their nephews as ‘special’ in some way, Matthew and 
Julia, the paternal uncle and aunt of Joe and Ella’s three sons, had this to say: 
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Julia: In the beginning.  The situation has changed though.  I mean we don't treat them any 
differently to any of the other nieces and nephews. 
                                                                              
 Matthew: No.  Not at all.  
 
Julia: We don't see them any differently.  They're not any more special than any of the other 
family.  
 
Matthew: No they're not special.  They're special to Joe and Ella, but to us no...  
 
Julia: They’re just...  
 
Matthew: Our nephews, and that's it. 
 
Other parents and family members who had initially characterised their child as 
‘special’ said that they had begun to resist using the word in relation to their child. 
Patricia and Neil commented: 
 
Patricia: I have to confess that when Tracey was little and I would say things like, “Yes, you are special 
to me.”  And she'd pick up on that and feel really important that she was very special.  And, I 
felt concerned that I might have been putting too much weight into her being so special to us 
that it might create a barrier for her, that she was special and should be protected and looked 
after carefully, and handled carefully and things like that, and that that would be a barrier 
amongst her peers….children would just sort of notice when something is different with 
another child, and then it becomes that much harder for a child to enter into the group. So, I've 
stopped using that language with Tracey in that way, because I didn't want her to take on too 
much that she was too special.  
 
Neil: I don't see anything wrong with that language.  Ah, I don't think it's any different really than 
other families... their children, I think, are special to them. 
 
While Patricia had stopped telling her daughter that she was ‘special’, in case it set 
her apart from her peers, Neil countered that this form of characterising children was 
common to families more generally. 
 
Like Patricia, Sarah, who had written booklets for her children to tell them how they 
came to be part of their family, said that she now had second thoughts about referring 
to them as ESPs (Extra Special Persons).  She said: 
 
Sarah: When we wrote the books, we wrote Extra Special Person, but that was a philosophy going 
through.  You know, I said to Charlotte, we had another special nice man that helped us, 
because we want him to be held up here [on a pedestal] but we try not...we don't try to make out 
that they should feel that they're special because we couldn't have kids.  I mean, we don't make 
them feel that they've got a responsibility because we couldn't have kids.  So, you know, we try 
to balance it with all that. And since then, probably if I rewrote the books, I probably wouldn't 
write that they were extra special people, or special persons. 
 
Sarah indicated that she was aware that discourses that frame DI shift and change over 
time.  It is also interesting that Sarah refers to herself and her husband when she said, 
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“we couldn’t have kids”.  In light of the fact that Sarah and Tim did have children, 
and Sarah had experienced pregnancy, this illustrates her acceptance of the definition 
of couple infertility.6
 
The missing genetic link: the issue of ‘asymmetry’ 
 
Critics of third party reproduction maintain that the separation of genetic, gestational 
and social parenthood weakens the bonds of kinship and lineage which are central to 
individual and societal stability.  In response to such criticisms, Lauritzen (1993:74) 
contends that people should not just assume that a genetic connection is constitutive 
of parenthood. As previously discussed, however, the strength of the pervasive view 
that biological kinship is somehow foundational to family ties and kinship inevitably 
has implications for families who have conceived children by DI, particularly in 
relation to the meanings attached to concepts such as ‘fatherhood’, ‘motherhood’ and 
‘parenthood’.  The lack of a genetic tie between fathers and their children in these 
families is often framed as creating an ‘asymmetry’ or imbalance that has implications 
for family relationships (McWhinnie, 1996; Lauritzen, 1993; Baran and Pannor, 1989; 
Snowden and Mitchell, 1981).  
 
Kathy was aware of the missing genetic link between her ex-husband Joel, and their 
daughter Melissa.  She said: 
 
Kathy: Yes.  There was always that imbalance in there.  I was always mindful of... I always wanted 
Joel to have a close relationship with Melissa, but then I realised I had to leave them alone to 
have their own relationship. 
                                                                              
KH: But you felt that he bonded well with her right from the start?  
                                                                              
Kathy: Yeah, he did indeed.  He probably was a lot less complex than me.  Mind you, men are.  They 
think one thing at a time (she laughs). 
 
Other women thought that their husbands might have found it more difficult to bond 
with their child because of the lack of a genetic link.  When I asked Mary and 
Brendan if they were aware of any imbalance in their relationships as a result of 
having children this way, they said: 
 
                                                          
6 Infertility is generally defined in terms of a couple’s failure to conceive after twelve months of 
unprotected, regular sexual intercourse.  Within the functional category of the infertile may be included 
some who are fertile; that is, people who are apparently able to have children with other partners and 
may already have done so (Dickens, 1990:24-25). 
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Brendan: Hasn't worried me, but I don't know about her [Mary].  
 
Mary:  No.  Oh, sometimes I sort of feel as if he doesn't relate to them as well as I do.  But  
 that might be...[pause] 
 
KH: Might be a "man" thing? 
 
Mary: Yeah, yeah.  
 
Brendan: Yeah, I think it is. I think a mother is always closer to her children than a male.  Not  
 always... yeah.  
 
Mary: And particularly when I first had Jason.  I think Brendan found it really hard to relate to him, 
but a lot of men do when the first baby's born anyway.  You know, you become very 
protective, and that's something, you know, a tiny wee baby... but I don't know whether I 
was over-protective because we'd waited so long, perhaps, and perhaps left him out a wee bit 
with it, or whether he found it a bit harder because it wasn't his, you know, and it took him a 
while to bond.  I think that, um, that that might be what a normal male finds.  I'm not sure.  
But, I think as the years have gone on, you know, that he relates to them as well as any 
Dad…. 
 
[To Brendan] You did find it a bit hard when I first had the children, and people said, “Oh 
congratulations” and all this, you know, and all that stuff.  I think he did feel, you know, “Oh 
it's not really mine, but I can't really tell you that.” 
                                                                              
Brendan: No I didn't at all.  Who told you that rubbish?  
 
Mary: Well, that's how I sensed that you were feeling.  
 
Brendan: No, not at all.  No.  It didn't worry me at all. 
 
What emerged in this conversation was Mary’s projection onto Brendan of her 
awareness that the children were not genetically connected to him. This suggests that 
these were issues for Mary signalled in her reference to Jason as not Brendan’s child.  
As the interviewer, I asked the leading question about gender which was prompted by 
information from other interviews when both men and women suggested that men 
often found it difficult to relate to newborn babies. 
 
The experience of the lesbian couples in this study provides an interesting comparison 
to the initial parenting experience of heterosexual couples like Mary and Brendan.  
Sophie, the partner of Ria and Lydia’s non-biological mother, said that because she 
was a woman, she expected to be able to bond with their baby in the same way as Ria 
did.  They had this to say: 
 
Sophie: It's been really hard, because Lydia didn't bond to me nearly as quickly as she bonded to Ria, 
purely because she was being breastfed by Ria and Ria was her primary caregiver really.  I 
wasn't there all the time.  And being a woman I think I took that harder, because women's 
emotions are a lot more sensitive.  
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Ria: We were both shocked when it started to happen.  I guess we both went into it thinking two 
women, we will give and receive the same affection, but it didn't happen like that.  
 
Sophie:  No, she still goes through phases, like sometimes she just doesn't want anything to do with me, 
she just wants to be with Ria.  And that's fine, but it is hard.  And I know that after the 
weekend it'll be totally different because I spend so much more time with her.  
 
Ria: It happens like that in any family.  A man and a woman.  
 
Sophie: That's right.  Mum's the special one. 
 
As two women who chose to parent together, Sophie and Ria sought to challenge 
normative assumptions about the traditional model of the two-parent family based on 
the biological model of reproduction (Dalton and Bielby, 2000).  The two women 
expected to establish an ‘equal’ and similar relationship with their child from the start 
but Sophie, who was in paid work, found it more difficult to bond with Lydia because 
she did not breastfeed her,7 nor could she spend much time with her during the week. 
In her study of lesbian couples’ transition to parenthood, Reimann (1997:155) found 
that the experience of biological motherhood, especially breastfeeding, created a 
unique bond between the child and the birth mother.  In the absence of biological ties, 
cultural support and legal security, co-mothers were motivated to form unique 
relationships with their children through regular interaction, shared child-care and 
child-rearing (Reimann, 1997:155, 167).  Sophie and Ria explained their experiences 
of shared parenting by drawing on their knowledge of heterosexual parenting, the 
model of family that they were in fact resisting.  The situation also illustrates the 
problems all couples have when one parent is more involved in child-care, but both 
want to be equally recognised as parents.8
 
Petra indicated that an asymmetry had developed between her and her partner, 
Jennifer, because she did not share the role of breastfeeding.  She said: 
 
Petra:   I sometimes wonder if I feel less of a woman. 
  
KH: In that you haven't borne the child?  
 
Petra: Yeah, it's been fascinating to watch Jennifer's body change, and she can do some amazing 
things, and I don't know whether I can do them or not.  
                                                          
7 Concerned about her problems with bonding with Lydia, Sophie had sought advice from a gay man 
working at a child development unit who had advised her to take off her top when bottle-feeding, so 
she had skin contact with the baby.  Sophie claimed that this seemed to help with the bonding process.   
 
8 See Lupton and Barclay (1997:119-141) for discussion about discourses and experiences in relation to 
negotiating fatherhood and men’s relationships with intimate others, including their children. 
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KH: In what way?  
 
Petra: Well, breast-feeding is an amazing thing to do, and giving birth is an amazing thing, so there's 
part of me that...so that changes, you know, she's done this amazing thing and I haven't. 
 
In their national lesbian family study, Gartrell et al (1999:365) found that some co-
mothers expressed frustration and feelings of exclusion during breastfeeding. Both 
Sophie and Petra struggled in a way they had not expected to negotiate a role as an 
equal co-parent with the biological mother of the child.9  Petra said that her 
experience as a female secondary care-giver had raised some questions around 
general assumptions about gender.  She said:  
 
Petra:  There are some interesting revelations about gender roles, if you are the female parent of a child 
who is not the mother.  I'm finding that fascinating.  I come home in the evening.  I want to sit 
and do nothing.  I get really stressed.  I mean, I just...sometimes I'm turning into a man!  It's 
disgraceful.  It's really interesting; being the second carer is a really interesting role, and I think 
sometimes it's put onto gender and it's not actually to do with gender.  [To Jennifer] We talk 
about it a lot, don't we?… 
                                                                              
The best way to support someone who is the primary carer is to allow them to be the primary 
carer.  However, that automatically disempowers me, so whereas I'm perfectly capable of taking 
the initiative and if I have Olivia on my own and she doesn't need breast-feeding, I can do 
everything for her, absolutely fine.  When Jennifer's had her all day, I tend to defer to Jennifer 
around what needs... that can come across as dithering, as not being very clear, as being, you 
know, a ‘useless father’: “What shall I put her in?  What shall I do?” I do it, and I do it because 
I'm deferring and because I feel more disempowered...and so I make an active point now of…at 
the weekends, I care for her as much as I can because that way I'm in charge, it re-empowers 
me. It reminds us both that I can do it, we can both do it.                                                                          
 
Petra was fascinated to find that her behaviour was similar to that of fathers who, as 
secondary care-givers, were often described as ‘useless’ when it came to looking after 
babies.  She suggested that men may be ‘useless’ because they are less likely to be 
primary care-givers. Secondary care-givers need time to exercise their autonomy as 
care-givers.  If you are a secondary care-giver, your partner mediates and controls 
your parenting. Both Sophie and Petra reported experiences as co-mothers that 
indicated the way in which gender-based attributions and understandings about 
provider and care-giving roles are also an element of parental roles in lesbian families 
(Dalton and Bielby, 2000:40).  The experiences of these lesbian couples, who are 
more explicit about the impact of being pregnant and breastfeeding than are 
heterosexual couples, raises the question whether what might be ascribed to being a 
                                                          
9 Gartrell et al (1999:365) found that most lesbian couples considered themselves equal co-parents, but 
when asked to name factors most strongly implicated in mother-child bonding, 50% of couple 
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non-genetic parent when couples use DI might also be attributed to being the 
secondary care-giver. 
 
The missing genetic link:  “They’re my children, not yours” 
In some cases, a feeling of asymmetry between the parents of a child conceived by DI 
was accentuated or invoked in stressful or adversarial situations such as arguments 
relating to other aspects of their lives. Other research has shown that the knowledge 
that the child was conceived by DI can be used by one partner to ‘hurt’ the other 
(Snowden and Mitchell, 1981; Baran and Pannor, 1989). Illustrating this point, Jane 
argued that she had a greater ‘claim’ to their children than her husband Steve. 
 
Jane: To be quite honest, there have been a few times in the past where I sort of felt, well these are 
really my children, and felt quite annoyed about a couple of things.  I suppose because I'm the 
mother and you [Steve] being a second time parent, and me having to go back to work with 
the children quite early, there was a bit of...  
 
Steve: There was resentment there. 
 
Jane: There was a bit of resentment, yeah, from the beginning, because we had a really expensive 
house...more expensive than this one...and we got caught when everybody else did with the 
house...you know...the prices dropping.  
 
Steve: It was a promise that she would never have to go to work.  And it never came through. 
 
As further evidence of an imbalance between them resulting from the missing genetic 
tie between Steve and the children, Jane claimed that Steve often alluded to some of 
the children’s less ‘appealing’ characteristics as coming from her side of the family. 
Jane felt she could not in turn ‘blame’ his side of the family for the existence of some 
of their traits. 
 
For Carla the feeling that her daughter was hers and not her estranged husband’s was 
accentuated by marital breakup.  Carla, whose husband Ben left when Justine was five 
months old, said: 
 
Carla:  I was really disappointed that he hadn't been at the insemination that I got pregnant at, and that's 
been something that's stuck with me, and particularly when he left, it was like, “this is [the 
nurse’s] and my baby now, because you weren't even there”.  
 
While Ben had shown some reluctance to continue trying to conceive a child by DI, 
according to Carla, he had been a ‘model’ and attentive husband during her 
pregnancy. She did not attribute their breakup to the DI, but to a number of factors, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
respondents named time spent with the child, and 32% said biological connections were most 
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including Ben’s alleged mood disorder, and to the difficulties she had encountered 
giving birth and breastfeeding the baby. Snowden and Mitchell (1981) contend that 
while many DI practitioners claim that most couples who have a child by DI are in 
stable marriages, which are often enriched by the experience, some inevitably fail.  
For many of these marriages, the fact that a child conceived by DI is present appears 
to be irrelevant, while in others, it is an ostensible cause of failure or is used by one 
partner to hurt the other (Snowden and Mitchell, 1981:47).  
 
Some couples suggested that having children, in and of itself, no matter how they 
were conceived, could aggravate existing problems in a marital relationship. Henry 
and Prue said: 
 
Prue: I just think having children, full-stop, can aggravate problems.  It wasn't the fact that they 
were donor.  I don't think that's ever been a problem [a query in her voice].  
 
Henry: I felt alienated at one stage.  I felt scared that Prue would pick up the kids and walk away from 
me, saying, “they're all mine.”  I felt I could lose everything.  It's just a fear, you know.  But 
that's gone away. Probably I dwelt on it, because the people we knew [who had had DI], they 
split up too.  It was sort of like if you had donor kids you'd break up.  It was like this was the 
fear.  
 
Prue: I certainly think that the breakups... I've got another friend in [another town] with donor 
children, and she's just split up from her husband, but I don't believe it's got anything to do 
with having donor children.  It's other problems.  Probably problems that had been going on 
before they had those donor children.  
 
Some researchers have argued that the separation/divorce rate amongst parents of 
children conceived by DI is not as high as that of the general population (Snowden, 
Mitchell and Snowden, 1983; Amuzu, Laxova and Shapiro, 1990).  Adair (1994:87-
88), however, cites Norwegian research by Benvold, Sioberg, Skjaeraasen, Kravdal 
and Moe (1989) that found that the separation rate amongst parents of children 
conceived by DI did not differ from other groups of the population.    
 
Despite some of the complexities and ambiguities existing for parents of children 
conceived by DI in relation to some feeling of asymmetry between them, most 
couples said they thought of the child as their child. Belinda and Richard, the parents 
of a daughter conceived by DI, said: 
 
Belinda: …as far as I'm concerned, it's our baby.  Richard's problem too! (she laughs).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
important. 
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Richard: You know, you think about it at times, I mean we've never said it, and you could turn around 
and say, “Oh, she's a little ratbag” or something.  You know “there you go, she's yours” sort of 
thing, but I mean…              
 
Belinda: And he could blame me.  "She's actually yours" (she laughs).   But the thought's never come 
up.  
 
Richard: You know, no, that's just cruel isn't it? 
 
Richard and Belinda implied that they would never claim their daughter as anything 
but theirs, though the thought of doing otherwise had apparently occurred to them.  
 
Uncertain fatherhood 
The ‘asymmetry’ that is perceived by some couples to exist in their relationship 
because of the missing genetic link between the father and a child conceived by DI 
appeared to have implications for some fathers’ perceptions of their role as ‘father’.  
In social and legal terms, the father of the child produced as a result of DI is the 
consenting husband or partner of the woman who was inseminated and bore the child.  
In New Zealand, the Status of Children Amendment Act 1987, states: 
 
Where a married woman becomes pregnant as a result of artificial insemination and she has 
undergone the procedure with the consent of her husband (a) the Husband shall, for all 
purposes, be the father of the child of the pregnancy, whether born or unborn; and (b) any 
man, not being her Husband, who produces semen used for the procedure, shall, for all 
purposes, not be the father of the child of the pregnancy whether born or unborn (Status of 
Children Amendment Act 1987 (Cwth), s.5).    
 
The law therefore considers the social father and not the genetic father to be the 
father, in all senses of the word.  Similarly, according to Smart (1987), English law on 
paternity does not strictly follow the biological relationship between men and 
children. The biological relationship, although recognised as important, has not been a 
major factor. She argues that in English law, the relationship between men and 
children has been mediated by marriage, and paternity is dependent on proof of 
marriage rather than proof of fatherhood (Smart, 1987:101).  
 
Most fathers of children conceived by DI claimed to think of, and relate to, their child 
as ‘their own’ child.  Many were very positive about the strength of the bond they felt 
existed between them and their child.  For example, Chris, the father of Scott, said 
that he “couldn’t wish for a better child.” Some fathers, however, noted that they 
perceived that their relationship with their child was qualitatively different from what 
it would be if they were genetically linked to the child. The lack of a 
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biological/genetic tie appeared to make the relationship seem somewhat tenuous on 
one level, even if, on the social level, they felt they had bonded well and had a good 
relationship with the child. When asked about the missing genetic link between Peter 
and his daughter, Peter and Alice responded: 
 
Peter: I feel a little bit threatened by that, but just in terms of you know, perhaps the longevity of our 
relationship or the tenure of my kind of involvement…somewhere way down the track, it's 
hard to know isn't it? 
                                                                              
Alice: It was pretty difficult… 
                                                   
Peter: It may always be that the bond between Alice and Erica is stronger than it could be with me, 
you know, that's a concern I guess.  
 
Alice: I don't know. I mean, I think you're just observing from the outside. Your bond with her seems 
as strong as any other father.  
 
Peter: Yeah.  No, no no.  It's not whether or not that's actually; it's just my perception. 
 
Peter distinguishes between what is and what he is constructing as a possibility. He 
juggled with two conflicting discourses: that the bond between a parent and child is 
diminished by the lack of a genetic tie; and what ‘really’ matters in terms of the tenure 
of the relationship is the strength of the social tie between the parent and child. 
Snowden and Snowden (1998:41) contend that ‘DI fathers’, as ‘intentional’ but not 
genetic fathers, might at some later date wish to sever ties with the child conceived by 
DI, having grown to regret their ‘intention’. In contrast, Peter appeared to be 
suggesting that his daughter might somehow feel a weaker tie to him than to her 
mother, with whom she has a biological tie that he does not share.  This situation 
invokes the pervasive cultural notion that biological ties, unlike social ties, are 
permanent, unalterable and cannot be severed (Snowden and Snowden, 1998:41).  
Golombok et al (1993) argue that while it was suggested in the Warnock Report, 
1985, that a missing genetic link between the child and a parent might constitute a 
threat to the relationship, the results of their study do not support this contention.  
Their findings suggest that genetic ties are less important for family functioning than 
a strong desire for parenthood (Golombok et al, 1993:21).  Another study, which 
compared the functioning of ‘DI families’, ‘IVF families’ and families with children 
conceived without assistance, found that the quality of father-child interaction in IVF 
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families was higher than that in DI families10 (Brewaeys et al, 1997:143). The authors 
concluded that the results of their study suggested that parents with children 
conceived by DI have to deal with a number of difficulties associated with the use of a 
donor, which parents of children conceived using IVF do not.  They suggest that more 
research is needed to examine the long-term psychological effects of DI on family 
relationships (Brewaeys et al, 1997:148). 
Like Peter, Steve, the father of twins conceived by DI, expressed some uncertainty 
about his position as father of his children.  
 
Steve:  I feel a very close bond, but there's still the realisation at the light of day as to where it is...you 
know...where I stand.  But I don't think it's diminished my love or care for them, and the same 
for Jane [his wife]. 
 
Awareness of the child’s genetic origins appeared to be more acute for fathers in 
particular social contexts or at particular times in their child’s life.  Andrew recalled 
the times when he was least and most conscious of not being his daughter’s genetic 
father. 
 
Andrew: At birth time…there were no thoughts at all in regard to her being a donor child.  That wasn't 
part of my thinking at all at that time.  Those thoughts go way, way to the back of your mind.  
They only start coming back as the child starts growing up, like starting to walk, and 
developing their own personality, that you start thinking again about the donor 
insemination...from my point of view.  Annie would be different because she’s still the 
maternal parent, and fundamentally that doesn't change. …It's no different from Annie having 
a prior arrangement with someone else and having children.  We hear songs about it now. 
 
 
Andrew acknowledged experiencing conflicting feelings that his children were ‘his’ 
and yet they were not because of the lack of a biological connection to them.11  He 
likened his experience of being a father of children conceived by DI to that of a 
stepfather. 
 
Some fathers claimed to feel that they related better to their children once they had 
grown out of the baby stage, but they did not relate this to their having been 
conceived by DI.  Henry said: 
                                                          
10 When examining children’s perceptions of their relationship with their fathers, however, no 
differences were found between fathers of children conceived by DI and fathers with ‘naturally’ 
conceived children. This led the researchers to conclude that there was no clear evidence that the lack 
of a genetic link between fathers and their children conceived by DI might account for these 
differences (Brewaeys et al, 1997:143). 
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Henry:   I do a lot more stuff for the kids now that they're self-propelled, yeah.  When they were much 
younger I felt that I could only do so much with them because they were fragile little entities 
and I didn't want to... yeah, my world's out there [on the farm] and they can go into it now. 
 
 
Another father, whose two children were conceived using different donors, said that 
he found it easier to relate to his daughter than his son because of their differing 
personalities. 
 
Brendan:  I just sometimes find it a little bit hard to relate to Jason.  I can relate to Natalie better than 
Jason.  I think that Natalie and I have similar personalities, whereas as Mary says, he's a little 
bit deeper, more emotional. The problem is, you see, he's not sports-orientated, and we've 
been trying to get him into sports.  He's just... he's really an academic.  He's not into sports at 
all.  So I've found that hard, because I believe kids should be involved in sports.  I mean, he's 
played cricket for a while, but he's only very average, and he didn't really like it.  He just got 
bored. 
 
 
Brendan’s claim that it was more difficult to relate to his son because he was quite 
unlike him raises the question as to whether the donor, whom they had no part in 
choosing, was quite different from Brendan. It could be argued, however, that many 
children have different inclinations and aspirations from their parents. Although I did 
not formally interview children for this study, I had the opportunity to speak briefly to 
Brendan and Mary’s children, Jason, aged 12 years, and Natalie, aged 10 years.  They 
had been told two years previously how they were conceived. When I asked them if 
this had implications for their relationship with their father they said: 
 
Jason:   I just don't really care.  It's only a very little part of my life, so it doesn't really matter.  He's 
still my Dad. We're still like related emotionally and all that.  
                                                                              
KH: What do you think Natalie?  
 
Natalie: Oh, the same. 
 
To Jason and Natalie, their emotional tie to their father was more significant than the 
fact that they were not genetically related.  This supports Lauritzen’s argument for 
defining parenthood in relational terms (1993).  He suggests that if persons are forced 
to choose between a genetic connection and a social/emotional connection, they tend 
to opt for the social relation (Lauritzen,1993:94). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
11 See Chapter Four for further discussion of Andrew’s conflicting perceptions about his relationship to 
his children. 
 404
While positive about their relationship with their child who was conceived by DI, 
some fathers, who had talked to their child about the donor, appeared to wonder how 
they stood in relation to the donor in the child’s mind. Neil said of his eldest daughter, 
who was nearly 5 years old: 
 
Neil: Tracey now feeds back to me that, “Dad you're the most specialest Dad” or something like 
that, and I'd say, “Well, how many Dads have you got?” and she'd say, “I've just got one.”  
And what's that thing she's saying now about one hundred Dads?  
 
Patricia: She wouldn't be able to keep up with them all.  
 
Neil: If she had one hundred Dads.  So, one's enough. 
 
Neil appeared satisfied with the idea that his daughter thought that one dad was 
enough.  Like Neil, Paul, said that he talked to his daughter, Elise, aged 9 years, on a 
number of occasions about her donor conception.  Elise was present during part of the 
interview with her parents, and Paul asked her: 
 
Paul: How do you...you’ve sort of got two Dads though didn’t you say to me? 
 
Elise: Yeah. 
 
Paul: What am I?  Which one am I? 
 
Elise: First daddy. 
 
KH: First daddy? 
 
Elise: Yeah because he’s mostly my daddy. 
 
KH: And what sort of daddy would the donor be? 
 
Elise: Half. 
 
According to this account, Elise thought of the donor as a ‘half Dad’, presumably 
because of his genetic contribution to her conception.  This raises a number of 
questions connected to children’s construction of family and kinship (Pryor and 
Rodgers, 2001; O’Brien, Alldred and Jones, 1996). Pryor and Rodgers (2001:128) 
argue that children’s understanding of family changes over time, and that in middle 
childhood, biological ties become more salient.  Pryor and Rodgers (2001:129) also 
comment that there is a great deal of diversity in who constitutes family for children.  
This raises the question whether the donor, as a ‘half-daddy’, would be considered by 
Elise as part of her ‘family’? It also raises the question of how the concept of ‘a 
donor’ is presented to children conceived by DI, and how their conceptualisations of 
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donors might change over time. The question also arises as to whether the term ‘Dad’ 
or ‘father’ should be used in connection with the sperm donor. 
 
Whereas some men expressed ambivalence or uncertainty about some aspect of their 
relationship with their children conceived by DI, many mothers and grandparents of 
these children were very positive about the relationship between fathers and their 
children.  The question arises as to whether this may be attributed in part to initial 
concerns that they had about the father bonding with the child, and a desire to support 
the infertile male, whom they perceived to be in a somewhat vulnerable position.  
Belinda said this about her husband Richard’s relationship with their daughter: 
 
Belinda: Richard can get her to crack up, like, really crack up, laughing her head off. And he can do the 
stupidest things like kiss her around the neck and nobody else can do those sort of things, and 
he can toss her around and she'll squeal with delight.  Anybody else does it; she won't do it.  
They've just got their own little bond.  They just seem to click.  
 
Like Belinda, her mother Joanne spoke in glowing terms about her son-in-law’s 
relationship with Madison. 
 
Joanne: Yes, she's got a good father, and I'll keep reminding her (she laughs).  Oh he is.  He's 
wonderful to her.  There's certainly, you know, I just look at... and I think, even if my boys are 
fathers, I don't think they'll have as much compassion for their daughter as Richard has for 
Madison. 
 
 
The maternal grandmother of Scott, Chris and Diane’s son, had this to say about the 
strong bond between father and son: 
 
Marion: If you could see Chris with that little boy, you know, we forget [his donor origins]. …He's a 
proper dad…he'll come in, particularly when Scott was little and he'd be the one who'd be 
skiting off the new word or whatever, you know? There's just no question.  I've got complete 
faith that Chris probably most of the time forgets what his origin was, so there you are (she 
laughs)…. There's just no question in our minds as to whether Chris's got any questions or 
regrets or anything because he's just too... he just could not pretend the way he is.  He takes 
him out fishing for hours on end and this sort of stuff... all the things that dads do.  In fact, he's 
one of the best dads I've seen, and that is honest. 
 
 
Marion’s comment that Chris was such a good dad that nobody would ever guess that 
no genetic tie existed between father and son raised the common assumption that a 
genetic tie is a prerequisite for men to bond well with their children.  Chris’s parents, 
Doug and Sharon, were similarly positive about Chris’s relationship with his son.  
Doug said: 
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Doug: As far as Chris goes, he's just a born father... a parent. Have you met him?…If the donor was 
of the ratbag type [he chuckles], I would be very, very disappointed.  But then again, with the 
upbringing that Scott is going to get, and the love and attention, and what have you, there's no 
reason why he shouldn't turn out tops. 
 
Doug hesitated to use the term ‘father’ in relation to his son, but he nonetheless spoke 
highly of his skills as a parent.  He drew on a discourse about the importance of both 
genetic inheritance and environment in determining personhood anticipating that, 
even if the donor were a “ratbag”, his grandson’s excellent upbringing would 
probably override any such inherited tendencies.   
 
The powerful cultural theme of the importance of ‘blood ties’, however, emerged for 
Chris’s mother who had some concerns that their grandson might eventually wish to 
form a relationship with the donor, and that this might threaten Chris’s relationship 
with his son.  She said: 
 
Sharon:  Probably that is the fear in the back of my mind.  I don't, um, perhaps it's in the subconscious 
frame that, yes, I could feel that he might want to take more of his own father, like from 18, 
the hurt Chris would go through. That would probably be my mothering instinct12 for Chris's 
side, I would say. 
 
Sharon drew on a discourse about the importance of biological/genetic connections 
between parents and children in articulating the fear that her grandson might be drawn 
to the donor as his genetic ‘father’.  
 
For couples who were no longer together, the relationship between the child and the 
father appeared inevitably somewhat tenuous and sometimes problematic.13  Like 
most fathers and mothers after separation, Carla and Ben had to face the often 
difficult tasks of negotiating and renegotiating their family relationships (Pryor and 
Rodgers, 2001:205).  Couples interviewed for this research who were no longer 
together had had to arrange for shared care of the child.  Carla said that while Ben did 
not want to have their daughter, Justine, to stay while she was still very young, they 
                                                          
12 The concept of ‘maternal instinct’ is problematised by sociologists, such as Gittens, who argues: 
“That women can conceive and bear children is a universal phenomenon; that they do so by instinct is a 
fallacy.  So is the notion that they always raise them.  From the moment of birth motherhood is a social 
construction” (1993:67). 
13 Because I was unable to interview men who were divorced or separated from their partners and no 
longer living with their child who was conceived by DI, only the mothers’ perspectives are discussed 
here. 
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now had an arrangement where she stayed with her father on alternate weekends.  
Carla said: 
 
Carla:  He didn't have her for the first two years and I got really depressed and ended up in [hospital].  
And so Children and Young Persons (CYPFS)14 [intervened] because they felt that Justine's life 
was in danger, because I was so depressed.  And we had a huge family meeting and he had to 
take some responsibility for Justine, so to start with it was actually imposed on him, because he 
really didn't want to have her.  But now that we're out of nappies and we sleep all night and 
we're not a problem, he absolutely adores her.  And he looks forward to the time and enjoys it, 
and will pop in sometimes.  
 
As Justine’s legal father,15 Ben was required to share in her care.  Carla perceived him 
as a ‘fair weather dad’; at the same time, she believed that Ben and Justine had 
developed a good relationship over time.  
 
Also separated, Joanna said that her husband, Roger, had left her after each of the two 
children were born, and that now they were permanently separated.  In her view, he 
had not adjusted well to parenthood, although he had initially wanted to have the 
children.  She said: 
 
Joanna: He left when Todd was three months' old.  He left and went to Aussie, and then we followed 
him.  Then I discovered he had an affair over there, so we came back here.  He seemed to go 
off the rails after I had the child…sort of had these affairs after I had them.  Someone said he's 
probably insecure.  It's like he got sort of jealous.  It was funny, I mean, he wanted the 
children probably more than I did, but then when we had them he sort of used to say, “You go 
to work,” because he wasn't working at that stage, “and when you come home you spend time 
with the baby, and then you're doing things around the house and never spend any time with 
me.”  There was sort of quite a jealousy thing there.  I suppose because we'd been seven years 
with just the two of us, yeah.  You've sort of got to change your ways.   
                                   
 
While I am not qualified to comment on the psychological issues related to marital 
breakup after infertility, both Carla’s and Joanna’s experiences raise the issue of 
‘dysfunctional’ parenting following infertility. According to Hammer Burns 
(1990:178), a number of psychological studies of parenting after infertility suggest 
that “dysfunctional parenting following infertility may result when expectations of the 
anticipated rewards of parenting are less than the actual rewards”. Joanna claimed that 
although the children saw their father regularly, Todd did not have a good relationship 
with his father and had refused to stay with him on occasions. 
                                                          
14 The Children and Young Persons and their Families Service, currently known as Child Youth and 
Family, is the New Zealand government department that works with families to protect children, ensure 
that children in need are secure and cared for, and help families maintain and strengthen their child-
rearing role (CYPFS, 1997:5). 
15 This indicates that legal fatherhood can be differentiated from social or biological fatherhood.  
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Joanna: Todd has just got a thing at the moment, if anything happens to me, he doesn't want to live 
with his Dad.  He brings it up himself.  Him and his Dad have not had a very good 
relationship.  They've only just started this last six months. [His father’s] doing a parenting 
course which is really helping, because he's got a real bad temper and used to scare Todd.  
And Todd doesn't like getting close to his Dad because his Dad's been in and out of his life 
quite a bit.  They haven't had much of a bond anyway, and I think he's just...I think because 
my grandmother and my two uncles had just died around the same time, and I think he was 
feeling a wee bit insecure – “What happens to me if Mum dies? Where do I go?” and he didn't 
want to go to Dad's.  He still doesn't.  He'd rather go to his friend's place and live. 
 
While Joanna raised questions about the future tenure of her children’s relationship 
with their father, Kathy contended that Melissa’s relationship with her father had been 
affected by his recent remarriage.  She said: 
 
Kathy: He remarried last year [1997] and she has not, probably from three months before the 
wedding, been keen to go [to stay at his house].  I've encouraged her to go across.  When she 
gets there she's okay, and he does a lot of talking with her as well.  We speak to each other on 
the phone.  If anything it's been the one thing that's actually literally made us speak to each 
other.  She's always had problems with it, and I think at that point, I don't know, you could talk 
to her about that, I'm sure she realised at that point that the blood connection wasn't there, and 
she just had been grappling with it in her own right, and not said anything openly about it.  
Because he had taken on board his partner's 16 year old and now says, “this is my other 
daughter.”  I think this would have made her think “where am I in all of this?  Not even 
connected. ”  I actually said that to him at the time. 
 
Kathy appeared to attribute Melissa’s insecurities about her relationship with her 
father, at least in part, to the fact that they were not genetically linked.  The question 
arises, however, whether she is projecting onto her daughter her own feelings about 
the importance of a biological connection between parents and children.16 It is 
possible Melissa’s concerns were more likely to stem from his remarrying, 
reconstituting his family and acquiring another ‘daughter’, all of which were likely to 
change the dynamics of her relationship with her father. 
 
Like divorced or separated mothers, Ria and Sophie had some concerns about Derek’s 
long-term involvement with their daughter, Lydia, aged 7 ½ months. Although legally 
he was not Lydia’s father, Ria, Sophie and Derek all considered Derek to be the 
‘father’ of their child, rather than the ‘donor’. This contrasts with the results of 
Haimes and Weiner’s qualitative study of lesbian women who conceived by DI which 
found that most women did not define the donor as their child’s father (2000:488). 
Ria and Sophie, however, said they did not see Derek on a regular basis.  They said: 
 
                                                          
16 For a more detailed discussion of this issue see Chapter Three. 
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Ria: It’s up to him how much he wants to have to do with Lydia, but there’s also the concern that 
will it all go okay for the two of them?  I just hope that she can get what she wants from him. 
 
Sophie: Mm.  Because he’s very good at not following commitments, and things like that. 
 
Ria: We don’t want to ask for a commitment from him, and I think that we would just like to see 
that he’s responsible and consistent with her. 
 
Sophie:  We’re quite open to what he’s wanting.  If he wants a small amount to do with her life, that’s 
fine, but if he wants more, that’s good too.  But I don’t want him to decrease his involvement. 
 
 
Ria and Sophie were caught between not wanting to ask Derek to take on the 
responsibilities of a legal father, and wanting their daughter to have a ‘father’ who 
would act responsibly and consistently towards her.  Their situation illustrates that the 
nature of the family they created by self-insemination is somewhat unpredictable, and 
demonstrates how lesbian parents define, redefine and debate their family 
characteristics (Haimes and Weiner, 2000:495). Ria and Sophie were concerned that 
their child’s ‘needs’ were met in her relationship with Derek. Similarly, in their 
qualitative study of lesbians who had become parents through DI, Haimes and Weiner 
found that arrangements made with the donors were shaped by their developing views 
on how to meet their child’s needs (2000:484).  The authors also contended that 
donors were located amongst a number of interwoven and changing considerations for 
the women (2000:479).   
 
When asked about his expectations of his involvement with Lydia, Derek said:   
 
Derek: As time goes on, and Lydia develops, I feel that I'm going to have to be there more and more, 
whereas initially, I try and be there quite a bit.  I haven't seen her for almost three weeks at the 
moment.  That's the longest it's been, and it's been hard, but it's got a lot to do with me being 
busy and also I've had a really bad head cold that I didn't want to take around.  So, there's 
those sort of things, but I'm really missing her. But as time goes on, I can see her coming to 
stay with me, you know, for the weekend, or maybe in school holidays, she might stay for a 
week or something if I get time off.  It's for me to make it available to her. 
 
Derek appeared to be juggling work commitments and the desire to have some on-
going contact with Lydia. This tension illustrates the process whereby Derek is 
constructing himself as a particular type of ‘father’: not only a biological father but 
also a social father, albeit not a co-habiting or a legally-recognised father. This 
suggests that there are more than the three categories of father suggested by Eichler: 
biological and social father (often considered the norm); biological father only; and 
social father only (1996:291). Derek’s expectation that he would see more of Lydia as 
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she grew older reflected some of the previously discussed views of heterosexual 
fathers, who had more to do with and felt they related better to their children once 
they were beyond the baby stage.  That he had not seen Lydia for three weeks because 
of illness and other commitments highlights the contingency that surrounds his 
involvement as a father. It also illustrates Dolgin’s argument that while women are 
generally thought of as becoming mothers ‘naturally’, men become fathers by choice 
(Dolgin, 1995:51).17  Later in the interview, Derek said that he expected to be 
involved in major decisions about Lydia’s life, including her education, and he 
planned to attend her naming day on her first birthday.  
 
When asked if their relationship with Derek had changed since Lydia’s birth, Ria and 
Sophie said: 
 
Sophie: No. 
 
Ria: No.  I do feel stronger towards him, more bonded to him, I guess.  But friendshipwise, no, it’s 
the same. 
 
KH: Do you feel a bond because of the biological tie? 
 
Ria: Yep.  And I guess now that the child is here, there’s a realisation that it is for life, and he is the 
biological father, so he’s part of her life, for life.  Therefore he’s part of our life, for life.   
 
Ria believed that a life-long bond had emerged between them as a result of 
procreating a child together. Derek appeared to feel a similar commitment to an on-
going relationship with Ria, Sophie, Lydia, and other children they expected to 
procreate together.  He commented on his relationship with the two women: 
 
Derek:  I feel that since this has happened, I now have two sisters.  The relationship has changed 
dramatically.  It’s become an unconditional thing, and now that you’re my sister, if a problem 
does arrive - I haven’t seen any arise, but it’s bound to arise - we’re just going to have to deal 
with that.  We don’t turn around and walk away, we have to actually sit down and deal with it. 
I have a half-brother and a brother.  And my relationship with the two women now is as strong 
as those relationships.   
 
Derek suggested that Ria and Sophie had become akin to his biological relatives since 
Lydia’s birth. He applied a family image to describe the social relations between him 
and the two women whom, he perceived, had become his ‘sisters’ through the process 
                                                          
17 Ria, Sophie and Derek planned to enter into a legal contract that defined their relationships, and 
rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis the child.  According to Derek, Sophie and he would apply in the 
future for legal guardianship of Lydia.  This illustrates Dolgin’s contention that in the last two decades 
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of conceiving a child together, which illustrates the way people practice family 
description and construct family meaning (Gubrium and Holstein, 1990:10). This 
provided a potentially interesting framing for Lydia of her parents as siblings. 
 
Conclusion 
The chapter has argued that families with children conceived by DI are not unitary.  
Like all families, they respond differently to issues that they confront:  in this case, 
families respond to a particular set of issues that emerges as a result of conceiving a 
child with the help of a ‘gift’ from a stranger.  In spite of the pervasiveness of 
powerful cultural images of conventional nuclear families based on biological ties, 
most parents perceived their family to be a ‘normal’ or ‘regular’ family.  While DI 
brought with it particular challenges to confront, which might be different from those 
emerging for other families, this did not mean that their families were ‘different’ from 
a particular norm. Even if they were constructed as ‘different’ from ‘normal’, this did 
not mean they were abnormal or not normal.  Parents thus generally avoided 
constructing a dichotomy between ‘different’ and ‘normal’. Several parents pointed to 
the diverse ways of forming families in contemporary life.  The concept of being 
‘different’ was endowed with a variety of positive and negative meanings. If they 
acknowledged difference, it was in positive terms, such as being ‘special’, ‘unique’, 
or ‘extraordinary’.  Some parents acknowledged difference along a variety of 
dimensions, other than the origins of their child, such as family size, marital status, 
and in the value they placed on their children because of the difficulties encountered 
having them.   
 
Perceptions of being ‘different’ were contingent and embedded in particular social 
and temporal contexts.  Some parents felt ‘different’ amongst others who had had 
children conceived without assistance or had more than one child.  Other parents were 
aware of being ‘different’ when they first had their baby, but this diminished after 
social ties had developed.  Others were more conscious of having conceived by DI 
when the child’s personality was more evident.  For some parents acknowledging 
‘difference’ was tantamount to being honest and accepting the reality of having 
conceived with the help of an anonymous donor.  While some heterosexual couples 
                                                                                                                                                                      
courts have increasingly permitted adult family members to define their relationships in contractual 
terms (1995:47). 
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actively concealed their ‘difference’ from others, this was not possible for lesbian 
couples who acknowledged that they might be perceived as ‘different’ by others, but 
hoped that their parenting would become normalised as more gay and lesbian people 
became parents.  One lesbian couple, who thought of themselves as ‘normal’, were 
occasionally reminded that others perceived them differently, raising the issue that 
self-perception of difference is at odds with the perception of others. 
 
Talk about physical resemblance and difference between parents and children brought 
into sharp relief assumptions about relatedness based on biological/genetic ties in 
families.  It also demonstrated that ‘biology’ is a cultural construction that is as much 
a metaphor for social relations as a statement about genetic fact.  Comments about 
likenesses and differences between babies and their parents highlighted that it is 
common for people to trace relationships on the body whether or not a genetic tie 
existed (although this was often assumed).  Remarks that babies resembled their 
mothers and not their fathers reinforced notions of an asymmetry in some 
relationships.  Evidence of a strong physical resemblance to the mother, however, also 
served to establish distance and emotional boundaries between parents, their children 
and donors. Some parents and their kin avoided invoking discourses of physical 
likeness or difference, preferring instead to focus on the primacy of the social 
relationships.  That the child was perceived as ‘different’ was not always attributed to 
genetic inheritance, but to general attributes of ‘family’, such as social positioning, or 
that families commonly have a child who stands out as ‘different’. 
 
Further illustrating that physical resemblance is not necessarily attributable to genetic 
inheritance, some extended family members, and maternal grandparents in particular, 
commented on likenesses (either facial features or mannerisms) between their 
grandchild and his/her father.  The construction of physical resemblance suggests that 
this can be used as a strategy to actively construct a father/child relationship and to 
mitigate any perceived asymmetry in families with children conceived by DI.  
Relatives of the social father were more likely to resist constructing physical 
resemblance between father and child thereby giving primacy to the lack of genetic 
connection between them. This suggests that the lack of genetic ties is significant in 
some ways to the family members of the infertile social male. This raises some 
questions about whether family members of the infertile male might not, on some 
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level, accept the child conceived by DI as part of their ‘family’. That some paternal 
grandparents expressed regret about the lack of physical resemblance to their side of 
the family illustrated the importance of resemblance to the bonding process, and that 
physical difference can separate people rather than bestowing a sense of unity or 
belonging.  In contrast to this view, some parents thought that a genetic endowment 
from the donor might have conferred on the child ‘better looks’ than he/she might 
otherwise have inherited. 
 
The child conceived by DI was often conceptualised as ‘special’.  The raised some 
issues about whether or not the characterisation of ‘special’ somehow singled out 
these children as ‘different’. However, in their conceptualisations of their child as 
‘special’, parents sought to minimise the possibility of negative associations of being 
‘different’.  These children were perceived as ‘special’ for a number of reasons over 
and above the circumstances of their conception.  Perceptions of the child’s 
‘specialness’ changed over time: initially, the child might have appeared ‘special’ but, 
with the development of social relationships over time, they became ‘just part of the 
family’.  Some parents who had told their child conceived by DI that they were 
‘special’ or ‘extra special persons’ had later decided that this might construct the child 
as in need of special treatment and set them apart from their peers.  This indicated that 
as the child grew the circumstances of their conception became less relevant.   
 
The chapter explored the issue of ‘asymmetry’ in families with children conceived by 
DI. The missing genetic link between fathers and their children appeared to be more 
of an issue for some women than their husbands.  Issues of gender and bonding 
emerged both for heterosexual and lesbian couples.  Some women perceived that the 
lack of a genetic tie negatively affected the bonding process between father and child.  
Non-biological mothers in lesbian relationships raised the issue of the need for 
secondary carers to have time to bond with their child.  For these women, being 
secondary care-givers who did not share in the breastfeeding of the child created an 
unexpected asymmetry between mother and co-mother who, as two women, 
anticipated an equal parenting partnership.  In relation to this asymmetry, one non-
biological mother raised the question of whether the notion of the ‘useless father’ was 
more attributable to being a secondary carer than to gender per se.  This could, 
therefore, explain any bonding difficulties experienced by the father reported above. 
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The issue of asymmetry was invoked in adversarial situations or marital breakup 
when some women felt they had a greater ‘claim’ than their husbands to their 
children. On the other hand, some men responded by attributing negative 
characteristics in the child to the mother’s genetic inheritance.  Others feared that their 
wife might leave, taking the children with her.  This illustrated the uncertainty 
surrounding fatherhood after DI for some men.  While most men thought of their 
child conceived by DI as theirs, and stressed the importance of the social/emotional 
tie, some thought that the relationship they had with their child was qualitatively 
different from the mother’s because of the missing genetic connection.  These issues 
have implications for the quality of not only the father-child relationship but also the 
relationship between parents of children conceived by DI that need to be considered 
in the context of DI treatment. 
 
Detracting from the issue of asymmetry, many grandparents and other extended 
family members highlighted the significance of the social/emotional bond that 
developed between fathers and their children conceived by DI, describing the 
relationship between father and child in superlative terms.  This indicated that the 
strategies used by extended family members to incorporate (or potentially exclude) 
the child into the family or kinship network might have significance for family 
dynamics. Others, who drew on the discourse of the primacy of biological/genetic 
ties, raised concerns about the possible threat to the father if the child showed an 
interest in the donor. 
 
Illustrating concerns about the tenuousness of social fatherhood, some women who 
were separated or divorced had encountered difficulties maintaining a relationship 
between the father and child and where social bonds were not strong, some had 
doubts about the longevity of the relationships.  Uncertainty surrounds not only the 
relationships between children, whose parents are separated or divorced, and their 
social/legal fathers, but also those constructed outside the legal framework through 
self-insemination. Parents who conceive through self-insemination, with the help of a 
known donor, need to engage in on-going negotiations to construct forms of 
parenthood and fatherhood that ideally ‘work’ in the interests of the children thus 
conceived. 
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In sum, this chapter has argued that if one considers relationships both ideologically 
and as enacted, a standard ‘DI family’ does not exist.  Instead, the chapter shows that 
parents, their children and kin all respond differently to sets of issues connected with 
conceiving children with the genetic contribution of sperm donors.  Within these 
diverse families, perceptions of sameness and difference are embedded in social and 
cultural contexts that shift and change over time. Perceptions from the outside, and 
sometimes from the inside, might frame these families as ‘different’ because DI, as a 
method of conception, is relatively unknown and rare, and challenges dominant 
cultural understandings about the biological basis of family formation.  Analysis of 
the interview material indicates, however, that people in these families, as in all 
families, are actively engaged in the processes of continual negotiation and re-
negotiation of intimate relationships in the context of the fluidity and diversity of 
contemporary family life.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART FOUR 
 
Conclusions 
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Chapter Twelve 
Locating DI Experiences 
 
 
Introduction 
This thesis has contextualised the use of donor insemination (DI) in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand.  It has shown that people’s experiences of conceiving a child through DI are 
located within a broad spectrum of discourses, practices and relationships. The 
context for DI experiences, among other things, includes the couple’s relationship, 
their kinship networks, the fertility clinic, the donors and their actual or imagined 
relationships with children, as well as the legislation defining fatherhood. The 
research has also been carried out in a particular socio-political context, where 
children’s ‘right’ to be informed of their biological/genetic origins is a dominant 
public and professional discourse.  Interviews with parents took place at a time when 
most parents are encouraged to tell their children how they were conceived, and when 
donors indicate a willingness to be contacted.  For some parents, however, the current 
socio-political context which advocates ‘openness’, sits in stark contrast to their 
experience at the time at which they conceived, when DI was provided under a cloak 
of secrecy, and they were given little information about their donors in order that they 
remain anonymous.  As this study shows, anonymity in the current climate of 
information-sharing has on-going implications for parents and children who are 
unable to identify donors and remains a highly problematic aspect of the practice of 
DI.   
 
Many of the potential problems regarding the inability to identify donors are not 
addressed in this thesis because I spoke to parents before their children reached 
adolescence, and therefore before many issues of identity come to the fore, and before 
some parents had begun the process of telling.  This context has shaped what was 
discussed in the interviews and the analysis that has been offered. 
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The thesis has made a unique contribution to the field in that it includes interviews not 
only with parents, but also with members of their extended families and the health 
professionals who assisted them in conceiving. The thesis therefore has explored the 
way couples’ experiences of infertility and their use of DI were located in interactions 
with their wider network of kin.  The inclusion of the perspectives of extended family 
members in this study has provided distinctive insights into what it means to be part 
of a particular family.  It highlights that children conceived by DI are not only born to 
their parents, but become part of an extended family network comprising individual 
relatives who themselves define what it means to be part of a family.  This, in turn, 
influences the ways that family members relate to the child, which may or may not be 
determined by the meanings attached to the significance of biogenetic ties.  Interviews 
with grandparents and aunts and uncles of children conceived by DI have drawn 
attention to what it means to belong to a family group and the ways that extended 
family members may include or potentially exclude children conceived by DI. The 
study has shown, that while some wider kin who knew of the DI conception expected 
to experience the child as ‘different’ from other children to whom they had a 
biogenetic connection, for most, the social bonding that occurred between them and 
the child over time defined the child as their relative and part of their extended family 
network.   
 
Couples’ experiences of DI have also been located in their interactions with fertility 
clinics and particular health professionals who adopted different subject positions vis-
à-vis recipients in the clinical context.  Analysis of the clinical context has highlighted 
recipients of donor sperm being located in a particular medical environment where 
their treatment is managed according to particular policies, protocols and quality 
control regimes, and where couples are urged to be ‘open’ with children conceived 
through the DI programme.  In particular, this study has argued that DI can be 
conceptualised as the medicalisation of family building, and that the discursive 
practices of health professionals rework meanings of family and relatedness.  The 
fertility clinic provides the context for the child’s ‘right to know’ their genetic origins. 
The culture of the clinic and what the clinical staff advocate sets up the ways in which 
families and parents define what it means to have a child conceived by DI and how 
they will act.  The fact that clinics recruit only donors who are willing to be identified 
sets up the potential for the identification of donors and possible social relationships 
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between donors and children in the future.  Moreover, the practice of the gifting of 
semen and the role taken up by clinics as intermediaries between families and donors, 
for example in the exchange of gifts or letters, or in the ‘matching’ of donors and 
recipients, clearly demonstrates that clinical strategies that set up relationships 
between parties to the DI conception have a bearing on wider family relationships. 
 
Analysis of interview material also has located families with children conceived by DI 
within a framework of discourses, practices and debates relating to ideas about 
families and kinship in contemporary western societies.  The thesis has demonstrated 
how parents and their kin draw on notions of ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’, and discourses 
about biological and social parenting, to make sense of their experience of having 
children conceived with the help of an initially unknown sperm donor, who 
potentially might become known to them.  The thesis has drawn attention to the many 
ways in which parents rework the biological/social dichotomy and manipulate 
meaning about relatedness.  Parents work their way around biological primordialism 
by emphasising the power of social connection even as they use biological symbolism 
to define relationships that do not have a biogenetic component.  This demonstrates 
that biology is usefully employed by parents of children conceived by DI as a 
metaphor for social relations and not just as a statement of biological ‘fact’ (Barnard, 
1994).   
 
While the themes of biology and social environment interacted in people’s 
interpretations of kinship and family, some participants, particularly the family 
members of infertile males, placed greater emphasis on the importance of biogenetic 
ties.  For some, the lack of a biological connection to the child meant that their 
perceived relationship to the child was qualitatively different from if there had been a 
biological connection.  This presumably has a bearing on how family members will 
relate to the child, particularly when he/she is young and the social bond has not yet 
evolved.  Family members, however, conceptualised the significance of biology 
differently.  For some, the biological connection has strong implications for identity, 
and belonging to a particular family; for others, biology was significant in the context 
of medical or health issues only.  For the latter, the social bonds created between 
loving parents and their children were constantly privileged over the significance over 
biogenetic ties. 
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The perception of families as primarily social units, rather than institutions based on 
purely genetic connections between parents and children was frequently challenged 
by participants in this study.  While some participants expressed concerns that the 
lack of genetic connection led to uncertainty in terms of the quality or tenure of the 
father/child relationship, several parents referred to the diversity of family forms in 
contemporary New Zealand society, where, for example, divorce and reconstituted 
families are common.  In this context, conceiving a child by DI, did not seem so 
unorthodox or ‘different’.  Similarly, lesbian-led families who chose to conceive by 
DI expected that their family form would become normalised as more same-sex 
couples became parents.  This study has shown, however, that a tension exists 
between the liberal discourse about the acceptance of family diversity, and families 
through choice (e.g. lesbian-led families, sole parenting) and conservative discourses 
that support the dominance of the ‘modern’ family, and repudiate the creation of 
‘fatherless’ families.  Such diametrically opposed ideologies of family raise important 
questions about general societal understandings of what ‘family’ means and for the 
formulation of policy and practice in DI. 
 
This thesis has also drawn attention to the different experiences of men and women 
participating in DI programmes. While the initial focus for most couples was the 
problematic, infertile male body, in the clinical context the inability to conceive was 
defined as a ‘couple’ problem.  During treatment the focus shifted from the male body 
to the monitoring and surveillance of the female body.  The thesis has therefore 
identified that constructing parenthood through DI is a gendered experience and that 
men and women respond to the issues as both individual gendered persons, and as 
couples.  This inevitably creates complexity and often tension for couples with male 
factor infertility.  While, in one sense, male infertility can be defined as a technical 
problem, this thesis has shown that it is a social problem for the whole family and 
possibly for others, such as workmates.  The thesis has highlighted that a network of 
people are involved in negotiating DI in some way.  It has therefore been about how 
having or not having sperm is located in complex sets of relations, ideas and 
understandings about the meaning of parenthood and ‘family’ more generally, and 
also in different understandings of biology and fertility. 
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Families and discourses of relatedness 
As a study of networks of relatedness in families with children conceived by DI, this 
thesis has been framed by discussion about changing families, family practices and 
kinship in contemporary western societies.  The study emerges at a time of renewed 
sociological interest in family practices, in contrast with a prior focus on ‘the family’ 
as a static societal institution (Morgan, 1996; Smart and Neale, 1999; Silva and Smart, 
1999).  The new conceptual and theoretical interest in families emphasises human 
interaction, including gendered practices, and parent-child relationships.  It 
emphasises relationships based on particular understandings of sexuality and the 
body.  Fluidity and change in families are recognised and the notion of ‘the family’ as 
a unitary category is disrupted (Weston, 1991; Stacey, 1996; Coontz, 1992, 1999; 
Gittens, 1993; Smart and Neale, 1999; Silva and Smart, 1999).  According to these 
social theorists, families can be created in different ways and, as a result, ‘the family’ 
has come to signify the subjective meaning of intimate connections, rather than 
formal objective ties based purely on biological or marriage ties (Gubrium and 
Holstein, 1990).  Illustrating this argument, this study has explored the way that 
heterosexual couples with male factor infertility and lesbian couples have chosen to 
embark on the project of parenthood and forming families through choice and with 
the use of sperm from a donor. 
 
Just as the sociological focus has shifted from ‘the family’ to families and family 
practices, social anthropological theorising about kinship has changed its focus from 
structure to practice and practice to discourse. Social anthropologists, such as 
Strathern (1992; 1992a; 1995), Franklin (1995, 1997) and Carsten (2000), are 
particularly concerned with issues about ‘nature’, ‘biology’ and the relationship 
between the ‘biological’ and the ‘social’.  These authors destabilise the analytic 
opposition between ‘biological’ and ‘social’ kinship, highlighting that the boundaries 
between these concepts are somewhat blurred.  The destabilisation of the analytical 
opposition between ‘biological’ and ‘social’ kinship is central to the conceptual and 
theoretical basis of this thesis.  Analysis of the talk of parents and their kin about their 
subjective understandings about family connections and relatedness indicated that 
people draw on discourses that both construct and deconstruct the analytic opposition 
between the ‘biological’ and the ‘social’.  This supports Edwards and Strathern’s 
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(2000) contention that a distinguishing feature of twentieth century notions of kinship 
in Euro-American cultures is the division and combination of social and biological 
‘facts’. 
 
The shift in focus in social anthropological theorising about kinship has been 
attributed in part to Schneider’s (1984) critique of the study of kinship and 
Eurocentric assumptions at the heart of anthropological study, and his subsequent 
contention that kin relations should be studied as an empirical question.  In light of 
this recommendation, this thesis has explored the meanings that people in New 
Zealand attach to kinship and family.  Disrupting the notion that biological 
connections between persons formed by procreation are the cornerstone of Euro-
American thinking about kinship, this study has demonstrated that discourses about 
human connectedness exist that draw simultaneously on the power of ‘blood ties’ and 
the power of social connection.  For example, in families with children conceived by 
DI, when talking about the father-child relationship, the nature/culture dichotomy was 
reworked by parents as a strategy for identifying social fathers as the sole fathers of 
their children (see Chapter Three, p.70).  At the same time, relatives connected by 
what are conceptualised as ‘blood ties’ were seen to have a claim on one another and 
to be emotionally connected.  For example, family members and friends expected 
mothers to feel ‘closer’ to the children they had borne themselves, than their adopted 
children (see Chapter Three, p.71). 
 
Biological ties were seen by several people to foster closer social ties.  This was 
particularly apparent in understandings about the process of bonding between parent 
and child.  Some parents and their kin had concerns about the social father bonding 
with a child who was not genetically related to him.  For others, a biological tie 
between the father and child was defined as never an issue, but also less of an issue as 
the social bond became established (see Chapter Three, p.72).  This showed that 
social bonding has to occur between all parents and their children, but the significance 
given to the biological connection means that emotional bonds between people with 
genetic links are assumed and therefore perhaps facilitated by the biological.  While 
some participants’ talk gave primacy to ‘biological ties’, many parents and their kin 
privileged social ties over biological ties.  The parents’ intention to conceive and bear 
a child was perceived by many participants as the decisive factor in determining 
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parenthood.  This suggested that the conception of a child is an expression of the love 
and commitment of two people rather than the desire to perpetuate particular genes 
(see Chapter Three, p.73).  As a result, the social father was usually conceptualised as 
the father of the child in all senses other than having provided the genetic material for 
the child’s conception. 
 
Many parents in this study were themselves already embedded in complex kin 
relations before using DI to conceive children.  Some had been adopted and traced 
their birth parents; others already had adopted children and maintained connections 
with their children’s birth parents.  Most parents recognised that biological ties have 
significance for human affairs, but that the meaning of the biological/genetic 
connection between their children and the donors was as yet unknown.  The meaning 
of biological ties was complex: they were perceived as both significant and yet not 
significant.  For example, Neil, a social father of two daughters conceived by DI, 
spoke about tracing his birth parents for his daughters’ sake, in case they wished to 
trace their genetic father in the future, and also because, after discovering he was 
infertile, he experienced a sense of no genetic connection with the past or the future 
(see Chapter Three, pp.74-75). Biological ties were therefore conceptualised by some 
parents as representing the ‘key’ or a part of the ‘jigsaw puzzle’ of life.  However, the 
parents of children conceived by DI also assumed their emotional tie was to the social 
or rearing parents. 
 
Related to discourses of the ‘biological’ and the ‘social’ were the discourses of 
‘nature’ and ‘nurture’ which emerged as interactive themes in parents’ talk about what 
their children were like as people. Parents talked about the importance of both 
genetics and the environment in determining how their children were, but sometimes 
they privileged one over the other.  Some parents contemplated whether their 
children’s genetic predispositions were realised and reinforced by environmental 
factors, or emphasised the importance of genetics over the environment, or vice versa.  
Other parents suggested that genetic inheritance was not highly significant: the 
relationship that developed between parents and children was most important in 
shaping who they were.   
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Discourses of the ‘biological’ and the ‘social’ were often used simultaneously, 
highlighting the complexities and ambiguities that emerge for many people in families 
with children conceived by DI. One grandmother said that she felt proud of her 
granddaughter who was conceived by DI but, at the same time, she could not feel 
proud for herself because she had nothing to do with who she was genetically (see 
Chapter Three, p.90). Andrew, a father of two daughters conceived by DI also 
articulated this ambiguity when he spoke about his children being his and yet not 
being his (see Chapter Three, pp.91-92).  Other family members raised the issue of 
the need to try to treat children conceived by DI as ‘true’ grandchildren.  In contrast, 
other parents and their kin expressed little interest in biological ties or genealogy, and 
instead stressed the significance of environmental factors, and social ties between 
people (see Chapter Three, pp.95-98).  Alternatively, for some parents and their kin, 
the significance of biological ties lay in the passing on of certain health-related 
predispositions, rather than in personal capacities or visual likeness to others in the 
family (see Chapter Three, p.96).  Discourses of the ‘biological’ and the ‘social’, 
‘nature’ and ‘nurture’, were therefore used both simultaneously and separately by 
parents in this study, sometimes highlighting how biology and social environments 
interact and, at other times, privileging one over the other. 
 
The demonstration of the simultaneous use of discourses of the biological and the 
social in this thesis provides a wealth of empirical evidence that this occurs widely 
within families with children conceived by DI.  This indicates that the concepts of 
biological and social relatedness play a significant role in how people define ‘family’ 
and kinship. In particular, the inclusion of the viewpoints of extended family members 
highlight that even if parents construct a particular meaning around motherhood or 
fatherhood to justify their use of donated gametes in the procreation of their children, 
their extended family members may hold a different, and perhaps conflicting view of 
their relationship to the child.  Analysis of the narratives of parents and their family 
members suggests that strategies that rework meaning about family may be employed 
by other families where all children are not genetically tied to both their parents.  This 
has particular relevance to the study of families in contemporary western societies 
where many are formed through choice, and possibly change form several times in the 
context of divorce and reconstituted families.   
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DI and the project of parenthood 
The thesis has located couples’ experience of DI in the context of embarking on the 
project of parenthood in a particular, deliberative way.  For most parents participating 
in this study, embarking on the project of parenthood was preceded by a ‘journey’ 
involving the discovery of male infertility and the experience of the shock and grief 
often associated with this knowledge.  Many couples spoke of the personal difficulties 
associated with their infertility:  that it was shocking, devastating and isolating. Some 
men spoke of the difficulty of coming to terms with their infertility and the issue of 
the lack of a satisfactory explanation for their infertility and the feeling of loss of 
control over their bodies and life choices.  Drawing on sociological theory of narrative 
identity, the thesis has explored disruptions to people’s narrative identity, and the way 
infertility stimulates ‘replotting’ and the crafting of alternative narrative identities (see 
Chapter Four, p.107).   
 
Analysis of participants’ narratives about their experiences of and reactions to 
infertility illustrated how infertility can be understood as a private trouble (Mills, 
1963) in that parenthood is socially constructed as being important to a person’s sense 
of biological and social completeness.  The thesis has also shown, however, that 
infertility can also be conceptualised as a public issue because the values cherished by 
the public at large are not fulfilled by infertility, and because infertility is not 
uncommon (see Chapter Four, p.113). Estimates of the prevalence of infertility in 
western countries ranges between 10-20% (MCART, 1994:5). In New Zealand, it is 
estimated that infertility affects about 25% of couples at some time in their 
reproductive lives, and 3,500 new referrals are made for infertility services in New 
Zealand each year (Gillett, Peek and Lilford, 1995:9). That infertility is a public issue 
is also demonstrated in by the formation of the National Ethics Committee on 
Assisted Human Reproduction (NECAHR) and the significance of its role in 
determining the kinds of reproductive techniques and arrangements that are 
considered ethically acceptable in this country.  Human Rights legislation and the 
consequences for fertility treatment practices, such as disallowing clinics to 
discriminate against certain types of person, is also an important component of the 
public issue of infertility and fertility treatment.   
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Discussion of issues connected with the politics of access to DI treatment also 
demonstrated that infertility and its treatment is a public issue, not only for married 
couples with male factor infertility, but also for de facto couples, lesbian couples and 
single women (see Chapter Six). The involvement of several participants in Infertility 
Societies as support networks at both the national and local levels was also testimony 
to the fact that experiences of infertility and fertility treatment are not only private 
troubles but also public issues (see Chapter Four, pp.115-116).  Controversies about 
the cost of fertility treatment and the limited availability of state subsidies for those 
who need assistance to conceive also drew attention to the public issues surrounding 
infertility and fertility treatment (see Chapter Six, pp.201-207). 
 
The unquestionable ‘public’ component of infertility and fertility treatment raises 
important questions and issues not just for those involved in accessing or providing 
fertility treatment, but for all people in contemporary western societies. Issues related 
to the formation of families and what is deemed to constitute an acceptable family 
form have wide implications for society as a whole.  The secrecy that often surrounds 
the use of DI has limited public awareness, understanding and therefore acceptance of 
the use of donor sperm in the conception of children. This clearly has had negative 
consequences for those who find themselves in the position where they cannot expect 
to conceive a child without the assistance of a donor.  It therefore seems important for 
the health and well-being of all people that the public become better educated about 
infertility and its implications for families, and are able to engage in debates around 
the use of AHR in contemporary New Zealand society. 
 
This study has shown that for would-be parents with male factor infertility, the 
decision-making processes involved in considering the options for parenthood 
illustrated that choosing to conceive with the help of a sperm donor, was fraught with 
ambivalence and complexity. Analysis of the narratives of parents and their kin 
highlighted the significance attributed to the biological/genetic connection between 
parents and their children (see, for example, Chapter Four, p.138).  As a result of this 
dominant discourse, many parents claimed that having a child ‘naturally’ was their 
first choice and that conceiving a child by DI was their second choice because it 
enabled a biological connection at least with the mother, if not the father, of the child. 
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By contrast, adoption was regarded as a third option if DI treatment was not 
successful (see Chapter Four, pp.122-124). 
 
The project of parenthood embarked upon by parents in this study illustrated that self-
identity is deliberative in high modernity (Shilling, 1993).  The process of 
determining the ‘best’ method of becoming parents drew attention to the complexities 
and paradoxes associated with making this decision which were embedded in wider 
sets of relations.  For example, many couples had rejected adoption as a means of 
becoming parents for a variety of reasons, including the difficulty of adopting in New 
Zealand, and the complexity of the social relationships entailed in open adoption.  
Some parents spoke about the possible harmful psychological consequences to a child 
of being relinquished by his/her birth parents.  Others suggested that adopting an 
“unwanted” baby carried greater risks than conceiving a child under the auspices of 
medical science.  While most parents claimed that a child conceived by DI would be 
more theirs than an adopted child, some relatives of infertile males expressed 
concerns about the potentially unfair ‘bonding advantage’ that the mother might have 
with a child conceived by DI, and therefore preferred the strategy of adoption (see 
Chapter Four, pp.125-127). 
 
The thesis illustrated that decisions about alternative means of achieving parenthood 
are embedded in the social and cultural meanings attached to gametes and kin 
relations.  For many couples included in this study, ICSI, a reproductive technology 
that enables men with very low sperm counts to become biological fathers, was not an 
option, at least when they conceived their first child. While most couples’ first choice 
was to conceive a child biologically related to them both, after having conceived a 
child by DI, deciding whether or not to conceive by ICSI became a more complex 
task (see Chapter Four, pp.129-132).  This was because it became important to 
consider the position of the child conceived by DI in relation to a possible sibling who 
was biologically related to both parents.  Some parents wondered whether the ‘full’ 
biological child would be construed by others as what the parents ‘really’ wanted 
when, for them, the significance of the biological tie diminished after the development 
of a relationship with a child conceived by DI.   
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As a way of enhancing the biological connection between the social father and child, 
some couples had considered asking the infertile male’s brother to become their 
sperm donor (see Chapter Four, pp.134-137).  This prospect, however, raised a 
number of social issues and impediments related to cultural notions about people’s 
potential sense of ‘ownership’ of children conceived using their sperm.  Issues related 
to the difficulty of separating the concepts of ‘father’ and ‘sperm donor’ and, while 
not explicitly stated, the possible implications of an extra-marital relationship between 
the woman and her brother-in-law, were impediments to using brothers as sperm 
donors.  This supports Haimes’ (1993a) contention that gametes are charged with 
meaning and that social distance from an anonymous sperm donor was important for 
many couples using DI to conceive children.   
 
Further illustrating the way that sperm are charged with social and cultural meaning, 
the thesis has drawn attention to the variety of ways in which sperm donors are 
conceptualised and the language used when referring to them.  One social father 
referred to the donor as his children’s “dad” (see Chapter Ten, p.358).  Other parents 
used distancing language, such as “this person” or “this man” (see Chapter Ten, 
pp.363, 380, 383).  Another father drew on adoption terminology and the discourse of 
the natural, referring to their donors as “birth fathers” or “natural fathers” (see 
Chapter Ten, pp.364-365). A mother referred to their donor as their son’s “other 
parent”, and assumed that the genetic connection might lead to an interest in a 
meeting between the genetic father and their son at some future date (Chapter Ten, 
pp.368-369).  Women who were no longer married to their children’s social father 
were more likely to refer to donors as their child’s “father” (see Chapter Ten, pp.387-
388), and to be positive about a social tie between the donor and their child in the 
future. This suggested that when the social tie is broken or diminished the biological 
assumes a more important role. 
 
Issues relating to the language used to describe donors relates to Snowden, Mitchell 
and Snowden’s (1983) “suggested nomenclature” which attempts to clarify the 
reproductive/parental roles of the parties involved in an assisted conception (see 
Chapter One, p.29).  This study indicates that while many refer to the sperm donor, as 
“the donor”, many use language that positions donors as ‘fathers’ which contradicts 
general taken-for-granted assumptions that people have only one mother or one father.  
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This highlights the difficulty in our culture of separating genetic connection from 
parental ties, and perhaps points to the need to introduce language into general usage 
that clearly differentiates the parental and gamete donor roles.   
 
As further evidence that gametes are charged with social and cultural meaning, some 
social fathers were concerned about how they would react to having a child not 
genetically related to them (but to another man).  Some couples stressed the need to 
come to terms with their infertility and their grief about the child they would never 
have together, before deciding to conceive by DI.  A few women indicated that they 
had reservations about conceiving with another man’s sperm: some were initially 
“revolted” by the idea, or perceived it as tantamount to “cheating” on their husbands 
(See Chapter Four, p.141). By contrast, others viewed DI as simply a means to an end.  
Some narratives about DI as a choice for conception drew on liberal discourses about 
the positive aspects of sharing gametes across families, while others referred to the 
Catholic Church’s opposition to the intrusion of the third party into the sacred domain 
of marriage and human reproduction.  For almost all couples, while DI was not 
perhaps the ‘ideal’ option, it was the best option in the circumstances and, despite 
some reservations about choosing to conceive by DI, the couples who participated in 
this research embarked on the project of parenthood as informed social actors and 
decision-makers. 
 
The clinical context 
This thesis has also located the experience of DI in the context of the fertility clinic. It 
has highlighted the uniqueness of New Zealand as a small country with few fertility 
clinics, which together have adopted a policy that encourages information-sharing in 
DI.  The study examined the discursive and relational strategies employed by two 
New Zealand DI programmes when establishing relationships between the parties to a 
DI conception, the processes involved in accessing DI treatment and recipients’ 
negotiation of clinical worlds. The clinic is a context for the experience of becoming a 
‘DI parent’.  While clinics exhibit some similarities in the organisation and operation 
of their DI programmes, variety between clinics also is evident. In this respect, ‘the’ 
fertility clinic carries out certain activities including gatekeeping, surveillance and 
quality control, that are required by RTAC, the accrediting body, but ‘a’ fertility clinic 
performs these activities in a particular way.  For example, one clinic may actively 
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promote information-sharing, while the other may discuss with couples the 
advantages and disadvantages of ‘openness’.  This raises questions about the practice 
of DI in New Zealand and the extent to which clinical practices should be regulated at 
the local or the national level.  Some aspects of treatment protocols, such as the 
establishment of a donor register, are likely to be regulated at the national level 
through the implementation of future AHR legislation. 
 
Interviews with health professionals demonstrated that relationships between the 
actors in the DI network are arranged around the principle of anonymity.  This was 
complicated by the current policy of most DI programmes in New Zealand to recruit 
only donors who are prepared to be identified to DI offspring in the future.  Central to 
the analysis of the establishment of relationships in the DI network were issues of 
trust, control, choice and rights.  Participants indicated that trust was central to the 
medical encounter: health professionals had to trust that donors were telling them the 
truth about their lives, and recipients trusted health professionals to adequately screen 
and select donors for them (see Chapter Five, pp.154, 160).  Issues of control, choice 
and rights were closely related and emerged in the context of donors’ rights to choose 
who can have access to their sperm, and recipients’ ability to choose a donor from a 
selection of donor profiles.   
 
That DI offspring should have the right to find out identifying information about 
donors, should they wish to in the future, was a dominant discourse in the clinical 
context.  This dominant discourse, it is argued, while not always adopted by parents, 
has a bearing on parents’ actions with regard to who they tell about the donor 
conception, particularly in relation to telling their child.  In the interests of 
maintaining participant anonymity, the study does not specifically identify which 
clinic each couple attended.  It appeared, however, that those who had attended a 
clinic that was directive in their advocacy of information-sharing and gave specific 
information about the sharing of age-relevant information were more likely to tell 
their child at a young age.  This illustrates the way in which the clinical culture sets 
the context for the child’s ‘right to know’ their genetic origins.  It also attests to the 
need for clinics to provide information that enables parents to develop the skills 
needed to pass on information that meets the child’s current level of comprehension.  
The study also points to the need to help parents construct ‘telling’ as an on-going 
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conversation, rather than a single event which can be perceived as a major obstacle to 
confront at a particular time in their lives. 
 
In the context of fertility treatment, the thesis has demonstrated that choices and rights 
were constrained by those who had the power to define them. Health professionals 
had the power to choose the donors that are accepted onto the DI programme, and this 
in turn constrained recipients’ choice of donor.  ‘Choice’ was a discursive strategy 
employed by DI programmes partly to shift responsibility to the recipient couple for 
the selection of a genetic parent for their child.  The process of ‘targeting’ particular 
categories of recipient was monitored and controlled by medical professionals who 
themselves had particular views on who were most ‘deserving’ of becoming parents 
(see Chapter Five, pp.163-165). In the case of one clinic in particular, health 
professionals and the donors they recruited clearly preferred to reproduce the 
traditional nuclear family and, as a result, sperm available to single women and 
lesbian couples was severely restricted. Some health professionals drew attention to 
the fact that children’s ‘right’ to identify donors was tenuous because the ability to 
access identifying information about donors is not written into law, and donors could 
not be held accountable for their decision to be willing to be contacted by DI 
offspring in the future (see Chapter Five, p.162).  This situation illustrated the tension 
that exists between competing rights discourses in the context of information-sharing 
about DI.   
 
Attention to the talk of both parents and health professionals illustrated the prevalence 
of gatekeeping and surveillance in the processes of determining the suitability of 
prospective recipients for parenthood through DI.  For most couples, the route to 
gaining access to DI treatment began with infertility diagnosis and referral to a 
fertility clinic.  Several couples reported negative encounters with insensitive medical 
professionals before accessing treatment.  These professionals were primarily 
concerned with ‘treating’ bodies and illness, and not with the social or psychological 
implications of their diagnoses (see Chapter Six, pp.189-190).  Couples’ varying 
experiences of accessing DI treatment illustrated the diverse processes by which 
identities are constituted and negotiated in particular settings. While DI programmes 
were traditionally set up to ‘treat’ male factor infertility in heterosexual couples, since 
the passing of the Human Rights Act 1993, clinics are no longer able to discriminate 
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against categories of people (such as lesbians, or single women) who seek to conceive 
using their services.  Clinics, however, are legally able to exclude individuals who are 
not deemed to meet certain criteria that would indicate they were suitable for 
parenthood, particularly in light of considerations about the welfare of the potential 
child (see Chapter Six, pp.207-208).   
 
The thesis has shown that once couples had gained access to DI treatment, they had to 
negotiate the shifting and changing identities of ‘client’, ‘patient’ and ‘would-be 
parent’ with clinical staff who adopt different roles and subject positions within the 
clinical setting.  The negotiation of clinical worlds for DI recipients was multifaceted. 
All couples had to conform to clinical protocols which involved women’s bodies 
being subjected to monitoring, surveillance and the clinical gaze, and the modification 
of treatment regimes with the objective of achieving a normal pregnancy within a 
statistically-determined timeframe (see Chapter Seven, pp.230-232). Couples began 
their experience of treatment by meeting with the clinical director who provided them 
with information about the organisation of the DI programme, treatment options and 
success rates.  As well as meeting with the clinical director, recipients met with nurses 
who provided information about monitoring menstrual cycles and oversaw the 
inseminations. Clinical directors interviewed for this research indicated that recipients 
were generally required to attend one counselling session before beginning treatment.  
 
This study supports the contention that the role of counselling in fertility treatment 
programmes is somewhat ambiguous because it involves elements of information 
giving, assessment, support and therapy (Daniels, 1993). Some health professionals 
reported resistance to counselling from some couples, particularly if they viewed the 
role as one of assessment or as a therapeutic injunction.   Several couples participating 
in this study claimed that they did not see a counsellor while undergoing DI treatment.  
Some reported that nurses or doctors appeared to carry out an assessment and 
information-giving role (see Chapter Seven, pp.238-239).  The counsellors I 
interviewed claimed that they usually saw couples more than once only if they had 
problems conceiving or were stressed by the treatment process.   
 
Inconsistencies in whether or not couples attended counselling sessions and the 
implications for some who perhaps could have benefited from seeing a counsellor 
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raise issues for policy and practice in DI programmes.  Some of the issues discussed 
by parents in the study raised questions about the possible need for on-going clinic 
support in relation to the psychosocial issues related to conceiving by DI.  For 
example, comments made by some men indicated that they felt marginalised during 
the treatment process and this carried over into the ambivalence many experienced 
during the pregnancy and after the birth of the child (see Chapter Seven, pp.257-259).  
Interviews with couples indicated that, while men and women were together in 
confronting infertility and deciding to conceive by DI, they were also differentiated. 
This has important implications for the study of gender, and understandings about 
differing responses to infertility and embodied experiences of fertility treatment, 
which are highly pertinent to clinical practice in this area.   
 
While infertility was constructed as a ‘couple problem’, men’s and women’s 
embodied experiences of infertility and treatment were quite different.  The medical 
problem was diagnosed in the male, the women’s body was the object of treatment, 
and she became the biological and the social mother of the child conceived by DI.  In 
contrast, the infertile male’s body was not ‘treated’ as such, although interviews with 
counsellors indicated that issues relating to men’s response to their infertility are 
discussed in the context of counselling (see Chapter Seven, pp.240-241).  Ultimately, 
however, the men participating in this study were constructed as medically infertile, 
and through the processes of giving informed consent and, possibly participating in 
the insemination process, they became legal and social fathers, but unlike their 
wives/partners they can not claim to be biological parents of their children.  This 
highlights the asymmetry between parents of children conceived by DI that can 
potentially be a source of tension or division within families. 
 
Analysis of interviews with parents and health professionals demonstrated that after 
conceiving, couples’ pregnancies were constructed as ‘normal’ events to be monitored 
by other maternity caregivers.  As a result, the relationship between the clinic and the 
couple formally ended, except in problematic or complicated cases.  Nurses and 
counsellors maintained a caring role for couples who required follow-up and visited 
mothers and their babies after the birth to help celebrate their mutual success.  This 
exemplified the gendered division of labour in the clinical context.  Women generally 
provided care and emotional or practical support for clients in the roles of nurse or 
 434
counsellor, and men, as doctors and clinical directors, were more instrumental and 
outcome-focused in their approach. Having negotiated the clinical worlds of fertility 
clinics, and conceived by DI recipients then had to face alone the ambivalences, 
challenges and uncertainties associated with conceiving a child with the help of an 
unknown, but potentially knowable, sperm donor.   
 
Negotiating relationships after DI conception 
The thesis has demonstrated that discourses about secrecy and disclosure and telling 
the child about their means of conception are highly significant aspects of 
contextualising the use and experience of DI. In recent years, the secrecy that has 
traditionally surrounded the practice of DI has been subjected to increasing criticism, 
particularly by psychologists, counsellors and social workers (Snowden, Mitchell and 
Snowden, 1983; Baran and Pannor, 1989; Daniels and Taylor, 1993a; Landau, 1998; 
Blyth, 1998, 1999). As discussed by these authors and demonstrated in this thesis, 
secrecy has been used variously as a tool to protect the parties to a DI conception, 
including the infertile male and the child, the donor and his family.  The medical 
profession has also benefited from the secrecy surrounding DI in that it has protected 
doctors from public scrutiny and criticism.  Secrecy has also served to protect the 
ideal of ‘the family’ (Haimes, 1990, 1993b).  Critics of secrecy in DI have argued, 
however, that it is harmful for family relationships and denies those who were 
conceived by DI knowledge of their genetic origins which might have some 
significance for them (Daniels, 1995). 
 
Analysis of the debates about secrecy and disclosure in the context of DI have drawn 
attention to the strong arguments for ‘openness’, or information-sharing between the 
parties to a DI conception in New Zealand, asserted on the basis that secrecy cannot 
be justified legally or culturally (MCART, 1994:71-92).  The thesis has shown that 
fertility clinics state that children have a ‘right’ to know about their genetic origins, 
and therefore pressure is brought to bear on parents to be ‘open’ with family and 
friends and to tell their children how they were conceived.  Chapters Eight and Nine 
focused on the complex issues of secrecy and disclosure and telling the child.  
Analysis of parents’ talk about their patterns of secrecy and disclosure in relation to 
DI demonstrated that telling and keeping secrets is embedded in sets of social 
relations that shift and change over time. Negotiating what and when to tell was 
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shown to occur in the context of discourses about the family, the meaning of 
biological ties, children’s rights, the stigmatisation of the ‘different’, and in 
relationships with clinics and donors.  Decisions about whether and who to tell were 
shown to be decisions about who had the power to control the flow of information 
(Bok, 1984). It appeared that women were more likely to disclose information about 
their DI conception than infertile men, which raises questions about the gendered 
aspects of secrecy and disclosure.  Difficulties arose for some couples when there was 
a tension between the perceived need for secrecy and the desire to tell. Social fathers 
who wanted to keep DI a secret appeared to do so out of a fear of social retribution, as 
a means of self-protection and to protect their children from the perceived stigma of 
being conceived using donor sperm.  For the wives of these secretive men, however, 
the perceived need to keep DI a secret was oppressive, a source of distress, and a 
barrier to intimacy with others (see Chapter Eight, pp.280-282; 274-276).  This 
suggests that attitudes towards secrecy and disclosure might be usefully explored in 
the context of counselling sessions in connection with DI treatment. 
 
For most couples, the issue of non-disclosure was not so much to do with secrecy as it 
was about privacy and confidentiality.  Many couples felt that having a child 
conceived by DI was their personal business and they did not wish to have to defend 
their decision to have a child in this way.  Some parents did not disclose to others 
about the DI until they themselves felt comfortable with the situation.  This illustrated 
secrecy as an adaptive process (see Chapter Eight, pp.296-301).  It also showed that 
secrecy was part of the constant process of self-production. Stories people told about 
themselves, their actions and experiences, illustrated that being a parent involves 
being in the process of constructing selves from a selection of alternatives. Attention 
to parents’ narratives demonstrated that disclosing private information to others was 
connected to issues of trust and intimacy.  For those who had not disclosed to some 
family members or friends, deciding not to tell resulted in it becoming more difficult 
to tell over time because the failure to tell earlier raised questions about levels of trust 
and intimacy.  Parents indicated that they did not tell those with whom they did not 
have a close on-going relationship.  They also did not talk about it if those to whom 
they were disclosing opposed the use of DI. 
 
 436
Goffman’s work on impression management and the management of stigma (1963) 
was shown to be highly relevant to the way that parents with children conceived by 
DI present themselves and their relationship to their children.  Managing the 
impressions they give others, couples are strategic actors in the on-going process of 
crafting selves in diverse settings.  While many had disclosed to family members and 
close friends, they chose not to do so in certain public settings, such as within 
antenatal groups and in the workplace (see Chapter Eight, pp.290-293).  This 
indicated that information about identity in one situation can interfere with the 
maintenance of identity in another.  Some women claimed that they would not tell 
those who might react in a judgemental way, or who would be made to feel 
uncomfortable by the disclosure (see Chapter Eight, pp.292-293).  As another means 
of impression management, some couples chose to tell some of the story by implying 
that they had had IVF treatment, a more familiar and socially acceptable means of 
assisted conception (see Chapter Eight, pp.294-295).  This also served to protect the 
male from the stigma of male infertility and reinforced the ideal of the traditional 
nuclear family. 
 
Parents were interviewed for this research at a particular point in time in the history of 
DI, but also at a particular point in their career as parents.  As strategic actors, couples 
operated with available discourses in diverse contexts, illustrating variety with respect 
to the strategies pursued and the subject positions that were taken up.  Most couples 
operated with the discourse of the child’s ‘right’ to know their genetic origins, but 
they took up a variety of subject positions in relation to when and how to tell their 
child.  Like other research in the area of disclosure to children, this research indicates 
that disclosure is part of an on-going conversation and not a single event (Rumball 
and Adair, 1999; Hajal and Rosenberg, 1991).  Some parents told their children from 
the beginning, drawing on the adoption discourse of the need for the child to think 
that their origins were “always known” (see Chapter Nine, pp. 326, 331-333) Other 
parents were waiting until what they perceived to be the ‘right time’ to tell, or when 
their child might understand the abstract concepts of biological and social relatedness 
(see Chapter Nine, pp.340-342).  Yet others operated within the frame that the child 
would eventually know his/her origins, but had no specific plans to tell. 
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Parents participating in this study, who had told their children about their origins, 
crafted new discourses using the resources of the old.  For example, they developed 
new scripts for telling based on traditional story-telling models, such as fairytales (see 
Chapter Nine, pp.332-335). The thesis has shown that parents who tell operate with a 
variety of competing or inconsistent discourses.  These include:  the harm caused by 
family secrets, and individuals finding out accidentally about their birth origins; the 
rights of the child to know their genetic heritage, and the possible significance of this 
knowledge for the development of a person’s identity; the possible ‘risks’ of crossing 
the biological-social divide; and the potential disruption or disappointment incurred 
by seeking one’s birth parents.  These parents are not victims of their circumstances, 
but actively construct themselves as negotiators of their social worlds.  As strategic 
actors, they manage the tension that arises between the competing discourses of the 
need for privacy, and the need for openness and honesty, particularly with significant 
others, to ensure the development of healthy, trusting, intimate relationships.  
 
The parents of children conceived by DI who were interviewed for this study are 
living at a time of transition from the dominant discourses of secrecy and anonymity 
to discourses about the rights of children to know about their origins (and, for a few, 
the rights of donors to identify their DI offspring). As already discussed, the transition 
from a culture of secrecy to a culture of information-sharing in DI programmes has  
particular implications for families who were conceived under a regime of secrecy, 
but now confront the issue of the child’s ‘right to know’ when this is not possible 
because donors did not agree to being identified at any time.  The children of the 
parents interviewed for this research had not yet reached adolescence, a time when 
issues of identity become more prominent and when some of the parents planned to 
talk to them about their conception.  These children will soon be reaching the age 
when many individuals who have been told about their conception might wish to 
discover more about their genetic fathers, or to make contact with them.   
 
Over the past decade in New Zealand, fertility clinics have been recruiting donors 
who are willing to be identified in the future by DI offspring.  It remains unknown 
whether many of these children/individuals will be interested in their genetic fathers 
and whether it will be possible for them to find the man who donated sperm for their 
conception.  This aspect of the experience of DI for families presents an interesting 
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and challenging next stage in the study of the implications for all those involved in the 
use of DI:  the couples, the children, the kinship networks, the clinics and health 
professionals, the donors and their families, and others who inhabit these intersecting 
networks of social relations. 
 
Finally, this study has contributed to the sociological study of families in the context 
of the diversity, change and flux that marks contemporary western family life.  While 
families with children conceived by DI can be perceived as ‘different’ in that children 
were conceived with the contribution of donor gametes, at another level, these 
families are merely one ‘type’ amongst many others.  Like all families, these families 
engage in day-to-day practices that involve the negotiation and re-negotiation of 
familial and kin relationships.  Unlike other families, these families respond to a set of 
issues related to the contribution of an unknown donor in the conception of their 
child.  This study has shown that each family responds differently to these issues, 
illustrating that ‘DI families’ are not a unitary category. At the same time, a study of a 
particular ‘type’ of family and the issues associated with creating a family by DI has 
brought into stark relief the importance of acknowledging, understanding and 
addressing at all levels the issues that help people make sense of what it means to be 
part of a particular family.  
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